369 lines
14 KiB
HTML
369 lines
14 KiB
HTML
<!doctype html public "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"
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<title>Postfix SMTP relay and access control </title>
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<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii">
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<h1><img src="postfix-logo.jpg" width="203" height="98" ALT="">Postfix
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SMTP relay and access control </h1>
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<hr>
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<h2> Introduction </h2>
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<p> The Postfix SMTP server receives mail from the network and is
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exposed to the big bad world of junk email and viruses. This document
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introduces the built-in and external methods that control what SMTP
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mail Postfix will accept, what mistakes to avoid, and how to test
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your configuration. </p>
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<p> Topics covered in this document: </p>
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<ul>
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<li> <a href="#relay"> Relay control, junk mail control, and per-user
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policies </a>
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<li> <a href="#global"> Restrictions that apply to all SMTP mail
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</a>
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<li> <a href="#lists"> Getting selective with SMTP access restriction
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lists </a>
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<li> <a href="#timing"> Delayed evaluation of SMTP access restriction lists </a>
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<li> <a href="#danger"> Dangerous use of smtpd_recipient_restrictions
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</a>
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<li> <a href="#testing"> SMTP access rule testing </a>
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</ul>
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<h2> <a name="relay"> Relay control, junk mail control, and per-user
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policies </a> </h2>
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<p> In a distant past, the Internet was a friendly environment.
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Mail servers happily forwarded mail on behalf of anyone towards
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any destination. On today's Internet, spammers abuse servers that
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forward mail from arbitrary systems, and abused systems end up on
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anti-spammer blacklists. See, for example, the information on
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http://www.mail-abuse.org/ and other websites. </p>
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<p> By default, Postfix has a moderately restrictive approach to
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mail relaying. Postfix forwards mail only from clients in trusted
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networks, or to domains that are configured as authorized relay
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destinations. For a description of the default policy, see the
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smtpd_recipient_restrictions parameter in the postconf(5) manual
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page, and the information that is referenced from there. </p>
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<p> Most of the Postfix SMTP server access controls are targeted
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at stopping junk email. </p>
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<ul>
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<li> <p> Protocol oriented: some SMTP server access controls block
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mail by being very strict with respect to the SMTP protocol; these
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catch poorly implemented and/or poorly configured junk email
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software, as well as email worms that come with their own non-standard
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SMTP client implementations. Protocol-oriented access controls
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become less useful over time as spammers and worm writers learn to
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read RFC documents. </p>
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<li> <p> Blacklist oriented: some SMTP server access controls
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query blacklists with known to be bad sites such as open mail
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relays, open web proxies, and home computers that have been
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compromised and that are under remote control by criminals. The
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effectiveness of these blacklists depends on how complete and how
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up to date they are. </p>
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<li> <p> Threshold oriented: some SMTP server access controls attempt
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to raise the bar by either making the client do more work (greylisting)
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or by asking for a second opinion (SPF and sender/recipient address
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verification). The greylisting and SPF policies are implemented
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externally, and are the subject of the SMTPD_POLICY_README document.
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Sender/recipient address verification is the subject of the
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ADDRESS_VERIFICATION_README document. </p>
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</ul>
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<p> Unfortunately, all junk mail controls have the possibility of
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falsely rejecting legitimate mail. This can be a problem for sites
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with many different types of users. For some users it is unacceptable
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when any junk email slips through, while for other users the world
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comes to an end when a single legitimate email message is blocked.
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Because there is no single policy that is "right" for all users,
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Postfix supports different SMTP access restrictions for different
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users. This is described in the RESTRICTION_CLASS_README document.
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</p>
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<h2> <a name="global"> Restrictions that apply to all SMTP mail </a> </h2>
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<p> Besides the restrictions that can be made configurable per
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client or per user as described in the next section, Postfix
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implements a few restrictions that apply to all SMTP mail. </p>
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<ul>
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<li> <p> The built-in header_checks and body_checks content
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restrictions, as described in the BUILTIN_FILTER_README document.
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This happens while Postfix receives mail, before it is stored in
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the incoming queue. </p>
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<li> <p> The external before-queue content restrictions, as described
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in the SMTPD_PROXY_README document. This happens while Postfix
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receives mail, before it is stored in the incoming queue. </p>
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<li> <p> Requiring that the client sends the HELO or EHLO command
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before sending the MAIL FROM or ETRN command. This may cause problems
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with home-grown applications that send mail. For this reason, the
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requirement is disabled by default ("smtpd_helo_required = no").
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</p>
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<li> <p> Disallowing illegal syntax in MAIL FROM or RCPT TO commands.
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This may cause problems with home-grown applications that send
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mail, and with ancient PC mail clients. For this reason, the
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requirement is disabled by default ("strict_rfc821_envelopes =
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no"). </p>
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<ul>
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<li> <p> Disallowing RFC 822 address syntax (example: "MAIL FROM: the
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dude <dude@example.com>"). </p>
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<li> <p> Disallowing addresses that are not enclosed with <>
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(example: "MAIL FROM: dude@example.com"). </p>
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</ul>
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<li> <p> Rejecting mail from a non-existent sender address. This form
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of egress filtering helps to slow down worms and other malware, but
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may cause problems with home-grown software that sends out mail
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software with an unreplyable address. For this reason the requirement
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is disabled by default ("smtpd_reject_unlisted_sender = no"). </p>
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<li> <p> Rejecting mail for a non-existent recipient address. This
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form of ingress filtering helps to keep the mail queue free of
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undeliverable MAILER-DAEMON messages. This requirement is enabled
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by default ("smtpd_reject_unlisted_recipient = yes"). </p>
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</ul>
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<h2> <a name="lists"> Getting selective with SMTP access restriction
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lists </a> </h2>
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<p> Postfix allows you to specify lists of access restrictions for
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each stage of the SMTP conversation. Individual restrictions are
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described in the postconf(5) manual page. </p>
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<p> Examples of simple restriction lists are: </p>
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<pre>
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/etc/postfix/main.cf:
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# Allow connections from trusted networks only.
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smtpd_client_restrictions = permit_mynetworks, reject
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# Don't talk to mail systems that don't know their own hostname.
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# With Postfix < 2.3, specify reject_unknown_hostname.
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smtpd_helo_restrictions = reject_unknown_helo_hostname
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# Don't accept mail from domains that don't exist.
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smtpd_sender_restrictions = reject_unknown_sender_domain
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# Whitelisting: local clients may specify any destination. Others may not.
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smtpd_recipient_restrictions = permit_mynetworks, reject_unauth_destination
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# Block clients that speak too early.
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smtpd_data_restrictions = reject_unauth_pipelining
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# Enforce mail volume quota via policy service callouts.
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smtpd_end_of_data_restrictions = check_policy_service unix:private/policy
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</pre>
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<p> Each restriction list is evaluated from left to right until
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some restriction produces a result of PERMIT, REJECT or DEFER (try
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again later). The end of the list is equivalent to a PERMIT result.
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By placing a PERMIT restriction before a REJECT restriction you
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can make exceptions for specific clients or users. This is called
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whitelisting; the last example above allows mail from local networks
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but otherwise rejects mail to arbitrary destinations. </p>
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<p> The table below summarizes the purpose of each SMTP access
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restriction list. All lists use the exact same syntax; they differ
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only in the time of evaluation and in the effect of a REJECT or
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DEFER result. </p>
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<blockquote>
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<table border="1">
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<tr> <th> Restriction list name </th> <th> Status </th> <th> Effect
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of REJECT or DEFER result </th> </tr>
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<tr> <td> smtpd_client_restrictions </td> <td> Optional </td> <td>
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Reject all client commands </td> </tr>
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<tr> <td> smtpd_helo_restrictions </td> <td> Optional </td> <td>
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Reject HELO/EHLO information </td> </tr>
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<tr> <td> smtpd_sender_restrictions </td> <td> Optional </td> <td>
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Reject MAIL FROM information </td> </tr>
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<tr> <td> smtpd_recipient_restrictions </td> <td> Required </td>
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<td> Reject RCPT TO information </td> </tr>
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<tr> <td> smtpd_data_restrictions </td> <td> Optional </td> <td>
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Reject DATA command </td> </tr>
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<tr> <td> smtpd_end_of_data_restrictions </td> <td> Optional </td> <td>
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Reject END-OF-DATA command </td> </tr>
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<tr> <td> smtpd_etrn_restrictions </td> <td> Optional </td> <td>
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Reject ETRN command </td> </tr>
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</table>
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</blockquote>
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<h2> <a name="timing"> Delayed evaluation of SMTP access restriction lists
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</a> </h2>
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<p> Early Postfix versions evaluated SMTP access restrictions lists
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as early as possible. The client restriction list was evaluated
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before Postfix sent the "220 $myhostname..." greeting banner to
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the SMTP client, the helo restriction list was evaluated before
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Postfix replied to the HELO (EHLO) command, the sender restriction
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list was evaluated before Postfix replied to the MAIL FROM command,
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and so on. This approach turned out to be difficult to use. </p>
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<p> Current Postfix versions postpone the evaluation of client,
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helo and sender restriction lists until the RCPT TO or ETRN command.
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This behavior is controlled by the smtpd_delay_reject parameter.
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Restriction lists are still evaluated in the proper order of (client,
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helo, etrn) or (client, helo, sender, recipient, data, or end-of-data)
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restrictions.
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When a restriction list (example: client) evaluates to REJECT or
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DEFER the other restriction lists (example: helo, sender, etc.)
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are skipped. </p>
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<p> Around the time that smtpd_delay_reject was introduced, Postfix
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was also changed to support mixed restriction lists that combine
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information about the client, helo, sender and recipient or etrn
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command. </p>
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<p> Benefits of delayed restriction evaluation, and of restriction
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mixing: </p>
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<ul>
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<li> <p> Some SMTP clients do not expect a negative reply early in
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the SMTP session. When the bad news is postponed until the RCPT TO
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reply, the client goes away as it is supposed to, instead of hanging
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around until a timeout happens, or worse, going into an endless
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connect-reject-connect loop. </p>
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<li> <p> Postfix can log more useful information. For example, when
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Postfix rejects a client name or address and delays the action
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until the RCPT TO command, it can log the sender and the recipient
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address. This is more useful than logging only the client hostname
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and IP address and not knowing whose mail was being blocked. </p>
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<li> <p> Mixing is needed for complex whitelisting policies. For
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example, in order to reject local sender addresses in mail from
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non-local clients, you need to be able to mix restrictions on client
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information with restrictions on sender information in the same
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restriction list. Without this ability, many per-user access
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restrictions would be impossible to express. </p>
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</ul>
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<h2> <a name="danger"> Dangerous use of smtpd_recipient_restrictions </a> </h2>
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<p> By now the reader may wonder why we need smtpd client, helo
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or sender restrictions, when their evaluation is postponed until
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the RCPT TO or ETRN command. Some people recommend placing ALL the
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access restrictions in the smtpd_recipient_restrictions list.
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Unfortunately, this can result in too permissive access. How is
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this possible? </p>
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<p> The purpose of the smtpd_recipient_restrictions feature is to
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control how Postfix replies to the RCPT TO command. If the restriction
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list evaluates to REJECT or DEFER, the recipient address is rejected;
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no surprises here. If the result is PERMIT, then the recipient
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address is accepted. And this is where surprises can happen. </p>
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<p> Here is an example that shows when a PERMIT result can result
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in too much access permission: </p>
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<pre>
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1 /etc/postfix/main.cf:
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2 smtpd_recipient_restrictions =
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3 permit_mynetworks
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4 check_helo_access hash:/etc/postfix/helo_access
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5 reject_unknown_helo_hostname
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6 reject_unauth_destination
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7
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8 /etc/postfix/helo_access:
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9 localhost.localdomain PERMIT
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</pre>
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<p> Line 5 rejects mail from hosts that don't specify a proper
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hostname in the HELO command (with Postfix < 2.3, specify
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reject_unknown_hostname). Lines 4 and 9 make an exception to
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allow mail from some machine that announces itself with "HELO
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localhost.localdomain". </p>
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<p> The problem with this configuration is that
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smtpd_recipient_restrictions evaluates to PERMIT for EVERY host
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that announces itself as "localhost.localdomain", making Postfix
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an open relay for all such hosts. </p>
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<p> In order to avoid surprises like these with
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smtpd_recipient_restrictions, you should place non-recipient
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restrictions AFTER the reject_unauth_destination restriction, not
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before. In the above example, the HELO based restrictions should
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be placed AFTER reject_unauth_destination, or better, the HELO
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based restrictions should be placed under smtpd_helo_restrictions
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where they can do no harm. </p>
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<h2> <a name="testing"> SMTP access rule testing </a> </h2>
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<p> Postfix has several features that aid in SMTP access rule
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testing: </p>
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<dl>
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<dt> soft_bounce </dt> <dd> <p> This is a safety net that changes
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SMTP server REJECT actions into DEFER (try again later) actions.
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This keeps mail queued that would otherwise be returned to the
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sender. Specify "soft_bounce = yes" in the main.cf file to prevent
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the Postfix SMTP server from rejecting mail permanently, by changing
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all 5xx SMTP reply codes into 4xx. </p> </dd>
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<dt> warn_if_reject </dt> <dd> <p> This is a different safety net
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that changes SMTP server REJECT actions into warnings. Instead of
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rejecting a command, Postfix logs what it would reject. Specify
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"warn_if_reject" in an SMTP access restriction list, before the
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restriction that you want to test without actually rejecting mail.
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</p> </dd>
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<dt> XCLIENT </dt> <dd> <p> With this Postfix 2.1 feature, authorized
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SMTP clients can impersonate other systems, so that you can do
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realistic SMTP access rule tests. Examples of how to impersonate
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other systems for access rule testing are given at the end of the
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XCLIENT_README document. </p> </dd>
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</dl>
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</body>
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</html>
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