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NetBSD/sys/netipsec/keysock.c

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/* $NetBSD: keysock.c,v 1.21 2011/07/17 20:54:54 joerg Exp $ */
/* $FreeBSD: src/sys/netipsec/keysock.c,v 1.3.2.1 2003/01/24 05:11:36 sam Exp $ */
/* $KAME: keysock.c,v 1.25 2001/08/13 20:07:41 itojun Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: keysock.c,v 1.21 2011/07/17 20:54:54 joerg Exp $");
#include "opt_ipsec.h"
/* This code has derived from sys/net/rtsock.c on FreeBSD2.2.5 */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/domain.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mbuf.h>
#include <sys/protosw.h>
#include <sys/signalvar.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <net/raw_cb.h>
#include <net/route.h>
#include <net/pfkeyv2.h>
#include <netipsec/key.h>
#include <netipsec/keysock.h>
#include <netipsec/key_debug.h>
#include <netipsec/ipsec_osdep.h>
#include <netipsec/ipsec_private.h>
typedef int pr_output_t (struct mbuf *, struct socket *);
struct key_cb {
int key_count;
int any_count;
};
static struct key_cb key_cb;
static struct sockaddr key_dst = {
.sa_len = 2,
.sa_family = PF_KEY,
};
static struct sockaddr key_src = {
.sa_len = 2,
.sa_family = PF_KEY,
};
static int key_sendup0(struct rawcb *, struct mbuf *, int, int);
int key_registered_sb_max = (2048 * MHLEN); /* XXX arbitrary */
/* XXX sysctl */
#ifdef __FreeBSD__
SYSCTL_INT(_net_key, OID_AUTO, registered_sbmax, CTLFLAG_RD,
&key_registered_sb_max , 0, "Maximum kernel-to-user PFKEY datagram size");
#endif
/*
* key_output()
*/
int
key_output(struct mbuf *m, ...)
{
struct sadb_msg *msg;
int len, error = 0;
int s;
struct socket *so;
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, m);
so = va_arg(ap, struct socket *);
va_end(ap);
if (m == 0)
panic("key_output: NULL pointer was passed");
{
uint64_t *ps = PFKEY_STAT_GETREF();
ps[PFKEY_STAT_OUT_TOTAL]++;
ps[PFKEY_STAT_OUT_BYTES] += m->m_pkthdr.len;
PFKEY_STAT_PUTREF();
}
len = m->m_pkthdr.len;
if (len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) {
PFKEY_STATINC(PFKEY_STAT_OUT_TOOSHORT);
error = EINVAL;
goto end;
}
if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) {
if ((m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(struct sadb_msg))) == 0) {
PFKEY_STATINC(PFKEY_STAT_OUT_NOMEM);
error = ENOBUFS;
goto end;
}
}
if ((m->m_flags & M_PKTHDR) == 0)
panic("key_output: not M_PKTHDR ??");
KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_KEY_DUMP, kdebug_mbuf(m));
msg = mtod(m, struct sadb_msg *);
PFKEY_STATINC(PFKEY_STAT_OUT_MSGTYPE + msg->sadb_msg_type);
if (len != PFKEY_UNUNIT64(msg->sadb_msg_len)) {
PFKEY_STATINC(PFKEY_STAT_OUT_INVLEN);
error = EINVAL;
goto end;
}
/*XXX giant lock*/
s = splsoftnet();
error = key_parse(m, so);
m = NULL;
splx(s);
end:
if (m)
m_freem(m);
return error;
}
/*
* send message to the socket.
*/
static int
key_sendup0(
struct rawcb *rp,
struct mbuf *m,
int promisc,
int sbprio
)
{
int error;
int ok;
if (promisc) {
struct sadb_msg *pmsg;
M_PREPEND(m, sizeof(struct sadb_msg), M_DONTWAIT);
if (m && m->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg))
m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
if (!m) {
PFKEY_STATINC(PFKEY_STAT_IN_NOMEM);
return ENOBUFS;
}
m->m_pkthdr.len += sizeof(*pmsg);
pmsg = mtod(m, struct sadb_msg *);
memset(pmsg, 0, sizeof(*pmsg));
pmsg->sadb_msg_version = PF_KEY_V2;
pmsg->sadb_msg_type = SADB_X_PROMISC;
pmsg->sadb_msg_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(m->m_pkthdr.len);
/* pid and seq? */
PFKEY_STATINC(PFKEY_STAT_IN_MSGTYPE + pmsg->sadb_msg_type);
}
if (sbprio == 0)
ok = sbappendaddr(&rp->rcb_socket->so_rcv,
(struct sockaddr *)&key_src, m, NULL);
else
ok = sbappendaddrchain(&rp->rcb_socket->so_rcv,
(struct sockaddr *)&key_src, m, sbprio);
if (!ok) {
PFKEY_STATINC(PFKEY_STAT_IN_NOMEM);
m_freem(m);
error = ENOBUFS;
} else
error = 0;
sorwakeup(rp->rcb_socket);
return error;
}
/* XXX this interface should be obsoleted. */
int
key_sendup(struct socket *so, struct sadb_msg *msg, u_int len,
int target) /*target of the resulting message*/
{
struct mbuf *m, *n, *mprev;
int tlen;
/* sanity check */
if (so == 0 || msg == 0)
panic("key_sendup: NULL pointer was passed");
KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_KEY_DUMP,
printf("key_sendup: \n");
kdebug_sadb(msg));
/*
* we increment statistics here, just in case we have ENOBUFS
* in this function.
*/
{
uint64_t *ps = PFKEY_STAT_GETREF();
ps[PFKEY_STAT_IN_TOTAL]++;
ps[PFKEY_STAT_IN_BYTES] += len;
ps[PFKEY_STAT_IN_MSGTYPE + msg->sadb_msg_type]++;
PFKEY_STAT_PUTREF();
}
/*
* Get mbuf chain whenever possible (not clusters),
* to save socket buffer. We'll be generating many SADB_ACQUIRE
* messages to listening key sockets. If we simply allocate clusters,
* sbappendaddr() will raise ENOBUFS due to too little sbspace().
* sbspace() computes # of actual data bytes AND mbuf region.
*
* TODO: SADB_ACQUIRE filters should be implemented.
*/
tlen = len;
m = mprev = NULL;
while (tlen > 0) {
if (tlen == len) {
MGETHDR(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA);
n->m_len = MHLEN;
} else {
MGET(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA);
n->m_len = MLEN;
}
if (!n) {
PFKEY_STATINC(PFKEY_STAT_IN_NOMEM);
return ENOBUFS;
}
if (tlen >= MCLBYTES) { /*XXX better threshold? */
MCLGET(n, M_DONTWAIT);
if ((n->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) {
m_free(n);
m_freem(m);
PFKEY_STATINC(PFKEY_STAT_IN_NOMEM);
return ENOBUFS;
}
n->m_len = MCLBYTES;
}
if (tlen < n->m_len)
n->m_len = tlen;
n->m_next = NULL;
if (m == NULL)
m = mprev = n;
else {
mprev->m_next = n;
mprev = n;
}
tlen -= n->m_len;
n = NULL;
}
m->m_pkthdr.len = len;
m->m_pkthdr.rcvif = NULL;
m_copyback(m, 0, len, msg);
/* avoid duplicated statistics */
{
uint64_t *ps = PFKEY_STAT_GETREF();
ps[PFKEY_STAT_IN_TOTAL]--;
ps[PFKEY_STAT_IN_BYTES] -= len;
ps[PFKEY_STAT_IN_MSGTYPE + msg->sadb_msg_type]--;
PFKEY_STAT_PUTREF();
}
return key_sendup_mbuf(so, m, target);
}
/* so can be NULL if target != KEY_SENDUP_ONE */
int
key_sendup_mbuf(struct socket *so, struct mbuf *m,
int target/*, sbprio */)
{
struct mbuf *n;
struct keycb *kp;
int sendup;
struct rawcb *rp;
int error = 0;
int sbprio = 0; /* XXX should be a parameter */
if (m == NULL)
panic("key_sendup_mbuf: NULL pointer was passed");
if (so == NULL && target == KEY_SENDUP_ONE)
panic("key_sendup_mbuf: NULL pointer was passed");
/*
* RFC 2367 says ACQUIRE and other kernel-generated messages
* are special. We treat all KEY_SENDUP_REGISTERED messages
* as special, delivering them to all registered sockets
* even if the socket is at or above its so->so_rcv.sb_max limits.
* The only constraint is that the so_rcv data fall below
* key_registered_sb_max.
* Doing that check here avoids reworking every key_sendup_mbuf()
* in the short term. . The rework will be done after a technical
* conensus that this approach is appropriate.
*/
if (target == KEY_SENDUP_REGISTERED) {
sbprio = SB_PRIO_BESTEFFORT;
}
{
uint64_t *ps = PFKEY_STAT_GETREF();
ps[PFKEY_STAT_IN_TOTAL]++;
ps[PFKEY_STAT_IN_BYTES] += m->m_pkthdr.len;
PFKEY_STAT_PUTREF();
}
if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) {
#if 1
m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
if (m == NULL) {
PFKEY_STATINC(PFKEY_STAT_IN_NOMEM);
return ENOBUFS;
}
#else
/* don't bother pulling it up just for stats */
#endif
}
if (m->m_len >= sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) {
struct sadb_msg *msg;
msg = mtod(m, struct sadb_msg *);
PFKEY_STATINC(PFKEY_STAT_IN_MSGTYPE + msg->sadb_msg_type);
}
LIST_FOREACH(rp, &rawcb_list, rcb_list)
{
struct socket * kso = rp->rcb_socket;
if (rp->rcb_proto.sp_family != PF_KEY)
continue;
if (rp->rcb_proto.sp_protocol
&& rp->rcb_proto.sp_protocol != PF_KEY_V2) {
continue;
}
kp = (struct keycb *)rp;
/*
* If you are in promiscuous mode, and when you get broadcasted
* reply, you'll get two PF_KEY messages.
* (based on pf_key@inner.net message on 14 Oct 1998)
*/
if (((struct keycb *)rp)->kp_promisc) {
if ((n = m_copy(m, 0, (int)M_COPYALL)) != NULL) {
(void)key_sendup0(rp, n, 1, 0);
n = NULL;
}
}
/* the exact target will be processed later */
if (so && sotorawcb(so) == rp)
continue;
sendup = 0;
switch (target) {
case KEY_SENDUP_ONE:
/* the statement has no effect */
if (so && sotorawcb(so) == rp)
sendup++;
break;
case KEY_SENDUP_ALL:
sendup++;
break;
case KEY_SENDUP_REGISTERED:
if (kp->kp_registered) {
if (kso->so_rcv.sb_cc <= key_registered_sb_max)
sendup++;
else
printf("keysock: "
"registered sendup dropped, "
"sb_cc %ld max %d\n",
kso->so_rcv.sb_cc,
key_registered_sb_max);
}
break;
}
PFKEY_STATINC(PFKEY_STAT_IN_MSGTARGET + target);
if (!sendup)
continue;
if ((n = m_copy(m, 0, (int)M_COPYALL)) == NULL) {
m_freem(m);
PFKEY_STATINC(PFKEY_STAT_IN_NOMEM);
return ENOBUFS;
}
if ((error = key_sendup0(rp, n, 0, 0)) != 0) {
m_freem(m);
return error;
}
n = NULL;
}
/* The 'later' time for processing the exact target has arrived */
if (so) {
error = key_sendup0(sotorawcb(so), m, 0, sbprio);
m = NULL;
} else {
error = 0;
m_freem(m);
}
return error;
}
#ifdef __FreeBSD__
/*
* key_abort()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_abort()
*/
static int
key_abort(struct socket *so)
{
int s, error;
s = splnet(); /* FreeBSD */
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_abort(so);
splx(s);
return error;
}
/*
* key_attach()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_attach()
*/
static int
key_attach(struct socket *so, int proto, struct proc *td)
{
struct keycb *kp;
int s, error;
if (sotorawcb(so) != 0)
return EISCONN; /* XXX panic? */
kp = (struct keycb *)malloc(sizeof *kp, M_PCB, M_WAITOK|M_ZERO); /* XXX */
if (kp == 0)
return ENOBUFS;
/*
* The spl[soft]net() is necessary to block protocols from sending
* error notifications (like RTM_REDIRECT or RTM_LOSING) while
* this PCB is extant but incompletely initialized.
* Probably we should try to do more of this work beforehand and
* eliminate the spl.
*/
s = splnet(); /* FreeBSD */
so->so_pcb = kp;
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_attach(so, proto, td);
kp = (struct keycb *)sotorawcb(so);
if (error) {
free(kp, M_PCB);
so->so_pcb = NULL;
splx(s);
return error;
}
kp->kp_promisc = kp->kp_registered = 0;
if (kp->kp_raw.rcb_proto.sp_protocol == PF_KEY) /* XXX: AF_KEY */
key_cb.key_count++;
key_cb.any_count++;
kp->kp_raw.rcb_laddr = &key_src;
kp->kp_raw.rcb_faddr = &key_dst;
soisconnected(so);
so->so_options |= SO_USELOOPBACK;
splx(s);
return 0;
}
/*
* key_bind()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_bind()
*/
static int
key_bind(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr *nam, struct proc *td)
{
int s, error;
s = splnet(); /* FreeBSD */
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_bind(so, nam, td); /* xxx just EINVAL */
splx(s);
return error;
}
/*
* key_connect()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_connect()
*/
static int
key_connect(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr *nam, struct proc *td)
{
int s, error;
s = splnet(); /* FreeBSD */
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_connect(so, nam, td); /* XXX just EINVAL */
splx(s);
return error;
}
/*
* key_detach()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_detach()
*/
static int
key_detach(struct socket *so)
{
struct keycb *kp = (struct keycb *)sotorawcb(so);
int s, error;
s = splnet(); /* FreeBSD */
if (kp != 0) {
if (kp->kp_raw.rcb_proto.sp_protocol
== PF_KEY) /* XXX: AF_KEY */
key_cb.key_count--;
key_cb.any_count--;
key_freereg(so);
}
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_detach(so);
splx(s);
return error;
}
/*
* key_disconnect()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:key_disconnect()
*/
static int
key_disconnect(struct socket *so)
{
int s, error;
s = splnet(); /* FreeBSD */
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_disconnect(so);
splx(s);
return error;
}
/*
* key_peeraddr()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_peeraddr()
*/
static int
key_peeraddr(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr **nam)
{
int s, error;
s = splnet(); /* FreeBSD */
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_peeraddr(so, nam);
splx(s);
return error;
}
/*
* key_send()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_send()
*/
static int
key_send(struct socket *so, int flags, struct mbuf *m, struct sockaddr *nam,
struct mbuf *control, struct proc *td)
{
int s, error;
s = splnet(); /* FreeBSD */
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_send(so, flags, m, nam, control, td);
splx(s);
return error;
}
/*
* key_shutdown()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_shutdown()
*/
static int
key_shutdown(struct socket *so)
{
int s, error;
s = splnet(); /* FreeBSD */
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_shutdown(so);
splx(s);
return error;
}
/*
* key_sockaddr()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_sockaddr()
*/
static int
key_sockaddr(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr **nam)
{
int s, error;
s = splnet(); /* FreeBSD */
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_sockaddr(so, nam);
splx(s);
return error;
}
#else /*!__FreeBSD__ -- traditional proto_usrreq() switch */
/*
* key_usrreq()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:route_usrreq()
*/
int
key_usrreq(struct socket *so, int req,struct mbuf *m, struct mbuf *nam,
struct mbuf *control, struct lwp *l)
{
int error = 0;
struct keycb *kp = (struct keycb *)sotorawcb(so);
int s;
s = splsoftnet();
if (req == PRU_ATTACH) {
kp = (struct keycb *)malloc(sizeof(*kp), M_PCB, M_WAITOK);
sosetlock(so);
so->so_pcb = kp;
if (so->so_pcb)
memset(so->so_pcb, 0, sizeof(*kp));
}
if (req == PRU_DETACH && kp) {
int af = kp->kp_raw.rcb_proto.sp_protocol;
if (af == PF_KEY) /* XXX: AF_KEY */
key_cb.key_count--;
key_cb.any_count--;
key_freereg(so);
}
error = raw_usrreq(so, req, m, nam, control, l);
m = control = NULL; /* reclaimed in raw_usrreq */
kp = (struct keycb *)sotorawcb(so);
if (req == PRU_ATTACH && kp) {
int af = kp->kp_raw.rcb_proto.sp_protocol;
if (error) {
PFKEY_STATINC(PFKEY_STAT_SOCKERR);
free(kp, M_PCB);
so->so_pcb = NULL;
splx(s);
return (error);
}
kp->kp_promisc = kp->kp_registered = 0;
if (af == PF_KEY) /* XXX: AF_KEY */
key_cb.key_count++;
key_cb.any_count++;
kp->kp_raw.rcb_laddr = &key_src;
kp->kp_raw.rcb_faddr = &key_dst;
soisconnected(so);
so->so_options |= SO_USELOOPBACK;
}
splx(s);
return (error);
}
#endif /*!__FreeBSD__*/
/* sysctl */
#ifdef SYSCTL_NODE
SYSCTL_NODE(_net, PF_KEY, key, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, "Key Family");
#endif /* SYSCTL_NODE */
/*
* Definitions of protocols supported in the KEY domain.
*/
#ifdef __FreeBSD__
extern struct domain keydomain;
struct pr_usrreqs key_usrreqs = {
key_abort, pru_accept_notsupp, key_attach, key_bind,
key_connect,
pru_connect2_notsupp, pru_control_notsupp, key_detach,
key_disconnect, pru_listen_notsupp, key_peeraddr,
pru_rcvd_notsupp,
pru_rcvoob_notsupp, key_send, pru_sense_null, key_shutdown,
key_sockaddr, sosend, soreceive, sopoll
};
struct protosw keysw[] = {
{ SOCK_RAW, &keydomain, PF_KEY_V2, PR_ATOMIC|PR_ADDR,
0, (pr_output_t *)key_output, raw_ctlinput, 0,
0,
raw_init, 0, 0, 0,
&key_usrreqs
}
};
static void
key_init0(void)
{
memset(&key_cb, 0, sizeof(key_cb));
key_init();
}
struct domain keydomain =
{ PF_KEY, "key", key_init0, 0, 0,
keysw, &keysw[sizeof(keysw)/sizeof(keysw[0])] };
DOMAIN_SET(key);
#else /* !__FreeBSD__ */
DOMAIN_DEFINE(keydomain);
const struct protosw keysw[] = {
{
.pr_type = SOCK_RAW,
.pr_domain = &keydomain,
.pr_protocol = PF_KEY_V2,
.pr_flags = PR_ATOMIC|PR_ADDR,
.pr_output = key_output,
.pr_ctlinput = raw_ctlinput,
.pr_usrreq = key_usrreq,
.pr_init = raw_init,
}
};
struct domain keydomain = {
.dom_family = PF_KEY,
.dom_name = "key",
.dom_init = key_init,
.dom_protosw = keysw,
.dom_protoswNPROTOSW = &keysw[__arraycount(keysw)],
};
#endif
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