NetBSD/sys/dev/random.c
riastradh bdad8b2721 New system call getrandom() compatible with Linux and others.
Three ways to call:

getrandom(p, n, 0)              Blocks at boot until full entropy.
                                Returns up to n bytes at p; guarantees
                                up to 256 bytes even if interrupted
                                after blocking.  getrandom(0,0,0)
                                serves as an entropy barrier: return
                                only after system has full entropy.

getrandom(p, n, GRND_INSECURE)  Never blocks.  Guarantees up to 256
                                bytes even if interrupted.  Equivalent
                                to /dev/urandom.  Safe only after
                                successful getrandom(...,0),
                                getrandom(...,GRND_RANDOM), or read
                                from /dev/random.

getrandom(p, n, GRND_RANDOM)    May block at any time.  Returns up to n
                                bytes at p, but no guarantees about how
                                many -- may return as short as 1 byte.
                                Equivalent to /dev/random.  Legacy.
                                Provided only for source compatibility
                                with Linux.

Can also use flags|GRND_NONBLOCK to fail with EWOULDBLOCK/EAGAIN
without producing any output instead of blocking.

- The combination GRND_INSECURE|GRND_NONBLOCK is the same as
  GRND_INSECURE, since GRND_INSECURE never blocks anyway.

- The combinations GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM and
  GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM|GRND_NONBLOCK are nonsensical and fail
  with EINVAL.

As proposed on tech-userlevel, tech-crypto, tech-security, and
tech-kern, and subsequently adopted by core (minus the getentropy part
of the proposal, because other operating systems and participants in
the discussion couldn't come to an agreement about getentropy and
blocking semantics):

https://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-userlevel/2020/05/02/msg012333.html
2020-08-14 00:53:15 +00:00

303 lines
7.7 KiB
C

/* $NetBSD: random.c,v 1.8 2020/08/14 00:53:16 riastradh Exp $ */
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2019 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
* by Taylor R. Campbell.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
* ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
* TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
* BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* /dev/random, /dev/urandom -- stateless version
*
* For short reads from /dev/urandom, up to 256 bytes, read from a
* per-CPU NIST Hash_DRBG instance that is reseeded as soon as the
* system has enough entropy.
*
* For all other reads, instantiate a fresh NIST Hash_DRBG from
* the global entropy pool, and draw from it.
*
* Each read is independent; there is no per-open state.
* Concurrent reads from the same open run in parallel.
*
* Reading from /dev/random may block until entropy is available.
* Either device may return short reads if interrupted.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: random.c,v 1.8 2020/08/14 00:53:16 riastradh Exp $");
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/atomic.h>
#include <sys/conf.h>
#include <sys/cprng.h>
#include <sys/entropy.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <sys/event.h>
#include <sys/fcntl.h>
#include <sys/kauth.h>
#include <sys/kmem.h>
#include <sys/lwp.h>
#include <sys/poll.h>
#include <sys/random.h>
#include <sys/rnd.h>
#include <sys/rndsource.h>
#include <sys/signalvar.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include "ioconf.h"
static dev_type_open(random_open);
static dev_type_close(random_close);
static dev_type_ioctl(random_ioctl);
static dev_type_poll(random_poll);
static dev_type_kqfilter(random_kqfilter);
static dev_type_read(random_read);
static dev_type_write(random_write);
const struct cdevsw rnd_cdevsw = {
.d_open = random_open,
.d_close = random_close,
.d_read = random_read,
.d_write = random_write,
.d_ioctl = random_ioctl,
.d_stop = nostop,
.d_tty = notty,
.d_poll = random_poll,
.d_mmap = nommap,
.d_kqfilter = random_kqfilter,
.d_discard = nodiscard,
.d_flag = D_OTHER|D_MPSAFE,
};
#define RANDOM_BUFSIZE 512 /* XXX pulled from arse */
/* Entropy source for writes to /dev/random and /dev/urandom */
static krndsource_t user_rndsource;
void
rndattach(int num)
{
rnd_attach_source(&user_rndsource, "/dev/random", RND_TYPE_UNKNOWN,
RND_FLAG_COLLECT_VALUE);
}
static int
random_open(dev_t dev, int flags, int fmt, struct lwp *l)
{
/* Validate minor. */
switch (minor(dev)) {
case RND_DEV_RANDOM:
case RND_DEV_URANDOM:
break;
default:
return ENXIO;
}
return 0;
}
static int
random_close(dev_t dev, int flags, int fmt, struct lwp *l)
{
/* Success! */
return 0;
}
static int
random_ioctl(dev_t dev, unsigned long cmd, void *data, int flag, struct lwp *l)
{
/*
* No non-blocking/async options; otherwise defer to
* entropy_ioctl.
*/
switch (cmd) {
case FIONBIO:
case FIOASYNC:
return 0;
default:
return entropy_ioctl(cmd, data);
}
}
static int
random_poll(dev_t dev, int events, struct lwp *l)
{
/* /dev/random may block; /dev/urandom is always ready. */
switch (minor(dev)) {
case RND_DEV_RANDOM:
return entropy_poll(events);
case RND_DEV_URANDOM:
return events & (POLLIN|POLLRDNORM | POLLOUT|POLLWRNORM);
default:
return 0;
}
}
static int
random_kqfilter(dev_t dev, struct knote *kn)
{
/* Validate the event filter. */
switch (kn->kn_filter) {
case EVFILT_READ:
case EVFILT_WRITE:
break;
default:
return EINVAL;
}
/* /dev/random may block; /dev/urandom never does. */
switch (minor(dev)) {
case RND_DEV_RANDOM:
if (kn->kn_filter == EVFILT_READ)
return entropy_kqfilter(kn);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case RND_DEV_URANDOM:
kn->kn_fop = &seltrue_filtops;
return 0;
default:
return ENXIO;
}
}
/*
* random_read(dev, uio, flags)
*
* Generate data from a PRNG seeded from the entropy pool.
*
* - If /dev/random, block until we have full entropy, or fail
* with EWOULDBLOCK, and if `depleting' entropy, return at most
* the entropy pool's capacity at once.
*
* - If /dev/urandom, generate data from whatever is in the
* entropy pool now.
*
* On interrupt, return a short read, but not shorter than 256
* bytes (actually, no shorter than RANDOM_BUFSIZE bytes, which is
* 512 for hysterical raisins).
*/
static int
random_read(dev_t dev, struct uio *uio, int flags)
{
int gflags;
/* Set the appropriate GRND_* mode. */
switch (minor(dev)) {
case RND_DEV_RANDOM:
gflags = GRND_RANDOM;
break;
case RND_DEV_URANDOM:
gflags = GRND_INSECURE;
break;
default:
return ENXIO;
}
/* Set GRND_NONBLOCK if the user requested FNONBLOCK. */
if (flags & FNONBLOCK)
gflags |= GRND_NONBLOCK;
/* Defer to getrandom. */
return dogetrandom(uio, gflags);
}
/*
* random_write(dev, uio, flags)
*
* Enter data from uio into the entropy pool.
*
* Assume privileged users provide full entropy, and unprivileged
* users provide no entropy. If you have a nonuniform source of
* data with n bytes of min-entropy, hash it with an XOF like
* SHAKE128 into exactly n bytes first.
*/
static int
random_write(dev_t dev, struct uio *uio, int flags)
{
kauth_cred_t cred = kauth_cred_get();
uint8_t *buf;
bool privileged = false, any = false;
int error = 0;
/* Verify user's authorization to affect the entropy pool. */
error = kauth_authorize_device(cred, KAUTH_DEVICE_RND_ADDDATA,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (error)
return error;
/*
* Check whether user is privileged. If so, assume user
* furnishes full-entropy data; if not, accept user's data but
* assume it has zero entropy when we do accounting. If you
* want to specify less entropy, use ioctl(RNDADDDATA).
*/
if (kauth_authorize_device(cred, KAUTH_DEVICE_RND_ADDDATA_ESTIMATE,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) == 0)
privileged = true;
/* Get a buffer for transfers. */
buf = kmem_alloc(RANDOM_BUFSIZE, KM_SLEEP);
/* Consume data. */
while (uio->uio_resid) {
size_t n = MIN(uio->uio_resid, RANDOM_BUFSIZE);
/* Transfer n bytes in and enter them into the pool. */
error = uiomove(buf, n, uio);
if (error)
break;
rnd_add_data(&user_rndsource, buf, n, privileged ? n*NBBY : 0);
any = true;
/* Yield if requested. */
if (curcpu()->ci_schedstate.spc_flags & SPCF_SHOULDYIELD)
preempt();
/* Check for interruption. */
if (__predict_false(curlwp->l_flag & LW_PENDSIG) &&
sigispending(curlwp, 0)) {
error = EINTR;
break;
}
}
/* Zero the buffer and free it. */
explicit_memset(buf, 0, RANDOM_BUFSIZE);
kmem_free(buf, RANDOM_BUFSIZE);
/* If we added anything, consolidate entropy now. */
if (any)
entropy_consolidate();
return error;
}