e128743cff
August 2003: On NetBSD, when we get to ah_massage_headers(), ip->ip_len is in network byte order and includes all bytes in the input packet. Therefore we don't need to byte-swap it or to add `skip' back in, before verifying the receive-side hash. With this change, AH transport mode works against FreeBSD 4.9 fast-ipsec (which also works against Win2k, &c., &c.).
1280 lines
32 KiB
C
1280 lines
32 KiB
C
/* $NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.7 2004/05/01 03:00:42 jonathan Exp $ */
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/* $FreeBSD: src/sys/netipsec/xform_ah.c,v 1.1.4.1 2003/01/24 05:11:36 sam Exp $ */
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/* $OpenBSD: ip_ah.c,v 1.63 2001/06/26 06:18:58 angelos Exp $ */
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/*
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* The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org),
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* Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr) and
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* Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de).
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*
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* The original version of this code was written by John Ioannidis
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* for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, in November 1995.
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*
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* Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996,
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* by Angelos D. Keromytis.
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*
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* Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis
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* and Niels Provos.
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*
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* Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis and Niklas Hallqvist.
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*
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* Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis,
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* Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos.
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* Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist.
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* Copyright (c) 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis.
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee
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* is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in
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* all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or
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* modification of this software.
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* You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please
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* contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license
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* so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to
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* all.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY
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* REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE
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* MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE.
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*/
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.7 2004/05/01 03:00:42 jonathan Exp $");
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#include "opt_inet.h"
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#ifdef __FreeBSD__
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#include "opt_inet6.h"
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#endif
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/systm.h>
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#include <sys/mbuf.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <sys/syslog.h>
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#include <sys/kernel.h>
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#include <sys/sysctl.h>
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#include <net/if.h>
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
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#include <netinet/ip.h>
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#include <netinet/ip_ecn.h>
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#include <netinet/ip6.h>
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#include <net/route.h>
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#include <netipsec/ipsec.h>
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#include <netipsec/ah.h>
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#include <netipsec/ah_var.h>
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#include <netipsec/xform.h>
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#ifdef INET6
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#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>
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#include <netipsec/ipsec6.h>
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# ifdef __FreeBSD__
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# include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h>
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# endif
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#endif
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#include <netipsec/key.h>
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#include <netipsec/key_debug.h>
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#include <netipsec/ipsec_osdep.h>
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#include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h>
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/*
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* Return header size in bytes. The old protocol did not support
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* the replay counter; the new protocol always includes the counter.
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*/
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#define HDRSIZE(sav) \
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(((sav)->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? \
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sizeof (struct ah) : sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t))
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/*
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* Return authenticator size in bytes. The old protocol is known
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* to use a fixed 16-byte authenticator. The new algorithm gets
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* this size from the xform but is (currently) always 12.
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*/
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#define AUTHSIZE(sav) \
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((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 16 : (sav)->tdb_authalgxform->authsize)
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int ah_enable = 1; /* control flow of packets with AH */
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int ah_cleartos = 1; /* clear ip_tos when doing AH calc */
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struct ahstat ahstat;
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#ifdef __FreeBSD__
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SYSCTL_DECL(_net_inet_ah);
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SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO,
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ah_enable, CTLFLAG_RW, &ah_enable, 0, "");
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SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO,
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ah_cleartos, CTLFLAG_RW, &ah_cleartos, 0, "");
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SYSCTL_STRUCT(_net_inet_ah, IPSECCTL_STATS,
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stats, CTLFLAG_RD, &ahstat, ahstat, "");
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#endif /* __FreeBSD__ */
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static unsigned char ipseczeroes[256]; /* larger than an ip6 extension hdr */
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static int ah_input_cb(struct cryptop*);
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static int ah_output_cb(struct cryptop*);
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/*
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* NB: this is public for use by the PF_KEY support.
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*/
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struct auth_hash *
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ah_algorithm_lookup(int alg)
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{
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if (alg >= AH_ALG_MAX)
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return NULL;
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switch (alg) {
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case SADB_X_AALG_NULL:
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return &auth_hash_null;
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case SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC:
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return &auth_hash_hmac_md5_96;
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case SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC:
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return &auth_hash_hmac_sha1_96;
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case SADB_X_AALG_RIPEMD160HMAC:
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return &auth_hash_hmac_ripemd_160_96;
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case SADB_X_AALG_MD5:
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return &auth_hash_key_md5;
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case SADB_X_AALG_SHA:
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return &auth_hash_key_sha1;
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case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256:
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return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256;
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case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_384:
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return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384;
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case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512:
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return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512;
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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size_t
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ah_hdrsiz(struct secasvar *sav)
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{
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size_t size;
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if (sav != NULL) {
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int authsize;
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IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL,
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("ah_hdrsiz: null xform"));
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/*XXX not right for null algorithm--does it matter??*/
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authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
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size = roundup(authsize, sizeof (u_int32_t)) + HDRSIZE(sav);
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} else {
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/* default guess */
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size = sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t) + 16;
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}
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return size;
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}
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/*
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* NB: public for use by esp_init.
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*/
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int
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ah_init0(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp, struct cryptoini *cria)
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{
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struct auth_hash *thash;
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int keylen;
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thash = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth);
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if (thash == NULL) {
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DPRINTF(("ah_init: unsupported authentication algorithm %u\n",
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sav->alg_auth));
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return EINVAL;
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}
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/*
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* Verify the replay state block allocation is consistent with
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* the protocol type. We check here so we can make assumptions
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* later during protocol processing.
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*/
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/* NB: replay state is setup elsewhere (sigh) */
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if (((sav->flags&SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0) ^ (sav->replay != NULL)) {
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DPRINTF(("ah_init: replay state block inconsistency, "
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"%s algorithm %s replay state\n",
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(sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? "old" : "new",
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sav->replay == NULL ? "without" : "with"));
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return EINVAL;
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}
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if (sav->key_auth == NULL) {
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DPRINTF(("ah_init: no authentication key for %s "
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"algorithm\n", thash->name));
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return EINVAL;
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}
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keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth);
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if (keylen != thash->keysize && thash->keysize != 0) {
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DPRINTF(("ah_init: invalid keylength %d, algorithm "
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"%s requires keysize %d\n",
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keylen, thash->name, thash->keysize));
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return EINVAL;
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}
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sav->tdb_xform = xsp;
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sav->tdb_authalgxform = thash;
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/* Initialize crypto session. */
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bzero(cria, sizeof (*cria));
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cria->cri_alg = sav->tdb_authalgxform->type;
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cria->cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
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cria->cri_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth);
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* ah_init() is called when an SPI is being set up.
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*/
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static int
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ah_init(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp)
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{
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struct cryptoini cria;
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int error;
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error = ah_init0(sav, xsp, &cria);
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return error ? error :
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crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid, &cria, crypto_support);
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}
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/*
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* Paranoia.
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*
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* NB: public for use by esp_zeroize (XXX).
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*/
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int
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ah_zeroize(struct secasvar *sav)
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{
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int err;
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if (sav->key_auth)
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bzero(_KEYBUF(sav->key_auth), _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth));
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err = crypto_freesession(sav->tdb_cryptoid);
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sav->tdb_cryptoid = 0;
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sav->tdb_authalgxform = NULL;
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sav->tdb_xform = NULL;
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return err;
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}
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/*
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* Massage IPv4/IPv6 headers for AH processing.
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*/
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static int
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ah_massage_headers(struct mbuf **m0, int proto, int skip, int alg, int out)
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{
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struct mbuf *m = *m0;
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unsigned char *ptr;
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int off, count;
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#ifdef INET
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struct ip *ip;
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#endif /* INET */
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#ifdef INET6
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struct ip6_ext *ip6e;
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struct ip6_hdr ip6;
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int alloc, len, ad;
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#endif /* INET6 */
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switch (proto) {
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#ifdef INET
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case AF_INET:
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/*
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* This is the least painful way of dealing with IPv4 header
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* and option processing -- just make sure they're in
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* contiguous memory.
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*/
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*m0 = m = m_pullup(m, skip);
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if (m == NULL) {
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DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: m_pullup failed\n"));
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return ENOBUFS;
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}
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/* Fix the IP header */
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ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
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if (ah_cleartos)
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ip->ip_tos = 0;
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ip->ip_ttl = 0;
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ip->ip_sum = 0;
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/*
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* On FreeBSD, ip_off and ip_len assumed in host endian;
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* they are converted (if necessary) by ip_input().
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* On NetBSD, ip_off and ip_len are in network byte order.
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* They must be massaged back to network byte order
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* before verifying the HMAC. Moreover, on FreeBSD,
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* we should add `skip' back into the massaged ip_len
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* (presumably ip_input() deducted it before we got here?)
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* whereas on NetBSD, we should not.
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*/
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#ifdef __FreeBSD__
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#define TOHOST(x) (x)
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#else
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#define TOHOST(x) (ntohs(x))
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#endif
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if (!out) {
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u_int16_t inlen = TOHOST(ip->ip_len);
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#ifdef __FreeBSD__
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ip->ip_len = htons(inlen + skip);
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#else /*!__FreeBSD__ */
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ip->ip_len = htons(inlen);
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#endif /*!__FreeBSD__ */
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DPRINTF(("ip len: skip %d, "
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"in %d host %d: new: raw %d host %d\n",
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skip,
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inlen, TOHOST(inlen),
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ip->ip_len, ntohs(ip->ip_len)));
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if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK)
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ip->ip_off = htons(TOHOST(ip->ip_off) & IP_DF);
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else
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ip->ip_off = 0;
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} else {
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if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK)
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ip->ip_off = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_off) & IP_DF);
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else
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ip->ip_off = 0;
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}
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ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) + sizeof(struct ip);
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/* IPv4 option processing */
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for (off = sizeof(struct ip); off < skip;) {
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if (ptr[off] == IPOPT_EOL || ptr[off] == IPOPT_NOP ||
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off + 1 < skip)
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;
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else {
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DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: illegal IPv4 "
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"option length for option %d\n",
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ptr[off]));
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m_freem(m);
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return EINVAL;
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}
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switch (ptr[off]) {
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case IPOPT_EOL:
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off = skip; /* End the loop. */
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break;
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case IPOPT_NOP:
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off++;
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break;
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case IPOPT_SECURITY: /* 0x82 */
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case 0x85: /* Extended security. */
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case 0x86: /* Commercial security. */
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case 0x94: /* Router alert */
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case 0x95: /* RFC1770 */
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/* Sanity check for option length. */
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if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) {
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DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: "
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"illegal IPv4 option length for "
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"option %d\n", ptr[off]));
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m_freem(m);
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return EINVAL;
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}
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off += ptr[off + 1];
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break;
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case IPOPT_LSRR:
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case IPOPT_SSRR:
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/* Sanity check for option length. */
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if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) {
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DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: "
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"illegal IPv4 option length for "
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"option %d\n", ptr[off]));
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m_freem(m);
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return EINVAL;
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}
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/*
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* On output, if we have either of the
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* source routing options, we should
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* swap the destination address of the
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* IP header with the last address
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* specified in the option, as that is
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* what the destination's IP header
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* will look like.
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*/
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if (out)
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bcopy(ptr + off + ptr[off + 1] -
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sizeof(struct in_addr),
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&(ip->ip_dst), sizeof(struct in_addr));
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/* Fall through */
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default:
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/* Sanity check for option length. */
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if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) {
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DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: "
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"illegal IPv4 option length for "
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"option %d\n", ptr[off]));
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m_freem(m);
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return EINVAL;
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}
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|
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/* Zeroize all other options. */
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count = ptr[off + 1];
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bcopy(ipseczeroes, ptr, count);
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off += count;
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break;
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}
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|
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/* Sanity check. */
|
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if (off > skip) {
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DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers(): malformed "
|
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"IPv4 options header\n"));
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|
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m_freem(m);
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return EINVAL;
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}
|
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}
|
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|
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break;
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#endif /* INET */
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|
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#ifdef INET6
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case AF_INET6: /* Ugly... */
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/* Copy and "cook" the IPv6 header. */
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m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(ip6), (caddr_t) &ip6);
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|
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/* We don't do IPv6 Jumbograms. */
|
|
if (ip6.ip6_plen == 0) {
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DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: unsupported IPv6 jumbogram\n"));
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m_freem(m);
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return EMSGSIZE;
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}
|
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|
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ip6.ip6_flow = 0;
|
|
ip6.ip6_hlim = 0;
|
|
ip6.ip6_vfc &= ~IPV6_VERSION_MASK;
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|
ip6.ip6_vfc |= IPV6_VERSION;
|
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|
|
/* Scoped address handling. */
|
|
if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_src))
|
|
ip6.ip6_src.s6_addr16[1] = 0;
|
|
if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_dst))
|
|
ip6.ip6_dst.s6_addr16[1] = 0;
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|
|
/* Done with IPv6 header. */
|
|
m_copyback(m, 0, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), (caddr_t) &ip6);
|
|
|
|
/* Let's deal with the remaining headers (if any). */
|
|
if (skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) > 0) {
|
|
if (m->m_len <= skip) {
|
|
ptr = (unsigned char *) malloc(
|
|
skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr),
|
|
M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT);
|
|
if (ptr == NULL) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: failed "
|
|
"to allocate memory for IPv6 "
|
|
"headers\n"));
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
return ENOBUFS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Copy all the protocol headers after
|
|
* the IPv6 header.
|
|
*/
|
|
m_copydata(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr),
|
|
skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr);
|
|
alloc = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* No need to allocate memory. */
|
|
ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) +
|
|
sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);
|
|
alloc = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
} else
|
|
break;
|
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|
|
off = ip6.ip6_nxt & 0xff; /* Next header type. */
|
|
|
|
for (len = 0; len < skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);)
|
|
switch (off) {
|
|
case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS:
|
|
case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS:
|
|
ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Process the mutable/immutable
|
|
* options -- borrows heavily from the
|
|
* KAME code.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (count = len + sizeof(struct ip6_ext);
|
|
count < len + ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);) {
|
|
if (ptr[count] == IP6OPT_PAD1) {
|
|
count++;
|
|
continue; /* Skip padding. */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Sanity check. */
|
|
if (count > len +
|
|
((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3)) {
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
|
|
/* Free, if we allocated. */
|
|
if (alloc)
|
|
FREE(ptr, M_XDATA);
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ad = ptr[count + 1];
|
|
|
|
/* If mutable option, zeroize. */
|
|
if (ptr[count] & IP6OPT_MUTABLE)
|
|
bcopy(ipseczeroes, ptr + count,
|
|
ptr[count + 1]);
|
|
|
|
count += ad;
|
|
|
|
/* Sanity check. */
|
|
if (count >
|
|
skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) {
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
|
|
/* Free, if we allocated. */
|
|
if (alloc)
|
|
FREE(ptr, M_XDATA);
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Advance. */
|
|
len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);
|
|
off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case IPPROTO_ROUTING:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Always include routing headers in
|
|
* computation.
|
|
*/
|
|
ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len);
|
|
len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);
|
|
off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: unexpected "
|
|
"IPv6 header type %d", off));
|
|
if (alloc)
|
|
FREE(ptr, M_XDATA);
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Copyback and free, if we allocated. */
|
|
if (alloc) {
|
|
m_copyback(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr),
|
|
skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr);
|
|
free(ptr, M_XDATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* INET6 */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* ah_input() gets called to verify that an input packet
|
|
* passes authentication.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
ah_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
|
|
{
|
|
struct auth_hash *ahx;
|
|
struct tdb_ident *tdbi;
|
|
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
|
|
struct m_tag *mtag;
|
|
struct newah *ah;
|
|
int hl, rplen, authsize;
|
|
|
|
struct cryptodesc *crda;
|
|
struct cryptop *crp;
|
|
|
|
IPSEC_SPLASSERT_SOFTNET("ah_input");
|
|
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("ah_input: null SA"));
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->key_auth != NULL,
|
|
("ah_input: null authentication key"));
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL,
|
|
("ah_input: null authentication xform"));
|
|
|
|
/* Figure out header size. */
|
|
rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
|
|
|
|
/* XXX don't pullup, just copy header */
|
|
IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct newah *, m, skip, rplen);
|
|
if (ah == NULL) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_input: cannot pullup header\n"));
|
|
ahstat.ahs_hdrops++; /*XXX*/
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
return ENOBUFS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check replay window, if applicable. */
|
|
if (sav->replay && !ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(ah->ah_seq), sav)) {
|
|
ahstat.ahs_replay++;
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_input: packet replay failure: %s\n",
|
|
ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
return ENOBUFS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Verify AH header length. */
|
|
hl = ah->ah_len * sizeof (u_int32_t);
|
|
ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
|
|
authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
|
|
if (hl != authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_input: bad authenticator length %u (expecting %lu)"
|
|
" for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n",
|
|
hl, (u_long) (authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)),
|
|
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
|
|
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
|
|
ahstat.ahs_badauthl++;
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
return EACCES;
|
|
}
|
|
ahstat.ahs_ibytes += m->m_pkthdr.len - skip - hl;
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_input skip %d poff %d\n"
|
|
"len: hl %d authsize %d rpl %d expect %ld\n",
|
|
skip, protoff,
|
|
hl, authsize, rplen,
|
|
(long)(authsize + rplen - sizeof(struct ah))));
|
|
|
|
/* Get crypto descriptors. */
|
|
crp = crypto_getreq(1);
|
|
if (crp == NULL) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_input: failed to acquire crypto descriptor\n"));
|
|
ahstat.ahs_crypto++;
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
return ENOBUFS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crda = crp->crp_desc;
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(crda != NULL, ("ah_input: null crypto descriptor"));
|
|
|
|
crda->crd_skip = 0;
|
|
crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len;
|
|
crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen;
|
|
|
|
/* Authentication operation. */
|
|
crda->crd_alg = ahx->type;
|
|
crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth);
|
|
crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
|
|
|
|
/* Find out if we've already done crypto. */
|
|
for (mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, NULL);
|
|
mtag != NULL;
|
|
mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, mtag)) {
|
|
tdbi = (struct tdb_ident *) (mtag + 1);
|
|
if (tdbi->proto == sav->sah->saidx.proto &&
|
|
tdbi->spi == sav->spi &&
|
|
!bcmp(&tdbi->dst, &sav->sah->saidx.dst,
|
|
sizeof (union sockaddr_union)))
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */
|
|
if (mtag == NULL) {
|
|
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto) +
|
|
skip + rplen + authsize, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Hash verification has already been done successfully. */
|
|
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto),
|
|
M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO);
|
|
}
|
|
if (tc == NULL) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_input: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n"));
|
|
ahstat.ahs_crypto++;
|
|
crypto_freereq(crp);
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
return ENOBUFS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Only save information if crypto processing is needed. */
|
|
if (mtag == NULL) {
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Save the authenticator, the skipped portion of the packet,
|
|
* and the AH header.
|
|
*/
|
|
m_copydata(m, 0, skip + rplen + authsize, (caddr_t)(tc+1));
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
u_int8_t *pppp = ((caddr_t)(tc+1))+skip+rplen;
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_input: zeroing %d bytes of authent " \
|
|
"%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x\n",
|
|
authsize,
|
|
pppp[0], pppp[1], pppp[2], pppp[3],
|
|
pppp[4], pppp[5], pppp[6], pppp[7],
|
|
pppp[8], pppp[9], pppp[10], pppp[11]));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Zeroize the authenticator on the packet. */
|
|
m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes);
|
|
|
|
/* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */
|
|
error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family,
|
|
skip, ahx->type, 0);
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
|
/* NB: mbuf is free'd by ah_massage_headers */
|
|
ahstat.ahs_hdrops++;
|
|
free(tc, M_XDATA);
|
|
crypto_freereq(crp);
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Crypto operation descriptor. */
|
|
crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */
|
|
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF;
|
|
crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m;
|
|
crp->crp_callback = ah_input_cb;
|
|
crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid;
|
|
crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) tc;
|
|
|
|
/* These are passed as-is to the callback. */
|
|
tc->tc_spi = sav->spi;
|
|
tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst;
|
|
tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto;
|
|
tc->tc_nxt = ah->ah_nxt;
|
|
tc->tc_protoff = protoff;
|
|
tc->tc_skip = skip;
|
|
tc->tc_ptr = (caddr_t) mtag; /* Save the mtag we've identified. */
|
|
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah: hash over %d bytes, skip %d: "
|
|
"crda len %d skip %d inject %d\n",
|
|
crp->crp_ilen, tc->tc_skip,
|
|
crda->crd_len, crda->crd_skip, crda->crd_inject));
|
|
|
|
if (mtag == NULL)
|
|
return crypto_dispatch(crp);
|
|
else
|
|
return ah_input_cb(crp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
#define IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag) do { \
|
|
if (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) { \
|
|
error = ipsec6_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); \
|
|
} else { \
|
|
error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); \
|
|
} \
|
|
} while (0)
|
|
#else
|
|
#define IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag) \
|
|
(error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag))
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* AH input callback from the crypto driver.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
ah_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
|
|
{
|
|
int rplen, error, skip, protoff;
|
|
unsigned char calc[AH_ALEN_MAX];
|
|
struct mbuf *m;
|
|
struct cryptodesc *crd;
|
|
struct auth_hash *ahx;
|
|
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
|
|
struct m_tag *mtag;
|
|
struct secasvar *sav;
|
|
struct secasindex *saidx;
|
|
u_int8_t nxt;
|
|
caddr_t ptr;
|
|
int s, authsize;
|
|
|
|
crd = crp->crp_desc;
|
|
|
|
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque;
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("ah_input_cb: null opaque crypto data area!"));
|
|
skip = tc->tc_skip;
|
|
nxt = tc->tc_nxt;
|
|
protoff = tc->tc_protoff;
|
|
mtag = (struct m_tag *) tc->tc_ptr;
|
|
m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf;
|
|
|
|
s = splsoftnet();
|
|
|
|
sav = KEY_ALLOCSA(&tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto, tc->tc_spi);
|
|
if (sav == NULL) {
|
|
ahstat.ahs_notdb++;
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: SA expired while in crypto\n"));
|
|
error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
saidx = &sav->sah->saidx;
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET ||
|
|
saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6,
|
|
("ah_input_cb: unexpected protocol family %u",
|
|
saidx->dst.sa.sa_family));
|
|
|
|
ahx = (struct auth_hash *) sav->tdb_authalgxform;
|
|
|
|
/* Check for crypto errors. */
|
|
if (crp->crp_etype) {
|
|
if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0)
|
|
sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
|
|
|
|
if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN)
|
|
return crypto_dispatch(crp);
|
|
|
|
ahstat.ahs_noxform++;
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: crypto error %d\n", crp->crp_etype));
|
|
error = crp->crp_etype;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ahstat.ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]++;
|
|
crypto_freereq(crp); /* No longer needed. */
|
|
crp = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen... */
|
|
if (m == NULL) {
|
|
ahstat.ahs_crypto++;
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n"));
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Figure out header size. */
|
|
rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
|
|
authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
|
|
|
|
if (ipsec_debug)
|
|
bzero(calc, sizeof(calc));
|
|
|
|
/* Copy authenticator off the packet. */
|
|
m_copydata(m, skip + rplen, authsize, calc);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we have an mtag, we don't need to verify the authenticator --
|
|
* it has been verified by an IPsec-aware NIC.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (mtag == NULL) {
|
|
ptr = (caddr_t) (tc + 1);
|
|
|
|
/* Verify authenticator. */
|
|
if (bcmp(ptr + skip + rplen, calc, authsize)) {
|
|
u_int8_t *pppp = ptr + skip+rplen;
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_input: authentication hash mismatch " \
|
|
"over %d bytes " \
|
|
"for packet in SA %s/%08lx:\n" \
|
|
"%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x, " \
|
|
"%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x\n",
|
|
authsize,
|
|
ipsec_address(&saidx->dst),
|
|
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi),
|
|
calc[0], calc[1], calc[2], calc[3],
|
|
calc[4], calc[5], calc[6], calc[7],
|
|
calc[8], calc[9], calc[10], calc[11],
|
|
pppp[0], pppp[1], pppp[2], pppp[3],
|
|
pppp[4], pppp[5], pppp[6], pppp[7],
|
|
pppp[8], pppp[9], pppp[10], pppp[11]
|
|
));
|
|
ahstat.ahs_badauth++;
|
|
error = EACCES;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Fix the Next Protocol field. */
|
|
((u_int8_t *) ptr)[protoff] = nxt;
|
|
|
|
/* Copyback the saved (uncooked) network headers. */
|
|
m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Fix the Next Protocol field. */
|
|
m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &nxt);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free(tc, M_XDATA), tc = NULL; /* No longer needed */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Header is now authenticated.
|
|
*/
|
|
m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR|M_AUTHIPDGM;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Update replay sequence number, if appropriate.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sav->replay) {
|
|
u_int32_t seq;
|
|
|
|
m_copydata(m, skip + offsetof(struct newah, ah_seq),
|
|
sizeof (seq), (caddr_t) &seq);
|
|
if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(seq), sav)) {
|
|
ahstat.ahs_replay++;
|
|
error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX as above*/
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Remove the AH header and authenticator from the mbuf.
|
|
*/
|
|
error = m_striphdr(m, skip, rplen + authsize);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: mangled mbuf chain for SA %s/%08lx\n",
|
|
ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
|
|
|
|
ahstat.ahs_hdrops++;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag);
|
|
|
|
KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
|
|
splx(s);
|
|
return error;
|
|
bad:
|
|
if (sav)
|
|
KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
|
|
splx(s);
|
|
if (m != NULL)
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
if (tc != NULL)
|
|
free(tc, M_XDATA);
|
|
if (crp != NULL)
|
|
crypto_freereq(crp);
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* AH output routine, called by ipsec[46]_process_packet().
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
ah_output(
|
|
struct mbuf *m,
|
|
struct ipsecrequest *isr,
|
|
struct mbuf **mp,
|
|
int skip,
|
|
int protoff)
|
|
{
|
|
struct secasvar *sav;
|
|
struct auth_hash *ahx;
|
|
struct cryptodesc *crda;
|
|
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
|
|
struct mbuf *mi;
|
|
struct cryptop *crp;
|
|
u_int16_t iplen;
|
|
int error, rplen, authsize, maxpacketsize, roff;
|
|
u_int8_t prot;
|
|
struct newah *ah;
|
|
|
|
IPSEC_SPLASSERT_SOFTNET("ah_output");
|
|
|
|
sav = isr->sav;
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("ah_output: null SA"));
|
|
ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(ahx != NULL, ("ah_output: null authentication xform"));
|
|
|
|
ahstat.ahs_output++;
|
|
|
|
/* Figure out header size. */
|
|
rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
|
|
|
|
/* Check for maximum packet size violations. */
|
|
switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) {
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
|
case AF_INET:
|
|
maxpacketsize = IP_MAXPACKET;
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* INET */
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
case AF_INET6:
|
|
maxpacketsize = IPV6_MAXPACKET;
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* INET6 */
|
|
default:
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_output: unknown/unsupported protocol "
|
|
"family %u, SA %s/%08lx\n",
|
|
sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family,
|
|
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
|
|
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
|
|
ahstat.ahs_nopf++;
|
|
error = EPFNOSUPPORT;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
|
|
if (rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len > maxpacketsize) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_output: packet in SA %s/%08lx got too big "
|
|
"(len %u, max len %u)\n",
|
|
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
|
|
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi),
|
|
rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len, maxpacketsize));
|
|
ahstat.ahs_toobig++;
|
|
error = EMSGSIZE;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Update the counters. */
|
|
ahstat.ahs_obytes += m->m_pkthdr.len - skip;
|
|
|
|
m = m_clone(m);
|
|
if (m == NULL) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_output: cannot clone mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n",
|
|
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
|
|
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
|
|
ahstat.ahs_hdrops++;
|
|
error = ENOBUFS;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Inject AH header. */
|
|
mi = m_makespace(m, skip, rplen + authsize, &roff);
|
|
if (mi == NULL) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_output: failed to inject %u byte AH header for SA "
|
|
"%s/%08lx\n",
|
|
rplen + authsize,
|
|
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
|
|
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
|
|
ahstat.ahs_hdrops++; /*XXX differs from openbsd */
|
|
error = ENOBUFS;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The AH header is guaranteed by m_makespace() to be in
|
|
* contiguous memory, at roff bytes offset into the returned mbuf.
|
|
*/
|
|
ah = (struct newah *)(mtod(mi, caddr_t) + roff);
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize the AH header. */
|
|
m_copydata(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), (caddr_t) &ah->ah_nxt);
|
|
ah->ah_len = (rplen + authsize - sizeof(struct ah)) / sizeof(u_int32_t);
|
|
ah->ah_reserve = 0;
|
|
ah->ah_spi = sav->spi;
|
|
|
|
/* Zeroize authenticator. */
|
|
m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes);
|
|
|
|
/* Insert packet replay counter, as requested. */
|
|
if (sav->replay) {
|
|
if (sav->replay->count == ~0 &&
|
|
(sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_CYCSEQ) == 0) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_output: replay counter wrapped for SA "
|
|
"%s/%08lx\n",
|
|
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
|
|
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
|
|
ahstat.ahs_wrap++;
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
sav->replay->count++;
|
|
ah->ah_seq = htonl(sav->replay->count);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get crypto descriptors. */
|
|
crp = crypto_getreq(1);
|
|
if (crp == NULL) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_output: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n"));
|
|
ahstat.ahs_crypto++;
|
|
error = ENOBUFS;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crda = crp->crp_desc;
|
|
|
|
crda->crd_skip = 0;
|
|
crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen;
|
|
crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len;
|
|
|
|
/* Authentication operation. */
|
|
crda->crd_alg = ahx->type;
|
|
crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth);
|
|
crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */
|
|
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(
|
|
sizeof(struct tdb_crypto) + skip, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO);
|
|
if (tc == NULL) {
|
|
crypto_freereq(crp);
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_output: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n"));
|
|
ahstat.ahs_crypto++;
|
|
error = ENOBUFS;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Save the skipped portion of the packet. */
|
|
m_copydata(m, 0, skip, (caddr_t) (tc + 1));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fix IP header length on the header used for
|
|
* authentication. We don't need to fix the original
|
|
* header length as it will be fixed by our caller.
|
|
*/
|
|
switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) {
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
|
case AF_INET:
|
|
bcopy(((caddr_t)(tc + 1)) +
|
|
offsetof(struct ip, ip_len),
|
|
(caddr_t) &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t));
|
|
iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize);
|
|
m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip, ip_len),
|
|
sizeof(u_int16_t), (caddr_t) &iplen);
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* INET */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
case AF_INET6:
|
|
bcopy(((caddr_t)(tc + 1)) +
|
|
offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen),
|
|
(caddr_t) &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t));
|
|
iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize);
|
|
m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen),
|
|
sizeof(u_int16_t), (caddr_t) &iplen);
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* INET6 */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Fix the Next Header field in saved header. */
|
|
((u_int8_t *) (tc + 1))[protoff] = IPPROTO_AH;
|
|
|
|
/* Update the Next Protocol field in the IP header. */
|
|
prot = IPPROTO_AH;
|
|
m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), (caddr_t) &prot);
|
|
|
|
/* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */
|
|
error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family,
|
|
skip, ahx->type, 1);
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
|
m = NULL; /* mbuf was free'd by ah_massage_headers. */
|
|
free(tc, M_XDATA);
|
|
crypto_freereq(crp);
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Crypto operation descriptor. */
|
|
crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */
|
|
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF;
|
|
crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m;
|
|
crp->crp_callback = ah_output_cb;
|
|
crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid;
|
|
crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) tc;
|
|
|
|
/* These are passed as-is to the callback. */
|
|
tc->tc_isr = isr;
|
|
tc->tc_spi = sav->spi;
|
|
tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst;
|
|
tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto;
|
|
tc->tc_skip = skip;
|
|
tc->tc_protoff = protoff;
|
|
|
|
return crypto_dispatch(crp);
|
|
bad:
|
|
if (m)
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* AH output callback from the crypto driver.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
ah_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
|
|
{
|
|
int skip, protoff, error;
|
|
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
|
|
struct ipsecrequest *isr;
|
|
struct secasvar *sav;
|
|
struct mbuf *m;
|
|
caddr_t ptr;
|
|
int s, err;
|
|
|
|
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque;
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("ah_output_cb: null opaque data area!"));
|
|
skip = tc->tc_skip;
|
|
protoff = tc->tc_protoff;
|
|
ptr = (caddr_t) (tc + 1);
|
|
m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf;
|
|
|
|
s = splsoftnet();
|
|
|
|
isr = tc->tc_isr;
|
|
sav = KEY_ALLOCSA(&tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto, tc->tc_spi);
|
|
if (sav == NULL) {
|
|
ahstat.ahs_notdb++;
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_output_cb: SA expired while in crypto\n"));
|
|
error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(isr->sav == sav, ("ah_output_cb: SA changed\n"));
|
|
|
|
/* Check for crypto errors. */
|
|
if (crp->crp_etype) {
|
|
if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0)
|
|
sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
|
|
|
|
if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
|
|
KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
|
|
splx(s);
|
|
return crypto_dispatch(crp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ahstat.ahs_noxform++;
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_output_cb: crypto error %d\n", crp->crp_etype));
|
|
error = crp->crp_etype;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen... */
|
|
if (m == NULL) {
|
|
ahstat.ahs_crypto++;
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_output_cb: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n"));
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
ahstat.ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]++;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Copy original headers (with the new protocol number) back
|
|
* in place.
|
|
*/
|
|
m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr);
|
|
|
|
/* No longer needed. */
|
|
free(tc, M_XDATA);
|
|
crypto_freereq(crp);
|
|
|
|
/* NB: m is reclaimed by ipsec_process_done. */
|
|
err = ipsec_process_done(m, isr);
|
|
KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
|
|
splx(s);
|
|
return err;
|
|
bad:
|
|
if (sav)
|
|
KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
|
|
splx(s);
|
|
if (m)
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
free(tc, M_XDATA);
|
|
crypto_freereq(crp);
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct xformsw ah_xformsw = {
|
|
XF_AH, XFT_AUTH, "IPsec AH",
|
|
ah_init, ah_zeroize, ah_input, ah_output,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
INITFN void
|
|
ah_attach(void)
|
|
{
|
|
xform_register(&ah_xformsw);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef __FreeBSD__
|
|
SYSINIT(ah_xform_init, SI_SUB_PROTO_DOMAIN, SI_ORDER_MIDDLE, ah_attach, NULL);
|
|
#endif
|