NetBSD/crypto/external
christos 132cc1c4ae Changes between 1.1.0h and 1.1.0i [14 Aug 2018]
*) Client DoS due to large DH parameter

     During key agreement in a TLS handshake using a DH(E) based ciphersuite a
     malicious server can send a very large prime value to the client. This will
     cause the client to spend an unreasonably long period of time generating a
     key for this prime resulting in a hang until the client has finished. This
     could be exploited in a Denial Of Service attack.

     This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 5th June 2018 by Guido Vranken
     (CVE-2018-0732)
     [Guido Vranken]

  *) Cache timing vulnerability in RSA Key Generation

     The OpenSSL RSA Key generation algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to
     a cache timing side channel attack. An attacker with sufficient access to
     mount cache timing attacks during the RSA key generation process could
     recover the private key.

     This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th April 2018 by Alejandro Cabrera
     Aldaya, Billy Brumley, Cesar Pereida Garcia and Luis Manuel Alvarez Tapia.
     (CVE-2018-0737)
     [Billy Brumley]

  *) Make EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() a bit stricter about its input.  A NULL pem_str
     parameter is no longer accepted, as it leads to a corrupt table.  NULL
     pem_str is reserved for alias entries only.
     [Richard Levitte]

  *) Revert blinding in ECDSA sign and instead make problematic addition
     length-invariant. Switch even to fixed-length Montgomery multiplication.
     [Andy Polyakov]

  *) Change generating and checking of primes so that the error rate of not
     being prime depends on the intended use based on the size of the input.
     For larger primes this will result in more rounds of Miller-Rabin.
     The maximal error rate for primes with more than 1080 bits is lowered
     to 2^-128.
     [Kurt Roeckx, Annie Yousar]

  *) Increase the number of Miller-Rabin rounds for DSA key generating to 64.
     [Kurt Roeckx]

  *) Add blinding to ECDSA and DSA signatures to protect against side channel
     attacks discovered by Keegan Ryan (NCC Group).
     [Matt Caswell]

  *) When unlocking a pass phrase protected PEM file or PKCS#8 container, we
     now allow empty (zero character) pass phrases.
     [Richard Levitte]

  *) Certificate time validation (X509_cmp_time) enforces stricter
     compliance with RFC 5280. Fractional seconds and timezone offsets
     are no longer allowed.
     [Emilia Käsper]

  *) Fixed a text canonicalisation bug in CMS

     Where a CMS detached signature is used with text content the text goes
     through a canonicalisation process first prior to signing or verifying a
     signature. This process strips trailing space at the end of lines, converts
     line terminators to CRLF and removes additional trailing line terminators
     at the end of a file. A bug in the canonicalisation process meant that
     some characters, such as form-feed, were incorrectly treated as whitespace
     and removed. This is contrary to the specification (RFC5485). This fix
     could mean that detached text data signed with an earlier version of
     OpenSSL 1.1.0 may fail to verify using the fixed version, or text data
     signed with a fixed OpenSSL may fail to verify with an earlier version of
     OpenSSL 1.1.0. A workaround is to only verify the canonicalised text data
     and use the "-binary" flag (for the "cms" command line application) or set
     the SMIME_BINARY/PKCS7_BINARY/CMS_BINARY flags (if using CMS_verify()).
     [Matt Caswell]
2018-08-18 08:30:43 +00:00
..
bsd Changes between 1.1.0h and 1.1.0i [14 Aug 2018] 2018-08-18 08:30:43 +00:00
cpl switch everyone to openssl.old 2018-02-04 03:19:51 +00:00
Makefile Remove MKCRYPTO option. 2017-05-21 15:28:36 +00:00
README description of cpl 2012-01-28 01:30:42 +00:00

$NetBSD: README,v 1.3 2012/01/28 01:30:42 christos Exp $

Organization of Sources:

This directory hierarchy is using an organization that separates
crypto source for programs that we have obtained from external third
parties (where NetBSD is not the primary maintainer) from the system
source.

This README file is derived from the README file in src/external.

The hierarchy is grouped by license, and then package per license,
and is organized as follows:

	crypto/external/

	    Makefile
			Descend into the license sub-directories.

	    <license>/
			Per-license sub-directories.

		Makefile
			Descend into the package sub-directories.

		<package>/
			Per-package sub-directories.

		    Makefile
			Build the package.
			
		    dist/
			The third-party source for a given package.

		    bin/
		    lib/
		    sbin/
			BSD makefiles "reach over" from these into
			"../dist/".

This arrangement allows for packages to be easily disabled or
excised as necessary, either on a per-license or per-package basis.

The licenses currently used are:

	bsd		BSD (or equivalent) licensed software, possibly with
			the "advertising clause".
	cpl		Common Public License
			http://www.opensource.org/licenses/cpl1.0

If a package has components covered by different licenses
(for example, GPL2 and the LGPL), use the <license> subdirectory
for the more restrictive license.

If a package allows the choice of a license to use, we'll
generally use the less restrictive license.

If in doubt about where a package should be located, please
contact <core@NetBSD.org> for advice.


Migration Strategy:


Eventually src/dist (and associated framework in other base source
directories) and src/gnu will be migrated to this hierarchy.


Maintenance Strategy:

The sources under src/crypto/external/<license>/<package>/dist/ are
generally a combination of a published distribution plus changes
that we submit to the maintainers and that are not yet published
by them.

Make sure all changes made to the external sources are submitted
to the appropriate maintainer, but only after coordinating with
the NetBSD maintainers.