NetBSD/sys/kern/kern_verifiedexec.c
elad 6590e0e201 Catch up with ktrace-lwp merge.
While I'm here, stop using cur{lwp,proc}.
2005-12-12 16:26:33 +00:00

725 lines
18 KiB
C

/* $NetBSD: kern_verifiedexec.c,v 1.48 2005/12/12 16:26:33 elad Exp $ */
/*-
* Copyright 2005 Elad Efrat <elad@bsd.org.il>
* Copyright 2005 Brett Lymn <blymn@netbsd.org>
*
* This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
* by Brett Lymn and Elad Efrat
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Neither the name of The NetBSD Foundation nor the names of its
* contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
* from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
* ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
* TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
* BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: kern_verifiedexec.c,v 1.48 2005/12/12 16:26:33 elad Exp $");
#include "opt_verified_exec.h"
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <sys/namei.h>
#include <sys/exec.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/syslog.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/inttypes.h>
#define VERIEXEC_NEED_NODE
#include <sys/verified_exec.h>
#if defined(__FreeBSD__)
# include <sys/systm.h>
# include <sys/imgact.h>
# include <crypto/sha1.h>
#else
# include <sys/sha1.h>
#endif
#include <crypto/sha2/sha2.h>
#include <crypto/ripemd160/rmd160.h>
#include <sys/md5.h>
#include <uvm/uvm_extern.h>
int veriexec_verbose;
int veriexec_strict;
char *veriexec_fp_names;
size_t veriexec_name_max;
const struct sysctlnode *veriexec_count_node;
/* Veriexecs table of hash types and their associated information. */
LIST_HEAD(veriexec_ops_head, veriexec_fp_ops) veriexec_ops_list;
/*
* Add fingerprint names to the global list.
*/
static void
veriexec_add_fp_name(char *name)
{
char *newp;
unsigned int new_max;
if (name == NULL)
return;
if (veriexec_fp_names == NULL) {
veriexec_name_max = (VERIEXEC_TYPE_MAXLEN + 1) * 6;
veriexec_fp_names = malloc(veriexec_name_max, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
memset(veriexec_fp_names, 0, veriexec_name_max);
}
if ((strlen(veriexec_fp_names) + VERIEXEC_TYPE_MAXLEN + 1) >=
veriexec_name_max) {
new_max = veriexec_name_max + 4 * (VERIEXEC_TYPE_MAXLEN + 1);
newp = realloc(veriexec_fp_names, new_max, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
veriexec_fp_names = newp;
veriexec_name_max = new_max;
}
strlcat(veriexec_fp_names, name, veriexec_name_max);
strlcat(veriexec_fp_names, " ", veriexec_name_max);
}
/*
* Add ops to the fignerprint ops vector list.
*/
int veriexec_add_fp_ops(struct veriexec_fp_ops *ops)
{
if (ops == NULL)
return (EFAULT);
if ((ops->init == NULL) ||
(ops->update == NULL) ||
(ops->final == NULL))
return (EFAULT);
ops->type[sizeof(ops->type) - 1] = '\0';
#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC
if (veriexec_find_ops(ops->type) != NULL)
return (EEXIST);
#endif /* DIAGNOSTIC */
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&veriexec_ops_list, ops, entries);
veriexec_add_fp_name(ops->type);
return (0);
}
/*
* Initialise the internal "default" fingerprint ops vector list.
*/
void
veriexec_init_fp_ops(void)
{
struct veriexec_fp_ops *ops;
LIST_INIT(&veriexec_ops_list);
veriexec_fp_names = NULL;
veriexec_name_max = 0;
#ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_RMD160
ops = (struct veriexec_fp_ops *) malloc(sizeof(*ops), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
VERIEXEC_OPINIT(ops, "RMD160", RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH,
sizeof(RMD160_CTX), RMD160Init, RMD160Update,
RMD160Final);
(void) veriexec_add_fp_ops(ops);
#endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_RMD160 */
#ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA256
ops = (struct veriexec_fp_ops *) malloc(sizeof(*ops), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
VERIEXEC_OPINIT(ops, "SHA256", SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
sizeof(SHA256_CTX), SHA256_Init, SHA256_Update,
SHA256_Final);
(void) veriexec_add_fp_ops(ops);
#endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA256 */
#ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA384
ops = (struct veriexec_fp_ops *) malloc(sizeof(*ops), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
VERIEXEC_OPINIT(ops, "SHA384", SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
sizeof(SHA384_CTX), SHA384_Init, SHA384_Update,
SHA384_Final);
(void) veriexec_add_fp_ops(ops);
#endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA384 */
#ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA512
ops = (struct veriexec_fp_ops *) malloc(sizeof(*ops), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
VERIEXEC_OPINIT(ops, "SHA512", SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
sizeof(SHA512_CTX), SHA512_Init, SHA512_Update,
SHA512_Final);
(void) veriexec_add_fp_ops(ops);
#endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA512 */
#ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA1
ops = (struct veriexec_fp_ops *) malloc(sizeof(*ops), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
VERIEXEC_OPINIT(ops, "SHA1", SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH,
sizeof(SHA1_CTX), SHA1Init, SHA1Update,
SHA1Final);
(void) veriexec_add_fp_ops(ops);
#endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA1 */
#ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_MD5
ops = (struct veriexec_fp_ops *) malloc(sizeof(*ops), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
VERIEXEC_OPINIT(ops, "MD5", MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(MD5_CTX),
MD5Init, MD5Update, MD5Final);
(void) veriexec_add_fp_ops(ops);
#endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_MD5 */
}
struct veriexec_fp_ops *
veriexec_find_ops(u_char *name)
{
struct veriexec_fp_ops *ops;
name[VERIEXEC_TYPE_MAXLEN] = '\0';
LIST_FOREACH(ops, &veriexec_ops_list, entries) {
if ((strlen(name) == strlen(ops->type)) &&
(strncasecmp(name, ops->type, sizeof(ops->type) - 1)
== 0))
return (ops);
}
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Calculate fingerprint. Information on hash length and routines used is
* extracted from veriexec_hash_list according to the hash type.
*/
int
veriexec_fp_calc(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp,
struct veriexec_hash_entry *vhe, uint64_t size, u_char *fp)
{
void *ctx, *page_ctx;
u_char *buf, *page_fp;
off_t offset, len;
size_t resid, npages;
int error, do_perpage, pagen;
if (vhe->ops == NULL) {
panic("veriexec: Operations vector is NULL");
}
#if 0 /* XXX - for now */
if ((vhe->type & VERIEXEC_UNTRUSTED) &&
(vhe->page_fp_status == PAGE_FP_NONE))
do_perpage = 1;
else
#endif
do_perpage = 0;
ctx = (void *) malloc(vhe->ops->context_size, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
buf = (u_char *) malloc(PAGE_SIZE, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
page_ctx = NULL;
page_fp = NULL;
npages = 0;
if (do_perpage) {
npages = (size >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 1;
page_fp = (u_char *) malloc(vhe->ops->hash_len * npages,
M_TEMP, M_WAITOK|M_ZERO);
vhe->page_fp = page_fp;
page_ctx = (void *) malloc(vhe->ops->context_size, M_TEMP,
M_WAITOK);
}
(vhe->ops->init)(ctx);
len = 0;
error = 0;
pagen = 0;
for (offset = 0; offset < size; offset += PAGE_SIZE) {
len = ((size - offset) < PAGE_SIZE) ? (size - offset)
: PAGE_SIZE;
error = vn_rdwr(UIO_READ, vp, buf, len, offset,
UIO_SYSSPACE,
#ifdef __FreeBSD__
IO_NODELOCKED,
#else
0,
#endif
l->l_proc->p_ucred, &resid, NULL);
if (error) {
if (do_perpage) {
free(vhe->page_fp, M_TEMP);
vhe->page_fp = NULL;
}
goto bad;
}
(vhe->ops->update)(ctx, buf, (unsigned int) len);
if (do_perpage) {
(vhe->ops->init)(page_ctx);
(vhe->ops->update)(page_ctx, buf, (unsigned int)len);
(vhe->ops->final)(page_fp, page_ctx);
if (veriexec_verbose >= 2) {
int i;
printf("hash for page %d: ", pagen);
for (i = 0; i < vhe->ops->hash_len; i++)
printf("%02x", page_fp[i]);
printf("\n");
}
page_fp += vhe->ops->hash_len;
pagen++;
}
if (len != PAGE_SIZE)
break;
}
(vhe->ops->final)(fp, ctx);
if (do_perpage) {
vhe->last_page_size = len;
vhe->page_fp_status = PAGE_FP_READY;
vhe->npages = npages;
}
bad:
if (do_perpage)
free(page_ctx, M_TEMP);
free(ctx, M_TEMP);
free(buf, M_TEMP);
return (error);
}
/* Compare two fingerprints of the same type. */
int
veriexec_fp_cmp(struct veriexec_fp_ops *ops, u_char *fp1, u_char *fp2)
{
if (veriexec_verbose >= 2) {
int i;
printf("comparing hashes...\n");
printf("fp1: ");
for (i = 0; i < ops->hash_len; i++) {
printf("%02x", fp1[i]);
}
printf("\nfp2: ");
for (i = 0; i < ops->hash_len; i++) {
printf("%02x", fp2[i]);
}
printf("\n");
}
return (memcmp(fp1, fp2, ops->hash_len));
}
/* Get the hash table for the specified device. */
struct veriexec_hashtbl *
veriexec_tblfind(dev_t device) {
struct veriexec_hashtbl *tbl;
LIST_FOREACH(tbl, &veriexec_tables, hash_list) {
if (tbl->hash_dev == device)
return (tbl);
}
return (NULL);
}
/* Perform a lookup on a hash table. */
struct veriexec_hash_entry *
veriexec_lookup(dev_t device, ino_t inode)
{
struct veriexec_hashtbl *tbl;
struct veriexec_hashhead *tble;
struct veriexec_hash_entry *e;
size_t indx;
tbl = veriexec_tblfind(device);
if (tbl == NULL)
return (NULL);
indx = VERIEXEC_HASH(tbl, inode);
tble = &(tbl->hash_tbl[indx & VERIEXEC_HASH_MASK(tbl)]);
LIST_FOREACH(e, tble, entries) {
if ((e != NULL) && (e->inode == inode))
return (e);
}
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Add an entry to a hash table. If a collision is found, handle it.
* The passed entry is allocated in kernel memory.
*/
int
veriexec_hashadd(struct veriexec_hashtbl *tbl, struct veriexec_hash_entry *e)
{
struct veriexec_hashhead *vhh;
size_t indx;
if (tbl == NULL)
return (EFAULT);
indx = VERIEXEC_HASH(tbl, e->inode);
vhh = &(tbl->hash_tbl[indx]);
if (vhh == NULL)
panic("veriexec: veriexec_hashadd: vhh is NULL.");
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(vhh, e, entries);
tbl->hash_count++;
return (0);
}
/*
* Verify the fingerprint of the given file. If we're called directly from
* sys_execve(), 'flag' will be VERIEXEC_DIRECT. If we're called from
* exec_script(), 'flag' will be VERIEXEC_INDIRECT. If we are called from
* vn_open(), 'flag' will be VERIEXEC_FILE.
*/
int
veriexec_verify(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, struct vattr *va,
const u_char *name, int flag, struct veriexec_hash_entry **ret)
{
struct veriexec_hash_entry *vhe;
u_char *digest;
int error;
if (vp->v_type != VREG)
return (0);
/* Lookup veriexec table entry, save pointer if requested. */
vhe = veriexec_lookup((dev_t)va->va_fsid, (ino_t)va->va_fileid);
if (ret != NULL)
*ret = vhe;
if (vhe == NULL)
goto out;
/* Evaluate fingerprint if needed. */
error = 0;
digest = NULL;
if ((vhe->status == FINGERPRINT_NOTEVAL) ||
(vhe->type & VERIEXEC_UNTRUSTED)) {
/* Calculate fingerprint for on-disk file. */
digest = (u_char *) malloc(vhe->ops->hash_len, M_TEMP,
M_WAITOK);
error = veriexec_fp_calc(l, vp, vhe, va->va_size, digest);
if (error) {
veriexec_report("Fingerprint calculation error.",
name, va, NULL, REPORT_NOVERBOSE,
REPORT_NOALARM, REPORT_NOPANIC);
free(digest, M_TEMP);
return (error);
}
/* Compare fingerprint with loaded data. */
if (veriexec_fp_cmp(vhe->ops, vhe->fp, digest) == 0) {
vhe->status = FINGERPRINT_VALID;
} else {
vhe->status = FINGERPRINT_NOMATCH;
}
free(digest, M_TEMP);
}
if (!(vhe->type & flag)) {
veriexec_report("Incorrect access type.", name, va, l,
REPORT_NOVERBOSE, REPORT_ALARM,
REPORT_NOPANIC);
/* IPS mode: Enforce access type. */
if (veriexec_strict >= 2)
return (EPERM);
}
out:
/* No entry in the veriexec tables. */
if (vhe == NULL) {
veriexec_report("veriexec_verify: No entry.", name, va,
l, REPORT_VERBOSE, REPORT_NOALARM, REPORT_NOPANIC);
/* Lockdown mode: Deny access to non-monitored files. */
if (veriexec_strict >= 3)
return (EPERM);
return (0);
}
switch (vhe->status) {
case FINGERPRINT_NOTEVAL:
/* Should not happen. */
veriexec_report("veriexec_verify: Not-evaluated status "
"post evaluation; inconsistency detected.", name, va,
NULL, REPORT_NOVERBOSE, REPORT_NOALARM, REPORT_PANIC);
case FINGERPRINT_VALID:
/* Valid fingerprint. */
veriexec_report("veriexec_verify: Match.", name, va, NULL,
REPORT_VERBOSE, REPORT_NOALARM, REPORT_NOPANIC);
break;
case FINGERPRINT_NOMATCH:
/* Fingerprint mismatch. */
veriexec_report("veriexec_verify: Mismatch.", name, va,
NULL, REPORT_NOVERBOSE, REPORT_ALARM, REPORT_NOPANIC);
/* IDS mode: Deny access on fingerprint mismatch. */
if (veriexec_strict >= 1)
error = EPERM;
break;
default:
/*
* Should never happen.
* XXX: Print vnode/process?
*/
veriexec_report("veriexec_verify: Invalid status "
"post evaluation.", name, va, NULL, REPORT_NOVERBOSE,
REPORT_NOALARM, REPORT_PANIC);
}
return (error);
}
/*
* Evaluate per-page fingerprints.
*/
int
veriexec_page_verify(struct veriexec_hash_entry *vhe, struct vattr *va,
struct vm_page *pg, size_t idx, struct lwp *l)
{
void *ctx;
u_char *fp;
u_char *page_fp;
int error;
vaddr_t kva;
if (vhe->page_fp_status == PAGE_FP_NONE)
return (0);
if (vhe->page_fp_status == PAGE_FP_FAIL)
return (EPERM);
if (idx >= vhe->npages)
return (0);
ctx = (void *) malloc(vhe->ops->context_size, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
fp = (u_char *) malloc(vhe->ops->hash_len, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
kva = 0;
error = uvm_map(kernel_map, &kva, PAGE_SIZE, NULL,
UVM_UNKNOWN_OFFSET, 0, UVM_MAPFLAG(UVM_PROT_READ,
UVM_PROT_READ, UVM_INH_NONE, UVM_ADV_NORMAL,
UVM_FLAG_NOMERGE));
if (error)
goto bad;
pmap_kenter_pa(kva, VM_PAGE_TO_PHYS(pg), VM_PROT_READ);
page_fp = (u_char *) vhe->page_fp + (vhe->ops->hash_len * idx);
(vhe->ops->init)(ctx);
(vhe->ops->update)(ctx, (void *) kva,
((vhe->npages - 1) == idx) ? vhe->last_page_size
: PAGE_SIZE);
(vhe->ops->final)(fp, ctx);
pmap_kremove(kva, PAGE_SIZE);
uvm_unmap(kernel_map, kva, kva + PAGE_SIZE);
error = veriexec_fp_cmp(vhe->ops, page_fp, fp);
if (error) {
const char *msg;
if (veriexec_strict > 0) {
msg = "Pages modified: Killing process.";
} else {
msg = "Pages modified.";
error = 0;
}
veriexec_report(msg, "[page_in]", va, l, REPORT_NOVERBOSE,
REPORT_ALARM, REPORT_NOPANIC);
if (error) {
ksiginfo_t ksi;
KSI_INIT(&ksi);
ksi.ksi_signo = SIGKILL;
ksi.ksi_code = SI_NOINFO;
ksi.ksi_pid = l->l_proc->p_pid;
ksi.ksi_uid = 0;
kpsignal(l->l_proc, &ksi, NULL);
}
}
bad:
free(ctx, M_TEMP);
free(fp, M_TEMP);
return (error);
}
/*
* Veriexec remove policy code.
*/
int
veriexec_removechk(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, const char *pathbuf)
{
struct veriexec_hashtbl *tbl;
struct veriexec_hash_entry *vhe;
struct vattr va;
int error;
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &va, l->l_proc->p_ucred, l);
if (error)
return (error);
vhe = veriexec_lookup(va.va_fsid, va.va_fileid);
if (vhe == NULL) {
/* Lockdown mode: Deny access to non-monitored files. */
if (veriexec_strict >= 3)
return (EPERM);
return (0);
}
veriexec_report("Remove request.", pathbuf, &va, l,
REPORT_NOVERBOSE, REPORT_ALARM, REPORT_NOPANIC);
/* IPS mode: Deny removal of monitored files. */
if (veriexec_strict >= 2)
return (EPERM);
tbl = veriexec_tblfind(va.va_fsid);
if (tbl == NULL) {
veriexec_report("veriexec_removechk: Inconsistency "
"detected: Could not get table for file in lists.",
pathbuf, &va, NULL, REPORT_NOVERBOSE, REPORT_NOALARM,
REPORT_PANIC);
}
LIST_REMOVE(vhe, entries);
if (vhe->fp != NULL)
free(vhe->fp, M_TEMP);
if (vhe->page_fp != NULL)
free(vhe->page_fp, M_TEMP);
free(vhe, M_TEMP);
tbl->hash_count--;
return (error);
}
/*
* Veriexe rename policy.
*/
int
veriexec_renamechk(struct vnode *vp, const char *from, const char *to,
struct lwp *l)
{
struct veriexec_hash_entry *vhe;
struct vattr va;
int error;
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &va, l->l_proc->p_ucred, l);
if (error)
return (error);
if (veriexec_strict >= 3) {
printf("Veriexec: veriexec_renamechk: Preventing rename "
"of \"%s\" [%ld:%llu] to \"%s\", uid=%u, pid=%u: "
"Lockdown mode.\n", from, va.va_fsid,
(unsigned long long)va.va_fileid,
to, l->l_proc->p_ucred->cr_uid, l->l_proc->p_pid);
return (EPERM);
}
vhe = veriexec_lookup(va.va_fsid, va.va_fileid);
if (vhe != NULL) {
if (veriexec_strict >= 2) {
printf("Veriexec: veriexec_renamechk: Preventing "
"rename of \"%s\" [%ld:%llu] to \"%s\", "
"uid=%u, pid=%u: IPS mode, file "
"monitored.\n", from, va.va_fsid,
(unsigned long long)va.va_fileid,
to, l->l_proc->p_ucred->cr_uid,
l->l_proc->p_pid);
return (EPERM);
}
printf("Veriexec: veriexec_rename: Monitored file \"%s\" "
"[%ld:%llu] renamed to \"%s\", uid=%u, pid=%u.\n",
from, va.va_fsid, (unsigned long long)va.va_fileid, to,
l->l_proc->p_ucred->cr_uid, l->l_proc->p_pid);
}
return (0);
}
/*
* Routine for maintaining mostly consistent message formats in Verified
* Exec.
*
* 'verbose_only' - if 1, the message will be printed only if veriexec is
* in verbose mode.
* 'alarm' - if 1, the message is considered an alarm and will be printed
* at all times along with pid and user credentials.
* 'die' - if 1, the system will call panic() instead of printf().
*/
void
veriexec_report(const u_char *msg, const u_char *filename,
struct vattr *va, struct lwp *l, int verbose, int alarm,
int die)
{
void (*f)(const char *, ...);
if (msg == NULL || filename == NULL || va == NULL)
return;
if (die)
f = panic;
else
f = (void (*)(const char *, ...)) printf;
if (!verbose || (verbose <= veriexec_verbose)) {
if (!alarm || l == NULL)
f("veriexec: %s [%s, %ld:%" PRIu64 "%s", msg, filename,
va->va_fsid, va->va_fileid,
die ? "]" : "]\n");
else
f("veriexec: %s [%s, %ld:%" PRIu64 ", pid=%u, uid=%u, "
"gid=%u%s", msg, filename, va->va_fsid,
va->va_fileid, l->l_proc->p_pid,
l->l_proc->p_cred->p_ruid,
l->l_proc->p_cred->p_rgid, die ? "]" : "]\n");
}
}