.\" $NetBSD: systrace.4,v 1.5 2002/06/26 06:44:59 gmcgarry Exp $ .\" $OpenBSD: systrace.4,v 1.2 2002/06/03 15:44:17 mpech Exp $ .\" .\" Copyright (c) 2002 CubeSoft Communications, Inc. .\" All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistribution of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Neither the name of CubeSoft Communications, nor the names of its .\" contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from .\" this software without specific prior written permission. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED .\" WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE .\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, .\" INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES .\" (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR .\" SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) .\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, .\" STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING .\" IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE .\" POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" .Dd May 26, 2002 .Dt SYSTRACE 4 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm systrace .Nd enforce and generate policies for system calls .Sh SYNOPSIS .Cd "options SYSTRACE" .Sh DESCRIPTION The .Nm kernel facility provides a mechanism to manipulate and enforce access policies for system calls. Using the .Nm facility it is possible to monitor and control a process's access to the kernel through system calls. .Pp Access to the .Nm facility is provided to userland processes, such as .Xr systrace 1 , through an .Xr ioctl 2 interface on the pseudo-device .Pa /dev/systrace . This interface allows messages to be sent from the kernel to the userland process to request confirmation of an access policy. .Pp The .Nm facility can assign the following policies to system calls for a specific process: .Bl -tag -offset indent -width "XXXXXX" .It SYSTR_POLICY_ASK Send a message on .Pa /dev/systrace requesting the access policy for the system call. .It SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT Immediately allow the system call. .It SYSTR_POLICY_NEVER Immediately deny the system call and return an error code. .El .Sh SYSTRACE MESSAGES A .Xr read 2 operation on the .Nm pseudo-device will block if there are no pending messages, or return the following structure: .Bd -literal struct str_message { int32_t msg_type; #define SYSTR_MSG_ASK 1 #define SYSTR_MSG_RES 2 #define SYSTR_MSG_EMUL 3 #define SYSTR_MSG_CHILD 4 pid_t msg_pid; int16_t msg_policy; union { struct str_msg_emul msg_emul; struct str_msg_ask msg_ask; struct str_msg_child msg_child; } msg_data; }; struct str_msg_emul { char emul[SYSTR_EMULEN]; }; struct str_msg_ask { int32_t code; int32_t argsize; register_t args[SYSTR_MAXARGS]; register_t rval[2]; int32_t result; }; struct str_msg_child { pid_t new_pid; }; .Ed .Sh IOCTL INTERFACE The .Nm facility supports the following .Xr ioctl 2 operations: .Bl -tag -width "XXXXXX" .It Dv SYSTR_CLONE Fa "int" Return a .Nm file descriptor for further .Xr ioctl 2 operations. .It Dv STRIOCATTACH Fa "pid_t" Attach to the process with the specified process ID. This operation will fail under the following conditions: .Pp .Bl -enum -offset indent -compact -width 2n .It The process is trying to attach to itself. .It The process is a system process. .It The process is being traced already. .It You do not own the process and you are not root. .It The process is .Xr init 8 , and the kernel was not compiled with .Cd option INSECURE . .El .It Dv STRIOCDETACH Fa "pid_t" Wake up the process if it is waiting for an answer, and detach from it. .It Dv STRIOCANSWER Fa "struct systrace_answer" Notify the .Nm facility in response to a SYSTR_MSG_ASK message what to do with a system call that was assigned a policy of .Dv SYSTR_POLICY_ASK . .Bd -literal struct systrace_answer { pid_t stra_pid; /* PID of process being traced */ int32_t stra_policy; /* Policy to assign */ int32_t stra_error; /* Return value of denied syscall (will return EPERM if zero) */ int32_t stra_flags; #define SYSTR_FLAGS_RESULT 0x0001 /* Report syscall result */ }; .Ed .Pp Valid return values for .Em stra_policy are SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT, SYSTR_POLICY_ASK and SYSTR_POLICY_NEVER. .It Dv STRIOCIO Fa "struct systrace_io" Copy data in/out of the process being traced. .Bd -literal struct systrace_io { pid_t strio_pid; /* PID of process being traced */ int32_t strio_ops; #define SYSTR_READ 1 #define SYSTR_WRITE 2 void *strio_offs; void *strio_addr; size_t strio_len; }; .Ed .It Dv STRIOCPOLICY Fa "struct systrace_policy" Manipulate the set of policies. .Bd -literal struct systrace_policy { int strp_op; #define SYSTR_POLICY_NEW 1 /* Allocate a new policy */ #define SYSTR_POLICY_ASSIGN 2 /* Assign policy to process */ #define SYSTR_POLICY_MODIFY 3 /* Modify an entry */ int32_t strp_num; union { struct { int16_t code; #define SYSTR_POLICY_ASK 0 #define SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT 1 #define SYSTR_POLICY_NEVER 2 int16_t policy; } assign; pid_t pid; int32_t maxents; } strp_data; #define strp_pid strp_data.pid #define strp_maxents strp_data.maxents #define strp_code strp_data.assign.code #define strp_policy strp_data.assign.policy }; .Ed .Pp The .Dv SYSTR_POLICY_NEW operation allocates a new policy with all entries initialized to .Dv SYSTR_POLICY_ASK , and returns the new policy number into .Va strp_num . The .Dv SYSTR_POLICY_ASSIGN operation attaches the policy identified by .Va strp_num to .Va strp_pid , with a maximum of .Va strp_maxents entries. The .Dv SYSTR_POLICY_MODIFY operation changes the entry indexed by .Va strp_code to .Va strp_policy . .It Dv STRIOCGETCWD Fa "pid_t" Set the working directory of the current process to that of the specified process. .It Dv STRIOCRESCWD Restore the working directory of the current process. .El .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width "/dev/systrace" -compact .It Pa /dev/systrace system call tracing facility .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr systrace 1 , .Xr ioctl 2 , .Xr read 2 , .Xr options 4 , .Xr init 8 .Sh HISTORY The .Nm facility first appeared in .Ox 3.2 . It appeared in .Nx 1.7 . .\" .Sh BUGS .\" .Sh CAVEATS