/* $NetBSD: fix_options.c,v 1.7 2002/02/23 23:28:31 wiz Exp $ */ /* * Routine to disable IP-level socket options. This code was taken from 4.4BSD * rlogind and kernel source, but all mistakes in it are my fault. * * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. */ #include #ifndef lint #if 0 static char sccsid[] = "@(#) fix_options.c 1.6 97/04/08 02:29:19"; #else __RCSID("$NetBSD: fix_options.c,v 1.7 2002/02/23 23:28:31 wiz Exp $"); #endif #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef IPOPT_OPTVAL #define IPOPT_OPTVAL 0 #define IPOPT_OLEN 1 #endif #include "tcpd.h" #define BUFFER_SIZE 512 /* Was: BUFSIZ */ /* fix_options - get rid of IP-level socket options */ void fix_options(request) struct request_info *request; { #ifdef IP_OPTIONS unsigned char optbuf[BUFFER_SIZE / 3], *cp; char lbuf[BUFFER_SIZE], *lp; int optsize = sizeof(optbuf), ipproto; struct protoent *ip; int fd = request->fd; int len = sizeof lbuf; unsigned int opt; int optlen; struct in_addr dummy; struct sockaddr_storage ss; int sslen; /* * check if this is AF_INET socket * XXX IPv6 support? */ sslen = sizeof(ss); if (getsockname(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&ss, &sslen) < 0) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "getsockname: %m"); clean_exit(request); } if (ss.ss_family != AF_INET) return; if ((ip = getprotobyname("ip")) != 0) ipproto = ip->p_proto; else ipproto = IPPROTO_IP; if (getsockopt(fd, ipproto, IP_OPTIONS, (char *) optbuf, &optsize) == 0 && optsize != 0) { /* * Horror! 4.[34] BSD getsockopt() prepends the first-hop destination * address to the result IP options list when source routing options * are present (see ), but produces no output for * other IP options. Solaris 2.x getsockopt() does produce output for * non-routing IP options, and uses the same format as BSD even when * the space for the destination address is unused. The code below * does the right thing with 4.[34]BSD derivatives and Solaris 2, but * may occasionally miss source routing options on incompatible * systems such as Linux. Their choice. * * Look for source routing options. Drop the connection when one is * found. Just wiping the IP options is insufficient: we would still * help the attacker by providing a real TCP sequence number, and the * attacker would still be able to send packets (blind spoofing). I * discussed this attack with Niels Provos, half a year before the * attack was described in open mailing lists. * * It would be cleaner to just return a yes/no reply and let the caller * decide how to deal with it. Resident servers should not terminate. * However I am not prepared to make changes to internal interfaces * on short notice. */ #define ADDR_LEN sizeof(dummy.s_addr) for (cp = optbuf + ADDR_LEN; cp < optbuf + optsize; cp += optlen) { opt = cp[IPOPT_OPTVAL]; if (opt == IPOPT_LSRR || opt == IPOPT_SSRR) { syslog(LOG_WARNING, "refused connect from %s with IP source routing options", eval_client(request)); shutdown(fd, 2); return; } if (opt == IPOPT_EOL) break; if (opt == IPOPT_NOP) { optlen = 1; } else { optlen = cp[IPOPT_OLEN]; if (optlen <= 0) /* Do not loop! */ break; } } lp = lbuf; for (cp = optbuf; optsize > 0; cp++, optsize--, lp += 3) len -= snprintf(lp, len, " %2.2x", *cp); syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "connect from %s with IP options (ignored):%s", eval_client(request), lbuf); if (setsockopt(fd, ipproto, IP_OPTIONS, (char *) 0, optsize) != 0) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "setsockopt IP_OPTIONS NULL: %m"); shutdown(fd, 2); } } #endif }