/* $NetBSD: kern_prot.c,v 1.116 2012/06/09 02:55:32 christos Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * (c) UNIX System Laboratories, Inc. * All or some portions of this file are derived from material licensed * to the University of California by American Telephone and Telegraph * Co. or Unix System Laboratories, Inc. and are reproduced herein with * the permission of UNIX System Laboratories, Inc. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * @(#)kern_prot.c 8.9 (Berkeley) 2/14/95 */ /* * System calls related to processes and protection */ #include __KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: kern_prot.c,v 1.116 2012/06/09 02:55:32 christos Exp $"); #include "opt_compat_43.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include int sys_getpid(struct lwp *, const void *, register_t *); int sys_getpid_with_ppid(struct lwp *, const void *, register_t *); int sys_getuid(struct lwp *, const void *, register_t *); int sys_getuid_with_euid(struct lwp *, const void *, register_t *); int sys_getgid(struct lwp *, const void *, register_t *); int sys_getgid_with_egid(struct lwp *, const void *, register_t *); /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_getpid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval) { struct proc *p = l->l_proc; *retval = p->p_pid; return (0); } /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_getpid_with_ppid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval) { struct proc *p = l->l_proc; retval[0] = p->p_pid; retval[1] = p->p_ppid; return (0); } /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_getppid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval) { struct proc *p = l->l_proc; *retval = p->p_ppid; return (0); } /* Get process group ID; note that POSIX getpgrp takes no parameter */ int sys_getpgrp(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval) { struct proc *p = l->l_proc; mutex_enter(proc_lock); *retval = p->p_pgrp->pg_id; mutex_exit(proc_lock); return (0); } /* * Return the process group ID of the session leader (session ID) * for the specified process. */ int sys_getsid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_getsid_args *uap, register_t *retval) { /* { syscalldarg(pid_t) pid; } */ pid_t pid = SCARG(uap, pid); struct proc *p; int error = 0; mutex_enter(proc_lock); if (pid == 0) *retval = l->l_proc->p_session->s_sid; else if ((p = proc_find(pid)) != NULL) *retval = p->p_session->s_sid; else error = ESRCH; mutex_exit(proc_lock); return error; } int sys_getpgid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_getpgid_args *uap, register_t *retval) { /* { syscallarg(pid_t) pid; } */ pid_t pid = SCARG(uap, pid); struct proc *p; int error = 0; mutex_enter(proc_lock); if (pid == 0) *retval = l->l_proc->p_pgid; else if ((p = proc_find(pid)) != NULL) *retval = p->p_pgid; else error = ESRCH; mutex_exit(proc_lock); return error; } /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_getuid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval) { *retval = kauth_cred_getuid(l->l_cred); return (0); } /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_getuid_with_euid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval) { retval[0] = kauth_cred_getuid(l->l_cred); retval[1] = kauth_cred_geteuid(l->l_cred); return (0); } /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_geteuid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval) { *retval = kauth_cred_geteuid(l->l_cred); return (0); } /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_getgid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval) { *retval = kauth_cred_getgid(l->l_cred); return (0); } /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_getgid_with_egid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval) { retval[0] = kauth_cred_getgid(l->l_cred); retval[1] = kauth_cred_getegid(l->l_cred); return (0); } /* * Get effective group ID. The "egid" is groups[0], and could be obtained * via getgroups. This syscall exists because it is somewhat painful to do * correctly in a library function. */ /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_getegid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval) { *retval = kauth_cred_getegid(l->l_cred); return (0); } int sys_getgroups(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_getgroups_args *uap, register_t *retval) { /* { syscallarg(int) gidsetsize; syscallarg(gid_t *) gidset; } */ *retval = kauth_cred_ngroups(l->l_cred); if (SCARG(uap, gidsetsize) == 0) return 0; if (SCARG(uap, gidsetsize) < (int)*retval) return EINVAL; return kauth_cred_getgroups(l->l_cred, SCARG(uap, gidset), *retval, UIO_USERSPACE); } int sys_setsid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval) { struct proc *p = l->l_proc; int error; error = proc_enterpgrp(p, p->p_pid, p->p_pid, true); *retval = p->p_pid; return (error); } /* * set process group (setpgid/old setpgrp) * * caller does setpgid(targpid, targpgid) * * pgid must be in valid range (EINVAL) * pid must be caller or child of caller (ESRCH) * if a child * pid must be in same session (EPERM) * pid can't have done an exec (EACCES) * if pgid != pid * there must exist some pid in same session having pgid (EPERM) * pid must not be session leader (EPERM) * * Permission checks now in proc_enterpgrp() */ int sys_setpgid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_setpgid_args *uap, register_t *retval) { /* { syscallarg(int) pid; syscallarg(int) pgid; } */ struct proc *p = l->l_proc; pid_t targp, pgid; if (SCARG(uap, pgid) < 0) return EINVAL; if ((targp = SCARG(uap, pid)) == 0) targp = p->p_pid; if ((pgid = SCARG(uap, pgid)) == 0) pgid = targp; return proc_enterpgrp(p, targp, pgid, false); } /* * Set real, effective and saved uids to the requested values. * non-root callers can only ever change uids to values that match * one of the processes current uid values. * This is further restricted by the flags argument. */ int do_setresuid(struct lwp *l, uid_t r, uid_t e, uid_t sv, u_int flags) { struct proc *p = l->l_proc; kauth_cred_t cred, ncred; ncred = kauth_cred_alloc(); /* Get a write lock on the process credential. */ proc_crmod_enter(); cred = p->p_cred; /* * Check that the new value is one of the allowed existing values, * or that we have root privilege. */ if ((r != -1 && !((flags & ID_R_EQ_R) && r == kauth_cred_getuid(cred)) && !((flags & ID_R_EQ_E) && r == kauth_cred_geteuid(cred)) && !((flags & ID_R_EQ_S) && r == kauth_cred_getsvuid(cred))) || (e != -1 && !((flags & ID_E_EQ_R) && e == kauth_cred_getuid(cred)) && !((flags & ID_E_EQ_E) && e == kauth_cred_geteuid(cred)) && !((flags & ID_E_EQ_S) && e == kauth_cred_getsvuid(cred))) || (sv != -1 && !((flags & ID_S_EQ_R) && sv == kauth_cred_getuid(cred)) && !((flags & ID_S_EQ_E) && sv == kauth_cred_geteuid(cred)) && !((flags & ID_S_EQ_S) && sv == kauth_cred_getsvuid(cred)))) { int error; error = kauth_authorize_process(cred, KAUTH_PROCESS_SETID, p, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (error != 0) { proc_crmod_leave(cred, ncred, false); return error; } } /* If nothing has changed, short circuit the request */ if ((r == -1 || r == kauth_cred_getuid(cred)) && (e == -1 || e == kauth_cred_geteuid(cred)) && (sv == -1 || sv == kauth_cred_getsvuid(cred))) { proc_crmod_leave(cred, ncred, false); return 0; } kauth_cred_clone(cred, ncred); if (r != -1 && r != kauth_cred_getuid(ncred)) { /* Update count of processes for this user */ (void)chgproccnt(kauth_cred_getuid(ncred), -1); (void)chgproccnt(r, 1); /* The first lwp of a process is not counted */ int nlwps = p->p_nlwps - 1; (void)chglwpcnt(kauth_cred_getuid(ncred), -nlwps); (void)chglwpcnt(r, nlwps); kauth_cred_setuid(ncred, r); } if (sv != -1) kauth_cred_setsvuid(ncred, sv); if (e != -1) kauth_cred_seteuid(ncred, e); /* Broadcast our credentials to the process and other LWPs. */ proc_crmod_leave(ncred, cred, true); return 0; } /* * Set real, effective and saved gids to the requested values. * non-root callers can only ever change gids to values that match * one of the processes current gid values. * This is further restricted by the flags argument. */ int do_setresgid(struct lwp *l, gid_t r, gid_t e, gid_t sv, u_int flags) { struct proc *p = l->l_proc; kauth_cred_t cred, ncred; ncred = kauth_cred_alloc(); /* Get a write lock on the process credential. */ proc_crmod_enter(); cred = p->p_cred; /* * check new value is one of the allowed existing values. * otherwise, check if we have root privilege. */ if ((r != -1 && !((flags & ID_R_EQ_R) && r == kauth_cred_getgid(cred)) && !((flags & ID_R_EQ_E) && r == kauth_cred_getegid(cred)) && !((flags & ID_R_EQ_S) && r == kauth_cred_getsvgid(cred))) || (e != -1 && !((flags & ID_E_EQ_R) && e == kauth_cred_getgid(cred)) && !((flags & ID_E_EQ_E) && e == kauth_cred_getegid(cred)) && !((flags & ID_E_EQ_S) && e == kauth_cred_getsvgid(cred))) || (sv != -1 && !((flags & ID_S_EQ_R) && sv == kauth_cred_getgid(cred)) && !((flags & ID_S_EQ_E) && sv == kauth_cred_getegid(cred)) && !((flags & ID_S_EQ_S) && sv == kauth_cred_getsvgid(cred)))) { int error; error = kauth_authorize_process(cred, KAUTH_PROCESS_SETID, p, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (error != 0) { proc_crmod_leave(cred, ncred, false); return error; } } /* If nothing has changed, short circuit the request */ if ((r == -1 || r == kauth_cred_getgid(cred)) && (e == -1 || e == kauth_cred_getegid(cred)) && (sv == -1 || sv == kauth_cred_getsvgid(cred))) { proc_crmod_leave(cred, ncred, false); return 0; } kauth_cred_clone(cred, ncred); if (r != -1) kauth_cred_setgid(ncred, r); if (sv != -1) kauth_cred_setsvgid(ncred, sv); if (e != -1) kauth_cred_setegid(ncred, e); /* Broadcast our credentials to the process and other LWPs. */ proc_crmod_leave(ncred, cred, true); return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setuid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_setuid_args *uap, register_t *retval) { /* { syscallarg(uid_t) uid; } */ uid_t uid = SCARG(uap, uid); return do_setresuid(l, uid, uid, uid, ID_R_EQ_R | ID_E_EQ_R | ID_S_EQ_R); } /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_seteuid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_seteuid_args *uap, register_t *retval) { /* { syscallarg(uid_t) euid; } */ return do_setresuid(l, -1, SCARG(uap, euid), -1, ID_E_EQ_R | ID_E_EQ_S); } int sys_setreuid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_setreuid_args *uap, register_t *retval) { /* { syscallarg(uid_t) ruid; syscallarg(uid_t) euid; } */ kauth_cred_t cred = l->l_cred; uid_t ruid, euid, svuid; ruid = SCARG(uap, ruid); euid = SCARG(uap, euid); if (ruid == -1) ruid = kauth_cred_getuid(cred); if (euid == -1) euid = kauth_cred_geteuid(cred); /* Saved uid is set to the new euid if the ruid changed */ svuid = (ruid == kauth_cred_getuid(cred)) ? -1 : euid; return do_setresuid(l, ruid, euid, svuid, ID_R_EQ_R | ID_R_EQ_E | ID_E_EQ_R | ID_E_EQ_E | ID_E_EQ_S | ID_S_EQ_R | ID_S_EQ_E | ID_S_EQ_S); } /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setgid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_setgid_args *uap, register_t *retval) { /* { syscallarg(gid_t) gid; } */ gid_t gid = SCARG(uap, gid); return do_setresgid(l, gid, gid, gid, ID_R_EQ_R | ID_E_EQ_R | ID_S_EQ_R); } /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setegid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_setegid_args *uap, register_t *retval) { /* { syscallarg(gid_t) egid; } */ return do_setresgid(l, -1, SCARG(uap, egid), -1, ID_E_EQ_R | ID_E_EQ_S); } int sys_setregid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_setregid_args *uap, register_t *retval) { /* { syscallarg(gid_t) rgid; syscallarg(gid_t) egid; } */ kauth_cred_t cred = l->l_cred; gid_t rgid, egid, svgid; rgid = SCARG(uap, rgid); egid = SCARG(uap, egid); if (rgid == -1) rgid = kauth_cred_getgid(cred); if (egid == -1) egid = kauth_cred_getegid(cred); /* Saved gid is set to the new egid if the rgid changed */ svgid = rgid == kauth_cred_getgid(cred) ? -1 : egid; return do_setresgid(l, rgid, egid, svgid, ID_R_EQ_R | ID_R_EQ_E | ID_E_EQ_R | ID_E_EQ_E | ID_E_EQ_S | ID_S_EQ_R | ID_S_EQ_E | ID_S_EQ_S); } int sys_issetugid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval) { struct proc *p = l->l_proc; /* * Note: OpenBSD sets a P_SUGIDEXEC flag set at execve() time, * we use PK_SUGID because we consider changing the owners as * "tainting" as well. * This is significant for procs that start as root and "become" * a user without an exec - programs cannot know *everything* * that libc *might* have put in their data segment. */ *retval = (p->p_flag & PK_SUGID) != 0; return (0); } /* ARGSUSED */ int sys_setgroups(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_setgroups_args *uap, register_t *retval) { /* { syscallarg(int) gidsetsize; syscallarg(const gid_t *) gidset; } */ kauth_cred_t ncred; int error; ncred = kauth_cred_alloc(); error = kauth_cred_setgroups(ncred, SCARG(uap, gidset), SCARG(uap, gidsetsize), -1, UIO_USERSPACE); if (error != 0) { kauth_cred_free(ncred); return error; } return kauth_proc_setgroups(l, ncred); } /* * Get login name, if available. */ /* ARGSUSED */ int sys___getlogin(struct lwp *l, const struct sys___getlogin_args *uap, register_t *retval) { /* { syscallarg(char *) namebuf; syscallarg(size_t) namelen; } */ struct proc *p = l->l_proc; char login[sizeof(p->p_session->s_login)]; int namelen = SCARG(uap, namelen); if (namelen > sizeof(login)) namelen = sizeof(login); mutex_enter(proc_lock); memcpy(login, p->p_session->s_login, namelen); mutex_exit(proc_lock); return (copyout(login, (void *)SCARG(uap, namebuf), namelen)); } /* * Set login name. */ /* ARGSUSED */ int sys___setlogin(struct lwp *l, const struct sys___setlogin_args *uap, register_t *retval) { /* { syscallarg(const char *) namebuf; } */ struct proc *p = l->l_proc; struct session *sp; char newname[sizeof sp->s_login + 1]; int error; if ((error = kauth_authorize_process(l->l_cred, KAUTH_PROCESS_SETID, p, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0) return (error); error = copyinstr(SCARG(uap, namebuf), newname, sizeof newname, NULL); if (error != 0) return (error == ENAMETOOLONG ? EINVAL : error); mutex_enter(proc_lock); sp = p->p_session; if (sp->s_flags & S_LOGIN_SET && p->p_pid != sp->s_sid && strncmp(newname, sp->s_login, sizeof sp->s_login) != 0) log(LOG_WARNING, "%s (pid %d) changing logname from " "%.*s to %s\n", p->p_comm, p->p_pid, (int)sizeof sp->s_login, sp->s_login, newname); sp->s_flags |= S_LOGIN_SET; strncpy(sp->s_login, newname, sizeof sp->s_login); mutex_exit(proc_lock); return (0); }