in a variable that can be added other maps than amd.home. Patch submitted
in PR 11826 by Anthony Mallet <anthony.mallet@ficus.yi.org>
* Slightly optimize calculation of DOMAIN
server1,server2,server3 on the command line. This allows the user to
optionally avoid the interactive mode of ypinit. If the -l flag is not
supplied, the old behavior is retained.
This allows users to do things like rsh out creation of YP clients, and
sushi to generate yp clients/servers/slaves.
It broke a sequence of:
key1 \
value1 \
value2 \
value3 \
key2 \
value4 \
etc.
Handle both the netgroup rule and the amd.home rule using a .USEBEFORE
macro rule, since they contain the same code.
XXX: Needs new make(1)
hosts.{byname,byaddr} is still an IPv4 only mapping.
obeys solaris8 practice. see comments in ypinit/Makefile.yp for details.
TODO: interop test with solaris8 (any takers?)
through sort before makedbm.
This drops Erik Rungi's <rungus@openface.ca> passwd.byname generation for
3000 entries from 25-30 seconds down to 0.75 seconds.
- use fgetln() instead of fgets()
- store info in internal buffer
- fix \\ support
- count line numbers internally, so \\ lines don't mess up count
* ypdb_store():
- ensure that the length of key or val doesn't exceed YPMAXRECORD
* makedbm, mknetid, revnetgroup, stdethers, stdhosts:
- improve error handling
- take advantage of rewritten read_line(), and cleanup line parsing
- don't print trailing ` ' for key/val pairs with an empty val
* Makefile.yp:
- fix up building of ypservers (from Chuck Cranor)
* ypinit.sh:
- remove leading spaces in variable assignment (from Chuck Cranor)
follow our formatting convetions.
- add support for aliases, amd.home, master.passwd and netgroup maps
[initially from openbsd, reworked as above]
- if INSECURE != "yes" then the passwd.by* maps will not contain the
encrypted version of the passwd - privileged clients will request
info from the master.passwd.by* maps.
FreeBSD originally implemented this, and & OpenBSD supports it too.
[from openbsd].
By default, passwd maps are INSECURE, but in a *BSD-only environment,
this could be disabled to allow for a [slightly] higher degree of
security from non-root users...
christos