FORTIFY_SOURCE feature of libssp, thus checking the size of arguments to
various string and memory copy and set functions (as well as a few system
calls and other miscellany) where known at function entry. RedHat has
evidently built all "core system packages" with this option for some time.
This option should be used at the top of Makefiles (or Makefile.inc where
this is used for subdirectories) but after any setting of LIB.
This is only useful for userland code, and cannot be used in libc or in
any code which includes the libc internals, because it overrides certain
libc functions with macros. Some effort has been made to make USE_FORT=yes
work correctly for a full-system build by having the bsd.sys.mk logic
disable the feature where it should not be used (libc, libssp iteself,
the kernel) but no attempt has been made to build the entire system with
USE_FORT and doing so will doubtless expose numerous bugs and misfeatures.
Adjust the system build so that all programs and libraries that are setuid,
directly handle network data (including serial comm data), perform
authentication, or appear likely to have (or have a history of having)
data-driven bugs (e.g. file(1)) are built with USE_FORT=yes by default,
with the exception of libc, which cannot use USE_FORT and thus uses
only USE_SSP by default. Tested on i386 with no ill results; USE_FORT=no
per-directory or in a system build will disable if desired.
While there are some open issues, particulary wrt support of old
NetBSD-specific interfaces, it is better to get the code some public
testing before NetBSD-4 is branched.
derive IP address(es) from the interface (e.g "... from any to fxp0").
This however, creates window for possible attacks from the network.
Implement the solution proposed by YAMAMOTO Takashi:
Add /etc/defaults/pf.boot.conf and load it with the /etc/rc.d/pf_boot
script before starting the network. People who don't like the default
rules can override it with their own /etc/pf.boot.conf.
The default rules have been obtained from OpenBSD.
No objections on: tech-security
appeared and whether it's really part of pf or not is still unclear. Looking
at the other *BSDs it seems that they have left out spamd when importing pf,
and now we do that too. Also, the name conflicted with another more popular
used tool, after the rename to pfspamd it was left with completely unusable
documentation which apparently no-one wanted to fix.
A port of the latest spamd will be imported into pkgsrc soon.
Suggested by several people, no objections on last proposal on tech-userlevel.
`spamd-setup', and `spamdb' as `pfspamd', `pfspamd-setup', and `pfspamdb'.
To quote Steven M. Bellovin:
This [having a program in basesrc with the same name as a widely used and
completely different program in pkgsrc] is a seriously bad idea; it
violates the rule of least surprise. That's bad enough in normal
situations; here, we're talking about security. You do *not* want to
confuse people about security features; they're hard enough to get right
as is.
headers and LKM.
Add MKPF; if set to no, don't build and install the pf(4) programs,
headers, LKM and spamd.
Both options default to yes, so nothing changed in the default build.
Reviewed by lukem.
some files were imported to the different places from the previous version.
v3_5:
etc/pf.conf
etc/pf.os
etc/spamd.conf
share/man/man4/pf.4
share/man/man4/pflog.4
share/man/man5/pf.conf.5
share/man/man5/pf.os.5
share/man/man5/spamd.conf.5
v3_6:
dist/pf/etc/pf.conf
dist/pf/etc/pf.os
dist/pf/etc/spamd.conf
dist/pf/share/man/man4/pf.4
dist/pf/share/man/man4/pflog.4
dist/pf/share/man/man5/pf.conf.5
dist/pf/share/man/man5/pf.os.5
dist/pf/share/man/man5/spamd.conf.5
tron