KAUTH_REQ_NETWORK_NFS_EXPORT and KAUTH_REQ_NETWORK_NFS_SVC, and use them
to replace two KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER calls in the NFS code.
Also replace two more with KAUTH_SYSTEM_MKNOD, where appropriate.
Documetnation and examples updated. More to come.
Make the FreeBSD and Linux compat code convert the parameters to their
native representation and call the native routines.
Remove KAUTH_PROCESS_SCHEDULER_GET/SET.
Update documentation and examples.
XXX: For now, only the Linux compat code does the priority conversion
XXX: right.
Linux priority conversion code from yamt@, thanks!
Okay yamt@.
words, don't pass an action and a request, and just use a single action to
indicate what is the operation in question.
This is the first step in fixing PR/37986, which calls for policy/priority
checking in the secmodel code. Right now we're lacking room for another
parameter required to make a decision, and this change makes room for such.
- Add a KAUTH_PROCESS_SCHEDULER action, to handle scheduler related
requests, and add specific requests for set/get scheduler policy and
set/get scheduler parameters.
- Add a KAUTH_PROCESS_KEVENT_FILTER action, to handle kevent(2) related
requests.
- Add a KAUTH_DEVICE_TTY_STI action to handle requests to TIOCSTI.
- Add requests for the KAUTH_PROCESS_CANSEE action, indicating what
process information is being looked at (entry itself, args, env,
open files).
- Add requests for the KAUTH_PROCESS_RLIMIT action indicating set/get.
- Add requests for the KAUTH_PROCESS_CORENAME action indicating set/get.
- Make bsd44 secmodel code handle the newly added rqeuests appropriately.
All of the above make it possible to issue finer-grained kauth(9) calls in
many places, removing some KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER requests.
- Remove the "CAN" from KAUTH_PROCESS_CAN{KTRACE,PROCFS,PTRACE,SIGNAL}.
Discussed with christos@ and yamt@.
Been running in my tree for over a month at least.
Reviewed and okay yamt@, and special thanks to him as well as rittera@
for making this possible through fixing NDIS to not call fork1() with
l1 != curlwp.
active development and its ABI (and possibly API) may change between
NetBSD versions.
This is critical to, for example, LKMs, where there might be a case of them
being built using one version of the ABI and used on system with another.
The main concern for "ABI" here is the set of KAUTH_* actions and requests
that is (for now) an enum. This note is likely to be removed as kauth(9)
is stablized -- hopefully before NetBSD 5.0.
okay christos@
implementation and meant to be used by security models to hook credential
related operations (init, fork, copy, free -- hooked in kauth_cred_alloc(),
kauth_proc_fork(), kauth_cred_clone(), and kauth_cred_free(), respectively)
and document it.
Add specificdata to credentials, and routines to register/deregister new
"keys", as well as set/get routines. This allows security models to add
their own private data to a kauth_cred_t.
The above two, combined, allow security models to control inheritance of
their own private data in credentials which is a requirement for doing
stuff like, I dunno, capabilities?
requests and centralizing them all. The result is that some of these
are not used on some architectures, but the documentation was updated
to reflect that.
- Make procfs_control() in procfs_ctl.c static,
- Add an argument to the above, 'pfs', for the pfsnode,
- Add another request type to KAUTH_PROCESS_CANPROCFS named
KAUTH_REQ_PROCESS_CANPROCFS_CTL (and update documentation),
- Use the above combination in a call to kauth_authorize_process().
- makes sysctl_proc_find() just lookup the process,
- use KAUTH_PROCESS_CANSEE requests to determine if the caller is
allowed to view the target process' corename, stop flags, and
rlimits,
- use explicit kauth(9) calls with KAUTH_PROCESS_CORENAME,
KAUTH_REQ_PROCESS_RESOURCE_NICE, KAUTH_REQ_PROCESS_RESOURCE_RLIMIT,
and KAUTH_PROCESS_STOPFLAG when modifying the aforementioned.
- sync man-page and example skeleton secmodel with reality.
okay yamt@
this is a pullup candidate.
First, remove process_checkioperm() calls from MD code. Similar checks
using kauth(9) routines (on the process scope, using appropriate action)
are done in the callers.
Add secmodel back-end to handle each subsystem.
allowed. It takes three int * arguments indicating domain, type, and
protocol. Replace previous KAUTH_REQ_NETWORK_SOCKET_RAWSOCK with it (but
keep it still).
Places that used to explicitly check for privileged context now don't
need it anymore, so I replaced these with XXX comment indiacting it for
future reference.
Documented and updated examples as well.
While here, undocument converstion routines for pcred/ucred, as these are
going to be deprecated. They already are, actually, but because we exposed
them to userland so cleverly with sysctl, it may require more thinking
before actually removing them. For now, just make sure nobody relies on
these types. Or at least try...
used to manage network interfaces.
Add four sub-actions to fulfill generic needs for now, until a more
carefully defined usage of the interface is documented: get, set,
getpriv, and setpriv.
