https://www.top10vpn.com/research/wifi-vulnerabilities/
PEAP client: Update Phase 2 authentication requirements
The previous PEAP client behavior allowed the server to skip Phase 2
authentication with the expectation that the server was authenticated
during Phase 1 through TLS server certificate validation. Various PEAP
specifications are not exactly clear on what the behavior on this front
is supposed to be and as such, this ended up being more flexible than
the TTLS/FAST/TEAP cases. However, this is not really ideal when
unfortunately common misconfiguration of PEAP is used in deployed
devices where the server trust root (ca_cert) is not configured or the
user has an easy option for allowing this validation step to be skipped.
Change the default PEAP client behavior to be to require Phase 2
authentication to be successfully completed for cases where TLS session
resumption is not used and the client certificate has not been
configured. Those two exceptions are the main cases where a deployed
authentication server might skip Phase 2 and as such, where a more
strict default behavior could result in undesired interoperability
issues. Requiring Phase 2 authentication will end up disabling TLS
session resumption automatically to avoid interoperability issues.
Allow Phase 2 authentication behavior to be configured with a new phase1
configuration parameter option:
'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
* 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
* 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
(private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
not used (default)
* 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
Provide a single variable
CC_WNO_ADDRESS_OF_PACKED_MEMBER
with options for both clang and gcc, to replace
CLANG_NO_ADDR_OF_PACKED_MEMBER
CC_NO_ADDR_OF_PACKED_MEMBER
GCC_NO_ADDR_OF_PACKED_MEMBER
Using the convention CC_compilerflag, where compilerflag
is based on the full compiler flag name.
src/external/bsd/wpa/bin/hostapd/../../dist/src/common/dpp.c:5377:7:
error: format specifies type 'unsigned long' but the argument has type
'os_time_t' (aka 'long long') [-Werror,-Wformat]
2019-08-07 - v2.9
* SAE changes
- disable use of groups using Brainpool curves
- improved protection against side channel attacks
[https://w1.fi/security/2019-6/]
* EAP-pwd changes
- disable use of groups using Brainpool curves
- improved protection against side channel attacks
[https://w1.fi/security/2019-6/]
* fixed FT-EAP initial mobility domain association using PMKSA caching
* added configuration of airtime policy
* fixed FILS to and RSNE into (Re)Association Response frames
* fixed DPP bootstrapping URI parser of channel list
* added support for regulatory WMM limitation (for ETSI)
* added support for MACsec Key Agreement using IEEE 802.1X/PSK
* added experimental support for EAP-TEAP server (RFC 7170)
* added experimental support for EAP-TLS server with TLS v1.3
* added support for two server certificates/keys (RSA/ECC)
* added AKMSuiteSelector into "STA <addr>" control interface data to
determine with AKM was used for an association
* added eap_sim_id parameter to allow EAP-SIM/AKA server pseudonym and
fast reauthentication use to be disabled
* fixed an ECDH operation corner case with OpenSSL
2019-04-21 - v2.8
* SAE changes
- added support for SAE Password Identifier
- changed default configuration to enable only group 19
(i.e., disable groups 20, 21, 25, 26 from default configuration) and
disable all unsuitable groups completely based on REVmd changes
- improved anti-clogging token mechanism and SAE authentication
frame processing during heavy CPU load; this mitigates some issues
with potential DoS attacks trying to flood an AP with large number
of SAE messages
- added Finite Cyclic Group field in status code 77 responses
- reject use of unsuitable groups based on new implementation guidance
in REVmd (allow only FFC groups with prime >= 3072 bits and ECC
groups with prime >= 256)
- minimize timing and memory use differences in PWE derivation
[https://w1.fi/security/2019-1/] (CVE-2019-9494)
- fixed confirm message validation in error cases
[https://w1.fi/security/2019-3/] (CVE-2019-9496)
* EAP-pwd changes
- minimize timing and memory use differences in PWE derivation
[https://w1.fi/security/2019-2/] (CVE-2019-9495)
- verify peer scalar/element
[https://w1.fi/security/2019-4/] (CVE-2019-9497 and CVE-2019-9498)
- fix message reassembly issue with unexpected fragment
[https://w1.fi/security/2019-5/]
- enforce rand,mask generation rules more strictly
- fix a memory leak in PWE derivation
- disallow ECC groups with a prime under 256 bits (groups 25, 26, and
27)
* Hotspot 2.0 changes
- added support for release number 3
- reject release 2 or newer association without PMF
* added support for RSN operating channel validation
(CONFIG_OCV=y and configuration parameter ocv=1)
* added Multi-AP protocol support
* added FTM responder configuration
* fixed build with LibreSSL
* added FT/RRB workaround for short Ethernet frame padding
* fixed KEK2 derivation for FILS+FT
* added RSSI-based association rejection from OCE
* extended beacon reporting functionality
* VLAN changes
- allow local VLAN management with remote RADIUS authentication
- add WPA/WPA2 passphrase/PSK -based VLAN assignment
* OpenSSL: allow systemwide policies to be overridden
* extended PEAP to derive EMSK to enable use with ERP/FILS
* extended WPS to allow SAE configuration to be added automatically
for PSK (wps_cred_add_sae=1)
* fixed FT and SA Query Action frame with AP-MLME-in-driver cases
* OWE: allow Diffie-Hellman Parameter element to be included with DPP
in preparation for DPP protocol extension
* RADIUS server: started to accept ERP keyName-NAI as user identity
automatically without matching EAP database entry
* fixed PTK rekeying with FILS and FT
ChangeLog for hostapd
2019-08-07 - v2.9
* SAE changes
- disable use of groups using Brainpool curves
- improved protection against side channel attacks
[https://w1.fi/security/2019-6/]
* EAP-pwd changes
- disable use of groups using Brainpool curves
- allow the set of groups to be configured (eap_pwd_groups)
- improved protection against side channel attacks
[https://w1.fi/security/2019-6/]
* fixed FT-EAP initial mobility domain association using PMKSA caching
(disabled by default for backwards compatibility; can be enabled
with ft_eap_pmksa_caching=1)
* fixed a regression in OpenSSL 1.1+ engine loading
* added validation of RSNE in (Re)Association Response frames
* fixed DPP bootstrapping URI parser of channel list
* extended EAP-SIM/AKA fast re-authentication to allow use with FILS
* extended ca_cert_blob to support PEM format
* improved robustness of P2P Action frame scheduling
* added support for EAP-SIM/AKA using anonymous@realm identity
* fixed Hotspot 2.0 credential selection based on roaming consortium
to ignore credentials without a specific EAP method
* added experimental support for EAP-TEAP peer (RFC 7170)
* added experimental support for EAP-TLS peer with TLS v1.3
* fixed a regression in WMM parameter configuration for a TDLS peer
* fixed a regression in operation with drivers that offload 802.1X
4-way handshake
* fixed an ECDH operation corner case with OpenSSL
2019-04-21 - v2.8
* SAE changes
- added support for SAE Password Identifier
- changed default configuration to enable only groups 19, 20, 21
(i.e., disable groups 25 and 26) and disable all unsuitable groups
completely based on REVmd changes
- do not regenerate PWE unnecessarily when the AP uses the
anti-clogging token mechanisms
- fixed some association cases where both SAE and FT-SAE were enabled
on both the station and the selected AP
- started to prefer FT-SAE over SAE AKM if both are enabled
- started to prefer FT-SAE over FT-PSK if both are enabled
- fixed FT-SAE when SAE PMKSA caching is used
- reject use of unsuitable groups based on new implementation guidance
in REVmd (allow only FFC groups with prime >= 3072 bits and ECC
groups with prime >= 256)
- minimize timing and memory use differences in PWE derivation
[https://w1.fi/security/2019-1/] (CVE-2019-9494)
* EAP-pwd changes
- minimize timing and memory use differences in PWE derivation
[https://w1.fi/security/2019-2/] (CVE-2019-9495)
- verify server scalar/element
[https://w1.fi/security/2019-4/] (CVE-2019-9499)
- fix message reassembly issue with unexpected fragment
[https://w1.fi/security/2019-5/]
- enforce rand,mask generation rules more strictly
- fix a memory leak in PWE derivation
- disallow ECC groups with a prime under 256 bits (groups 25, 26, and
27)
* fixed CONFIG_IEEE80211R=y (FT) build without CONFIG_FILS=y
* Hotspot 2.0 changes
- do not indicate release number that is higher than the one
AP supports
- added support for release number 3
- enable PMF automatically for network profiles created from
credentials
* fixed OWE network profile saving
* fixed DPP network profile saving
* added support for RSN operating channel validation
(CONFIG_OCV=y and network profile parameter ocv=1)
* added Multi-AP backhaul STA support
* fixed build with LibreSSL
* number of MKA/MACsec fixes and extensions
* extended domain_match and domain_suffix_match to allow list of values
* fixed dNSName matching in domain_match and domain_suffix_match when
using wolfSSL
* started to prefer FT-EAP-SHA384 over WPA-EAP-SUITE-B-192 AKM if both
are enabled
* extended nl80211 Connect and external authentication to support
SAE, FT-SAE, FT-EAP-SHA384
* fixed KEK2 derivation for FILS+FT
* extended client_cert file to allow loading of a chain of PEM
encoded certificates
* extended beacon reporting functionality
* extended D-Bus interface with number of new properties
* fixed a regression in FT-over-DS with mac80211-based drivers
* OpenSSL: allow systemwide policies to be overridden
* extended driver flags indication for separate 802.1X and PSK
4-way handshake offload capability
* added support for random P2P Device/Interface Address use
* extended PEAP to derive EMSK to enable use with ERP/FILS
* extended WPS to allow SAE configuration to be added automatically
for PSK (wps_cred_add_sae=1)
* removed support for the old D-Bus interface (CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS)
* extended domain_match and domain_suffix_match to allow list of values
* added a RSN workaround for misbehaving PMF APs that advertise
IGTK/BIP KeyID using incorrect byte order
* fixed PTK rekeying with FILS and FT
Messages such as RTM_IFNFO or RTM_IFANNOUNCE could have been lost.
As such, sync the state of our internal driver to the state of the
system interfaces as reported by getifaddrs(2).
This change requires the routing socket be placed in non-blocking
mode. While here, set the routing and inet sockets to close on exec.
right now. new address-of-packed-member and format-overflow
warnings have new GCC_NO_ADDR_OF_PACKED_MEMBER amd
GCC_NO_FORMAT_OVERFLOW variables to remove these warnings.
apply to a bunch of the tree. mostly, these are real bugs that
should be fixed, but in many cases, only by removing the 'packed'
attribute from some structure that doesn't really need it. (i
looked at many different ones, and while perhaps 60-80% were
already properly aligned, it wasn't clear to me that the uses
were always coming from sane data vs network alignment, so it
doesn't seem safe to remove packed without careful research for
each affect struct.) clang already warned (and was not erroring)
for many of these cases, but gcc picked up dozens more.
If there is no matching interface given, but interface matching is enabled
then all interfaces on the system will try to be initialized.
Non wireless interfaces will fail and the loopback device will be one
of these, so just log a diagnostic rather than an error.
Now that both hostapd and wpa_supplicant react to interface flag
changes, there is no need to set or remove IFF_UP.
It should be an administrative flag only.
Do not process any received Management frames with unexpected/invalid SA
so that we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end up
sending out frames to unexpected destination. This prevents unexpected
sequences where an unprotected frame might end up causing the AP to send
out a response to another device and that other device processing the
unexpected response.
In particular, this prevents some potential denial of service cases
where the unexpected response frame from the AP might result in a
connected station dropping its association.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This reduces differences in timing and memory access within the
hunting-and-pecking loop for ECC groups that have a prime that is not
close to a power of two (e.g., Brainpool curves).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
(cherry picked from commit cd803299ca485eb857e37c88f973fccfbb8600e5)
This reduces differences in timing and memory access within the
hunting-and-pecking loop for ECC groups that have a prime that is not
close to a power of two (e.g., Brainpool curves).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
(cherry picked from commit 147bf7b88a9c231322b5b574263071ca6dbb0503)
This converts crypto_bignum_to_bin() to use the OpenSSL/BoringSSL
functions BN_bn2binpad()/BN_bn2bin_padded(), when available, to avoid
differences in runtime and memory access patterns depending on the
leading bytes of the BIGNUM value.
OpenSSL 1.0.2 and LibreSSL do not include such functions, so those cases
are still using the previous implementation where the BN_num_bytes()
call may result in different memory access pattern.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1e237903f5b5d3117342daf006c5878cdb45e3d3)
that is equal or greater than the prime and as such, need for going
through the PWE derivation loop multiple times. This can result in
sufficient timing different to allow an external observer to determine
how many rounds are needed and that can leak information about the used
password.
Force at least 40 loop rounds for these MODP groups similarly to the ECC
group design to mask timing. This behavior is not described in IEEE Std
802.11-2016 for SAE, but it does not result in different values (i.e.,
only different timing), so such implementation specific countermeasures
can be done without breaking interoperability with other implementation.
Note: These MODP groups 22, 23, and 24 are not considered sufficiently
strong to be used with SAE (or more or less anything else). As such,
they should never be enabled in runtime configuration for any production
use cases. These changes to introduce additional protection to mask
timing is only for completeness of implementation and not an indication
that these groups should be used.
This is related to CVE-2019-9494.
attacker, so try to minimize differences in how the
sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc() result is used. (CVE-2019-9494)
Use heap memory for the dummy password to allow the same password length
to be used even with long passwords.
Use constant time selection functions to track the real vs. dummy
variables so that the exact same operations can be performed for both QR
test results.
timing differences or memory access patterns (cache use). While the
previous implementation had protection against the most visible timing
differences (looping 40 rounds and masking the legendre operation), it
did not protect against memory access patterns between the two possible
code paths in the masking operations. That might be sufficient to allow
an unprivileged process running on the same device to be able to
determine which path is being executed through a cache attack and based
on that, determine information about the used password.
Convert the PWE finding loop to use constant time functions and
identical memory access path without different branches for the QR/QNR
cases to minimize possible side-channel information similarly to the
changes done for SAE authentication. (CVE-2019-9495)
operation. This is needed to avoid leaking information about different
temporary results in blinding mechanisms.
This is related to CVE-2019-9494 and CVE-2019-9495.
for various cryptographic operations that must minimize externally
observable differences in processing (both in timing and also in
internal cache use, etc.).
This is related to CVE-2019-9494 and CVE-2019-9495.
involving private information. BoringSSL has removed BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
and expects specific constant time functions to be called instead, so a
bit different approach is needed depending on which library is used.
The main operation that needs protection against side channel attacks is
BN_mod_exp() that depends on private keys (the public key validation
step in crypto_dh_derive_secret() is an exception that can use the
faster version since it does not depend on private keys).
crypto_bignum_div() is currently used only in SAE FFC case with not
safe-prime groups and only with values that do not depend on private
keys, so it is not critical to protect it.
crypto_bignum_inverse() is currently used only in SAE FFC PWE
derivation. The additional protection here is targeting only OpenSSL.
BoringSSL may need conversion to using BN_mod_inverse_blinded().
This is related to CVE-2019-9494 and CVE-2019-9495.
when trying to check SAE confirm message. It could have been possible to
hit a NULL pointer dereference if the peer element could not have been
parsed. (CVE-2019-9496)
2.8.5.2.2 requirement. The earlier checks might have covered this
implicitly, but it is safer to avoid any dependency on implicit checks
and specific crypto library behavior. (CVE-2019-9498 and CVE-2019-9499)
Furthermore, this moves the EAP-pwd element and scalar parsing and
validation steps into shared helper functions so that there is no need
to maintain two separate copies of this common functionality between the
server and peer implementations.
(elliptic curve point) were not validated. This allowed an adversary to
bypass authentication, and act as a rogue Access Point (AP) if the
crypto implementation did not verify the validity of the EC point.
Fix this vulnerability by assuring the received scalar lies within the
valid range, and by checking that the received element is not the point
at infinity and lies on the elliptic curve being used. (CVE-2019-9499)
The vulnerability is only exploitable if OpenSSL version 1.0.2 or lower
is used, or if LibreSSL or wolfssl is used. Newer versions of OpenSSL
(and also BoringSSL) implicitly validate the elliptic curve point in
EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(), preventing the attack.
and elliptic curve element differ from the one sent by the server. This
prevents reflection attacks where the adversary reflects the scalar and
element sent by the server. (CVE-2019-9497)
The vulnerability allows an adversary to complete the EAP-pwd handshake
as any user. However, the adversary does not learn the negotiated
session key, meaning the subsequent 4-way handshake would fail. As a
result, this cannot be abused to bypass authentication unless EAP-pwd is
used in non-WLAN cases without any following key exchange that would
require the attacker to learn the MSK.
When processing an EAP-pwd Commit frame, the peer's scalar and element
(elliptic curve point) were not validated. This allowed an adversary to
bypass authentication, and impersonate any user if the crypto
implementation did not verify the validity of the EC point.
Fix this vulnerability by assuring the received scalar lies within the
valid range, and by checking that the received element is not the point
at infinity and lies on the elliptic curve being used. (CVE-2019-9498)
The vulnerability is only exploitable if OpenSSL version 1.0.2 or lower
is used, or if LibreSSL or wolfssl is used. Newer versions of OpenSSL
(and also BoringSSL) implicitly validate the elliptic curve point in
EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(), preventing the attack.
* fixed WPA packet number reuse with replayed messages and key
reinstallation
[https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/] (CVE-2017-13077, CVE-2017-13078,
CVE-2017-13079, CVE-2017-13080, CVE-2017-13081, CVE-2017-13082,
CVE-2017-13086, CVE-2017-13087, CVE-2017-13088)
* fixed unauthenticated EAPOL-Key decryption in wpa_supplicant
[https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/] (CVE-2018-14526)
* added support for FILS (IEEE 802.11ai) shared key authentication
* added support for OWE (Opportunistic Wireless Encryption, RFC 8110;
and transition mode defined by WFA)
* added support for DPP (Wi-Fi Device Provisioning Protocol)
* added support for RSA 3k key case with Suite B 192-bit level
* fixed Suite B PMKSA caching not to update PMKID during each 4-way
handshake
* fixed EAP-pwd pre-processing with PasswordHashHash
* added EAP-pwd client support for salted passwords
* fixed a regression in TDLS prohibited bit validation
* started to use estimated throughput to avoid undesired signal
strength based roaming decision
* MACsec/MKA:
- new macsec_linux driver interface support for the Linux
kernel macsec module
- number of fixes and extensions
* added support for external persistent storage of PMKSA cache
(PMKSA_GET/PMKSA_ADD control interface commands; and
MESH_PMKSA_GET/MESH_PMKSA_SET for the mesh case)
* fixed mesh channel configuration pri/sec switch case
* added support for beacon report
* large number of other fixes, cleanup, and extensions
* added support for randomizing local address for GAS queries
(gas_rand_mac_addr parameter)
* fixed EAP-SIM/AKA/AKA' ext auth cases within TLS tunnel
* added option for using random WPS UUID (auto_uuid=1)
* added SHA256-hash support for OCSP certificate matching
* fixed EAP-AKA' to add AT_KDF into Synchronization-Failure
* fixed a regression in RSN pre-authentication candidate selection
* added option to configure allowed group management cipher suites
(group_mgmt network profile parameter)
* removed all PeerKey functionality
* fixed nl80211 AP and mesh mode configuration regression with
Linux 4.15 and newer
* added ap_isolate configuration option for AP mode
* added support for nl80211 to offload 4-way handshake into the driver
* added support for using wolfSSL cryptographic library
* SAE
- added support for configuring SAE password separately of the
WPA2 PSK/passphrase
- fixed PTK and EAPOL-Key integrity and key-wrap algorithm selection
for SAE;
note: this is not backwards compatible, i.e., both the AP and
station side implementations will need to be update at the same
time to maintain interoperability
- added support for Password Identifier
- fixed FT-SAE PMKID matching
* Hotspot 2.0
- added support for fetching of Operator Icon Metadata ANQP-element
- added support for Roaming Consortium Selection element
- added support for Terms and Conditions
- added support for OSEN connection in a shared RSN BSS
- added support for fetching Venue URL information
* added support for using OpenSSL 1.1.1
* FT
- disabled PMKSA caching with FT since it is not fully functional
- added support for SHA384 based AKM
- added support for BIP ciphers BIP-CMAC-256, BIP-GMAC-128,
BIP-GMAC-256 in addition to previously supported BIP-CMAC-128
- fixed additional IE inclusion in Reassociation Request frame when
using FT protocol
When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames with the Encrypted flag and without the MIC
flag set, the data field was decrypted first without verifying the MIC. When
the dta field was encrypted using RC4, for example, when negotiating TKIP as
a pairwise cipher, the unauthenticated but decrypted data was subsequently
processed. This opened wpa_supplicant(8) to abuse by decryption and recovery
of sensitive information contained in EAPOL-Key messages.
See https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/unauthenticated-eapol-key-decryption.txt
for a detailed description of the bug.
XXX: pullup-8
christos