Make the FreeBSD and Linux compat code convert the parameters to their
native representation and call the native routines.
Remove KAUTH_PROCESS_SCHEDULER_GET/SET.
Update documentation and examples.
XXX: For now, only the Linux compat code does the priority conversion
XXX: right.
Linux priority conversion code from yamt@, thanks!
Okay yamt@.
words, don't pass an action and a request, and just use a single action to
indicate what is the operation in question.
This is the first step in fixing PR/37986, which calls for policy/priority
checking in the secmodel code. Right now we're lacking room for another
parameter required to make a decision, and this change makes room for such.
- Add a KAUTH_PROCESS_SCHEDULER action, to handle scheduler related
requests, and add specific requests for set/get scheduler policy and
set/get scheduler parameters.
- Add a KAUTH_PROCESS_KEVENT_FILTER action, to handle kevent(2) related
requests.
- Add a KAUTH_DEVICE_TTY_STI action to handle requests to TIOCSTI.
- Add requests for the KAUTH_PROCESS_CANSEE action, indicating what
process information is being looked at (entry itself, args, env,
open files).
- Add requests for the KAUTH_PROCESS_RLIMIT action indicating set/get.
- Add requests for the KAUTH_PROCESS_CORENAME action indicating set/get.
- Make bsd44 secmodel code handle the newly added rqeuests appropriately.
All of the above make it possible to issue finer-grained kauth(9) calls in
many places, removing some KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER requests.
- Remove the "CAN" from KAUTH_PROCESS_CAN{KTRACE,PROCFS,PTRACE,SIGNAL}.
Discussed with christos@ and yamt@.
Been running in my tree for over a month at least.
Reviewed and okay yamt@, and special thanks to him as well as rittera@
for making this possible through fixing NDIS to not call fork1() with
l1 != curlwp.
allow certain operations.
The suser module of the bsd44 secmodel code was made aware of the missing
operations that were explicitly allowed in the securelevel module, and
the logic in the latter was modified to a default defer, deny where not
allowed.
This concept, which is the correct way to write secmodel code, was first
brought up by pavel@ a long time ago.
okay christos@.
While it's true that it's part of the traditional 4.4BSD security model,
there may come a time where a different "primary" security model used for
fine-grained privileges (ie., splitting root's responsibilities to various
privileges that can be assigned) may want to still have a securelevel
setting.
Idea from Daniel Carosone:
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/08/25/0001.html
The location of the removed files, for reference, was:
src/secmodel/bsd44/secmodel_bsd44_securelevel.c
src/secmodel/bsd44/securelevel.h
P_*/L_* naming convention, and rename the in-kernel flags to avoid
conflict. (P_ -> PK_, L_ -> LW_ ). Add back the (now unused) LSDEAD
constant.
Restores source compatibility with pre-newlock2 tools like ps or top.
Reviewed by Andrew Doran.
