Changes between 1.1.1s and 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023]
*) Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName.
There is a type confusion vulnerability relating to X.400 address processing
inside an X.509 GeneralName. X.400 addresses were parsed as an ASN1_STRING
but subsequently interpreted by GENERAL_NAME_cmp as an ASN1_TYPE. This
vulnerability may allow an attacker who can provide a certificate chain and
CRL (neither of which need have a valid signature) to pass arbitrary
pointers to a memcmp call, creating a possible read primitive, subject to
some constraints. Refer to the advisory for more information. Thanks to
David Benjamin for discovering this issue. (CVE-2023-0286)
This issue has been fixed by changing the public header file definition of
GENERAL_NAME so that x400Address reflects the implementation. It was not
possible for any existing application to successfully use the existing
definition; however, if any application references the x400Address field
(e.g. in dead code), note that the type of this field has changed. There is
no ABI change.
[Hugo Landau]
*) Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF.
The public API function BIO_new_NDEF is a helper function used for
streaming ASN.1 data via a BIO. It is primarily used internally to OpenSSL
to support the SMIME, CMS and PKCS7 streaming capabilities, but may also
be called directly by end user applications.
The function receives a BIO from the caller, prepends a new BIO_f_asn1
filter BIO onto the front of it to form a BIO chain, and then returns
the new head of the BIO chain to the caller. Under certain conditions,
for example if a CMS recipient public key is invalid, the new filter BIO
is freed and the function returns a NULL result indicating a failure.
However, in this case, the BIO chain is not properly cleaned up and the
BIO passed by the caller still retains internal pointers to the previously
freed filter BIO. If the caller then goes on to call BIO_pop() on the BIO
then a use-after-free will occur. This will most likely result in a crash.
(CVE-2023-0215)
[Viktor Dukhovni, Matt Caswell]
*) Fixed Double free after calling PEM_read_bio_ex.
The function PEM_read_bio_ex() reads a PEM file from a BIO and parses and
decodes the "name" (e.g. "CERTIFICATE"), any header data and the payload
data. If the function succeeds then the "name_out", "header" and "data"
arguments are populated with pointers to buffers containing the relevant
decoded data. The caller is responsible for freeing those buffers. It is
possible to construct a PEM file that results in 0 bytes of payload data.
In this case PEM_read_bio_ex() will return a failure code but will populate
the header argument with a pointer to a buffer that has already been freed.
If the caller also frees this buffer then a double free will occur. This
will most likely lead to a crash.
The functions PEM_read_bio() and PEM_read() are simple wrappers around
PEM_read_bio_ex() and therefore these functions are also directly affected.
These functions are also called indirectly by a number of other OpenSSL
functions including PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio_ex() and
SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file() which are also vulnerable. Some OpenSSL
internal uses of these functions are not vulnerable because the caller does
not free the header argument if PEM_read_bio_ex() returns a failure code.
(CVE-2022-4450)
[Kurt Roeckx, Matt Caswell]
*) Fixed Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption.
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful
decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number
of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding
modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
(CVE-2022-4304)
[Dmitry Belyavsky, Hubert Kario]
Changes between 1.1.1r and 1.1.1s [1 Nov 2022]
*) Fixed a regression introduced in 1.1.1r version not refreshing the
certificate data to be signed before signing the certificate.
[Gibeom Gwon]
Changes between 1.1.1q and 1.1.1r [11 Oct 2022]
*) Fixed the linux-mips64 Configure target which was missing the
SIXTY_FOUR_BIT bn_ops flag. This was causing heap corruption on that
platform.
[Adam Joseph]
*) Fixed a strict aliasing problem in bn_nist. Clang-14 optimisation was
causing incorrect results in some cases as a result.
[Paul Dale]
*) Fixed SSL_pending() and SSL_has_pending() with DTLS which were failing to
report correct results in some cases
[Matt Caswell]
*) Fixed a regression introduced in 1.1.1o for re-signing certificates with
different key sizes
[Todd Short]
*) Added the loongarch64 target
[Shi Pujin]
*) Fixed a DRBG seed propagation thread safety issue
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Fixed a memory leak in tls13_generate_secret
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Fixed reported performance degradation on aarch64. Restored the
implementation prior to commit 2621751 ("aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl: avoid
32-bit lane assignment in CTR mode") for 64bit targets only, since it is
reportedly 2-17% slower and the silicon errata only affects 32bit targets.
The new algorithm is still used for 32 bit targets.
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Added a missing header for memcmp that caused compilation failure on some
platforms
[Gregor Jasny]
Changes between 1.1.1p and 1.1.1q [5 Jul 2022]
*) AES OCB mode for 32-bit x86 platforms using the AES-NI assembly optimised
implementation would not encrypt the entirety of the data under some
circumstances. This could reveal sixteen bytes of data that was
preexisting in the memory that wasn't written. In the special case of
"in place" encryption, sixteen bytes of the plaintext would be revealed.
Since OpenSSL does not support OCB based cipher suites for TLS and DTLS,
they are both unaffected.
(CVE-2022-2097)
[Alex Chernyakhovsky, David Benjamin, Alejandro Sedeño]
Changes between 1.1.1o and 1.1.1p [21 Jun 2022]
*) In addition to the c_rehash shell command injection identified in
CVE-2022-1292, further bugs where the c_rehash script does not
properly sanitise shell metacharacters to prevent command injection have
been fixed.
When the CVE-2022-1292 was fixed it was not discovered that there
are other places in the script where the file names of certificates
being hashed were possibly passed to a command executed through the shell.
This script is distributed by some operating systems in a manner where
it is automatically executed. On such operating systems, an attacker
could execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the script.
Use of the c_rehash script is considered obsolete and should be replaced
by the OpenSSL rehash command line tool.
(CVE-2022-2068)
[Daniel Fiala, Tomáš Mráz]
*) When OpenSSL TLS client is connecting without any supported elliptic
curves and TLS-1.3 protocol is disabled the connection will no longer fail
if a ciphersuite that does not use a key exchange based on elliptic
curves can be negotiated.
[Tomáš Mráz]
Changes between 1.1.1n and 1.1.1o [3 May 2022]
*) Fixed a bug in the c_rehash script which was not properly sanitising shell
metacharacters to prevent command injection. This script is distributed
by some operating systems in a manner where it is automatically executed.
On such operating systems, an attacker could execute arbitrary commands
with the privileges of the script.
Use of the c_rehash script is considered obsolete and should be replaced
by the OpenSSL rehash command line tool.
(CVE-2022-1292)
[Tomáš Mráz]
If rule_str ended in a "-", "l" was incremented one byte past the
end of the buffer. This resulted in an out-of-bounds read when "l"
is dereferenced at the end of the loop. It is safest to just return
early in this case since the condition occurs inside a nested loop.
This release is focused on bug fixing.
Security
========
This release contains fixes for three minor memory safety problems.
None are believed to be exploitable, but we report most memory safety
problems as potential security vulnerabilities out of caution.
* ssh-keyscan(1): fix a one-byte overflow in SSH- banner processing.
Reported by Qualys
* ssh-keygen(1): double free() in error path of file hashing step in
signing/verify code; GHPR333
* ssh-keysign(8): double-free in error path introduced in openssh-8.9
Potentially-incompatible changes
--------------------------------
* The portable OpenSSH project now signs commits and release tags
using git's recent SSH signature support. The list of developer
signing keys is included in the repository as .git_allowed_signers
and is cross-signed using the PGP key that is still used to sign
release artifacts:
https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/RELEASE_KEY.asc
* ssh(1), sshd(8): SetEnv directives in ssh_config and sshd_config
are now first-match-wins to match other directives. Previously
if an environment variable was multiply specified the last set
value would have been used. bz3438
* ssh-keygen(8): ssh-keygen -A (generate all default host key types)
will no longer generate DSA keys, as these are insecure and have
not been used by default for some years.
New features
------------
* ssh(1), sshd(8): add a RequiredRSASize directive to set a minimum
RSA key length. Keys below this length will be ignored for user
authentication and for host authentication in sshd(8).
ssh(1) will terminate a connection if the server offers an RSA key
that falls below this limit, as the SSH protocol does not include
the ability to retry a failed key exchange.
* sftp-server(8): add a "users-groups-by-id@openssh.com" extension
request that allows the client to obtain user/group names that
correspond to a set of uids/gids.
* sftp(1): use "users-groups-by-id@openssh.com" sftp-server
extension (when available) to fill in user/group names for
directory listings.
* sftp-server(8): support the "home-directory" extension request
defined in draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-extensions-00. This overlaps
a bit with the existing "expand-path@openssh.com", but some other
clients support it.
* ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8): allow certificate validity intervals,
sshsig verification times and authorized_keys expiry-time options
to accept dates in the UTC time zone in addition to the default
of interpreting them in the system time zone. YYYYMMDD and
YYMMDDHHMM[SS] dates/times will be interpreted as UTC if suffixed
with a 'Z' character.
Also allow certificate validity intervals to be specified in raw
seconds-since-epoch as hex value, e.g. -V 0x1234:0x4567890. This
is intended for use by regress tests and other tools that call
ssh-keygen as part of a CA workflow. bz3468
* sftp(1): allow arguments to the sftp -D option, e.g. sftp -D
"/usr/libexec/sftp-server -el debug3"
* ssh-keygen(1): allow the existing -U (use agent) flag to work
with "-Y sign" operations, where it will be interpreted to require
that the private keys is hosted in an agent; bz3429
Bugfixes
--------
* ssh-keygen(1): implement the "verify-required" certificate option.
This was already documented when support for user-verified FIDO
keys was added, but the ssh-keygen(1) code was missing.
* ssh-agent(1): hook up the restrict_websafe command-line flag;
previously the flag was accepted but never actually used.
* sftp(1): improve filename tab completions: never try to complete
names to non-existent commands, and better match the completion
type (local or remote filename) against the argument position
being completed.
* ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): several fixes to FIDO key
handling, especially relating to keys that request
user-verification. These should reduce the number of unnecessary
PIN prompts for keys that support intrinsic user verification.
GHPR302, GHPR329
* ssh-keygen(1): when enrolling a FIDO resident key, check if a
credential with matching application and user ID strings already
exists and, if so, prompt the user for confirmation before
overwriting the credential. GHPR329
* sshd(8): improve logging of errors when opening authorized_keys
files. bz2042
* ssh(1): avoid multiplexing operations that could cause SIGPIPE from
causing the client to exit early. bz3454
* ssh_config(5), sshd_config(5): clarify that the RekeyLimit
directive applies to both transmitted and received data. GHPR328
* ssh-keygen(1): avoid double fclose() in error path.
* sshd(8): log an error if pipe() fails while accepting a
connection. bz3447
* ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): fix possible NULL deref when built without
FIDO support. bz3443
* ssh-keyscan(1): add missing *-sk types to ssh-keyscan manpage.
GHPR294.
* sshd(8): ensure that authentication passwords are cleared from
memory in error paths. GHPR286
* ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): avoid possibility of notifier code executing
kill(-1). GHPR286
* ssh_config(5): note that the ProxyJump directive also accepts the
same tokens as ProxyCommand. GHPR305.
* scp(1): do not not ftruncate(3) files early when in sftp mode. The
previous behaviour of unconditionally truncating the destination
file would cause "scp ~/foo localhost:foo" and the reverse
"scp localhost:foo ~/foo" to delete all the contents of their
destination. bz3431
* ssh-keygen(1): improve error message when 'ssh-keygen -Y sign' is
unable to load a private key; bz3429
* sftp(1), scp(1): when performing operations that glob(3) a remote
path, ensure that the implicit working directory used to construct
that path escapes glob(3) characters. This prevents glob characters
from being processed in places they shouldn't, e.g. "cd /tmp/a*/",
"get *.txt" should have the get operation treat the path "/tmp/a*"
literally and not attempt to expand it.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): be stricter in which characters will be accepted
in specifying a mask length; allow only 0-9. GHPR278
* ssh-keygen(1): avoid printing hash algorithm twice when dumping a
KRL
* ssh(1), sshd(8): continue running local I/O for open channels
during SSH transport rekeying. This should make ~-escapes work in
the client (e.g. to exit) if the connection happened to have
stalled during a rekey event.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): avoid potential poll() spin during rekeying
* Further hardening for sshbuf internals: disallow "reparenting" a
hierarchical sshbuf and zero the entire buffer if reallocation
fails. GHPR287
Portability
-----------
* ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8): automatically enable the built-in
FIDO security key support if libfido2 is found and usable, unless
--without-security-key-builtin was requested.
* ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8): many fixes to make the WinHello
FIDO device usable on Cygwin. The windows://hello FIDO device will
be automatically used by default on this platform unless requested
otherwise, or when probing resident FIDO credentials (an operation
not currently supported by WinHello).
* Portable OpenSSH: remove workarounds for obsolete and unsupported
versions of OpenSSL libcrypto. In particular, this release removes
fallback support for OpenSSL that lacks AES-CTR or AES-GCM.
Those AES cipher modes were added to OpenSSL prior to the minimum
version currently supported by OpenSSH, so this is not expected to
impact any currently supported configurations.
* sshd(8): fix SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG on current Linux/glibc
* All: resync and clean up internal CSPRNG code.
* scp(1), sftp(1), sftp-server(8): avoid linking these programs with
unnecessary libraries. They are no longer linked against libz and
libcrypto. This may be of benefit to space constrained systems
using any of those components in isolation.
* sshd(8): add AUDIT_ARCH_PPC to supported seccomp sandbox
architectures.
* configure: remove special casing of crypt(). configure will no
longer search for crypt() in libcrypto, as it was removed from
there years ago. configure will now only search libc and libcrypt.
* configure: refuse to use OpenSSL 3.0.4 due to potential RCE in its
RSA implementation (CVE-2022-2274) on x86_64.
* All: request 1.1x API compatibility for OpenSSL >=3.x; GHPR322
* ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8): fix a number of missing includes
required by the XMSS code on some platforms.
* sshd(8): cache timezone data in capsicum sandbox.
error: passing 'char [1]' to parameter of type 'const uint8_t *'
(aka 'const unsigned char *') converts between pointers to integer
types where one is of the unique plain 'char' type and the other is
not [-Werror,-Wpointer-sign]
This way they match the mtree and make sense and don't cause editors
to ask to override read-only files when editing them.
Exception: Not sure /etc/bluetooth/protocols makes as much sense to
edit, but the mtree says 644, so if you want to change it, make sure
to change it in both places -- Makefile and mtree.
XXX pullup-8
XXX pullup-9
This avoids hundreds of lint warnings for OpenSSL's stack definitions:
openssl/x509.h(75): warning:
static function sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num unused [236]
Changes between 1.1.1m and 1.1.1n [15 Mar 2022]
*) Fixed a bug in the BN_mod_sqrt() function that can cause it to loop forever
for non-prime moduli.
Internally this function is used when parsing certificates that contain
elliptic curve public keys in compressed form or explicit elliptic curve
parameters with a base point encoded in compressed form.
It is possible to trigger the infinite loop by crafting a certificate that
has invalid explicit curve parameters.
Since certificate parsing happens prior to verification of the certificate
signature, any process that parses an externally supplied certificate may
thus be subject to a denial of service attack. The infinite loop can also
be reached when parsing crafted private keys as they can contain explicit
elliptic curve parameters.
Thus vulnerable situations include:
- TLS clients consuming server certificates
- TLS servers consuming client certificates
- Hosting providers taking certificates or private keys from customers
- Certificate authorities parsing certification requests from subscribers
- Anything else which parses ASN.1 elliptic curve parameters
Also any other applications that use the BN_mod_sqrt() where the attacker
can control the parameter values are vulnerable to this DoS issue.
(CVE-2022-0778)
[Tomáš Mráz]
*) Add ciphersuites based on DHE_PSK (RFC 4279) and ECDHE_PSK (RFC 5489)
to the list of ciphersuites providing Perfect Forward Secrecy as
required by SECLEVEL >= 3.
[Dmitry Belyavskiy, Nicola Tuveri]
Future deprecation notice
=========================
A near-future release of OpenSSH will switch scp(1) from using the
legacy scp/rcp protocol to using SFTP by default.
Legacy scp/rcp performs wildcard expansion of remote filenames (e.g.
"scp host:* .") through the remote shell. This has the side effect of
requiring double quoting of shell meta-characters in file names
included on scp(1) command-lines, otherwise they could be interpreted
as shell commands on the remote side.
This creates one area of potential incompatibility: scp(1) when using
the SFTP protocol no longer requires this finicky and brittle quoting,
and attempts to use it may cause transfers to fail. We consider the
removal of the need for double-quoting shell characters in file names
to be a benefit and do not intend to introduce bug-compatibility for
legacy scp/rcp in scp(1) when using the SFTP protocol.
Another area of potential incompatibility relates to the use of remote
paths relative to other user's home directories, for example -
"scp host:~user/file /tmp". The SFTP protocol has no native way to
expand a ~user path. However, sftp-server(8) in OpenSSH 8.7 and later
support a protocol extension "expand-path@openssh.com" to support
this.
Security Near Miss
==================
* sshd(8): fix an integer overflow in the user authentication path
that, in conjunction with other logic errors, could have yielded
unauthenticated access under difficult to exploit conditions.
This situation is not exploitable because of independent checks in
the privilege separation monitor. Privilege separation has been
enabled by default in since openssh-3.2.2 (released in 2002) and
has been mandatory since openssh-7.5 (released in 2017). Moreover,
portable OpenSSH has used toolchain features available in most
modern compilers to abort on signed integer overflow since
openssh-6.5 (released in 2014).
Thanks to Malcolm Stagg for finding and reporting this bug.
Potentially-incompatible changes
================================
* sshd(8), portable OpenSSH only: this release removes in-built
support for MD5-hashed passwords. If you require these on your
system then we recommend linking against libxcrypt or similar.
* This release modifies the FIDO security key middleware interface
and increments SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR.
Changes since OpenSSH 8.8
=========================
This release includes a number of new features.
New features
------------
* ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1): add a system for
restricting forwarding and use of keys added to ssh-agent(1)
A detailed description of the feature is available at
https://www.openssh.com/agent-restrict.html and the protocol
extensions are documented in the PROTOCOL and PROTOCOL.agent
files in the source release.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): add the sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com hybrid
ECDH/x25519 + Streamlined NTRU Prime post-quantum KEX to the
default KEXAlgorithms list (after the ECDH methods but before the
prime-group DH ones). The next release of OpenSSH is likely to
make this key exchange the default method.
* ssh-keygen(1): when downloading resident keys from a FIDO token,
pass back the user ID that was used when the key was created and
append it to the filename the key is written to (if it is not the
default). Avoids keys being clobbered if the user created multiple
resident keys with the same application string but different user
IDs.
* ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): better handling for FIDO keys
on tokens that provide user verification (UV) on the device itself,
including biometric keys, avoiding unnecessary PIN prompts.
* ssh-keygen(1): add "ssh-keygen -Y match-principals" operation to
perform matching of principals names against an allowed signers
file. To be used towards a TOFU model for SSH signatures in git.
* ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1): allow pin-required FIDO keys to be added
to ssh-agent(1). $SSH_ASKPASS will be used to request the PIN at
authentication time.
* ssh-keygen(1): allow selection of hash at sshsig signing time
(either sha512 (default) or sha256).
* ssh(1), sshd(8): read network data directly to the packet input
buffer instead indirectly via a small stack buffer. Provides a
modest performance improvement.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): read data directly to the channel input buffer,
providing a similar modest performance improvement.
* ssh(1): extend the PubkeyAuthentication configuration directive to
accept yes|no|unbound|host-bound to allow control over one of the
protocol extensions used to implement agent-restricted keys.
Bugfixes
--------
* sshd(8): document that CASignatureAlgorithms, ExposeAuthInfo and
PubkeyAuthOptions can be used in a Match block. PR#277.
* sshd(8): fix possible string truncation when constructing paths to
.rhosts/.shosts files with very long user home directory names.
* ssh-keysign(1): unbreak for KEX algorithms that use SHA384/512
exchange hashes
* ssh(1): don't put the TTY into raw mode when SessionType=none,
avoids ^C being unable to kill such a session. bz3360
* scp(1): fix some corner-case bugs in SFTP-mode handling of
~-prefixed paths.
* ssh(1): unbreak hostbased auth using RSA keys. Allow ssh(1) to
select RSA keys when only RSA/SHA2 signature algorithms are
configured (this is the default case). Previously RSA keys were
not being considered in the default case.
* ssh-keysign(1): make ssh-keysign use the requested signature
algorithm and not the default for the key type. Part of unbreaking
hostbased auth for RSA/SHA2 keys.
* ssh(1): stricter UpdateHostkey signature verification logic on
the client- side. Require RSA/SHA2 signatures for RSA hostkeys
except when RSA/SHA1 was explicitly negotiated during initial
KEX; bz3375
* ssh(1), sshd(8): fix signature algorithm selection logic for
UpdateHostkeys on the server side. The previous code tried to
prefer RSA/SHA2 for hostkey proofs of RSA keys, but missed some
cases. This will use RSA/SHA2 signatures for RSA keys if the
client proposed these algorithms in initial KEX. bz3375
* All: convert all uses of select(2)/pselect(2) to poll(2)/ppoll(2).
This includes the mainloops in ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-agent(1)
and sftp-server(8), as well as the sshd(8) listen loop and all
other FD read/writability checks. On platforms with missing or
broken poll(2)/ppoll(2) syscalls a select(2)-based compat shim is
available.
* ssh-keygen(1): the "-Y find-principals" command was verifying key
validity when using ca certs but not with simple key lifetimes
within the allowed signers file.
* ssh-keygen(1): make sshsig verify-time argument parsing optional
* sshd(8): fix truncation in rhosts/shosts path construction.
* ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): avoid xmalloc(0) for PKCS#11 keyid for ECDSA
keys (we already did this for RSA keys). Avoids fatal errors for
PKCS#11 libraries that return empty keyid, e.g. Microchip ATECC608B
"cryptoauthlib"; bz#3364
* ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): improve the testing of credentials against
inserted FIDO: ask the token whether a particular key belongs to
it in cases where the token supports on-token user-verification
(e.g. biometrics) rather than just assuming that it will accept it.
Will reduce spurious "Confirm user presence" notifications for key
handles that relate to FIDO keys that are not currently inserted in at
least some cases. bz3366
* ssh(1), sshd(8): correct value for IPTOS_DSCP_LE. It needs to
allow for the preceding two ECN bits. bz#3373
* ssh-keygen(1): add missing -O option to usage() for the "-Y sign"
option.
* ssh-keygen(1): fix a NULL deref when using the find-principals
function, when matching an allowed_signers line that contains a
namespace restriction, but no restriction specified on the
command-line
* ssh-agent(1): fix memleak in process_extension(); oss-fuzz
issue #42719
* ssh(1): suppress "Connection to xxx closed" messages when LogLevel
is set to "error" or above. bz3378
* ssh(1), sshd(8): use correct zlib flags when inflate(3)-ing
compressed packet data. bz3372
* scp(1): when recursively transferring files in SFTP mode, create the
destination directory if it doesn't already exist to match scp(1) in
legacy RCP mode behaviour.
* scp(1): many improvements in error message consistency between scp(1)
in SFTP mode vs legacy RCP mode.
* sshd(8): fix potential race in SIGTERM handling PR#289
* ssh(1), ssh(8): since DSA keys are deprecated, move them to the
end of the default list of public keys so that they will be tried
last. PR#295
* ssh-keygen(1): allow 'ssh-keygen -Y find-principals' to match
wildcard principals in allowed_signers files
Portability
-----------
* ssh(1), sshd(8): don't trust closefrom(2) on Linux. glibc's
implementation does not work in a chroot when the kernel does not
have close_range(2). It tries to read from /proc/self/fd and when
that fails dies with an assertion of sorts. Instead, call
close_range(2) directly from our compat code and fall back if
that fails. bz#3349,
* OS X poll(2) is broken; use compat replacement. For character-
special devices like /dev/null, Darwin's poll(2) returns POLLNVAL
when polled with POLLIN. Apparently this is Apple bug 3710161 -
not public but a websearch will find other OSS projects
rediscovering it periodically since it was first identified in
2005.
* Correct handling of exceptfds/POLLPRI in our select(2)-based
poll(2)/ppoll(2) compat implementation.
* Cygwin: correct checking of mbstowcs() return value.
* Add a basic SECURITY.md that refers people to the openssh.com
website.
* Enable additional compiler warnings and toolchain hardening flags,
including -Wbitwise-instead-of-logical, -Wmisleading-indentation,
-fzero-call-used-regs and -ftrivial-auto-var-init.
* HP/UX. Use compat getline(3) on HP-UX 10.x, where the libc version
is not reliable.
*) Avoid loading of a dynamic engine twice.
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Fixed building on Debian with kfreebsd kernels
[Mattias Ellert]
*) Prioritise DANE TLSA issuer certs over peer certs
[Viktor Dukhovni]
*) Fixed random API for MacOS prior to 10.12
These MacOS versions don't support the CommonCrypto APIs
[Lenny Primak]
Changes between 1.1.1k and 1.1.1l [24 Aug 2021]
*) Fixed an SM2 Decryption Buffer Overflow.
In order to decrypt SM2 encrypted data an application is expected
to call the API function EVP_PKEY_decrypt(). Typically an application
will call this function twice. The first time, on entry, the "out"
parameter can be NULL and, on exit, the "outlen" parameter is
populated with the buffer size required to hold the decrypted
plaintext. The application can then allocate a sufficiently sized
buffer and call EVP_PKEY_decrypt() again, but this time passing
a non-NULL value for the "out" parameter.
A bug in the implementation of the SM2 decryption code means that
the calculation of the buffer size required to hold the plaintext
returned by the first call to EVP_PKEY_decrypt() can be smaller
than the actual size required by the second call. This can lead to
a buffer overflow when EVP_PKEY_decrypt() is called by the application
a second time with a buffer that is too small.
A malicious attacker who is able present SM2 content for decryption
to an application could cause attacker chosen data to overflow the
buffer by up to a maximum of 62 bytes altering the contents of
other data held after the buffer, possibly changing application
behaviour or causing the application to crash. The location of the
buffer is application dependent but is typically heap allocated.
(CVE-2021-3711)
[Matt Caswell]
*) Fixed various read buffer overruns processing ASN.1 strings
ASN.1 strings are represented internally within OpenSSL as an
ASN1_STRING structure which contains a buffer holding the string
data and a field holding the buffer length. This contrasts with
normal C strings which are repesented as a buffer for the string
data which is terminated with a NUL (0) byte.
Although not a strict requirement, ASN.1 strings that are parsed
using OpenSSL's own "d2i" functions (and other similar parsing
functions) as well as any string whose value has been set with the
ASN1_STRING_set() function will additionally NUL terminate the byte
array in the ASN1_STRING structure.
However, it is possible for applications to directly construct
valid ASN1_STRING structures which do not NUL terminate the byte
array by directly setting the "data" and "length" fields in the
ASN1_STRING array. This can also happen by using the ASN1_STRING_set0()
function.
Numerous OpenSSL functions that print ASN.1 data have been found
to assume that the ASN1_STRING byte array will be NUL terminated,
even though this is not guaranteed for strings that have been
directly constructed. Where an application requests an ASN.1
structure to be printed, and where that ASN.1 structure contains
ASN1_STRINGs that have been directly constructed by the application
without NUL terminating the "data" field, then a read buffer overrun
can occur.
The same thing can also occur during name constraints processing
of certificates (for example if a certificate has been directly
constructed by the application instead of loading it via the OpenSSL
parsing functions, and the certificate contains non NUL terminated
ASN1_STRING structures). It can also occur in the X509_get1_email(),
X509_REQ_get1_email() and X509_get1_ocsp() functions.
If a malicious actor can cause an application to directly construct
an ASN1_STRING and then process it through one of the affected
OpenSSL functions then this issue could be hit. This might result
in a crash (causing a Denial of Service attack). It could also
result in the disclosure of private memory contents (such as private
keys, or sensitive plaintext).
(CVE-2021-3712)
[Matt Caswell]
christos