Rename compiler-warning-disable variables from
GCC_NO_warning
to
CC_WNO_warning
where warning is the full warning name as used by the compiler.
GCC_NO_IMPLICIT_FALLTHRU is CC_WNO_IMPLICIT_FALLTHROUGH
Using the convention CC_compilerflag, where compilerflag
is based on the full compiler flag name.
Provide a single variable
CC_WNO_ADDRESS_OF_PACKED_MEMBER
with options for both clang and gcc, to replace
CLANG_NO_ADDR_OF_PACKED_MEMBER
CC_NO_ADDR_OF_PACKED_MEMBER
GCC_NO_ADDR_OF_PACKED_MEMBER
Using the convention CC_compilerflag, where compilerflag
is based on the full compiler flag name.
right now. new address-of-packed-member and format-overflow
warnings have new GCC_NO_ADDR_OF_PACKED_MEMBER amd
GCC_NO_FORMAT_OVERFLOW variables to remove these warnings.
apply to a bunch of the tree. mostly, these are real bugs that
should be fixed, but in many cases, only by removing the 'packed'
attribute from some structure that doesn't really need it. (i
looked at many different ones, and while perhaps 60-80% were
already properly aligned, it wasn't clear to me that the uses
were always coming from sane data vs network alignment, so it
doesn't seem safe to remove packed without careful research for
each affect struct.) clang already warned (and was not erroring)
for many of these cases, but gcc picked up dozens more.
Push -Wno-array-bounds down to the cases that depend on it.
Selectively disable warnings for 3rd party software or non-trivial
issues to be reviewed later to get clang -Werror to build most of the
tree.
- Add libnpf(3) - a library to control NPF (configuration, ruleset, etc).
- Add NPF support for ftp-proxy(8).
- Add rc.d script for NPF.
- Convert npfctl(8) to use libnpf(3) and thus make it less depressive.
Note: next clean-up step should be a parser, once dholland@ will finish it.
- Add more documentation.
- Various fixes.
pfs(8) is a tool similar to ipfs(8) but for pf(4). It allows the admin to
dump internal configuration of pf, and restore at a latter point, after a
maintenance reboot for example, in a transparent way for user.
This work has been done mostly during my GSoC 2009
No objections on tech-net@
Pfsync interface exposes change in the pf(4) over a pseudo-interface, and can
be used to synchronise different pf.
This work was part of my 2009 GSoC
No objection on tech-net@
FORTIFY_SOURCE feature of libssp, thus checking the size of arguments to
various string and memory copy and set functions (as well as a few system
calls and other miscellany) where known at function entry. RedHat has
evidently built all "core system packages" with this option for some time.
This option should be used at the top of Makefiles (or Makefile.inc where
this is used for subdirectories) but after any setting of LIB.
This is only useful for userland code, and cannot be used in libc or in
any code which includes the libc internals, because it overrides certain
libc functions with macros. Some effort has been made to make USE_FORT=yes
work correctly for a full-system build by having the bsd.sys.mk logic
disable the feature where it should not be used (libc, libssp iteself,
the kernel) but no attempt has been made to build the entire system with
USE_FORT and doing so will doubtless expose numerous bugs and misfeatures.
Adjust the system build so that all programs and libraries that are setuid,
directly handle network data (including serial comm data), perform
authentication, or appear likely to have (or have a history of having)
data-driven bugs (e.g. file(1)) are built with USE_FORT=yes by default,
with the exception of libc, which cannot use USE_FORT and thus uses
only USE_SSP by default. Tested on i386 with no ill results; USE_FORT=no
per-directory or in a system build will disable if desired.
While there are some open issues, particulary wrt support of old
NetBSD-specific interfaces, it is better to get the code some public
testing before NetBSD-4 is branched.
derive IP address(es) from the interface (e.g "... from any to fxp0").
This however, creates window for possible attacks from the network.
Implement the solution proposed by YAMAMOTO Takashi:
Add /etc/defaults/pf.boot.conf and load it with the /etc/rc.d/pf_boot
script before starting the network. People who don't like the default
rules can override it with their own /etc/pf.boot.conf.
The default rules have been obtained from OpenBSD.
No objections on: tech-security
appeared and whether it's really part of pf or not is still unclear. Looking
at the other *BSDs it seems that they have left out spamd when importing pf,
and now we do that too. Also, the name conflicted with another more popular
used tool, after the rename to pfspamd it was left with completely unusable
documentation which apparently no-one wanted to fix.
A port of the latest spamd will be imported into pkgsrc soon.
Suggested by several people, no objections on last proposal on tech-userlevel.
`spamd-setup', and `spamdb' as `pfspamd', `pfspamd-setup', and `pfspamdb'.
To quote Steven M. Bellovin:
This [having a program in basesrc with the same name as a widely used and
completely different program in pkgsrc] is a seriously bad idea; it
violates the rule of least surprise. That's bad enough in normal
situations; here, we're talking about security. You do *not* want to
confuse people about security features; they're hard enough to get right
as is.
lukem