- use vmspace rather than proc or lwp where appropriate.
the latter is more natural to specify an address space.
(and less likely to be abused for random purposes.)
- fix a swdmover race.
link points to the process's current working directory, and the root
link points to the process's root directory. What else would you
expect?
For directories that are out of reach (caller is in a chroot, target
process is in a different chroot, etc), the links point to "/"
instead.
1. Checking for a negative uio_offset at the beginning. This really does
not affect us in most cases because we check that later too.
2. Checking for attempts to write to init sooner and in all cases.
to have KFS or PFS differentiators. Further I have wrapped the enum in
procfs in "#ifdef _KERNEL" as it is done in kernfs.
To see the discussion go to http://mail-index.NetBSD.org/tech-kern/2003/09/
and look for "Mismatched enums in include files" in the list.
* Remove the "lwp *" argument that was added to vget(). Turns out
that nothing actually used it!
* Remove the "lwp *" arguments that were added to VFS_ROOT(), VFS_VGET(),
and VFS_FHTOVP(); all they did was pass it to vget() (which, as noted
above, didn't use it).
* Remove all of the "lwp *" arguments to internal functions that were added
just to appease the above.
be inserted into ktrace records. The general change has been to replace
"struct proc *" with "struct lwp *" in various function prototypes, pass
the lwp through and use l_proc to get the process pointer when needed.
Bump the kernel rev up to 1.6V
* do not set *vpp unless successful, otherwise we'd trigger
DIAGNOSTIC panic in lookup(9) on error return
* on error, make sure to free malloc'ed memory and ungetnewvnode() the
previously acquired vnode
this fixes panic on 'tail -f <file> &; ls -l /proc/$!/fd' reported by
Andrew Brown
fix reviewed by Christos Zoulas
- Is it ok to convert DTYPE_PIPE to VFIFO and DTYPE_SOCKET to VSOCK?
- XXX: Avoid locking issue in ls -Rl /proc by avoiding curproc
- Does I/O to pipes work?
- XXX: Are there security implications?
(__HAVE_PTRACE_MACHDEP) and procfs (__HAVE_PROCFS_MACHDEP).
These changes will allow platforms like x86 (XMM) and PowerPC
(AltiVec) to export extended register sets in a sane manner.
* Use __HAVE_PTRACE_MACHDEP to export x86 XMM registers (standard
FP + SSE/SSE2) using PT_{GET,SET}XMMREGS (in the machdep
ptrace request space).
* Use __HAVE_PROCFS_MACHDEP to export x86 XMM registers via
/proc/N/xmmregs in procfs.
adjusted via sysctl. file systems that have hash tables which are
sized based on the value of this variable now resize those hash tables
using the new value. the max number of FFS softdeps is also recalculated.
convert various file systems to use the <sys/queue.h> macros for
their hash tables.
in vfs_detach(). vfs_done may free global filesystem's resources,
typically those allocated in respective filesystem's init function.
Needed so those filesystems which went in via LKM have a chance to
clean after themselves before unloading. This fixes random panics
when LKM for filesystem using pools was loaded and unloaded several
times.
For each leaf filesystem, add appropriate vfs_done routine.
UFS code, and I forgot to rename the "ihash" variable, causing
weird effects, because 3/4th of the UFS hash table would become
unreachable after procfs was loaded as an LKM.
process is about to exec a sugid binary.
To speed up things, use hashing for vnode allocation, like other filesystems
do. This avoids walking the whole procfs node list in the revoke case too.
Update coda to new struct lock in struct vnode.
make fdescfs, kernfs, portalfs, and procfs actually lock their vnodes.
It's not that hard.
Make unionfs set v_vnlock = NULL so any overlayed fs will call its
VOP_LOCK.
not included in a kernel without procfs, and it seems wrong to pull
all of procfs_subr.c in for just that one function. Perhaps this
should go into a new file instead?
FreeBSD by Sean Eric Fagan, but a bit different. This makes the checks
in the same places as sef's FreeBSD patch, but does not hardcode the
"kmem" group into the kernel, and also does a check identical to the
(3) and (4) checks in the NetBSD ptrace(2):
(1) it's not owned by you, or is set-id on exec (unless
you're root), or
(2) it's init, which controls the security level of the
entire system, and the system was not compiled with
permanently insecure mode turned on.
yamt