particular problem on hosts with only wireless interfaces that are
definitely not safe to use as entropy sources.
Add arc4randbytes() which hands out bytes from the same source used
by arc4random(). This is intended to be a _temporary_ interface
until we can design and implement a better general PRNG interface
that is decoupled from the entropy-pool implementation.
Modify key_randomfill() (used only for initialization vectors on
SA creation and via key_sa_stir_iv(), which does not "stir",
despite its name) to use arc4randbytes() instead of pulling bits
directly from the entropy pool. It is my hope that this change
will pose minimal integration problems for the KAME folks as the
random-pool interface is *already* different between each BSD
variant; this just simplifies the NetBSD case and solves a
fairly serious problem.
Note that it is generally considered acceptable cryptographic
practice to use a fast stream cipher to generate IVs for encryption
with stronger block ciphers. For example, the use of "non-Approved"
PRNGs to generate IVs for "Approved" block ciphers is explicitly
sanctioned by FIPS 140-2.
Make sure that each va_start has one and only one matching va_end,
especially in error cases.
If the va_list is used multiple times, do multiple va_starts/va_ends.
If a function gets va_list as argument, don't let it use va_end (since
it's the callers responsibility).
Improved by comments from enami and christos -- thanks!
Heimdal/krb4/KAME changes already fed back, rest to follow.
Inspired by, but not not based on, OpenBSD.
blank. In this case, we delete all non-LARVAL SAs that match the
src/dst/protocol. This is particularly useful in IKE INITIAL-CONTACT
processing. Idea from Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@east.sun.com>, who
implemented it in post-Solaris8.
if there's no rnd(4), random(9) will be used with one-time warning printf(9).
XXX not sure how good rnd_extract_data(RND_EXTRACT_ANY) is, under entropy-
starvation situation
support ipcomp ACQUIRE messages (again).
it violates RFC2367 slightly. RFC2367 does not suport ipcomp at all
so we have no choice.
(KAME 1.151 -> 1.152)
do not leave dangling pointer after KFREE(). caused kernel panic with
certain PF_KEY message (error case) - only root can open PF_KEY socket
so it is not security issue.
(KAME 1.152 -> 1.153)
itojun