Don't try to load a driver module if the driver is already exist but just
not attached. [bc]dev_open() could return ENXIO even if the driver exists.
XXX: Maybe this should be handled by helper functions for
XXX: module_autoload() calls on demand.
proc_enterpgrp() with proc_leavepgrp() to free process group and/or
session without proc_lock held.
- Rename SESSHOLD() and SESSRELE() to to proc_sesshold() and
proc_sessrele(). The later releases proc_lock now.
Quick OK by <ad>.
PR kern/16942 panic with softdep and quotas
PR kern/19565 panic: softdep_write_inodeblock: indirect pointer #1 mismatch
PR kern/26274 softdep panic: allocdirect_merge: ...
PR kern/26374 Long delay before non-root users can write to softdep partitions
PR kern/28621 1.6.x "vp != NULL" panic in ffs_softdep.c:4653 while unmounting a softdep (+quota) filesystem
PR kern/29513 FFS+Softdep panic with unfsck-able file-corruption
PR kern/31544 The ffs softdep code appears to fail to write dirty bits to disk
PR kern/31981 stopping scsi disk can cause panic (softdep)
PR kern/32116 kernel panic in softdep (assertion failure)
PR kern/32532 softdep_trackbufs deadlock
PR kern/37191 softdep: locking against myself
PR kern/40474 Kernel panic after remounting raid root with softdep
Retire softdep, pass 2. As discussed and later formally announced on the
mailing lists.
specs_open routine. If devsw_open fail, get driver name with devsw_getname
routine and autoload module.
For now only dm drivervcan be loaded, other pseudo drivers needs more work.
Ok by ad@.
run through copy-on-write. Call fscow_run() with valid data where possible.
The LP_UFSCOW hack is no longer needed to protect ffs_copyonwrite() against
endless recursion.
- Add a flag B_MODIFY to bread(), breada() and breadn(). If set the caller
intends to modify the buffer returned.
- Always run copy-on-write on buffers returned from ffs_balloc().
- Add new function ffs_getblk() that gets a buffer, assigns a new blkno,
may clear the buffer and runs copy-on-write. Process possible errors
from getblk() or fscow_run(). Part of PR kern/38664.
Welcome to 4.99.63
Reviewed by: YAMAMOTO Takashi <yamt@netbsd.org>
proclist_mutex and proclist_lock into a single adaptive mutex (proc_lock).
Implications:
- Inspecting process state requires thread context, so signals can no longer
be sent from a hardware interrupt handler. Signal activity must be
deferred to a soft interrupt or kthread.
- As the proc state locking is simplified, it's now safe to take exit()
and wait() out from under kernel_lock.
- The system spends less time at IPL_SCHED, and there is less lock activity.
shutdown). There are still problems with device access and a PR will be
filed.
- Kill checkalias(). Allow multiple vnodes to reference a single device.
- Don't play dangerous tricks with block vnodes to ensure that only one
vnode can describe a block device. Instead, prohibit concurrent opens of
block devices. As a bonus remove the unreliable code that prevents
multiple file system mounts on the same device. It's no longer needed.
- Track opens by vnode and by device. Issue cdev_close() when the last open
goes away, instead of abusing vnode::v_usecount to tell if the device is
open.
Buffers run through copy-on-write are marked B_COWDONE. This condition
is valid until the buffer has run through bwrite() and gets cleared from
biodone().
Welcome to 4.99.39.
Reviewed by: YAMAMOTO Takashi <yamt@netbsd.org>
The general trend is to remove it from all kernel interfaces and
this is a start. In case the calling lwp is desired, curlwp should
be used.
quick consensus on tech-kern
- Instead of hooking the handler on the specdev of a mounted file system
hook directly on the `struct mount'.
- Rename from `vn_cow_*' to `fscow_*' and move to `kern/vfs_trans.c'. Use
`mount_*specific' instead of clobbering `struct mount' or `struct specinfo'.
- Replace the hand-made reader/writer lock with a krwlock.
- Keep `vn_cow_*' functions and mark as obsolete.
- Welcome to NetBSD 4.99.32 - `struct specinfo' changed size.
Reviewed by: Jason Thorpe <thorpej@netbsd.org>
need to understand the locking around that field. Instead of setting
B_ERROR, set b_error instead. b_error is 'owned' by whoever completes
the I/O request.
setting vnode sizes, is handled elsewhere: file system vnode creation
or spec_open() for regular files or block special files, respectively.
Add a call to VOP_MMAP() to the pagedvn exec path, since the vnode
is being memory mapped.
reviewed by tech-kern & wrstuden
using both the rawio_spec and passthru actions to detect raw disk
activity. Same for kernel memory policy.
Update documentation (no longer need to expose veriexec_rawchk()) and
remove all Veriexec-related bits from specfs.
to do with the security model used. Move back the call to spec_open(),
which can now return the real return value from vfs_mountedon() (EBUSY)
and not EPERM, changing semantics.
- Add a few scopes to the kernel: system, network, and machdep.
- Add a few more actions/sub-actions (requests), and start using them as
opposed to the KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER place-holders.
- Introduce a basic set of listeners that implement our "traditional"
security model, called "bsd44". This is the default (and only) model we
have at the moment.
- Update all relevant documentation.
- Add some code and docs to help folks who want to actually use this stuff:
* There's a sample overlay model, sitting on-top of "bsd44", for
fast experimenting with tweaking just a subset of an existing model.
This is pretty cool because it's *really* straightforward to do stuff
you had to use ugly hacks for until now...
* And of course, documentation describing how to do the above for quick
reference, including code samples.
All of these changes were tested for regressions using a Python-based
testsuite that will be (I hope) available soon via pkgsrc. Information
about the tests, and how to write new ones, can be found on:
http://kauth.linbsd.org/kauthwiki
NOTE FOR DEVELOPERS: *PLEASE* don't add any code that does any of the
following:
- Uses a KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER kauth(9) request,
- Checks 'securelevel' directly,
- Checks a uid/gid directly.
(or if you feel you have to, contact me first)
This is still work in progress; It's far from being done, but now it'll
be a lot easier.
Relevant mailing list threads:
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/01/25/0011.htmlhttp://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/03/24/0001.htmlhttp://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/04/18/0000.htmlhttp://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/05/15/0000.htmlhttp://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/08/01/0000.htmlhttp://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/08/25/0000.html
Many thanks to YAMAMOTO Takashi, Matt Thomas, and Christos Zoulas for help
stablizing kauth(9).
Full credit for the regression tests, making sure these changes didn't break
anything, goes to Matt Fleming and Jaime Fournier.
Happy birthday Randi! :)
fileassoc.diff adds a fileassoc_table_run() routine that allows you to
pass a callback to be called with every entry on a given mount.
veriexec.diff adds some raw device access policies: if raw disk is
opened at strict level 1, all fingerprints on this disk will be
invalidated as a safety measure. level 2 will not allow opening disk
for raw writing if we monitor it, and prevent raw writes to memory.
level 3 will not allow opening any disk for raw writing.
both update all relevant documentation.
veriexec concept is okay blymn@.
- use vmspace rather than proc or lwp where appropriate.
the latter is more natural to specify an address space.
(and less likely to be abused for random purposes.)
- fix a swdmover race.
pgoyette