- Add a KAUTH_PROCESS_SCHEDULER action, to handle scheduler related
requests, and add specific requests for set/get scheduler policy and
set/get scheduler parameters.
- Add a KAUTH_PROCESS_KEVENT_FILTER action, to handle kevent(2) related
requests.
- Add a KAUTH_DEVICE_TTY_STI action to handle requests to TIOCSTI.
- Add requests for the KAUTH_PROCESS_CANSEE action, indicating what
process information is being looked at (entry itself, args, env,
open files).
- Add requests for the KAUTH_PROCESS_RLIMIT action indicating set/get.
- Add requests for the KAUTH_PROCESS_CORENAME action indicating set/get.
- Make bsd44 secmodel code handle the newly added rqeuests appropriately.
All of the above make it possible to issue finer-grained kauth(9) calls in
many places, removing some KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER requests.
- Remove the "CAN" from KAUTH_PROCESS_CAN{KTRACE,PROCFS,PTRACE,SIGNAL}.
Discussed with christos@ and yamt@.
Been running in my tree for over a month at least.
Reviewed and okay yamt@, and special thanks to him as well as rittera@
for making this possible through fixing NDIS to not call fork1() with
l1 != curlwp.
allow certain operations.
The suser module of the bsd44 secmodel code was made aware of the missing
operations that were explicitly allowed in the securelevel module, and
the logic in the latter was modified to a default defer, deny where not
allowed.
This concept, which is the correct way to write secmodel code, was first
brought up by pavel@ a long time ago.
okay christos@.
While it's true that it's part of the traditional 4.4BSD security model,
there may come a time where a different "primary" security model used for
fine-grained privileges (ie., splitting root's responsibilities to various
privileges that can be assigned) may want to still have a securelevel
setting.
Idea from Daniel Carosone:
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/08/25/0001.html
The location of the removed files, for reference, was:
src/secmodel/bsd44/secmodel_bsd44_securelevel.c
src/secmodel/bsd44/securelevel.h
P_*/L_* naming convention, and rename the in-kernel flags to avoid
conflict. (P_ -> PK_, L_ -> LW_ ). Add back the (now unused) LSDEAD
constant.
Restores source compatibility with pre-newlock2 tools like ps or top.
Reviewed by Andrew Doran.
decisions, then have a kauth(9) call for security policy enforcement,
and only then proceed to processing each request.
Add a KAUTH_PROCESS_CANSEE call right after pfind(). This should really
be done differently, so mark it with XXX.
requests and centralizing them all. The result is that some of these
are not used on some architectures, but the documentation was updated
to reflect that.
- makes sysctl_proc_find() just lookup the process,
- use KAUTH_PROCESS_CANSEE requests to determine if the caller is
allowed to view the target process' corename, stop flags, and
rlimits,
- use explicit kauth(9) calls with KAUTH_PROCESS_CORENAME,
KAUTH_REQ_PROCESS_RESOURCE_NICE, KAUTH_REQ_PROCESS_RESOURCE_RLIMIT,
and KAUTH_PROCESS_STOPFLAG when modifying the aforementioned.
- sync man-page and example skeleton secmodel with reality.
okay yamt@
this is a pullup candidate.
First, remove process_checkioperm() calls from MD code. Similar checks
using kauth(9) routines (on the process scope, using appropriate action)
are done in the callers.
Add secmodel back-end to handle each subsystem.
* XXX: This is bogus. We should be failing the request
* XXX: not only if this specific slice is mounted, but
* XXX: if it's on a disk with any other mounted slice.
