Problem turned out to be due to improper handling of reads beyond EOF:
they should just return without error with the uio unchanged, and the
caller will recognize this as a zero-byte return (EOF).
The previous fix to protect directory reads against bogus uio_offset
values returned EINVAL, which broke mount -o union, which only
union'ed in the lower directory if the upper directory cleanly
returned EOF.
While we're here, protect kernfs as well.
call with F_FSCTL set and F_SETFL calls generate calls to a new
fileop fo_fcntl. Add genfs_fcntl() and soo_fcntl() which return 0
for F_SETFL and EOPNOTSUPP otherwise. Have all leaf filesystems
use genfs_fcntl().
Reviewed by: thorpej
Tested by: wrstuden
and PID allocation MP-safe. A new process state is added: SDEAD. This
state indicates that a process is dead, but not yet a zombie (has not
yet been processed by the process reaper).
SDEAD processes exist on both the zombproc list (via p_list) and deadproc
(via p_hash; the proc has been removed from the pidhash earlier in the exit
path). When the reaper deals with a process, it changes the state to
SZOMB, so that wait4 can process it.
Add a P_ZOMBIE() macro, which treats a proc in SZOMB or SDEAD as a zombie,
and update various parts of the kernel to reflect the new state.
Update coda to new struct lock in struct vnode.
make fdescfs, kernfs, portalfs, and procfs actually lock their vnodes.
It's not that hard.
Make unionfs set v_vnlock = NULL so any overlayed fs will call its
VOP_LOCK.
array of ARG_MAX size. ARG_MAX is currently 256k, which causes a rather
serious stack overflow (kernel stacks are not very large, usually 8k).
Fixes memory corruption problems observed after accessig /proc/1/cmdline
during tests. Problem in my case manifested itself as massive lossage
in ffs_sync(), resulting in a crash, and sometimes, pooched file systems.
XXX This could, and probably should, be rewritten to use a much smaller
temporary buffer, and a loop around uiomove().
- Don't error out on P_SYSTEM or SZOMB processes; instead, do what ps(1)
would do, i.e. the p_comm in parenthesis.
- Use uvm_io() (or procfs_rwmem() if !UVM) to read the target process's
psstrings and argument vector. Using copyin() is problematic, because
it operates on the current processes! That is, the old code would
always get the `cmdline' of the process reading the file, not that of
the target process.
with UVM and seperate I&D-Cache). Mostly by Michael Hitch, but pass struct
proc * instead of the pmap. Reason: said machine will need a method to do
the syncing operation for "curproc", too; this way more code can be shared.
as with user-land programs, include files are installed by each directory
in the tree that has includes to install. (This allows more flexibility
as to what gets installed, makes 'partial installs' easier, and gives us
more options as to which machines' includes get installed at any given
time.) The old SYS_INCLUDES={symlinks,copies} behaviours are _both_
still supported, though at least one bug in the 'symlinks' case is
fixed by this change. Include files can't be build before installation,
so directories that have includes as targets (e.g. dev/pci) have to move
those targets into a different Makefile.
(thus causing s_leader to become NULL) by storing the session ID separately
in the session structure. Export the session ID to userspace in the
eproc structure.
Submitted by Tom Proett <proett@nas.nasa.gov>.
UVM was written by chuck cranor <chuck@maria.wustl.edu>, with some
minor portions derived from the old Mach code. i provided some help
getting swap and paging working, and other bug fixes/ideas. chuck
silvers <chuq@chuq.com> also provided some other fixes.
this is the rest of the MI portion changes.
this will be KNF'd shortly. :-)
not included in a kernel without procfs, and it seems wrong to pull
all of procfs_subr.c in for just that one function. Perhaps this
should go into a new file instead?
FreeBSD by Sean Eric Fagan, but a bit different. This makes the checks
in the same places as sef's FreeBSD patch, but does not hardcode the
"kmem" group into the kernel, and also does a check identical to the
(3) and (4) checks in the NetBSD ptrace(2):
(1) it's not owned by you, or is set-id on exec (unless
you're root), or
(2) it's init, which controls the security level of the
entire system, and the system was not compiled with
permanently insecure mode turned on.
* Did not check for P_SUGID on ATTACH.
* Did not check for tracing of init on ATTACH.
* Did not turn off single-step mode on RUN or DETACH.
* Might have screwed up reparenting in some cases.
* Allowed anyone to detach the process.
thorpej