- New /etc/security check for entropy in daily security report.
- New /etc/rc.d/entropy script runs (after random_seed and rndctl) to
check for entropy at boot -- in rc.conf, you can:
. set `entropy=check' to halt multiuser boot and enter single-user
mode if not enough entropy
. set `entropy=wait' to make multiuser boot wait until enough entropy
Default is to always boot without waiting -- and rely on other
channels like security report to alert the operator if there's a
problem.
- New man page entropy(7) discussing the higher-level concepts and
system integration with cross-references.
- New paragraph in afterboot(8) about entropy citing entropy(7) for
more details.
This change addresses many of the issues discussed in security/55659.
This is a first draft; happy to take improvements to the man pages and
scripted messages to improve clarity.
I considered changing motd to include an entropy warning with a
reference to the entropy(7) man page, but it's a little trickier:
- Not sure it's appropriate for all users to see at login rather than
users who have power to affect the entropy estimate (maybe it is,
just haven't decided).
- We only have a mechanism for changing once at boot; the message would
remain until next boot even if an operator adds enough entropy.
- The mechanism isn't really conducive to making a message appear
conditionally from boot to boot.
These are currently listed in order of uid because I went through
src/etc/group and src/etc/master.passwd line by line, and sorting any
other way after the fact -- like lexicographically, how it should be
-- was kinda inconvenient.
Feel free to sort, add information, add historical references,
correct any mistakes, &c., so that these remain living documents
describing NetBSD's standard users and groups and practices around
them.
- make sysctl kern.expose_address tri-state:
0: no access
1: access to processes with open /dev/kmem
2: access to everyone
defaults:
0: KASLR kernels
1: non-KASLR kernels
- improve efficiency by calling get_expose_address() per sysctl, not per
process.
- don't expose addresses for linux procfs
- welcome to 8.99.27, changes to fill_*proc ABI
riastradh