mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/.
OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and
includes sftp client and server support.
Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their
continued support of the project, especially those who contributed
code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the
project. More information on donations may be found at:
https://www.openssh.com/donations.html
Future deprecation notice
=========================
It is now possible[1] to perform chosen-prefix attacks against the
SHA-1 algorithm for less than USD$50K. For this reason, we will be
disabling the "ssh-rsa" public key signature algorithm by default in a
near-future release.
This algorithm is unfortunately still used widely despite the
existence of better alternatives, being the only remaining public key
signature algorithm specified by the original SSH RFCs.
The better alternatives include:
* The RFC8332 RSA SHA-2 signature algorithms rsa-sha2-256/512. These
algorithms have the advantage of using the same key type as
"ssh-rsa" but use the safe SHA-2 hash algorithms. These have been
supported since OpenSSH 7.2 and are already used by default if the
client and server support them.
* The ssh-ed25519 signature algorithm. It has been supported in
OpenSSH since release 6.5.
* The RFC5656 ECDSA algorithms: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256/384/521. These
have been supported by OpenSSH since release 5.7.
To check whether a server is using the weak ssh-rsa public key
algorithm, for host authentication, try to connect to it after
removing the ssh-rsa algorithm from ssh(1)'s allowed list:
ssh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=-ssh-rsa user@host
If the host key verification fails and no other supported host key
types are available, the server software on that host should be
upgraded.
A future release of OpenSSH will enable UpdateHostKeys by default
to allow the client to automatically migrate to better algorithms.
Users may consider enabling this option manually. Vendors of devices
that implement the SSH protocol should ensure that they support the
new signature algorithms for RSA keys.
[1] "SHA-1 is a Shambles: First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and
Application to the PGP Web of Trust" Leurent, G and Peyrin, T
(2020) https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf
Security
========
* scp(1): when receiving files, scp(1) could be become desynchronised
if a utimes(2) system call failed. This could allow file contents
to be interpreted as file metadata and thereby permit an adversary
to craft a file system that, when copied with scp(1) in a
configuration that caused utimes(2) to fail (e.g. under a SELinux
policy or syscall sandbox), transferred different file names and
contents to the actual file system layout.
Exploitation of this is not likely as utimes(2) does not fail under
normal circumstances. Successful exploitation is not silent - the
output of scp(1) would show transfer errors followed by the actual
file(s) that were received.
Finally, filenames returned from the peer are (since openssh-8.0)
matched against the user's requested destination, thereby
disallowing a successful exploit from writing files outside the
user's selected target glob (or directory, in the case of a
recursive transfer). This ensures that this attack can achieve no
more than a hostile peer is already able to achieve within the scp
protocol.
Potentially-incompatible changes
================================
This release includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:
* sftp(1): reject an argument of "-1" in the same way as ssh(1) and
scp(1) do instead of accepting and silently ignoring it.
Changes since OpenSSH 8.2
=========================
The focus of this release is bug fixing.
New Features
------------
* sshd(8): make IgnoreRhosts a tri-state option: "yes" to ignore
rhosts/shosts, "no" allow rhosts/shosts or (new) "shosts-only"
to allow .shosts files but not .rhosts.
* sshd(8): allow the IgnoreRhosts directive to appear anywhere in a
sshd_config, not just before any Match blocks; bz3148
* ssh(1): add %TOKEN percent expansion for the LocalFoward and
RemoteForward keywords when used for Unix domain socket forwarding.
bz#3014
* all: allow loading public keys from the unencrypted envelope of a
private key file if no corresponding public key file is present.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): prefer to use chacha20 from libcrypto where
possible instead of the (slower) portable C implementation included
in OpenSSH.
* ssh-keygen(1): add ability to dump the contents of a binary key
revocation list via "ssh-keygen -lQf /path" bz#3132
Bugfixes
--------
* ssh(1): fix IdentitiesOnly=yes to also apply to keys loaded from
a PKCS11Provider; bz#3141
* ssh-keygen(1): avoid NULL dereference when trying to convert an
invalid RFC4716 private key.
* scp(1): when performing remote-to-remote copies using "scp -3",
start the second ssh(1) channel with BatchMode=yes enabled to
avoid confusing and non-deterministic ordering of prompts.
* ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): when signing a challenge using a FIDO token,
perform hashing of the message to be signed in the middleware layer
rather than in OpenSSH code. This permits the use of security key
middlewares that perform the hashing implicitly, such as Windows
Hello.
* ssh(1): fix incorrect error message for "too many known hosts
files." bz#3149
* ssh(1): make failures when establishing "Tunnel" forwarding
terminate the connection when ExitOnForwardFailure is enabled;
bz#3116
* ssh-keygen(1): fix printing of fingerprints on private keys and add
a regression test for same.
* sshd(8): document order of checking AuthorizedKeysFile (first) and
AuthorizedKeysCommand (subsequently, if the file doesn't match);
bz#3134
* sshd(8): document that /etc/hosts.equiv and /etc/shosts.equiv are
not considered for HostbasedAuthentication when the target user is
root; bz#3148
* ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): fix NULL dereference in private certificate
key parsing (oss-fuzz #20074).
* ssh(1), sshd(8): more consistency between sets of %TOKENS are
accepted in various configuration options.
* ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): improve error messages for some common
PKCS#11 C_Login failure cases; bz#3130
* ssh(1), sshd(8): make error messages for problems during SSH banner
exchange consistent with other SSH transport-layer error messages
and ensure they include the relevant IP addresses bz#3129
* various: fix a number of spelling errors in comments and debug/error
messages
* ssh-keygen(1), ssh-add(1): when downloading FIDO2 resident keys
from a token, don't prompt for a PIN until the token has told us
that it needs one. Avoids double-prompting on devices that
implement on-device authentication.
* sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): no-touch-required FIDO certificate option
should be an extension, not a critical option.
* ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh-add(1): offer a better error message
when trying to use a FIDO key function and SecurityKeyProvider is
empty.
* ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(8): ensure that a key lifetime fits within
the values allowed by the wire format (u32). Prevents integer
wraparound of the timeout values. bz#3119
* ssh(1): detect and prevent trivial configuration loops when using
ProxyJump. bz#3057.
Portability
-----------
* Detect systems where signals flagged with SA_RESTART will interrupt
select(2). POSIX permits implementations to choose whether
select(2) will return when interrupted with a SA_RESTART-flagged
signal, but OpenSSH requires interrupting behaviour.
* Several compilation fixes for HP/UX and AIX.
* On platforms that do not support setting process-wide routing
domains (all excepting OpenBSD at present), fail to accept a
configuration attempts to set one at process start time rather than
fatally erroring at run time. bz#3126
* Improve detection of egrep (used in regression tests) on platforms
that offer a poor default one (e.g. Solaris).
* A number of shell portability fixes for the regression tests.
* Fix theoretical infinite loop in the glob(3) replacement
implementation.
* Fix seccomp sandbox compilation problems for some Linux
configurations bz#3085
* Improved detection of libfido2 and some compilation fixes for some
configurations when --with-security-key-builtin is selected.
Update netpgpverify and libnetpgpverify to version 20200503
ensure all exported functions use a unique prfix, so that they don't
conflict with symbols (both data and text) in libcrypto. this works for
statically linked binaries and libraries, rather then the version map which
only works for dynalically-linked.
exported. In particular the following symbols:
DSA_SIG_free
DSA_SIG_new
DSA_do_sign
DSA_do_verify
DSA_free
DSA_new
DSA_size
RSA_check_key
RSA_free
RSA_generate_key
RSA_new
RSA_private_decrypt
RSA_private_encrypt
RSA_public_decrypt
RSA_public_encrypt
conflict with libcrypto and break pkg_add which links against both
libraries.
Firstly, include the correct headers. Then, make sure that requests
never exceed 256 bytes.
Disable a hack for old FreeBSD versions, just in case it actually gets
used.
This should mean that OpenSSL doesn't ever fall back to reading from
/dev/urandom.
XXX pullup, XXX upstream.
*) Fixed segmentation fault in SSL_check_chain()
Server or client applications that call the SSL_check_chain() function
during or after a TLS 1.3 handshake may crash due to a NULL pointer
dereference as a result of incorrect handling of the
"signature_algorithms_cert" TLS extension. The crash occurs if an invalid
or unrecognised signature algorithm is received from the peer. This could
be exploited by a malicious peer in a Denial of Service attack.
(CVE-2020-1967)
[Benjamin Kaduk]
*) Added AES consttime code for no-asm configurations
an optional constant time support for AES was added
when building openssl for no-asm.
Enable with: ./config no-asm -DOPENSSL_AES_CONST_TIME
Disable with: ./config no-asm -DOPENSSL_NO_AES_CONST_TIME
At this time this feature is by default disabled.
It will be enabled by default in 3.0.
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Revert the change of EOF detection while reading in libssl to avoid
regressions in applications depending on the current way of reporting
the EOF. As the existing method is not fully accurate the change to
reporting the EOF via SSL_ERROR_SSL is kept on the current development
branch and will be present in the 3.0 release.
[Tomas Mraz]
*) Revised BN_generate_prime_ex to not avoid factors 3..17863 in p-1
when primes for RSA keys are computed.
Since we previously always generated primes == 2 (mod 3) for RSA keys,
the 2-prime and 3-prime RSA modules were easy to distinguish, since
N = p*q = 1 (mod 3), but N = p*q*r = 2 (mod 3). Therefore fingerprinting
2-prime vs. 3-prime RSA keys was possible by computing N mod 3.
This avoids possible fingerprinting of newly generated RSA modules.
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Properly detect EOF while reading in libssl. Previously if we hit an EOF
while reading in libssl then we would report an error back to the
application (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) but errno would be 0. We now add
an error to the stack (which means we instead return SSL_ERROR_SSL) and
therefore give a hint as to what went wrong.
[Matt Caswell]
*) Check that ed25519 and ed448 are allowed by the security level. Previously
signature algorithms not using an MD were not being checked that they were
allowed by the security level.
[Kurt Roeckx]
*) Fixed SSL_get_servername() behaviour. The behaviour of SSL_get_servername()
was not quite right. The behaviour was not consistent between resumption
and normal handshakes, and also not quite consistent with historical
behaviour. The behaviour in various scenarios has been clarified and
it has been updated to make it match historical behaviour as closely as
possible.
[Matt Caswell]
*) [VMS only] The header files that the VMS compilers include automatically,
__DECC_INCLUDE_PROLOGUE.H and __DECC_INCLUDE_EPILOGUE.H, use pragmas that
the C++ compiler doesn't understand. This is a shortcoming in the
compiler, but can be worked around with __cplusplus guards.
C++ applications that use OpenSSL libraries must be compiled using the
qualifier '/NAMES=(AS_IS,SHORTENED)' to be able to use all the OpenSSL
functions. Otherwise, only functions with symbols of less than 31
characters can be used, as the linker will not be able to successfully
resolve symbols with longer names.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Corrected the documentation of the return values from the EVP_DigestSign*
set of functions. The documentation mentioned negative values for some
errors, but this was never the case, so the mention of negative values
was removed.
Code that followed the documentation and thereby check with something
like 'EVP_DigestSignInit(...) <= 0' will continue to work undisturbed.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Fixed an an overflow bug in the x64_64 Montgomery squaring procedure
used in exponentiation with 512-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are
affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against 2-prime RSA1024,
3-prime RSA1536, and DSA1024 as a result of this defect would be very
difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH512
are considered just feasible. However, for an attack the target would
have to re-use the DH512 private key, which is not recommended anyway.
Also applications directly using the low level API BN_mod_exp may be
affected if they use BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
(CVE-2019-1551)
[Andy Polyakov]
*) Added a new method to gather entropy on VMS, based on SYS$GET_ENTROPY.
The presence of this system service is determined at run-time.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Added newline escaping functionality to a filename when using openssl dgst.
This output format is to replicate the output format found in the '*sum'
checksum programs. This aims to preserve backward compatibility.
[Matt Eaton, Richard Levitte, and Paul Dale]
*) Print all values for a PKCS#12 attribute with 'openssl pkcs12', not just
the first value.
[Jon Spillett]
- Add GSSAPIAuthentication and related options
- Add KerberosAuthentication and related options
- Bring in the lengthy but useful comment block about
the side-effect of UsePAM with regards to PermitRootLogin.
- Match the case of the UsePAM keyword used in the manual page and code,
to aid case-sensitive grep etc.
- Remove references to obsole UseLogin and UsePrivilegeSeparation keywords.
- Whitespace police
The first matching entry that sets an option "wins." Therefore more
specific matches should be provided before the "Host *" entry that
matches everything. This way options set in the more specific entry will
not be accidentally made ineffective by the match-all entry.
OpenSSH 8.2 was released on 2020-02-14. It is available from the
mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/.
OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and
includes sftp client and server support.
Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their
continued support of the project, especially those who contributed
code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the
project. More information on donations may be found at:
https://www.openssh.com/donations.html
Future deprecation notice
=========================
It is now possible[1] to perform chosen-prefix attacks against the
SHA-1 hash algorithm for less than USD$50K. For this reason, we will
be disabling the "ssh-rsa" public key signature algorithm that depends
on SHA-1 by default in a near-future release.
This algorithm is unfortunately still used widely despite the
existence of better alternatives, being the only remaining public key
signature algorithm specified by the original SSH RFCs.
The better alternatives include:
* The RFC8332 RSA SHA-2 signature algorithms rsa-sha2-256/512. These
algorithms have the advantage of using the same key type as
"ssh-rsa" but use the safe SHA-2 hash algorithms. These have been
supported since OpenSSH 7.2 and are already used by default if the
client and server support them.
* The ssh-ed25519 signature algorithm. It has been supported in
OpenSSH since release 6.5.
* The RFC5656 ECDSA algorithms: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256/384/521. These
have been supported by OpenSSH since release 5.7.
To check whether a server is using the weak ssh-rsa public key
algorithm for host authentication, try to connect to it after
removing the ssh-rsa algorithm from ssh(1)'s allowed list:
ssh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=-ssh-rsa user@host
If the host key verification fails and no other supported host key
types are available, the server software on that host should be
upgraded.
A future release of OpenSSH will enable UpdateHostKeys by default
to allow the client to automatically migrate to better algorithms.
Users may consider enabling this option manually.
[1] "SHA-1 is a Shambles: First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and
Application to the PGP Web of Trust" Leurent, G and Peyrin, T
(2020) https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf
Security
========
* ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): this release removes the "ssh-rsa"
(RSA/SHA1) algorithm from those accepted for certificate signatures
(i.e. the client and server CASignatureAlgorithms option) and will
use the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm by default when the
ssh-keygen(1) CA signs new certificates.
Certificates are at special risk to the aforementioned SHA1
collision vulnerability as an attacker has effectively unlimited
time in which to craft a collision that yields them a valid
certificate, far more than the relatively brief LoginGraceTime
window that they have to forge a host key signature.
The OpenSSH certificate format includes a CA-specified (typically
random) nonce value near the start of the certificate that should
make exploitation of chosen-prefix collisions in this context
challenging, as the attacker does not have full control over the
prefix that actually gets signed. Nonetheless, SHA1 is now a
demonstrably broken algorithm and futher improvements in attacks
are highly likely.
OpenSSH releases prior to 7.2 do not support the newer RSA/SHA2
algorithms and will refuse to accept certificates signed by an
OpenSSH 8.2+ CA using RSA keys unless the unsafe algorithm is
explicitly selected during signing ("ssh-keygen -t ssh-rsa").
Older clients/servers may use another CA key type such as
ssh-ed25519 (supported since OpenSSH 6.5) or one of the
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256/384/521 types (supported since OpenSSH 5.7)
instead if they cannot be upgraded.
Potentially-incompatible changes
================================
This release includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the above removal of "ssh-rsa" from the accepted
CASignatureAlgorithms list.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): this release removes diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
from the default key exchange proposal for both the client and
server.
* ssh-keygen(1): the command-line options related to the generation
and screening of safe prime numbers used by the
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-* key exchange algorithms have
changed. Most options have been folded under the -O flag.
* sshd(8): the sshd listener process title visible to ps(1) has
changed to include information about the number of connections that
are currently attempting authentication and the limits configured
by MaxStartups.
* ssh-sk-helper(8): this is a new binary. It is used by the FIDO/U2F
support to provide address-space isolation for token middleware
libraries (including the internal one). It needs to be installed
in the expected path, typically under /usr/libexec or similar.
Changes since OpenSSH 8.1
=========================
This release contains some significant new features.
FIDO/U2F Support
----------------
This release adds support for FIDO/U2F hardware authenticators to
OpenSSH. U2F/FIDO are open standards for inexpensive two-factor
authentication hardware that are widely used for website
authentication. In OpenSSH FIDO devices are supported by new public
key types "ecdsa-sk" and "ed25519-sk", along with corresponding
certificate types.
ssh-keygen(1) may be used to generate a FIDO token-backed key, after
which they may be used much like any other key type supported by
OpenSSH, so long as the hardware token is attached when the keys are
used. FIDO tokens also generally require the user explicitly authorise
operations by touching or tapping them.
Generating a FIDO key requires the token be attached, and will usually
require the user tap the token to confirm the operation:
$ ssh-keygen -t ecdsa-sk -f ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
Generating public/private ecdsa-sk key pair.
You may need to touch your security key to authorize key generation.
Enter file in which to save the key (/home/djm/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk):
Enter passphrase (empty for no passphrase):
Enter same passphrase again:
Your identification has been saved in /home/djm/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
Your public key has been saved in /home/djm/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
This will yield a public and private key-pair. The private key file
should be useless to an attacker who does not have access to the
physical token. After generation, this key may be used like any other
supported key in OpenSSH and may be listed in authorized_keys, added
to ssh-agent(1), etc. The only additional stipulation is that the FIDO
token that the key belongs to must be attached when the key is used.
FIDO tokens are most commonly connected via USB but may be attached
via other means such as Bluetooth or NFC. In OpenSSH, communication
with the token is managed via a middleware library, specified by the
SecurityKeyProvider directive in ssh/sshd_config(5) or the
$SSH_SK_PROVIDER environment variable for ssh-keygen(1) and
ssh-add(1). The API for this middleware is documented in the sk-api.h
and PROTOCOL.u2f files in the source distribution.
OpenSSH includes a middleware ("SecurityKeyProvider=internal") with
support for USB tokens. It is automatically enabled in OpenBSD and may
be enabled in portable OpenSSH via the configure flag
--with-security-key-builtin. If the internal middleware is enabled
then it is automatically used by default. This internal middleware
requires that libfido2 (https://github.com/Yubico/libfido2) and its
dependencies be installed. We recommend that packagers of portable
OpenSSH enable the built-in middleware, as it provides the
lowest-friction experience for users.
Note: FIDO/U2F tokens are required to implement the ECDSA-P256
"ecdsa-sk" key type, but hardware support for Ed25519 "ed25519-sk" is
less common. Similarly, not all hardware tokens support some of the
optional features such as resident keys.
The protocol-level changes to support FIDO/U2F keys in SSH are
documented in the PROTOCOL.u2f file in the OpenSSH source
distribution.
There are a number of supporting changes to this feature:
* ssh-keygen(1): add a "no-touch-required" option when generating
FIDO-hosted keys, that disables their default behaviour of
requiring a physical touch/tap on the token during authentication.
Note: not all tokens support disabling the touch requirement.
* sshd(8): add a sshd_config PubkeyAuthOptions directive that
collects miscellaneous public key authentication-related options
for sshd(8). At present it supports only a single option
"no-touch-required". This causes sshd to skip its default check for
FIDO/U2F keys that the signature was authorised by a touch or press
event on the token hardware.
* ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): add a "no-touch-required" option
for authorized_keys and a similar extension for certificates. This
option disables the default requirement that FIDO key signatures
attest that the user touched their key to authorize them, mirroring
the similar PubkeyAuthOptions sshd_config option.
* ssh-keygen(1): add support for the writing the FIDO attestation
information that is returned when new keys are generated via the
"-O write-attestation=/path" option. FIDO attestation certificates
may be used to verify that a FIDO key is hosted in trusted
hardware. OpenSSH does not currently make use of this information,
beyond optionally writing it to disk.
FIDO2 resident keys
-------------------
FIDO/U2F OpenSSH keys consist of two parts: a "key handle" part stored
in the private key file on disk, and a per-device private key that is
unique to each FIDO/U2F token and that cannot be exported from the
token hardware. These are combined by the hardware at authentication
time to derive the real key that is used to sign authentication
challenges.
For tokens that are required to move between computers, it can be
cumbersome to have to move the private key file first. To avoid this
requirement, tokens implementing the newer FIDO2 standard support
"resident keys", where it is possible to effectively retrieve the key
handle part of the key from the hardware.
OpenSSH supports this feature, allowing resident keys to be generated
using the ssh-keygen(1) "-O resident" flag. This will produce a
public/private key pair as usual, but it will be possible to retrieve
the private key part from the token later. This may be done using
"ssh-keygen -K", which will download all available resident keys from
the tokens attached to the host and write public/private key files
for them. It is also possible to download and add resident keys
directly to ssh-agent(1) without writing files to the file-system
using "ssh-add -K".
Resident keys are indexed on the token by the application string and
user ID. By default, OpenSSH uses an application string of "ssh:" and
an empty user ID. If multiple resident keys on a single token are
desired then it may be necessary to override one or both of these
defaults using the ssh-keygen(1) "-O application=" or "-O user="
options. Note: OpenSSH will only download and use resident keys whose
application string begins with "ssh:"
Storing both parts of a key on a FIDO token increases the likelihood
of an attacker being able to use a stolen token device. For this
reason, tokens should enforce PIN authentication before allowing
download of keys, and users should set a PIN on their tokens before
creating any resident keys.
Other New Features
------------------
* sshd(8): add an Include sshd_config keyword that allows including
additional configuration files via glob(3) patterns. bz2468
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): make the LE (low effort) DSCP code point available
via the IPQoS directive; bz2986,
* ssh(1): when AddKeysToAgent=yes is set and the key contains no
comment, add the key to the agent with the key's path as the
comment. bz2564
* ssh-keygen(1), ssh-agent(1): expose PKCS#11 key labels and X.509
subjects as key comments, rather than simply listing the PKCS#11
provider library path. PR138
* ssh-keygen(1): allow PEM export of DSA and ECDSA keys; bz3091
* ssh(1), sshd(8): make zlib compile-time optional, available via the
Makefile.inc ZLIB flag on OpenBSD or via the --with-zlib configure
option for OpenSSH portable.
* sshd(8): when clients get denied by MaxStartups, send a
notification prior to the SSH2 protocol banner according to
RFC4253 section 4.2.
* ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): when invoking the $SSH_ASKPASS prompt
program, pass a hint to the program to describe the type of
desired prompt. The possible values are "confirm" (indicating
that a yes/no confirmation dialog with no text entry should be
shown), "none" (to indicate an informational message only), or
blank for the original ssh-askpass behaviour of requesting a
password/phrase.
* ssh(1): allow forwarding a different agent socket to the path
specified by $SSH_AUTH_SOCK, by extending the existing ForwardAgent
option to accepting an explicit path or the name of an environment
variable in addition to yes/no.
* ssh-keygen(1): add a new signature operations "find-principals" to
look up the principal associated with a signature from an allowed-
signers file.
* sshd(8): expose the number of currently-authenticating connections
along with the MaxStartups limit in the process title visible to
"ps".
Bugfixes
--------
* sshd(8): make ClientAliveCountMax=0 have sensible semantics: it
will now disable connection killing entirely rather than the
current behaviour of instantly killing the connection after the
first liveness test regardless of success. bz2627
* sshd(8): clarify order of AllowUsers / DenyUsers vs AllowGroups /
DenyGroups in the sshd(8) manual page. bz1690
* sshd(8): better describe HashKnownHosts in the manual page. bz2560
* sshd(8): clarify that that permitopen=/PermitOpen do no name or
address translation in the manual page. bz3099
* sshd(8): allow the UpdateHostKeys feature to function when
multiple known_hosts files are in use. When updating host keys,
ssh will now search subsequent known_hosts files, but will add
updated host keys to the first specified file only. bz2738
* All: replace all calls to signal(2) with a wrapper around
sigaction(2). This wrapper blocks all other signals during the
handler preventing races between handlers, and sets SA_RESTART
which should reduce the potential for short read/write operations.
* sftp(1): fix a race condition in the SIGCHILD handler that could
turn in to a kill(-1); bz3084
* sshd(8): fix a case where valid (but extremely large) SSH channel
IDs were being incorrectly rejected. bz3098
* ssh(1): when checking host key fingerprints as answers to new
hostkey prompts, ignore whitespace surrounding the fingerprint
itself.
* All: wait for file descriptors to be readable or writeable during
non-blocking connect, not just readable. Prevents a timeout when
the server doesn't immediately send a banner (e.g. multiplexers
like sslh)
* sshd_config(5): document the sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org
key exchange algorithm. PR#151
*) Fixed a fork protection issue. OpenSSL 1.1.1 introduced a rewritten random
number generator (RNG). This was intended to include protection in the
event of a fork() system call in order to ensure that the parent and child
processes did not share the same RNG state. However this protection was not
being used in the default case.
A partial mitigation for this issue is that the output from a high
precision timer is mixed into the RNG state so the likelihood of a parent
and child process sharing state is significantly reduced.
If an application already calls OPENSSL_init_crypto() explicitly using
OPENSSL_INIT_ATFORK then this problem does not occur at all.
(CVE-2019-1549)
[Matthias St. Pierre]
*) For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is
used even when parsing explicit parameters, when loading a serialized key
or calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`/
`EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`.
This prevents bypass of security hardening and performance gains,
especially for curves with specialized EC_METHODs.
By default, if a key encoded with explicit parameters is loaded and later
serialized, the output is still encoded with explicit parameters, even if
internally a "named" EC_GROUP is used for computation.
[Nicola Tuveri]
*) Compute ECC cofactors if not provided during EC_GROUP construction. Before
this change, EC_GROUP_set_generator would accept order and/or cofactor as
NULL. After this change, only the cofactor parameter can be NULL. It also
does some minimal sanity checks on the passed order.
(CVE-2019-1547)
[Billy Bob Brumley]
*) Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey.
An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the
second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second
recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct
encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be
decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is
used and the recipient will not notice the attack.
As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted
key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the
certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
(CVE-2019-1563)
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Early start up entropy quality from the DEVRANDOM seed source has been
improved for older Linux systems. The RAND subsystem will wait for
/dev/random to be producing output before seeding from /dev/urandom.
The seeded state is stored for future library initialisations using
a system global shared memory segment. The shared memory identifier
can be configured by defining OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID to
the desired value. The default identifier is 114.
[Paul Dale]
*) Correct the extended master secret constant on EBCDIC systems. Without this
fix TLS connections between an EBCDIC system and a non-EBCDIC system that
negotiate EMS will fail. Unfortunately this also means that TLS connections
between EBCDIC systems with this fix, and EBCDIC systems without this
fix will fail if they negotiate EMS.
[Matt Caswell]
*) Use Windows installation paths in the mingw builds
Mingw isn't a POSIX environment per se, which means that Windows
paths should be used for installation.
(CVE-2019-1552)
[Richard Levitte]
*) Changed DH_check to accept parameters with order q and 2q subgroups.
With order 2q subgroups the bit 0 of the private key is not secret
but DH_generate_key works around that by clearing bit 0 of the
private key for those. This avoids leaking bit 0 of the private key.
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Significantly reduce secure memory usage by the randomness pools.
[Paul Dale]
*) Revert the DEVRANDOM_WAIT feature for Linux systems
The DEVRANDOM_WAIT feature added a select() call to wait for the
/dev/random device to become readable before reading from the
/dev/urandom device.
It turned out that this change had negative side effects on
performance which were not acceptable. After some discussion it
was decided to revert this feature and leave it up to the OS
resp. the platform maintainer to ensure a proper initialization
during early boot time.
[Matthias St. Pierre]
Bug fixes
PKCS#11 hcrypto back-end
. initialize the p11_module_load function list
. verify that not only is a mechanism present but that its mechanism
info states that it offers the required encryption, decryption or
digest services
krb5:
. Starting with 7.6, Heimdal permitted requesting authenticated
anonymous tickets. However, it did not verify that a KDC in fact
returned an anonymous ticket when one was requested.
. Cease setting the KDCOption reaquest_anonymous flag when issuing
S4UProxy (constrained delegation) TGS requests.
. when the Win2K PKINIT compatibility option is set, do
not require krbtgt otherName to match when validating KDC
certificate.
. set PKINIT_BTMM flag per Apple implementation
. use memset_s() instead of memset()
kdc:
. When generating KRB5SignedPath in the AS, use the reply client name
rather than the one from the request, so validation will work
correctly in the TGS.
. allow checksum of PA-FOR-USER to be HMAC_MD5. Even if TGT used
an enctype with a different checksum. Per [MS-SFU] 2.2.1
PA-FOR-USER the checksum is always HMAC_MD5, and that's what
Windows and MIT clients send.
In Heimdal both the client and kdc use instead the
checksum of the TGT, and therefore work with each other
but Windows and MIT clients fail against Heimdal KDC.
Both Windows and MIT KDC would allow any keyed checksum
to be used so Heimdal client work fine against it.
Change Heimdal KDC to allow HMAC_MD5 even for non RC4
based TGT in order to support per-spec clients.
. use memset_s() instead of memset()
. Detect Heimdal 1.0 through 7.6 clients that issue S4UProxy
(constrained delegation) TGS Requests with the request
anonymous flag set. These requests will be treated as
S4UProxy requests and not anonymous requests.
HDB:
. Set SQLite3 backend default page size to 8KB.
. Add hdb_set_sync() method
kadmind:
. disable HDB sync during database load avoiding unnecessary disk i/o.
ipropd:
. disable HDB sync during receive_everything. Doing an fsync
per-record when receiving the complete HDB is a performance
disaster. Among other things, if the HDB is very large, then
one slave receving a full HDB can cause other slaves to timeout
and, if HDB write activity is high enough to cause iprop log
truncation, then also need full syncs, which leads to a cycle of
full syncs for all slaves until HDB write activity drops.
Allowing the iprop log to be larger helps, but improving
receive_everything() performance helps even more.
kinit:
. Anonymous PKINIT tickets discard the realm information used
to locate the issuing AS. Store the issuing realm in the
credentials cache in order to locate a KDC which can renew them.
. Do not leak the result of krb5_cc_get_config() when determining
anonymous PKINIT start realm.
klist:
. Show transited-policy-checked, ok-as-delegate and anonymous
flags when listing credentials.
tests:
. Regenerate certs so that they expire before the 2038 armageddon
so the test suite will pass on 32-bit operating systems until the
underlying issues can be resolved.
Solaris:
. Define _STDC_C11_BCI for memset_s prototype
build tooling:
. Convert from python 2 to python 3
documentation
. rename verify-password to verify-password-quality
. hprop default mode is encrypt
. kadmind "all" permission does not include "get-keys"
. verify-password-quality might not be stateless
Release Notes - Heimdal - Version Heimdal 7.6
Security (#555)
CVE-2018-16860 Heimdal KDC: Reject PA-S4U2Self with unkeyed checksum
When the Heimdal KDC checks the checksum that is placed on the
S4U2Self packet by the server to protect the requested principal
against modification, it does not confirm that the checksum
algorithm that protects the user name (principal) in the request
is keyed. This allows a man-in-the-middle attacker who can
intercept the request to the KDC to modify the packet by replacing
the user name (principal) in the request with any desired user
name (principal) that exists in the KDC and replace the checksum
protecting that name with a CRC32 checksum (which requires no
prior knowledge to compute).
This would allow a S4U2Self ticket requested on behalf of user
name (principal) user@EXAMPLE.COM to any service to be changed
to a S4U2Self ticket with a user name (principal) of
Administrator@EXAMPLE.COM. This ticket would then contain the
PAC of the modified user name (principal).
CVE-2019-12098, client-only:
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key exchange
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Bug fixes
Happy eyeballs: Don't wait for responses from known-unreachable KDCs.
kdc: check return copy_Realm, copy_PrincipalName, copy_EncryptionKey
kinit:
. cleanup temporary ccaches
. see man page for "kinit --anonymous" command line syntax change
kdc: Make anonymous AS-requests more RFC8062-compliant.
Updated expired test certificates
Solaris:
. PKCS#11 hcrypto backend broken since 7.0.1
. Building with Sun Pro C
Features
kuser: support authenticated anonymous AS-REQs in kinit
kdc: support for anonymous TGS-REQs
kgetcred support for anonymous service tickets
Support builds with OpenSSL 1.1.1
Building from source:
Heimdal 7.5
This is a security release of Heimdal
This release patches a remote denial of service
CVE-2017-17439: In Heimdal 7.1 through 7.4, remote unauthenticated attackers are able to crash the KDC by sending a crafted UDP packet containing empty data fields for client name or realm.
Heimdal 7.4
This is a security release of Heimdal.
This release patches a critical vulnerability:
CVE-2017-11103: Orpheus' Lyre KDC-REP service name validation
In _krb5_extract_ticket() the KDC-REP service name must be obtained from
encrypted version stored in 'enc_part' instead of the unencrypted version
stored in 'ticket'. Use of the unecrypted version provides an
opportunity for successful server impersonation and other attacks.
Identified by Jeffrey Altman, Viktor Duchovni and Nico Williams.
See https://www.orpheus-lyre.info/
This is the Heimdal 7.3 security release.
This release addresses CVE-2017-6594. See the NEWS file for details.
Heimdal 7.2
This is the Heimdal 7.2 release.
GCC_NO_FORMAT_TRUNCATION -Wno-format-truncation (GCC 7/8)
GCC_NO_STRINGOP_TRUNCATION -Wno-stringop-truncation (GCC 8)
GCC_NO_STRINGOP_OVERFLOW -Wno-stringop-overflow (GCC 8)
GCC_NO_CAST_FUNCTION_TYPE -Wno-cast-function-type (GCC 8)
use these to turn off warnings for most GCC-8 complaints. many
of these are false positives, most of the real bugs are already
commited, or are yet to come.
we plan to introduce versions of (some?) of these that use the
"-Wno-error=" form, which still displays the warnings but does
not make it an error, and all of the above will be re-considered
as either being "fix me" (warning still displayed) or "warning
is wrong."
mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/.
OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and
includes sftp client and server support.
Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their
continued support of the project, especially those who contributed
code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the
project. More information on donations may be found at:
http://www.openssh.com/donations.html
Security
========
* ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1): an exploitable integer
overflow bug was found in the private key parsing code for the XMSS
key type. This key type is still experimental and support for it is
not compiled by default. No user-facing autoconf option exists in
portable OpenSSH to enable it. This bug was found by Adam Zabrocki
and reported via SecuriTeam's SSD program.
* ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-agent(1): add protection for private keys at
rest in RAM against speculation and memory side-channel attacks like
Spectre, Meltdown and Rambleed. This release encrypts private keys
when they are not in use with a symmetric key that is derived from a
relatively large "prekey" consisting of random data (currently 16KB).
Potentially-incompatible changes
================================
This release includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:
* ssh-keygen(1): when acting as a CA and signing certificates with
an RSA key, default to using the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm.
Certificates signed by RSA keys will therefore be incompatible
with OpenSSH versions prior to 7.2 unless the default is
overridden (using "ssh-keygen -t ssh-rsa -s ...").
If a specified SPI is not zero, tell the kernel to use the SPI by using
SADB_EXT_SPIRANGE. Otherwise, the kernel picks a random SPI.
It enables to mimic racoon.
Changes between 1.1.1b and 1.1.1c [28 May 2019]
*) Add build tests for C++. These are generated files that only do one
thing, to include one public OpenSSL head file each. This tests that
the public header files can be usefully included in a C++ application.
This test isn't enabled by default. It can be enabled with the option
'enable-buildtest-c++'.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Enable SHA3 pre-hashing for ECDSA and DSA.
[Patrick Steuer]
*) Change the default RSA, DSA and DH size to 2048 bit instead of 1024.
This changes the size when using the genpkey app when no size is given. It
fixes an omission in earlier changes that changed all RSA, DSA and DH
generation apps to use 2048 bits by default.
[Kurt Roeckx]
*) Reorganize the manual pages to consistently have RETURN VALUES,
EXAMPLES, SEE ALSO and HISTORY come in that order, and adjust
util/fix-doc-nits accordingly.
[Paul Yang, Joshua Lock]
*) Add the missing accessor EVP_PKEY_get0_engine()
[Matt Caswell]
*) Have apps like 's_client' and 's_server' output the signature scheme
along with other cipher suite parameters when debugging.
[Lorinczy Zsigmond]
*) Make OPENSSL_config() error agnostic again.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Do the error handling in RSA decryption constant time.
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305.
ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input
for every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value
(IV) should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length
and front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12
bytes. However it also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16
bytes. In this case only the last 12 bytes are significant and any
additional leading bytes are ignored.
It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are
unique. Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to
serious confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes
the default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a
change to the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a
new unique nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt
messages with a reused nonce.
Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the
integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the
integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further
affected. Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS,
is safe because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user
applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce
length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th of March 2019 by Joran Dirk
Greef of Ronomon.
(CVE-2019-1543)
[Matt Caswell]
*) Ensure that SM2 only uses SM3 as digest algorithm
[Paul Yang]
Security
========
This release contains mitigation for a weakness in the scp(1) tool
and protocol (CVE-2019-6111): when copying files from a remote system
to a local directory, scp(1) did not verify that the filenames that
the server sent matched those requested by the client. This could
allow a hostile server to create or clobber unexpected local files
with attacker-controlled content.
This release adds client-side checking that the filenames sent from
the server match the command-line request,
The scp protocol is outdated, inflexible and not readily fixed. We
recommend the use of more modern protocols like sftp and rsync for
file transfer instead.
Potentially-incompatible changes
================================
This release includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:
* scp(1): Relating to the above changes to scp(1); the scp protocol
relies on the remote shell for wildcard expansion, so there is no
infallible way for the client's wildcard matching to perfectly
reflect the server's. If there is a difference between client and
server wildcard expansion, the client may refuse files from the
server. For this reason, we have provided a new "-T" flag to scp
that disables these client-side checks at the risk of
reintroducing the attack described above.
* sshd(8): Remove support for obsolete "host/port" syntax. Slash-
separated host/port was added in 2001 as an alternative to
host:port syntax for the benefit of IPv6 users. These days there
are establised standards for this like [::1]:22 and the slash
syntax is easily mistaken for CIDR notation, which OpenSSH
supports for some things. Remove the slash notation from
ListenAddress and PermitOpen; bz#2335
Changes since OpenSSH 7.9
=========================
This release is focused on new features and internal refactoring.
New Features
------------
* ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-add(1): Add support for ECDSA keys in
PKCS#11 tokens.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Add experimental quantum-computing resistant
key exchange method, based on a combination of Streamlined NTRU
Prime 4591^761 and X25519.
* ssh-keygen(1): Increase the default RSA key size to 3072 bits,
following NIST Special Publication 800-57's guidance for a
128-bit equivalent symmetric security level.
* ssh(1): Allow "PKCS11Provider=none" to override later instances of
the PKCS11Provider directive in ssh_config; bz#2974
* sshd(8): Add a log message for situations where a connection is
dropped for attempting to run a command but a sshd_config
ForceCommand=internal-sftp restriction is in effect; bz#2960
* ssh(1): When prompting whether to record a new host key, accept
the key fingerprint as a synonym for "yes". This allows the user
to paste a fingerprint obtained out of band at the prompt and
have the client do the comparison for you.
* ssh-keygen(1): When signing multiple certificates on a single
command-line invocation, allow automatically incrementing the
certificate serial number.
* scp(1), sftp(1): Accept -J option as an alias to ProxyJump on
the scp and sftp command-lines.
* ssh-agent(1), ssh-pkcs11-helper(8), ssh-add(1): Accept "-v"
command-line flags to increase the verbosity of output; pass
verbose flags though to subprocesses, such as ssh-pkcs11-helper
started from ssh-agent.
* ssh-add(1): Add a "-T" option to allowing testing whether keys in
an agent are usable by performing a signature and a verification.
* sftp-server(8): Add a "lsetstat@openssh.com" protocol extension
that replicates the functionality of the existing SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT
operation but does not follow symlinks. bz#2067
* sftp(1): Add "-h" flag to chown/chgrp/chmod commands to request
they do not follow symlinks.
* sshd(8): Expose $SSH_CONNECTION in the PAM environment. This makes
the connection 4-tuple available to PAM modules that wish to use
it in decision-making. bz#2741
* sshd(8): Add a ssh_config "Match final" predicate Matches in same
pass as "Match canonical" but doesn't require hostname
canonicalisation be enabled. bz#2906
* sftp(1): Support a prefix of '@' to suppress echo of sftp batch
commands; bz#2926
* ssh-keygen(1): When printing certificate contents using
"ssh-keygen -Lf /path/certificate", include the algorithm that
the CA used to sign the cert.
Bugfixes
--------
* sshd(8): Fix authentication failures when sshd_config contains
"AuthenticationMethods any" inside a Match block that overrides
a more restrictive default.
* sshd(8): Avoid sending duplicate keepalives when ClientAliveCount
is enabled.
* sshd(8): Fix two race conditions related to SIGHUP daemon restart.
Remnant file descriptors in recently-forked child processes could
block the parent sshd's attempt to listen(2) to the configured
addresses. Also, the restarting parent sshd could exit before any
child processes that were awaiting their re-execution state had
completed reading it, leaving them in a fallback path.
* ssh(1): Fix stdout potentially being redirected to /dev/null when
ProxyCommand=- was in use.
* sshd(8): Avoid sending SIGPIPE to child processes if they attempt
to write to stderr after their parent processes have exited;
bz#2071
* ssh(1): Fix bad interaction between the ssh_config ConnectTimeout
and ConnectionAttempts directives - connection attempts after the
first were ignoring the requested timeout; bz#2918
* ssh-keyscan(1): Return a non-zero exit status if no keys were
found; bz#2903
* scp(1): Sanitize scp filenames to allow UTF-8 characters without
terminal control sequences; bz#2434
* sshd(8): Fix confusion between ClientAliveInterval and time-based
RekeyLimit that could cause connections to be incorrectly closed.
bz#2757
* ssh(1), ssh-add(1): Correct some bugs in PKCS#11 token PIN
handling at initial token login. The attempt to read the PIN
could be skipped in some cases, particularly on devices with
integrated PIN readers. This would lead to an inability to
retrieve keys from these tokens. bz#2652
* ssh(1), ssh-add(1): Support keys on PKCS#11 tokens that set the
CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE flag by requring a fresh login after the
C_SignInit operation. bz#2638
* ssh(1): Improve documentation for ProxyJump/-J, clarifying that
local configuration does not apply to jump hosts.
* ssh-keygen(1): Clarify manual - ssh-keygen -e only writes
public keys, not private.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): be more strict in processing protocol banners,
allowing \r characters only immediately before \n.
* Various: fix a number of memory leaks, including bz#2942 and
bz#2938
* scp(1), sftp(1): fix calculation of initial bandwidth limits.
Account for bytes written before the timer starts and adjust the
schedule on which recalculations are performed. Avoids an initial
burst of traffic and yields more accurate bandwidth limits;
bz#2927
* sshd(8): Only consider the ext-info-c extension during the initial
key eschange. It shouldn't be sent in subsequent ones, but if it
is present we should ignore it. This prevents sshd from sending a
SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO for REKEX for buggy these clients. bz#2929
* ssh-keygen(1): Clarify manual that ssh-keygen -F (find host in
authorized_keys) and -R (remove host from authorized_keys) options
may accept either a bare hostname or a [hostname]:port combo.
bz#2935
* ssh(1): Don't attempt to connect to empty SSH_AUTH_SOCK; bz#2936
* sshd(8): Silence error messages when sshd fails to load some of
the default host keys. Failure to load an explicitly-configured
hostkey is still an error, and failure to load any host key is
still fatal. pr/103
* ssh(1): Redirect stderr of ProxyCommands to /dev/null when ssh is
started with ControlPersist; prevents random ProxyCommand output
from interfering with session output.
* ssh(1): The ssh client was keeping a redundant ssh-agent socket
(leftover from authentication) around for the life of the
connection; bz#2912
* sshd(8): Fix bug in HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes and
PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes options. If only RSA-SHA2 siganture types
were specified, then authentication would always fail for RSA keys
as the monitor checks only the base key (not the signature
algorithm) type against *AcceptedKeyTypes. bz#2746
* ssh(1): Request correct signature types from ssh-agent when
certificate keys and RSA-SHA2 signatures are in use.
Portability
-----------
* sshd(8): On Cygwin, run as SYSTEM where possible, using S4U for
token creation if it supports MsV1_0 S4U Logon.
* sshd(8): On Cygwin, use custom user/group matching code that
respects the OS' behaviour of case-insensitive matching.
* sshd(8): Don't set $MAIL if UsePAM=yes as PAM typically specifies
the user environment if it's enabled; bz#2937
* sshd(8) Cygwin: Change service name to cygsshd to avoid collision
with Microsoft's OpenSSH port.
* Allow building against OpenSSL -dev (3.x)
* Fix a number of build problems against version configurations and
versions of OpenSSL. Including bz#2931 and bz#2921
* Improve warnings in cygwin service setup. bz#2922
* Remove hardcoded service name in cygwin setup. bz#2922
not 100% sure this is right but my build works now. here's what i did:
% cd crypto/external/bsd/openssl/lib/libcrypto/arch/powerpc
% make regen
after checking that the openssl generator calling code had not change
(but the relevant .pl file had.)
*) Added SCA hardening for modular field inversion in EC_GROUP through
a new dedicated field_inv() pointer in EC_METHOD.
This also addresses a leakage affecting conversions from projective
to affine coordinates.
[Billy Bob Brumley, Nicola Tuveri]
*) Change the info callback signals for the start and end of a post-handshake
message exchange in TLSv1.3. In 1.1.1/1.1.1a we used SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
and SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE. Experience has shown that many applications get
confused by this and assume that a TLSv1.2 renegotiation has started. This
can break KeyUpdate handling. Instead we no longer signal the start and end
of a post handshake message exchange (although the messages themselves are
still signalled). This could break some applications that were expecting
the old signals. However without this KeyUpdate is not usable for many
applications.
[Matt Caswell]
*) Fix a bug in the computation of the endpoint-pair shared secret used
by DTLS over SCTP. This breaks interoperability with older versions
of OpenSSL like OpenSSL 1.1.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.2. There is a runtime
switch SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG (off by default) enabling
interoperability with such broken implementations. However, enabling
this switch breaks interoperability with correct implementations.
*) Fix a use after free bug in d2i_X509_PUBKEY when overwriting a
re-used X509_PUBKEY object if the second PUBKEY is malformed.
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Move strictness check from EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() to EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0().
[Richard Levitte]
*) Remove the 'dist' target and add a tarball building script. The
'dist' target has fallen out of use, and it shouldn't be
necessary to configure just to create a source distribution.
[Richard Levitte]
christos