get rid of the global "yesno", introduce utility functions "ask_yesno()"
and "ask_noyes()" instead, greatly simplifying a lot of code.
Pass in a pointer to the return value to various "set source" menus.
For monolithic kernels, both modules will be compiled as "built-ins",
while modular environments will be able to load the SYSVSEM, SYSVSHM,
and SYSVMSG code independant from the rest of compat.
This is a necessary precursor step to making the "STD" SYSV* code
into a separate module.
Tested in both monolithic and modular environments with no errors
seen.
Don't use warn/err to print error messages about the input, as
prepending the program name to those both isn't helpful and confuses
programs that try to parse compile logs.
whether the locally generated response requires fragmentation. This
fixes an issue where these flags from the server could have been invalid
for the following message. In some cases, this could have resulted in
triggering the wpabuf security check that would terminate the process
due to invalid buffer allocation.
XXX: pullup-7
Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
as a huge positive integer.
In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
XXX: pullup-7
checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
overflow when processing an invalid message.
Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
reporting this issue.
XXX: pullup-7
length of the information elements (int left) could end up being
negative. This would result in reading significantly past the stack
buffer while parsing the IEs in ieee802_11_parse_elems() and while doing
so, resulting in segmentation fault.
This can result in an invalid frame being used for a denial of service
attack (hostapd process killed) against an AP with a driver that uses
hostapd for management frame processing (e.g., all mac80211-based
drivers).
Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
reporting this issue.
XXX: pullup-7
resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could
result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length
argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault.
This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that
has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This
would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with
upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER
(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used).
Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to
rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be
larger than the maximum configured body length.
Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
reporting this issue.
XXX: pullup-7
pgoyette