The algorithm used is essentially PBKDF1 from RFC 2898 but using
hmac_sha1 rather than SHA1 directly (suggested by smb@research.att.com).
* The format of the encrypted password is:
* $<tag>$<iterations>$<salt>$<digest>
*
* where:
* <tag> is "sha1"
* <iterations> is an unsigned int identifying how many rounds
* have been applied to <digest>. The number
* should vary slightly for each password to make
* it harder to generate a dictionary of
* pre-computed hashes. See crypt_sha1_iterations.
* <salt> up to 64 bytes of random data, 8 bytes is
* currently considered more than enough.
* <digest> the hashed password.
hmac.c implementes HMAC as defined in RFC 2104 and includes a unit
test for both hmac_sha1 and hmac_sha1 using a selection of the Known
Answer Tests from RFC 2202.
It is worth noting that to be FIPS compliant the hmac key (password)
should be 10-20 chars.
alter des.h to be friendly with openssl/des.h (you can include both in the
same file)
make libkrb to depend on libdes. bump major.
massage various portioin of heimdal to be friendly with openssl 0.9.7b.
infrastructure and using that infrastructure in programs.
* MKHESIOD, MKKERBEROS, MKSKEY, and MKYP control building
of the infratsructure (libraries, support programs, etc.)
* USE_HESIOD, USE_KERBEROS, USE_SKEY, and USE_YP control
building of support for using the corresponding API
in various libraries/programs that can use it.
As discussed on tech-toolchain.
due to expire within _PASSWORD_WARNDAYS (or the setting from login.conf),
force the user to set a different password than the one they are currently
using. (Yes, it's actually worthwhile doing this.)
adding support for Heimdal/KTH Kerberos where easy to do so. Eliminate
bsd.crypto.mk.
There is still a bunch more work to do, but crypto is now more-or-less
fully merged into the base NetBSD distribution.
