The algorithm used is essentially PBKDF1 from RFC 2898 but using
hmac_sha1 rather than SHA1 directly (suggested by smb@research.att.com).
* The format of the encrypted password is:
* $<tag>$<iterations>$<salt>$<digest>
*
* where:
* <tag> is "sha1"
* <iterations> is an unsigned int identifying how many rounds
* have been applied to <digest>. The number
* should vary slightly for each password to make
* it harder to generate a dictionary of
* pre-computed hashes. See crypt_sha1_iterations.
* <salt> up to 64 bytes of random data, 8 bytes is
* currently considered more than enough.
* <digest> the hashed password.
hmac.c implementes HMAC as defined in RFC 2104 and includes a unit
test for both hmac_sha1 and hmac_sha1 using a selection of the Known
Answer Tests from RFC 2202.
It is worth noting that to be FIPS compliant the hmac key (password)
should be 10-20 chars.
USETOOLS=no/never means the system groff is being used so depending on
anything except it's tmac files makes no sense (and prevents builds with
USETOOLS=no/never from working as PR#23067 points out)
_NETBSD_SOURCE as this makes cross building from older/newer versions of
NetBSD harder, not easier (and also makes the resulting tools 'different')
Wrap all required code with the inclusion of nbtool_config.h, attempt to
only use POSIX code in all places (or when reasonable test w. configure and
provide definitions: ala u_int, etc).
Reviewed by lukem. Tested on FreeBSD 4.9, Redhat Linux ES3, NetBSD 1.6.2 x86
NetBSD current (x86 and amd64) and Solaris 9.
Fixes PR's: PR#17762 PR#25944
doing copy-on-write.
- Change VFS_SNAPSHOT() to return the snapshot vnode locked.
- Make the IO path for copy-on-write and snapshot-read more lightweight.
Avoids deadlocks where vn_rdwr(...READ...) has a shared lock and needs
to copy-on-write.
Avoids deadlocks/panics where to clean pages the copy-on-write needs
to allocate pages for its VOP_PUTPAGES().
L_COWINPROGRESS part approved by: Jason R. Thorpe <thorpej@netbsd.org>
sekiya