- Builds with openssl 1.1.0
- Align code properly so gcc-6 does not complain
- update symbol file.
- drop 02-cflags-errors-unused.patch, -Werror is gone.
- update 03-fix-bool-error-parseStringWithValues.patch, different fix
upstream, does not look right.
tpm-tools (1.3.8.2)
* Add patch 03 to fix FTBFS with gcc-5
* Merge patch 04 to fix FTBFS with clang
Thanks to Alexander <email address hidden> for the patch.
* Bump Standards Version to 3.9.6
- Changes to support OpenSSL 1.1.0
- Removed some warnings for proper builds
- Changes to allow building on OS X
- Fixed memory leaks
- Fixed failure to recognize connections from localhost over IPv6
- Fixed for an exploitable local denial of service in tcsd
* TROUSERS_0_3_13
- Changed exported functions which had a name too common, to avoid collision
- Assessed daemon security using manual techniques and coverit
- Fixed major security bugs and memory leaks
- Added debug support to run tcsd with a different user/group
- Daemon now properly closes sockets before shutting down
* TROUSERS_0_3_12
- Added new network code for RPC, which supports IPv6
- Users of client applications can configure the hostname of the tcsd server
they want to connect through the TSS_TCSD_HOSTNAME env var (only works if
application didn't set a hostname in the context)
- Added disable_ipv4 and disable_ipv6 config options for server
* TROUSERS_0_3_11
- Fix build process for distros
- License was changed from GPL to BSD
- Many bugfixes
- updated man pages
for randomness, and the powerpc code uses mftbu and mftb for access.
The 601 is different than other powerpcs. It doesn't have a time
base register (TBR), but a real time clock (RTC) so it needs to
use different calls like mfrtcu/mfrtcl instead.
1. sets needs to be fixed
2. need to decide if I am going to add engine.so.MAJOR or use engine.so
like OpenSSL wants
3. padlock is MD (x86) needs asm to be added, and conditionally built
*) Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation
The OpenSSL DSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a
timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing
algorithm to recover the private key.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th October 2018 by Samuel Weiser.
(CVE-2018-0734)
[Paul Dale]
*) Timing vulnerability in ECDSA signature generation
The OpenSSL ECDSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a
timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing
algorithm to recover the private key.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 25th October 2018 by Samuel Weiser.
(CVE-2018-0735)
[Paul Dale]
*) Added EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_63 and ecdh_KDF_X9_63() as replacements for
the EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_62 KDF type and ECDH_KDF_X9_62(). The old names
are retained for backwards compatibility.
[Antoine Salon]
*) Fixed the issue that RAND_add()/RAND_seed() silently discards random input
if its length exceeds 4096 bytes. The limit has been raised to a buffer size
of two gigabytes and the error handling improved.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Dr. Falko Strenzke. It has been
categorized as a normal bug, not a security issue, because the DRBG reseeds
automatically and is fully functional even without additional randomness
provided by the application.
The code already knows how to handle it, but it assumes anyone who uses
GCC or clang might resolve the getauxval function to something eventually.
The only time we will expose getauxval is if a package tries to substitute
getauxval too, and then code will start having mysterious failures.
getauxval is purely a linux function (as far as I can see), so limit it to
that.
PR pkg/53387, PR port-arm/53386
Current racoon code cannot detect duplicate last fragments as it uses
the fragment flag instead of the fragment number.
The code does not consider that the IKE payload fragments might not be
received in the correct order. In this case, packet complete detection
will again fail and VPN clients abandoned from VPN service.
Nevertheless, clients still can add fragments to the fragment queue and
fill it up to the possible 255 fragments. Only duplicates are detected,
but not the fragments with a number greater than the last fragment
number.
The last fragment number is kept in the Phase 1 handler
after fragment queue deletion, which may lead to error notifications
after succesful reassembly of the IKE phase 1 message.
In general, the 2017's CVE fix added laconic and difficult to understand
failure notifications, which do not much help for analysis, why a VPN
client was blocked by racoon server.
This patch fixes the code and aligns it to Microsoft/Cisco IKE
fragmentation specification. It provides error logging which is in line
with above specification and adds some debug info to the logs to better
support analysis VPN client blackballing.
XXX: pullup-8
fragment list check.
While the fix in https://launchpad.net/~rdratlos/+archive/ubuntu/racoon
- if (i > last_frag) /* It is complete */
+ if (i >= last_frag) /* It is complete */
has the correct behavior, it violates the test for successful
completion of the invariant of the loop:
for (i = 1; i <= last_frag; i++) {
if (!check_fragment_index())
break;
}
if (i > last_frag)
return ok;
It is better to move the check for NULL in the loop earlier, so that
the final iteration is done and the test is kept the same. It makes
the code easier to understand and preserves the original intent.
XXX: pullup-8
mrg