FORTIFY_SOURCE feature of libssp, thus checking the size of arguments to
various string and memory copy and set functions (as well as a few system
calls and other miscellany) where known at function entry. RedHat has
evidently built all "core system packages" with this option for some time.
This option should be used at the top of Makefiles (or Makefile.inc where
this is used for subdirectories) but after any setting of LIB.
This is only useful for userland code, and cannot be used in libc or in
any code which includes the libc internals, because it overrides certain
libc functions with macros. Some effort has been made to make USE_FORT=yes
work correctly for a full-system build by having the bsd.sys.mk logic
disable the feature where it should not be used (libc, libssp iteself,
the kernel) but no attempt has been made to build the entire system with
USE_FORT and doing so will doubtless expose numerous bugs and misfeatures.
Adjust the system build so that all programs and libraries that are setuid,
directly handle network data (including serial comm data), perform
authentication, or appear likely to have (or have a history of having)
data-driven bugs (e.g. file(1)) are built with USE_FORT=yes by default,
with the exception of libc, which cannot use USE_FORT and thus uses
only USE_SSP by default. Tested on i386 with no ill results; USE_FORT=no
per-directory or in a system build will disable if desired.
with MKPIC=no, possibly because the target does not support shared
libraries, these include libraries required to resolve all symbols
which end up referenced from PAM-using applications. The libraries
presently required are -lcrypt, -lrpcsvc and -lutil.
Add use of these variables which are currently set up to use PAM,
so that they compile when MKPIC=no.
Also, in the telnetd case, reorder the order of the libraries, so
that libtelnet.a comes before -ltermcap and -lutil, again to fix
link error when MKPIC=no.
Discussed with thorpej and christos.
similar to Solaris's "-r <repository" or Mac OS X's "-i <infosystem>",
to select the password database (files, nis, krb5). Otherwise, we default
to using whatever PAM decides.
XXX: This avoids the issue of supporting separate -l -y -k, but is the behavior
correct? Should passwd -p disable all other passwd methods? Should it become
the default if compiled in?
The algorithm used is essentially PBKDF1 from RFC 2898 but using
hmac_sha1 rather than SHA1 directly (suggested by smb@research.att.com).
* The format of the encrypted password is:
* $<tag>$<iterations>$<salt>$<digest>
*
* where:
* <tag> is "sha1"
* <iterations> is an unsigned int identifying how many rounds
* have been applied to <digest>. The number
* should vary slightly for each password to make
* it harder to generate a dictionary of
* pre-computed hashes. See crypt_sha1_iterations.
* <salt> up to 64 bytes of random data, 8 bytes is
* currently considered more than enough.
* <digest> the hashed password.
hmac.c implementes HMAC as defined in RFC 2104 and includes a unit
test for both hmac_sha1 and hmac_sha1 using a selection of the Known
Answer Tests from RFC 2202.
It is worth noting that to be FIPS compliant the hmac key (password)
should be 10-20 chars.
alter des.h to be friendly with openssl/des.h (you can include both in the
same file)
make libkrb to depend on libdes. bump major.
massage various portioin of heimdal to be friendly with openssl 0.9.7b.
infrastructure and using that infrastructure in programs.
* MKHESIOD, MKKERBEROS, MKSKEY, and MKYP control building
of the infratsructure (libraries, support programs, etc.)
* USE_HESIOD, USE_KERBEROS, USE_SKEY, and USE_YP control
building of support for using the corresponding API
in various libraries/programs that can use it.
As discussed on tech-toolchain.
due to expire within _PASSWORD_WARNDAYS (or the setting from login.conf),
force the user to set a different password than the one they are currently
using. (Yes, it's actually worthwhile doing this.)
tls