in inetd.conf. otherwise, we'll have (minor) problem putting IPv6 address in.
sync with kame.
[::1]:ftp stream tcp6 nowait root /usr/libexec/ftpd ftpd -ll
- Centerize the check whether an interface is specified.
- Print maximum data length.
- Swap wi_type and wi_code in struct wi_table so that wi_type matches with
wi_type in wi_req.
XXX enami, I admit it is not a good thing to check the error code from
getaddrinfo. it is sometimes mandatory, however. gai_strerror message
can be too generic in some cases. we can't really extend getaddrinfo,
as it was not invented by kame (see RFC2553)
sync with kame.
benefits: allows us to access-control inbound traffic by using hosts.allow(5).
possible drawbacks: inetd mode has no chance for multi-connection-per-single-
process enhancement. current faithd(8) needs 1 process per 1 connection
anyways.
sockets in the situation where all of the following are true:
* /etc/syslogd.conf contained forwarding actions when we were
started up or when we last received a HUP
* /etc/syslogd.conf has had all forwarding actions removed
* we are running with -s
and we receive a HUP.
request:
instead of the -S flag, fix the -s flag to not open a socket
if there are no forwarding rules in /etc/syslog.conf
The behavior of syslogd when -s is specified and there are forwarding rules
should still be made cleaner.
in man page and comments -- for some time it has no longer prevents
an inet socket from being opened, just caused it to be ignored
2.) Fix this problem with `-s' -- syslogd always opens an inet socket, even if
-s is specified and it has nowhere to send to. This socket is then
shutdown(), but there is no way to not have this socket open.
Users setting up paranoid installations can now specify `-S' which
prevents any non-unix-domain sockets from being opened, even if
forwarding is specified in /etc/syslogd.conf.
As per the previous fix, this is not made the default for `-s', as it
also prevents syslogd from forwarding log messages.
3.) document the above in the man page and usage.
Justification: in light of the possibility of future DoS attacks, or the
desire to set up a machine which is relatively uninformative in the face
of port scans, users may quite legitimately want to control what sockets
are open on their machine. Telling such users that they cannot run
syslogd is non-ideal.
mason