There is no place in the source where this bit could ever be set (or I'm
to blind to find it).
This fixes PR 12671.
If someone thinks this is the wrong solution, please make sure to (a) reopen
the PR and (b) explain to me how the tested bits would ever get set. I'll
be glad to then look further for the real cause (i.e. the flags not getting
set in the case described in the PR).
(reported by: grendel@heorot.stanford.edu (Ted U)
- Don't cast malloc/realloc/calloc return values because they hide LP64 bugs.
- Don't destroy the whole array when realloc fails
- Use calloc in all cases (malloc was used inconsistently).
- Avoid duplicating code.
Reviewed by: ross
"lots of fragmented packets" DoS attack.
the current default value is derived from ipv6 counterpart, which is
a magical value "200". it should be enough for normal systems, not sure
if it is enough when you take hundreds of thousands of tcp connections on
your system. if you have proposal for a better value with concrete reasons,
let me know.
ISS attacks (which we already fend off quite well).
1. First-cut implementation of RFC1948, Steve Bellovin's cryptographic
hash method of generating TCP ISS values. Note, this code is experimental
and disabled by default (experimental enough that I don't export the
variable via sysctl yet, either). There are a couple of issues I'd
like to discuss with Steve, so this code should only be used by people
who really know what they're doing.
2. Per a recent thread on Bugtraq, it's possible to determine a system's
uptime by snooping the RFC1323 TCP timestamp options sent by a host; in
4.4BSD, timestamps are created by incrementing the tcp_now variable
at 2 Hz; there's even a company out there that uses this to determine
web server uptime. According to Newsham's paper "The Problem With
Random Increments", while NetBSD's TCP ISS generation method is much
better than the "random increment" method used by FreeBSD and OpenBSD,
it is still theoretically possible to mount an attack against NetBSD's
method if the attacker knows how many times the tcp_iss_seq variable
has been incremented. By not leaking uptime information, we can make
that much harder to determine. So, we avoid the leak by giving each
TCP connection a timebase of 0.
normal operation (/var can get filled up by flodding bogus packets).
sysctl net.inet6.icmp6.nd6_debug will turn on diagnostic messages.
(#define ND6_DEBUG will turn it on by default)
improve stats in ND6 code.
lots of synchronziation with kame (including comments and cometic ones).
- let ipfilter look at wire-format packet only (not the decapsulated ones),
so that VPN setting can work with NAT/ipfilter settings.
sync with kame.
TODO: use header history for stricter inbound validation
since we do not have feedback mechanism from path MTU to tunnel MTU
(not sure if we should), and inner packet source will not get informed of
outer PMTUD (we shouldn't do this), 1.15 behavior can lead us to
blackhole behavior.
configurable behavior (as suggested in RFC2401 6.1) would be nice to have,
however, reusing net.inet.ipsec.dfbit would be hairy.
itojun