<20111022023242.BA26F14A158@mail.netbsd.org>. This change includes
the following:
An initial cleanup and minor reorganization of the entropy pool
code in sys/dev/rnd.c and sys/dev/rndpool.c. Several bugs are
fixed. Some effort is made to accumulate entropy more quickly at
boot time.
A generic interface, "rndsink", is added, for stream generators to
request that they be re-keyed with good quality entropy from the pool
as soon as it is available.
The arc4random()/arc4randbytes() implementation in libkern is
adjusted to use the rndsink interface for rekeying, which helps
address the problem of low-quality keys at boot time.
An implementation of the FIPS 140-2 statistical tests for random
number generator quality is provided (libkern/rngtest.c). This
is based on Greg Rose's implementation from Qualcomm.
A new random stream generator, nist_ctr_drbg, is provided. It is
based on an implementation of the NIST SP800-90 CTR_DRBG by
Henric Jungheim. This generator users AES in a modified counter
mode to generate a backtracking-resistant random stream.
An abstraction layer, "cprng", is provided for in-kernel consumers
of randomness. The arc4random/arc4randbytes API is deprecated for
in-kernel use. It is replaced by "cprng_strong". The current
cprng_fast implementation wraps the existing arc4random
implementation. The current cprng_strong implementation wraps the
new CTR_DRBG implementation. Both interfaces are rekeyed from
the entropy pool automatically at intervals justifiable from best
current cryptographic practice.
In some quick tests, cprng_fast() is about the same speed as
the old arc4randbytes(), and cprng_strong() is about 20% faster
than rnd_extract_data(). Performance is expected to improve.
The AES code in src/crypto/rijndael is no longer an optional
kernel component, as it is required by cprng_strong, which is
not an optional kernel component.
The entropy pool output is subjected to the rngtest tests at
startup time; if it fails, the system will reboot. There is
approximately a 3/10000 chance of a false positive from these
tests. Entropy pool _input_ from hardware random numbers is
subjected to the rngtest tests at attach time, as well as the
FIPS continuous-output test, to detect bad or stuck hardware
RNGs; if any are detected, they are detached, but the system
continues to run.
A problem with rndctl(8) is fixed -- datastructures with
pointers in arrays are no longer passed to userspace (this
was not a security problem, but rather a major issue for
compat32). A new kernel will require a new rndctl.
The sysctl kern.arandom() and kern.urandom() nodes are hooked
up to the new generators, but the /dev/*random pseudodevices
are not, yet.
Manual pages for the new kernel interfaces are forthcoming.
int foo(struct lwp *l, void *v, register_t *retval)
to:
int foo(struct lwp *l, const struct foo_args *uap, register_t *retval)
Fixup compat code to not write into 'uap' and (in some cases) to actually
pass a correctly formatted 'uap' structure with the right name to the
next routine.
A few 'compat' routines that just call standard ones have been deleted.
All the 'compat' code compiles (along with the kernels required to test
build it).
98% done by automated scripts.
identify sockaddr_dl abuse that remains in the kernel, especially
the potential for overwriting memory past the end of a sockaddr_dl
with, e.g., memcpy(LLADDR(), ...).
Use sockaddr_dl_setaddr() in a few places.
- Clean up the namespace of this module and enable the encode/decode
functions and printing functions.
- Move the code that actually generates the UUID out of the system call
routine and into its own function.
PR#23470, with minor updates by me. This is only the syscall support
from that PR, for now.
Changes: port over fix from FreeBSD for multicast address generation.
Changed bcopy to memcpy. For now, #ifdef notyet the portions of
kern_uuid.c that are meant to be used by (currently nonexistent) other
things in the kernel. Added syscall to COMPAT_FREEBSD as well, though
that's currently not useful, as any program new enough to use this call
also uses other syscalls we don't (yet) emulate.
