Correctly handle the padding for IPv6-AH, as specified by RFC4302. Seen in

a FreeBSD bug report, by Jason Mader.

The RFC specifies that under IPv6 the complete AH header must be 64bit-
aligned, and under IPv4 32bit-aligned. That's a rule we've never respected.
The other BSDs and MacOS never have either.

So respect it now.

This makes it possible to set up IPv6-AH between Linux and NetBSD, and also
probably between Windows and NetBSD.

Until now all the tests I made were between two *BSD hosts, and everything
worked "correctly" since both hosts were speaking the same non-standard
AHv6, so they could understand each other.

Tested with Fedora<->NetBSD, hmac-sha2-384.
This commit is contained in:
maxv 2018-05-30 18:02:40 +00:00
parent 6abbe0506f
commit d52acbb31e

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.104 2018/05/30 17:17:11 maxv Exp $ */
/* $NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.105 2018/05/30 18:02:40 maxv Exp $ */
/* $FreeBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.1.4.1 2003/01/24 05:11:36 sam Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ip_ah.c,v 1.63 2001/06/26 06:18:58 angelos Exp $ */
/*
@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.104 2018/05/30 17:17:11 maxv Exp $");
__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.105 2018/05/30 18:02:40 maxv Exp $");
#if defined(_KERNEL_OPT)
#include "opt_inet.h"
@ -167,11 +167,21 @@ ah_hdrsiz(const struct secasvar *sav)
size_t size;
if (sav != NULL) {
int authsize;
int authsize, rplen, align;
KASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL);
/*XXX not right for null algorithm--does it matter??*/
/* RFC4302: use the correct alignment. */
align = sizeof(uint32_t);
#ifdef INET6
if (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
align = sizeof(uint64_t);
}
#endif
rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
size = roundup(authsize, sizeof(uint32_t)) + HDRSIZE(sav);
size = roundup(rplen + authsize, align);
} else {
/* default guess */
size = sizeof(struct ah) + sizeof(uint32_t) + ah_max_authsize;
@ -520,7 +530,7 @@ ah_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
const struct auth_hash *ahx;
struct tdb_crypto *tc = NULL;
struct newah *ah;
int hl, rplen, authsize, error, stat = AH_STAT_HDROPS;
int hl, rplen, authsize, ahsize, error, stat = AH_STAT_HDROPS;
struct cryptodesc *crda;
struct cryptop *crp = NULL;
bool pool_used;
@ -553,25 +563,26 @@ ah_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
}
/* Verify AH header length. */
hl = ah->ah_len * sizeof(uint32_t);
hl = sizeof(struct ah) + (ah->ah_len * sizeof(uint32_t));
ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
if (hl != authsize + rplen - sizeof(struct ah)) {
ahsize = ah_hdrsiz(sav);
if (hl != ahsize) {
char buf[IPSEC_ADDRSTRLEN];
DPRINTF(("%s: bad authenticator length %u (expecting %lu)"
" for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
hl, (u_long) (authsize + rplen - sizeof(struct ah)),
hl, (u_long)ahsize,
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
stat = AH_STAT_BADAUTHL;
error = EACCES;
goto bad;
}
if (skip + authsize + rplen > m->m_pkthdr.len) {
if (skip + ahsize > m->m_pkthdr.len) {
char buf[IPSEC_ADDRSTRLEN];
DPRINTF(("%s: bad mbuf length %u (expecting >= %lu)"
" for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
m->m_pkthdr.len, (u_long)(skip + authsize + rplen),
m->m_pkthdr.len, (u_long)(skip + ahsize),
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
stat = AH_STAT_BADAUTHL;
@ -720,7 +731,7 @@ static int
ah_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
{
char buf[IPSEC_ADDRSTRLEN];
int rplen, error, skip, protoff;
int rplen, ahsize, error, skip, protoff;
unsigned char calc[AH_ALEN_MAX];
struct mbuf *m;
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
@ -751,6 +762,7 @@ ah_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
/* Figure out header size. */
rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
ahsize = ah_hdrsiz(sav);
size = sizeof(*tc) + skip + rplen + authsize;
if (__predict_true(size <= ah_pool_item_size))
@ -844,7 +856,7 @@ ah_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
/*
* Remove the AH header and authenticator from the mbuf.
*/
error = m_striphdr(m, skip, rplen + authsize);
error = m_striphdr(m, skip, ahsize);
if (error) {
DPRINTF(("%s: mangled mbuf chain for SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
@ -891,7 +903,7 @@ ah_output(struct mbuf *m, const struct ipsecrequest *isr, struct secasvar *sav,
struct mbuf *mi;
struct cryptop *crp;
uint16_t iplen;
int error, rplen, authsize, maxpacketsize, roff;
int error, rplen, authsize, ahsize, maxpacketsize, roff;
uint8_t prot;
struct newah *ah;
size_t ipoffs;
@ -905,6 +917,8 @@ ah_output(struct mbuf *m, const struct ipsecrequest *isr, struct secasvar *sav,
/* Figure out header size. */
rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
ahsize = ah_hdrsiz(sav);
/* Check for maximum packet size violations. */
switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) {
@ -930,13 +944,12 @@ ah_output(struct mbuf *m, const struct ipsecrequest *isr, struct secasvar *sav,
error = EPFNOSUPPORT;
goto bad;
}
authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
if (rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len > maxpacketsize) {
if (ahsize + m->m_pkthdr.len > maxpacketsize) {
DPRINTF(("%s: packet in SA %s/%08lx got too big "
"(len %u, max len %u)\n", __func__,
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi),
rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len, maxpacketsize));
ahsize + m->m_pkthdr.len, maxpacketsize));
AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_TOOBIG);
error = EMSGSIZE;
goto bad;
@ -956,11 +969,10 @@ ah_output(struct mbuf *m, const struct ipsecrequest *isr, struct secasvar *sav,
}
/* Inject AH header. */
mi = m_makespace(m, skip, rplen + authsize, &roff);
mi = m_makespace(m, skip, ahsize, &roff);
if (mi == NULL) {
DPRINTF(("%s: failed to inject %u byte AH header for SA "
"%s/%08lx\n", __func__,
rplen + authsize,
"%s/%08lx\n", __func__, ahsize,
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS);
@ -976,13 +988,17 @@ ah_output(struct mbuf *m, const struct ipsecrequest *isr, struct secasvar *sav,
/* Initialize the AH header. */
m_copydata(m, protoff, sizeof(uint8_t), &ah->ah_nxt);
ah->ah_len = (rplen + authsize - sizeof(struct ah)) / sizeof(uint32_t);
ah->ah_len = (ahsize - sizeof(struct ah)) / sizeof(uint32_t);
ah->ah_reserve = 0;
ah->ah_spi = sav->spi;
/* Zeroize authenticator. */
m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes);
/* Zeroize padding. */
m_copyback(m, skip + rplen + authsize, ahsize - (rplen + authsize),
ipseczeroes);
/* Insert packet replay counter, as requested. */
if (sav->replay) {
if (sav->replay->count == ~0 &&
@ -1051,7 +1067,7 @@ ah_output(struct mbuf *m, const struct ipsecrequest *isr, struct secasvar *sav,
* header length as it will be fixed by our caller.
*/
memcpy(&iplen, pext + ipoffs, sizeof(iplen));
iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize);
iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + ahsize);
m_copyback(m, ipoffs, sizeof(iplen), &iplen);
/* Fix the Next Header field in saved header. */