add a comment on about how tracing is secured, but still keep it disabled.

This commit is contained in:
christos 2000-03-02 20:58:55 +00:00
parent 59fd2f8be8
commit d1c10b4cd1
1 changed files with 9 additions and 3 deletions

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $NetBSD: input.c,v 1.25 1999/02/23 10:47:40 christos Exp $ */
/* $NetBSD: input.c,v 1.26 2000/03/02 20:58:55 christos Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1983, 1988, 1993
@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
static char sccsid[] __attribute__((unused)) = "@(#)input.c 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/5/93";
#elif defined(__NetBSD__)
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__RCSID("$NetBSD: input.c,v 1.25 1999/02/23 10:47:40 christos Exp $");
__RCSID("$NetBSD: input.c,v 1.26 2000/03/02 20:58:55 christos Exp $");
#endif
#include "defs.h"
@ -445,7 +445,13 @@ input(struct sockaddr_in *from, /* received from this IP address */
case RIPCMD_TRACEON:
case RIPCMD_TRACEOFF:
/* verify message came from a privileged port */
/* Notice that trace messages are turned off for all possible
* abuse if _PATH_TRACE is undefined in pathnames.h.
* Notice also that because of the way the trace file is
* handled in trace.c, no abuse is plausible even if
* _PATH_TRACE_ is defined.
*
* First verify message came from a privileged port. */
if (ntohs(from->sin_port) > IPPORT_RESERVED) {
msglog("trace command from untrusted port on %s",
naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));