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Remove some code that breaks AH tunnels completely. The comment describing

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the purpose of this code appears to be on crack -- it's talking about
end-to-end authentication, but the purpose of an AH tunnel is NOT end-to-end
authentication; it's authentication of the tunnel endpoints.

NB: This does not fix the fact that IPsec leaks "packet tags."
This commit is contained in:
mycroft 2003-09-28 04:45:14 +00:00
parent 6cac03ae0e
commit ca96c7c4ec
2 changed files with 4 additions and 47 deletions
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14
sys/netinet/ip_input.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $NetBSD: ip_input.c,v 1.178 2003/09/06 03:36:30 itojun Exp $ */
/* $NetBSD: ip_input.c,v 1.179 2003/09/28 04:45:14 mycroft Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project.
@ -98,7 +98,7 @@
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: ip_input.c,v 1.178 2003/09/06 03:36:30 itojun Exp $");
__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: ip_input.c,v 1.179 2003/09/28 04:45:14 mycroft Exp $");
#include "opt_gateway.h"
#include "opt_pfil_hooks.h"
@ -443,16 +443,6 @@ ip_input(struct mbuf *m)
if ((m->m_flags & M_PKTHDR) == 0)
panic("ipintr no HDR");
#endif
#ifdef IPSEC
/*
* should the inner packet be considered authentic?
* see comment in ah4_input().
*/
if (m) {
m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
}
#endif
/*
* If no IP addresses have been set yet but the interfaces

37
sys/netinet6/ah_input.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $NetBSD: ah_input.c,v 1.41 2003/08/06 14:47:32 itojun Exp $ */
/* $NetBSD: ah_input.c,v 1.42 2003/09/28 04:45:14 mycroft Exp $ */
/* $KAME: ah_input.c,v 1.64 2001/09/04 08:43:19 itojun Exp $ */
/*
@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: ah_input.c,v 1.41 2003/08/06 14:47:32 itojun Exp $");
__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: ah_input.c,v 1.42 2003/09/28 04:45:14 mycroft Exp $");
#include "opt_inet.h"
@ -388,30 +388,6 @@ ah4_input(m, va_alist)
goto fail;
}
#if 1
/*
* Should the inner packet be considered authentic?
* My current answer is: NO.
*
* host1 -- gw1 === gw2 -- host2
* In this case, gw2 can trust the authenticity of the
* outer packet, but NOT inner. Packet may be altered
* between host1 and gw1.
*
* host1 -- gw1 === host2
* This case falls into the same scenario as above.
*
* host1 === host2
* This case is the only case when we may be able to leave
* M_AUTHIPHDR and M_AUTHIPDGM set.
* However, if host1 is wrongly configured, and allows
* attacker to inject some packet with src=host1 and
* dst=host2, you are in risk.
*/
m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
#endif
key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0 ||
ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_IPV4, 0) != 0) {
@ -831,15 +807,6 @@ ah6_input(mp, offp, proto)
goto fail;
}
#if 1
/*
* should the inner packet be considered authentic?
* see comment in ah4_input().
*/
m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPHDR;
m->m_flags &= ~M_AUTHIPDGM;
#endif
key_sa_recordxfer(sav, m);
if (ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_AH, spi) != 0 ||
ipsec_addhist(m, IPPROTO_IPV6, 0) != 0) {