diff --git a/usr.bin/bdes/bdes.1 b/usr.bin/bdes/bdes.1
index b3583c8231d8..3492631849ea 100644
--- a/usr.bin/bdes/bdes.1
+++ b/usr.bin/bdes/bdes.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\"	$NetBSD: bdes.1,v 1.6 2001/12/01 16:43:08 wiz Exp $
+.\"	$NetBSD: bdes.1,v 1.7 2001/12/01 18:49:55 wiz Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 1991, 1993
 .\"	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
@@ -36,148 +36,152 @@
 .\"
 .\"	@(#)bdes.1	8.1 (Berkeley) 6/29/93
 .\"
-.de x2
-.if t 2\u\s-3\\$1\s0\d
-.if n 2**\\$1
-..
-.TH BDES 1 "October 17, 1996"
-.UC 6
-.SH NAME
-bdes \- encrypt/decrypt using the Data Encryption Standard
-.SH SYNOPSIS
-.nf
-.ft B
-bdes [ \-abdp ] [ \-F N ] [ \-f N ] [ \-k key ]
-.ti +5
-[ \-m N ] [ \-o N ] [ \-v vector ]
-.ft R
-.fi
-.SH DESCRIPTION
-.I Bdes
+.Dd December 1, 2001
+.Dt BDES 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm bdes
+.Nd encrypt/decrypt using the Data Encryption Standard
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm
+.Op Fl abdp
+.Op Fl F Ar N
+.Op Fl f Ar N
+.Op Fl k Ar key
+.Op Fl m Ar N
+.Op Fl o Ar N
+.Op Fl v Ar vector
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
 implements all DES modes of operation described in FIPS PUB 81,
 including alternative cipher feedback mode and both authentication
 modes.
-.I Bdes
+.Nm
 reads from the standard input and writes to the standard output.
 By default, the input is encrypted using cipher block chaining mode.
 Using the same key for encryption and decryption preserves plain text.
-.PP
+.Pp
 All modes but the electronic code book mode require an initialization
 vector; if none is supplied, the zero vector is used.
 If no
-.I key
+.Ar key
 is specified on the command line, the user is prompted for one (see
-.IR getpass (3)
+.Xr getpass 3
 for more details).
-.PP
+.Pp
 The options are as follows:
-.TP
-\-a
+.Bl -tag -width "-v vector" -compact
+.It Fl a
 The key and initialization vector strings are to be taken as ASCII,
-suppressing the special interpretation given to leading ``0X'', ``0x'',
-``0B'', and ``0b'' characters.
+suppressing the special interpretation given to leading
+.Dq 0X ,
+.Dq 0x ,
+.Dq 0B ,
+and
+.Dq 0b
+characters.
 This flag applies to
-.I both
+.Em both
 the key and initialization vector.
-.TP
-\-b
+.It Fl b
 Use electronic code book mode.  This is not recommended for messages
 longer than 8 bytes, as patterns in the input will show through to the
 output.
-.TP
-\-d
+.It Fl d
 Decrypt the input.
-.TP
-\-F
+.It Fl F Ar N
 Use
-.IR N -bit
+.Ar N Ns -bit
 alternative cipher feedback mode.
 Currently
-.I N
+.Ar N
 must be a multiple of 7 between 7 and 56 inclusive (this does not conform
 to the alternative CFB mode specification).
-.TP
-\-f
+.It Fl f Ar N
 Use
-.IR N -bit
+.Ar N Ns -bit
 cipher feedback mode.
 Currently
-.I N
+.Ar N
 must be a multiple of 8 between 8 and 64 inclusive (this does not conform
 to the standard CFB mode specification).
-.TP
-\-k
+.It Fl k Ar key
 Use
-.I key
+.Ar key
 as the cryptographic key.
-.TP
-\-m
+.It Fl m Ar N
 Compute a message authentication code (MAC) of
-.I N
+.Ar N
 bits on the input.
 The value of
-.I N
+.Ar N
 must be between 1 and 64 inclusive; if
-.I N
+.Ar N
 is not a multiple of 8, enough 0 bits will be added to pad the MAC length
 to the nearest multiple of 8.
 Only the MAC is output.
 MACs are only available in cipher block chaining mode or in cipher feedback
 mode.
-.TP
-\-o
+.It Fl o Ar N
 Use
-.IR N -bit
+.Ar N Ns -bit
 output feedback mode.
 Currently
-.I N
+.Ar N
 must be a multiple of 8 between 8 and 64 inclusive (this does not conform
 to the OFB mode specification).
-.TP
-\-p
+.It Fl p
 Disable the resetting of the parity bit.
 This flag forces the parity bit of the key to be used as typed, rather than
 making each character be of odd parity.
 It is used only if the key is given in ASCII.
-.TP
-\-v
+.It Fl v Ar vector
 Set the initialization vector to
-.IR vector ;
+.Ar vector ;
 the vector is interpreted in the same way as the key.  The vector is
 ignored in electronic codebook mode.  For best security, a different
 initialization vector should be used for each file.
-.PP
+.El
+.Pp
 The key and initialization vector are taken as sequences of ASCII
 characters which are then mapped into their bit representations.
-If either begins with ``0X'' or ``0x'',
+If either begins with
+.Dq 0X
+or
+.Dq 0x ,
 that one is taken as a sequence of hexadecimal digits indicating the
 bit pattern;
-if either begins with ``0B'' or ``0b'',
+if either begins with
+.Dq 0B
+or
+.Dq 0b ,
 that one is taken as a sequence of binary digits indicating the bit pattern.
 In either case,
 only the leading 64 bits of the key or initialization vector
 are used,
 and if fewer than 64 bits are provided, enough 0 bits are appended
 to pad the key to 64 bits.
-.PP
+.Pp
 According to the DES standard, the low-order bit of each character in the
 key string is deleted.
 Since most ASCII representations set the high-order bit to 0, simply
 deleting the low-order bit effectively reduces the size of the key space
 from
-.x2 56
+.if t 2\u\s-356\s0\d
+.if n 2**56
 to
-.x2 48
+.if t 2\u\s-348\s0\d
+.if n 2**48
 keys.
 To prevent this, the high-order bit must be a function depending in part
 upon the low-order bit; so, the high-order bit is set to whatever value
 gives odd parity.
 This preserves the key space size.
 Note this resetting of the parity bit is
-.I not
+.Em not
 done if the key is given in binary or hex, and can be disabled for ASCII
 keys as well.
-.PP
+.Pp
 The DES is considered a very strong cryptosystem hobbled by a short
 key, and other than table lookup attacks, key search attacks, and
 Hellman's time-memory tradeoff (all of which are very expensive and
@@ -185,26 +189,28 @@ time-consuming), no practical cryptanalytic methods for breaking the
 DES are known in the open literature.  As of this writing, the best
 known cryptanalytic method is linear cryptanalysis, which requires an
 average of
-.x2 43
+.if t 2\u\s-343\s0\d
+.if n 2**43
 known plaintext-ciphertext pairs to succeed.
 Unfortunately for the DES, key search attacks (requiring only
 a single known plaintext-ciphertext pair and trying
-.x2 55
+.if t 2\u\s-355\s0\d
+.if n 2**55
 keys on average) are becoming practical.
-.PP
+.Pp
 As with all cryptosystems, the choice of keys and
 key security remain the most vulnerable aspect of
-.IR bdes .
-.SH IMPLEMENTATION NOTES
+.Nm "" .
+.Sh IMPLEMENTATION NOTES
 For implementors wishing to write software compatible with this program,
 the following notes are provided.
 This software is believed to be compatible with the implementation of the
 data encryption standard distributed by Sun Microsystems, Inc.
-.PP
+.Pp
 In the ECB and CBC modes, plaintext is encrypted in units of 64 bits (8 bytes,
 also called a block).
 To ensure that the plaintext file is encrypted correctly,
-.I bdes
+.Nm
 will (internally) append from 1 to 8 bytes, the last byte containing an
 integer stating how many bytes of that final block are from the plaintext
 file, and encrypt the resulting block.
@@ -219,84 +225,84 @@ and the final byte contains an integer between 0 and one less than the number
 of bytes being used as the mode.
 (This was another reason that the mode size must be a multiple of 8 for those
 modes.)
-.PP
+.Pp
 Unlike Sun's implementation, unused bytes of that last block are not filled
 with random data, but instead contain what was in those byte positions in
 the preceding block.
 This is quicker and more portable, and does not weaken the encryption
 significantly.
-.PP
+.Pp
 If the key is entered in ASCII, the parity bits of the key characters are set
 so that each key character is of odd parity.
 Unlike Sun's implementation, it is possible to enter binary or hexadecimal
 keys on the command line, and if this is done, the parity bits are
-.I not
+.Em not
 reset.
 This allows testing using arbitrary bit patterns as keys.
-.PP
+.Pp
 The Sun implementation always uses an initialization vector of 0
 (that is, all zeroes).
 By default,
-.I bdes
+.Nm
 does too, but this may be changed from the command line.
-.SH SEE ALSO
-crypt(3), getpass(3)
-.sp
-.IR "Data Encryption Standard" ,
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr crypt 3 ,
+.Xr getpass 3
+.Pp
+.Em "Data Encryption Standard" ,
 Federal Information Processing Standard #46,
 National Bureau of Standards,
 U.S. Department of Commerce,
 Washington DC
-(Jan. 1977)
-.sp
-.IR "DES Modes of Operation" ,
+(Jan. 1977).
+.Pp
+.Em "DES Modes of Operation" ,
 Federal Information Processing Standard #81,
 National Bureau of Standards,
 U.S. Department of Commerce
 Washington DC
-(Dec. 1980)
-.sp
+(Dec. 1980).
+.Pp
 Dorothy Denning,
-.IR "Cryptography and Data Security" ,
+.Em "Cryptography and Data Security" ,
 Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.,
 Reading, MA
 \(co1982.
-.sp
+.Pp
 Matt Bishop,
-.IR "Implementation Notes on bdes(1)" ,
+.Em "Implementation Notes on bdes(1)" ,
 Technical Report PCS-TR-91-158,
 Department of Mathematics and Computer Science,
 Dartmouth College,
 Hanover, NH  03755
 (Apr. 1991).
-.sp
+.Pp
 M.J. Wiener,
-.IR "Efficient DES Key Search" ,
+.Em "Efficient DES Key Search" ,
 Technical Report 244,
 School of Computer Science,
 Carleton University
 (May 1994).
-.sp
+.Pp
 Bruce Schneier,
-.IR "Applied Cryptography (2nd edition)" ,
+.Em "Applied Cryptography (2nd edition)" ,
 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
 New York, NY
 \(co1996.
-.sp
+.Pp
 M. Matsui,
-.IR "Linear Cryptanalysis Method for DES Cipher" ,
+.Em "Linear Cryptanalysis Method for DES Cipher" ,
 Advances in Cryptology -- Eurocrypt '93 Proceedings,
 Springer-Verlag
 \(co1994.
-.sp
+.Pp
 Blaze, Diffie, Rivest, Schneier, Shimomura, Thompson, and Wiener,
-.IR "Minimal Key Lengths for Symmetric Ciphers To Provide Adequate Commercial Security",
+.Em "Minimal Key Lengths for Symmetric Ciphers To Provide Adequate Commercial Security" ,
 Business Software Alliance,
 http://www.bsa.org/policy/encryption/cryptographers.html
 (January 1996).
-
-.SH DISCLAIMER
-.nf
+.Sh DISCLAIMER
+.Bd -literal
 THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
 ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -308,8 +314,8 @@ HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
 LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
 OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 SUCH DAMAGE.
-.fi
-.SH BUGS
+.Ed
+.Sh BUGS
 When this document was originally written, there was a controversy
 raging over whether the DES would still be secure in a few years.
 There is now near-universal consensus in the cryptographic community
@@ -322,27 +328,24 @@ devices has brought an attack using only commodity hardware into the
 realm of possibility.  Schneier and others currently recommend using
 cryptosystems with keys of at least 90 bits when long-term security is
 needed.
-.PP
+.Pp
 As the key or key schedule is stored in memory, the encryption can be
 compromised if memory is readable.
 Additionally, programs which display programs' arguments may compromise the
 key and initialization vector, if they are specified on the command line.
 To avoid this
-.I bdes
+.Nm
 overwrites its arguments, however, the obvious race cannot currently be
 avoided.
-.PP
+.Pp
 Certain specific keys should be avoided because they introduce potential
 weaknesses; these keys, called the
-.I weak
+.Em weak
 and
-.I semiweak
+.Em semiweak
 keys, are (in hex notation, where p is either 0 or 1, and P is either
 e or f):
-.sp
-.nf
-.in +10n
-.ta \w'0x0p0p0p0p0p0p0p0p\0\0\0'u+5n
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
 0x0p0p0p0p0p0p0p0p	0x0p1P0p1P0p0P0p0P
 0x0pep0pep0pfp0pfp	0x0pfP0pfP0pfP0pfP
 0x1P0p1P0p0P0p0P0p	0x1P1P1P1P0P0P0P0P
@@ -351,10 +354,11 @@ e or f):
 0xepepepepepepepep	0xepfPepfPfpfPfpfP
 0xfP0pfP0pfP0pfP0p	0xfP1PfP1PfP0PfP0P
 0xfPepfPepfPepfPep	0xfPfPfPfPfPfPfPfP
-.fi
-.in -10n
-.sp
+.Ed
+.Pp
 This is inherent in the DES algorithm (see Moore and Simmons,
-\*(LqCycle structure of the DES with weak and semi-weak keys,\*(Rq
-.I "Advances in Cryptology \- Crypto '86 Proceedings" ,
+.Do
+Cycle structure of the DES with weak and semi-weak keys
+.Dc ,
+.Em "Advances in Cryptology \- Crypto '86 Proceedings" ,
 Springer-Verlag New York, \(co1987, pp. 9-32.)