Fix kernel panic (assertion failure) on receiving an IPv6 packet with large options

If an IPv6 packet has large options, a necessary space for evacuation can
exceed the expected size (ah_pool_item_size). Give up using the pool_cache
if it happens.

Pointed out by maxv@
This commit is contained in:
ozaki-r 2018-02-15 04:27:24 +00:00
parent e7e35b3318
commit a7134ed919

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.78 2018/02/15 04:24:32 ozaki-r Exp $ */
/* $NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.79 2018/02/15 04:27:24 ozaki-r Exp $ */
/* $FreeBSD: src/sys/netipsec/xform_ah.c,v 1.1.4.1 2003/01/24 05:11:36 sam Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ip_ah.c,v 1.63 2001/06/26 06:18:58 angelos Exp $ */
/*
@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.78 2018/02/15 04:24:32 ozaki-r Exp $");
__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.79 2018/02/15 04:27:24 ozaki-r Exp $");
#if defined(_KERNEL_OPT)
#include "opt_inet.h"
@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ __KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.78 2018/02/15 04:24:32 ozaki-r Exp $"
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/pool.h>
#include <sys/pserialize.h>
#include <sys/kmem.h>
#include <net/if.h>
@ -621,6 +622,7 @@ ah_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
int hl, rplen, authsize, error, stat = AH_STAT_HDROPS;
struct cryptodesc *crda;
struct cryptop *crp = NULL;
bool pool_used;
IPSEC_SPLASSERT_SOFTNET(__func__);
@ -693,9 +695,14 @@ ah_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
size_t extra = skip + rplen + authsize;
size += extra;
KASSERTMSG(size <= ah_pool_item_size,
"size=%zu > ah_pool_item_size=%zu\n", size, ah_pool_item_size);
tc = pool_cache_get(ah_tdb_crypto_pool_cache, PR_NOWAIT);
if (__predict_true(size <= ah_pool_item_size)) {
tc = pool_cache_get(ah_tdb_crypto_pool_cache, PR_NOWAIT);
pool_used = true;
} else {
/* size can exceed on IPv6 packets with large options. */
tc = kmem_intr_zalloc(size, KM_NOSLEEP);
pool_used = false;
}
if (tc == NULL) {
DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n", __func__));
stat = AH_STAT_CRYPTO;
@ -767,8 +774,12 @@ ah_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
return crypto_dispatch(crp);
bad:
if (tc != NULL)
pool_cache_put(ah_tdb_crypto_pool_cache, tc);
if (tc != NULL) {
if (__predict_true(pool_used))
pool_cache_put(ah_tdb_crypto_pool_cache, tc);
else
kmem_intr_free(tc, size);
}
if (crp != NULL)
crypto_freereq(crp);
if (m != NULL)
@ -808,6 +819,8 @@ ah_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
int authsize;
uint16_t dport;
uint16_t sport;
bool pool_used;
size_t size;
IPSEC_DECLARE_LOCK_VARIABLE;
KASSERT(crp->crp_opaque != NULL);
@ -829,6 +842,16 @@ ah_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6,
"unexpected protocol family %u", saidx->dst.sa.sa_family);
/* Figure out header size. */
rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
size = sizeof(*tc) + skip + rplen + authsize;
if (__predict_true(size <= ah_pool_item_size))
pool_used = true;
else
pool_used = false;
/* Check for crypto errors. */
if (crp->crp_etype) {
if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0)
@ -849,10 +872,6 @@ ah_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
crp = NULL;
}
/* Figure out header size. */
rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
if (ipsec_debug)
memset(calc, 0, sizeof(calc));
@ -890,7 +909,10 @@ ah_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
/* Copyback the saved (uncooked) network headers. */
m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr);
pool_cache_put(ah_tdb_crypto_pool_cache, tc);
if (__predict_true(pool_used))
pool_cache_put(ah_tdb_crypto_pool_cache, tc);
else
kmem_intr_free(tc, size);
tc = NULL;
/*
@ -937,8 +959,12 @@ bad:
IPSEC_RELEASE_GLOBAL_LOCKS();
if (m != NULL)
m_freem(m);
if (tc != NULL)
pool_cache_put(ah_tdb_crypto_pool_cache, tc);
if (tc != NULL) {
if (pool_used)
pool_cache_put(ah_tdb_crypto_pool_cache, tc);
else
kmem_intr_free(tc, size);
}
if (crp != NULL)
crypto_freereq(crp);
return error;