Apply the third version of the patch from OpenSSL to address this issue.
- Rollback the updates for rsa.h, rsa_eay.c and rsa_err.c as they were not necessary to address this vulnerability. - Small update to the patch for rsa_sign.c for backward compatability so the same patch can be applied to 0.9.[6-9]
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parent
3053244401
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8d13789c5a
1
crypto/dist/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
vendored
1
crypto/dist/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
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@ -412,7 +412,6 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
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#define RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q 127
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#define RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR 121
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#define RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 114
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#define RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT 105
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#define RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME 128
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#define RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME 129
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#define RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED 130
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9
crypto/dist/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
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9
crypto/dist/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
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@ -617,15 +617,6 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
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{
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case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
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r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
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/* Generally signatures should be at least 2/3 padding, though
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this isn't possible for really short keys and some standard
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signature schemes, so don't check if the unpadded data is
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small. */
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if(r > 42 && 3*8*r >= BN_num_bits(rsa->n))
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{
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT);
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goto err;
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}
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break;
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case RSA_X931_PADDING:
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r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num);
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1
crypto/dist/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
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1
crypto/dist/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
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@ -142,7 +142,6 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[]=
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{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q) ,"n does not equal p q"},
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{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR) ,"oaep decoding error"},
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{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED) ,"padding check failed"},
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{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT),"pkcs1 padding too short"},
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{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME) ,"p not prime"},
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{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME) ,"q not prime"},
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{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED),"rsa operations not supported"},
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2
crypto/dist/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
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2
crypto/dist/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
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@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ int RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
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/* Parameters to the signature algorithm can also be used to
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create forgeries */
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if(sig->algor->parameter
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&& ASN1_TYPE_get(sig->algor->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL)
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&& sig->algor->parameter->type != V_ASN1_NULL)
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{
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
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goto err;
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