Apply the third version of the patch from OpenSSL to address this issue.

- Rollback the updates for rsa.h, rsa_eay.c and rsa_err.c as they were
  not necessary to address this vulnerability.
- Small update to the patch for rsa_sign.c for backward compatability so
  the same patch can be applied to 0.9.[6-9]
This commit is contained in:
adrianp 2006-09-06 22:47:11 +00:00
parent 3053244401
commit 8d13789c5a
4 changed files with 1 additions and 12 deletions

View File

@ -412,7 +412,6 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
#define RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q 127
#define RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR 121
#define RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 114
#define RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT 105
#define RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME 128
#define RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME 129
#define RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED 130

View File

@ -617,15 +617,6 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
{
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
/* Generally signatures should be at least 2/3 padding, though
this isn't possible for really short keys and some standard
signature schemes, so don't check if the unpadded data is
small. */
if(r > 42 && 3*8*r >= BN_num_bits(rsa->n))
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT);
goto err;
}
break;
case RSA_X931_PADDING:
r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num);

View File

@ -142,7 +142,6 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[]=
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q) ,"n does not equal p q"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR) ,"oaep decoding error"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED) ,"padding check failed"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT),"pkcs1 padding too short"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME) ,"p not prime"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME) ,"q not prime"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED),"rsa operations not supported"},

View File

@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ int RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
/* Parameters to the signature algorithm can also be used to
create forgeries */
if(sig->algor->parameter
&& ASN1_TYPE_get(sig->algor->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL)
&& sig->algor->parameter->type != V_ASN1_NULL)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto err;