Apply the third version of the patch from OpenSSL to address this issue.

- Rollback the updates for rsa.h, rsa_eay.c and rsa_err.c as they were
  not necessary to address this vulnerability.
- Small update to the patch for rsa_sign.c for backward compatability so
  the same patch can be applied to 0.9.[6-9]

crypto/dist/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h

@@ -412,7 +412,6 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
 #define RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q			 127
 #define RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR			 121
 #define RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED			 114
-#define RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT			 105
 #define RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME				 128
 #define RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME				 129
 #define RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED		 130

crypto/dist/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c

@@ -617,15 +617,6 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 		{
 	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
 		r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
-		/* Generally signatures should be at least 2/3 padding, though
-		   this isn't possible for really short keys and some standard
-		   signature schemes, so don't check if the unpadded data is
-		   small. */
-		if(r > 42 && 3*8*r >= BN_num_bits(rsa->n))
-			{
-			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT);
-			goto err;
-			}
 		break;
 	case RSA_X931_PADDING:
 		r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num);

crypto/dist/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c

@@ -142,7 +142,6 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q)  ,"n does not equal p q"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR)   ,"oaep decoding error"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED)  ,"padding check failed"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT),"pkcs1 padding too short"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME)           ,"p not prime"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME)           ,"q not prime"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED),"rsa operations not supported"},

crypto/dist/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c

@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ int RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
 		/* Parameters to the signature algorithm can also be used to
 		   create forgeries */
 		if(sig->algor->parameter
-		   && ASN1_TYPE_get(sig->algor->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL)
+		   && sig->algor->parameter->type != V_ASN1_NULL)
 			{
 			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
 			goto err;