PR/6836: Grag A. Woods: Formatting errors and limitation doc.
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.SH NAME
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hosts_access,
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hosts.allow,
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hosts.deny,
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hosts_ctl,
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request_init,
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request_set \- format of host access control files
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hosts.deny \- format of host access control files
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.SH DESCRIPTION
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This manual page describes a simple access control language that is
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based on client (host name/address, user name), and server (process
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@ -26,7 +23,7 @@ In the following text, \fIdaemon\fR is the process name of a
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network daemon process, and \fIclient\fR is the name and/or address of
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a host requesting service. Network daemon process names are specified
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in the inetd configuration file.
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.SH ACCESS CONTROL FILES
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.SH "ACCESS CONTROL FILES"
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The access control software consults two files. The search stops
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at the first match:
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.IP \(bu
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@ -41,14 +38,15 @@ Otherwise, access will be granted.
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A non-existing access control file is treated as if it were an empty
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file. Thus, access control can be turned off by providing no access
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control files.
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.SH ACCESS CONTROL RULES
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.SH "ACCESS CONTROL RULES"
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Each access control file consists of zero or more lines of text. These
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lines are processed in order of appearance. The search terminates when a
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match is found.
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.IP \(bu
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A newline character is ignored when it is preceded by a backslash
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character. This permits you to break up long lines so that they are
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easier to edit.
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character. This permits you to break up long lines so that they are
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easier to edit. \fBWARNING:\fP The total length of an entry can be no
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more than 2047 characters long including the final newline.
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.IP \(bu
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Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#\' character are ignored.
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This permits you to insert comments and whitespace so that the tables
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@ -160,7 +158,7 @@ Expands to a single `%\' character.
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.PP
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Characters in % expansions that may confuse the shell are replaced by
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underscores.
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.SH SERVER ENDPOINT PATTERNS
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.SH "SERVER ENDPOINT PATTERNS"
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In order to distinguish clients by the network address that they
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connect to, use patterns of the form:
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.sp
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@ -179,7 +177,7 @@ pseudo interfaces that live in a dedicated network address space.
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The host_pattern obeys the same syntax rules as host names and
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addresses in client_list context. Usually, server endpoint information
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is available only with connection-oriented services.
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.SH CLIENT USERNAME LOOKUP
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.SH "CLIENT USERNAME LOOKUP"
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When the client host supports the RFC 931 protocol or one of its
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descendants (TAP, IDENT, RFC 1413) the wrapper programs can retrieve
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additional information about the owner of a connection. Client username
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@ -223,7 +221,7 @@ daemon_list : @pcnetgroup ALL@ALL
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.PP
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would match members of the pc netgroup without doing username lookups,
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but would perform username lookups with all other systems.
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.SH DETECTING ADDRESS SPOOFING ATTACKS
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.SH "DETECTING ADDRESS SPOOFING ATTACKS"
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A flaw in the sequence number generator of many TCP/IP implementations
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allows intruders to easily impersonate trusted hosts and to break in
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via, for example, the remote shell service. The IDENT (RFC931 etc.)
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@ -257,7 +255,7 @@ match is found at all.
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The examples use host and domain names. They can be improved by
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including address and/or network/netmask information, to reduce the
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impact of temporary name server lookup failures.
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.SH MOSTLY CLOSED
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.SH "MOSTLY CLOSED"
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In this case, access is denied by default. Only explicitly authorized
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hosts are permitted access.
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.PP
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@ -287,7 +285,7 @@ in the host name) and from members of the \fIsome_netgroup\fP
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netgroup. The second rule permits access from all hosts in the
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\fIfoobar.edu\fP domain (notice the leading dot), with the exception of
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\fIterminalserver.foobar.edu\fP.
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.SH MOSTLY OPEN
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.SH "MOSTLY OPEN"
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Here, access is granted by default; only explicitly specified hosts are
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refused service.
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.PP
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@ -303,7 +301,7 @@ ALL EXCEPT in.fingerd: other.host.name, .other.domain
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.PP
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The first rule denies some hosts and domains all services; the second
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rule still permits finger requests from other hosts and domains.
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.SH BOOBY TRAPS
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.SH "BOOBY TRAPS"
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The next example permits tftp requests from hosts in the local domain
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(notice the leading dot). Requests from any other hosts are denied.
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Instead of the requested file, a finger probe is sent to the offending
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@ -354,15 +352,18 @@ that shouldn\'t. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon.
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/etc/hosts.deny, (daemon,client) pairs that are denied access.
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.ad
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.fi
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.SH SEE ALSO
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.SH "SEE ALSO"
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.nf
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tcpdchk(8), tcpdmatch(8), test programs.
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hosts_options(5), tcpdchk(8), tcpdmatch(8), test programs.
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.SH BUGS
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If a name server lookup times out, the host name will not be available
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to the access control software, even though the host is registered.
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.PP
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Domain name server lookups are case insensitive; NIS (formerly YP)
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netgroup lookups are case sensitive.
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.PP
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The total length of an entry can be no more than 2047 characters long,
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including the final newline.
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.SH AUTHOR
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.na
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.nf
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@ -372,4 +373,4 @@ Eindhoven University of Technology
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Den Dolech 2, P.O. Box 513,
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5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands
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\" @(#) hosts_access.5 1.20 95/01/30 19:51:46
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\" $NetBSD: hosts_access.5,v 1.4 1997/11/12 00:48:10 mrg Exp $
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\" $NetBSD: hosts_access.5,v 1.5 1999/01/18 19:39:24 christos Exp $
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