delete extra file
This commit is contained in:
parent
046f6d9783
commit
55498c5a44
|
@ -1,674 +0,0 @@
|
|||
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
|
||||
__RCSID("$NetBSD: auth.c,v 1.11 2016/05/09 10:15:59 roy Exp $");
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* dhcpcd - DHCP client daemon
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 2006-2015 Roy Marples <roy@marples.name>
|
||||
* All rights reserved
|
||||
|
||||
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
||||
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
||||
* are met:
|
||||
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
||||
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
||||
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
||||
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
||||
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
|
||||
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
||||
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
|
||||
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
|
||||
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
||||
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
|
||||
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
||||
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
|
||||
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
|
||||
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
||||
* SUCH DAMAGE.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include <sys/file.h>
|
||||
#include <errno.h>
|
||||
#include <fcntl.h>
|
||||
#include <inttypes.h>
|
||||
#include <stddef.h>
|
||||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
#include <time.h>
|
||||
#include <unistd.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include "config.h"
|
||||
#include "auth.h"
|
||||
#include "crypt/crypt.h"
|
||||
#include "dhcp.h"
|
||||
#include "dhcp6.h"
|
||||
#include "dhcpcd.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef __sun
|
||||
#define htonll
|
||||
#define ntohll
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef htonll
|
||||
#if (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN)
|
||||
static inline uint64_t
|
||||
htonll(uint64_t x)
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
||||
return (uint64_t)htonl((uint32_t)(x >> 32)) |
|
||||
(uint64_t)htonl((uint32_t)(x & 0xffffffff)) << 32;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else /* (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN) */
|
||||
#define htonll(x) (x)
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#endif /* htonll */
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef ntohll
|
||||
#if (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN)
|
||||
static inline uint64_t
|
||||
ntohll(uint64_t x)
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
||||
return (uint64_t)ntohl((uint32_t)(x >> 32)) |
|
||||
(uint64_t)ntohl((uint32_t)(x & 0xffffffff)) << 32;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else /* (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN) */
|
||||
#define ntohll(x) (x)
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#endif /* ntohll */
|
||||
|
||||
#define HMAC_LENGTH 16
|
||||
|
||||
void
|
||||
dhcp_auth_reset(struct authstate *state)
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
||||
state->replay = 0;
|
||||
if (state->token) {
|
||||
free(state->token->key);
|
||||
free(state->token->realm);
|
||||
free(state->token);
|
||||
state->token = NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (state->reconf) {
|
||||
free(state->reconf->key);
|
||||
free(state->reconf->realm);
|
||||
free(state->reconf);
|
||||
state->reconf = NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Authenticate a DHCP message.
|
||||
* m and mlen refer to the whole message.
|
||||
* t is the DHCP type, pass it 4 or 6.
|
||||
* data and dlen refer to the authentication option within the message.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
const struct token *
|
||||
dhcp_auth_validate(struct authstate *state, const struct auth *auth,
|
||||
const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, int mp, int mt,
|
||||
const uint8_t *data, size_t dlen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
uint8_t protocol, algorithm, rdm, *mm, type;
|
||||
uint64_t replay;
|
||||
uint32_t secretid;
|
||||
const uint8_t *d, *realm;
|
||||
size_t realm_len;
|
||||
const struct token *t;
|
||||
time_t now;
|
||||
uint8_t hmac[HMAC_LENGTH];
|
||||
|
||||
if (dlen < 3 + sizeof(replay)) {
|
||||
errno = EINVAL;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Ensure that d is inside m which *may* not be the case for DHPCPv4 */
|
||||
if (data < m || data > m + mlen || data + dlen > m + mlen) {
|
||||
errno = ERANGE;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
d = data;
|
||||
protocol = *d++;
|
||||
algorithm = *d++;
|
||||
rdm = *d++;
|
||||
if (!(auth->options & DHCPCD_AUTH_SEND)) {
|
||||
/* If we didn't send any authorisation, it can only be a
|
||||
* reconfigure key */
|
||||
if (protocol != AUTH_PROTO_RECONFKEY) {
|
||||
errno = EINVAL;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if (protocol != auth->protocol ||
|
||||
algorithm != auth->algorithm ||
|
||||
rdm != auth->rdm)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* As we don't require authentication, we should still
|
||||
* accept a reconfigure key */
|
||||
if (protocol != AUTH_PROTO_RECONFKEY ||
|
||||
auth->options & DHCPCD_AUTH_REQUIRE)
|
||||
{
|
||||
errno = EPERM;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
dlen -= 3;
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(&replay, d, sizeof(replay));
|
||||
replay = ntohll(replay);
|
||||
if (state->token) {
|
||||
if (state->replay == (replay ^ 0x8000000000000000ULL)) {
|
||||
/* We don't know if the singular point is increasing
|
||||
* or decreasing. */
|
||||
errno = EPERM;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ((uint64_t)(replay - state->replay) <= 0) {
|
||||
/* Replay attack detected */
|
||||
errno = EPERM;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
d+= sizeof(replay);
|
||||
dlen -= sizeof(replay);
|
||||
|
||||
realm = NULL;
|
||||
realm_len = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Extract realm and secret.
|
||||
* Rest of data is MAC. */
|
||||
switch (protocol) {
|
||||
case AUTH_PROTO_TOKEN:
|
||||
secretid = 0;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case AUTH_PROTO_DELAYED:
|
||||
if (dlen < sizeof(secretid) + sizeof(hmac)) {
|
||||
errno = EINVAL;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
memcpy(&secretid, d, sizeof(secretid));
|
||||
d += sizeof(secretid);
|
||||
dlen -= sizeof(secretid);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case AUTH_PROTO_DELAYEDREALM:
|
||||
if (dlen < sizeof(secretid) + sizeof(hmac)) {
|
||||
errno = EINVAL;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
realm_len = dlen - (sizeof(secretid) + sizeof(hmac));
|
||||
if (realm_len) {
|
||||
realm = d;
|
||||
d += realm_len;
|
||||
dlen -= realm_len;
|
||||
}
|
||||
memcpy(&secretid, d, sizeof(secretid));
|
||||
d += sizeof(secretid);
|
||||
dlen -= sizeof(secretid);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case AUTH_PROTO_RECONFKEY:
|
||||
if (dlen != 1 + 16) {
|
||||
errno = EINVAL;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
type = *d++;
|
||||
dlen--;
|
||||
switch (type) {
|
||||
case 1:
|
||||
if ((mp == 4 && mt == DHCP_ACK) ||
|
||||
(mp == 6 && mt == DHCP6_REPLY))
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (state->reconf == NULL) {
|
||||
state->reconf =
|
||||
malloc(sizeof(*state->reconf));
|
||||
if (state->reconf == NULL)
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
state->reconf->key = malloc(16);
|
||||
if (state->reconf->key == NULL) {
|
||||
free(state->reconf);
|
||||
state->reconf = NULL;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
state->reconf->secretid = 0;
|
||||
state->reconf->expire = 0;
|
||||
state->reconf->realm = NULL;
|
||||
state->reconf->realm_len = 0;
|
||||
state->reconf->key_len = 16;
|
||||
}
|
||||
memcpy(state->reconf->key, d, 16);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
errno = EINVAL;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (state->reconf == NULL)
|
||||
errno = ENOENT;
|
||||
/* Free the old token so we log acceptance */
|
||||
if (state->token) {
|
||||
free(state->token);
|
||||
state->token = NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Nothing to validate, just accepting the key */
|
||||
return state->reconf;
|
||||
case 2:
|
||||
if (!((mp == 4 && mt == DHCP_FORCERENEW) ||
|
||||
(mp == 6 && mt == DHCP6_RECONFIGURE)))
|
||||
{
|
||||
errno = EINVAL;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (state->reconf == NULL) {
|
||||
errno = ENOENT;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
t = state->reconf;
|
||||
goto gottoken;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
errno = EINVAL;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
default:
|
||||
errno = ENOTSUP;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Find a token for the realm and secret */
|
||||
secretid = ntohl(secretid);
|
||||
TAILQ_FOREACH(t, &auth->tokens, next) {
|
||||
if (t->secretid == secretid &&
|
||||
t->realm_len == realm_len &&
|
||||
(t->realm_len == 0 ||
|
||||
memcmp(t->realm, realm, t->realm_len) == 0))
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (t == NULL) {
|
||||
errno = ESRCH;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (t->expire) {
|
||||
if (time(&now) == -1)
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
if (t->expire < now) {
|
||||
errno = EFAULT;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
gottoken:
|
||||
/* First message from the server */
|
||||
if (state->token &&
|
||||
(state->token->secretid != t->secretid ||
|
||||
state->token->realm_len != t->realm_len ||
|
||||
memcmp(state->token->realm, t->realm, t->realm_len)))
|
||||
{
|
||||
errno = EPERM;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Special case as no hashing needs to be done. */
|
||||
if (protocol == AUTH_PROTO_TOKEN) {
|
||||
if (dlen != t->key_len || memcmp(d, t->key, dlen)) {
|
||||
errno = EPERM;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
goto finish;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Make a duplicate of the message, but zero out the MAC part */
|
||||
mm = malloc(mlen);
|
||||
if (mm == NULL)
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
memcpy(mm, m, mlen);
|
||||
memset(mm + (d - m), 0, dlen);
|
||||
|
||||
/* RFC3318, section 5.2 - zero giaddr and hops */
|
||||
if (mp == 4) {
|
||||
*(mm + offsetof(struct bootp, hops)) = '\0';
|
||||
memset(mm + offsetof(struct bootp, giaddr), 0, 4);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
memset(hmac, 0, sizeof(hmac));
|
||||
switch (algorithm) {
|
||||
case AUTH_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
|
||||
hmac_md5(mm, mlen, t->key, t->key_len, hmac);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
errno = ENOSYS;
|
||||
free(mm);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
free(mm);
|
||||
if (memcmp(d, &hmac, dlen)) {
|
||||
errno = EPERM;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
finish:
|
||||
/* If we got here then authentication passed */
|
||||
state->replay = replay;
|
||||
if (state->token == NULL) {
|
||||
/* We cannot just save a pointer because a reconfigure will
|
||||
* recreate the token list. So we duplicate it. */
|
||||
state->token = malloc(sizeof(*state->token));
|
||||
if (state->token) {
|
||||
state->token->secretid = t->secretid;
|
||||
state->token->key = malloc(t->key_len);
|
||||
if (state->token->key) {
|
||||
state->token->key_len = t->key_len;
|
||||
memcpy(state->token->key, t->key, t->key_len);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
free(state->token);
|
||||
state->token = NULL;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (t->realm_len) {
|
||||
state->token->realm = malloc(t->realm_len);
|
||||
if (state->token->realm) {
|
||||
state->token->realm_len = t->realm_len;
|
||||
memcpy(state->token->realm, t->realm,
|
||||
t->realm_len);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
free(state->token->key);
|
||||
free(state->token);
|
||||
state->token = NULL;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
state->token->realm = NULL;
|
||||
state->token->realm_len = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* If we cannot save the token, we must invalidate */
|
||||
if (state->token == NULL)
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return t;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static uint64_t
|
||||
get_next_rdm_monotonic_counter(struct auth *auth)
|
||||
{
|
||||
FILE *fp;
|
||||
uint64_t rdm;
|
||||
#ifdef LOCK_EX
|
||||
int flocked;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
fp = fopen(RDM_MONOFILE, "r+");
|
||||
if (fp == NULL) {
|
||||
if (errno != ENOENT)
|
||||
return ++auth->last_replay; /* report error? */
|
||||
fp = fopen(RDM_MONOFILE, "w");
|
||||
if (fp == NULL)
|
||||
return ++auth->last_replay; /* report error? */
|
||||
#ifdef LOCK_EX
|
||||
flocked = flock(fileno(fp), LOCK_EX);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
rdm = 0;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
#ifdef LOCK_EX
|
||||
flocked = flock(fileno(fp), LOCK_EX);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
if (fscanf(fp, "0x%016" PRIu64, &rdm) != 1)
|
||||
rdm = 0; /* truncated? report error? */
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rdm++;
|
||||
if (fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET) == -1 ||
|
||||
ftruncate(fileno(fp), 0) == -1 ||
|
||||
fprintf(fp, "0x%016" PRIu64 "\n", rdm) != 19 ||
|
||||
fflush(fp) == EOF)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (!auth->last_replay_set) {
|
||||
auth->last_replay = rdm;
|
||||
auth->last_replay_set = 1;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
rdm = ++auth->last_replay;
|
||||
/* report error? */
|
||||
}
|
||||
#ifdef LOCK_EX
|
||||
if (flocked == 0)
|
||||
flock(fileno(fp), LOCK_UN);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
fclose(fp);
|
||||
return rdm;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#define JAN_1970 2208988800U /* 1970 - 1900 in seconds */
|
||||
static uint64_t
|
||||
get_next_rdm_monotonic_clock(struct auth *auth)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct timespec ts;
|
||||
uint32_t pack[2];
|
||||
double frac;
|
||||
uint64_t rdm;
|
||||
|
||||
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts) != 0)
|
||||
return ++auth->last_replay; /* report error? */
|
||||
pack[0] = htonl((uint32_t)ts.tv_sec + JAN_1970);
|
||||
frac = ((double)ts.tv_nsec / 1e9 * 0x100000000ULL);
|
||||
pack[1] = htonl((uint32_t)frac);
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(&rdm, &pack, sizeof(rdm));
|
||||
return rdm;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static uint64_t
|
||||
get_next_rdm_monotonic(struct auth *auth)
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
||||
if (auth->options & DHCPCD_AUTH_RDM_COUNTER)
|
||||
return get_next_rdm_monotonic_counter(auth);
|
||||
return get_next_rdm_monotonic_clock(auth);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Encode a DHCP message.
|
||||
* Either we know which token to use from the server response
|
||||
* or we are using a basic configuration token.
|
||||
* token is the token to encrypt with.
|
||||
* m and mlen refer to the whole message.
|
||||
* mp is the DHCP type, pass it 4 or 6.
|
||||
* mt is the DHCP message type.
|
||||
* data and dlen refer to the authentication option within the message.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
ssize_t
|
||||
dhcp_auth_encode(struct auth *auth, const struct token *t,
|
||||
uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, int mp, int mt,
|
||||
uint8_t *data, size_t dlen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
uint64_t rdm;
|
||||
uint8_t hmac[HMAC_LENGTH];
|
||||
time_t now;
|
||||
uint8_t hops, *p, info;
|
||||
uint32_t giaddr, secretid;
|
||||
|
||||
if (auth->protocol == 0 && t == NULL) {
|
||||
TAILQ_FOREACH(t, &auth->tokens, next) {
|
||||
if (t->secretid == 0 &&
|
||||
t->realm_len == 0)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (t == NULL) {
|
||||
errno = EINVAL;
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (t->expire) {
|
||||
if (time(&now) == -1)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
if (t->expire < now) {
|
||||
errno = EPERM;
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
switch(auth->protocol) {
|
||||
case AUTH_PROTO_TOKEN:
|
||||
case AUTH_PROTO_DELAYED:
|
||||
case AUTH_PROTO_DELAYEDREALM:
|
||||
/* We don't ever send a reconf key */
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
errno = ENOTSUP;
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
switch(auth->algorithm) {
|
||||
case AUTH_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
errno = ENOTSUP;
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
switch(auth->rdm) {
|
||||
case AUTH_RDM_MONOTONIC:
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
errno = ENOTSUP;
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* DISCOVER or INFORM messages don't write auth info */
|
||||
if ((mp == 4 && (mt == DHCP_DISCOVER || mt == DHCP_INFORM)) ||
|
||||
(mp == 6 && (mt == DHCP6_SOLICIT || mt == DHCP6_INFORMATION_REQ)))
|
||||
info = 0;
|
||||
else
|
||||
info = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Work out the auth area size.
|
||||
* We only need to do this for DISCOVER messages */
|
||||
if (data == NULL) {
|
||||
dlen = 1 + 1 + 1 + 8;
|
||||
switch(auth->protocol) {
|
||||
case AUTH_PROTO_TOKEN:
|
||||
dlen += t->key_len;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case AUTH_PROTO_DELAYEDREALM:
|
||||
if (info && t)
|
||||
dlen += t->realm_len;
|
||||
/* FALLTHROUGH */
|
||||
case AUTH_PROTO_DELAYED:
|
||||
if (info && t)
|
||||
dlen += sizeof(t->secretid) + sizeof(hmac);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return (ssize_t)dlen;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (dlen < 1 + 1 + 1 + 8) {
|
||||
errno = ENOBUFS;
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Ensure that d is inside m which *may* not be the case for DHPCPv4 */
|
||||
if (data < m || data > m + mlen || data + dlen > m + mlen) {
|
||||
errno = ERANGE;
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Write out our option */
|
||||
*data++ = auth->protocol;
|
||||
*data++ = auth->algorithm;
|
||||
*data++ = auth->rdm;
|
||||
switch (auth->rdm) {
|
||||
case AUTH_RDM_MONOTONIC:
|
||||
rdm = get_next_rdm_monotonic(auth);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
/* This block appeases gcc, clang doesn't need it */
|
||||
rdm = get_next_rdm_monotonic(auth);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
rdm = htonll(rdm);
|
||||
memcpy(data, &rdm, 8);
|
||||
data += 8;
|
||||
dlen -= 1 + 1 + 1 + 8;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Special case as no hashing needs to be done. */
|
||||
if (auth->protocol == AUTH_PROTO_TOKEN) {
|
||||
/* Should be impossible, but still */
|
||||
if (t == NULL) {
|
||||
errno = EINVAL;
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (dlen < t->key_len) {
|
||||
errno = ENOBUFS;
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
memcpy(data, t->key, t->key_len);
|
||||
return (ssize_t)(dlen - t->key_len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* DISCOVER or INFORM messages don't write auth info */
|
||||
if (!info)
|
||||
return (ssize_t)dlen;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Loading a saved lease without an authentication option */
|
||||
if (t == NULL)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Write out the Realm */
|
||||
if (auth->protocol == AUTH_PROTO_DELAYEDREALM) {
|
||||
if (dlen < t->realm_len) {
|
||||
errno = ENOBUFS;
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
memcpy(data, t->realm, t->realm_len);
|
||||
data += t->realm_len;
|
||||
dlen -= t->realm_len;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Write out the SecretID */
|
||||
if (auth->protocol == AUTH_PROTO_DELAYED ||
|
||||
auth->protocol == AUTH_PROTO_DELAYEDREALM)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (dlen < sizeof(t->secretid)) {
|
||||
errno = ENOBUFS;
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
secretid = htonl(t->secretid);
|
||||
memcpy(data, &secretid, sizeof(secretid));
|
||||
data += sizeof(secretid);
|
||||
dlen -= sizeof(secretid);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Zero what's left, the MAC */
|
||||
memset(data, 0, dlen);
|
||||
|
||||
/* RFC3318, section 5.2 - zero giaddr and hops */
|
||||
if (mp == 4) {
|
||||
p = m + offsetof(struct bootp, hops);
|
||||
hops = *p;
|
||||
*p = '\0';
|
||||
p = m + offsetof(struct bootp, giaddr);
|
||||
memcpy(&giaddr, p, sizeof(giaddr));
|
||||
memset(p, 0, sizeof(giaddr));
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
/* appease GCC again */
|
||||
hops = 0;
|
||||
giaddr = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Create our hash and write it out */
|
||||
switch(auth->algorithm) {
|
||||
case AUTH_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
|
||||
hmac_md5(m, mlen, t->key, t->key_len, hmac);
|
||||
memcpy(data, hmac, sizeof(hmac));
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* RFC3318, section 5.2 - restore giaddr and hops */
|
||||
if (mp == 4) {
|
||||
p = m + offsetof(struct bootp, hops);
|
||||
*p = hops;
|
||||
p = m + offsetof(struct bootp, giaddr);
|
||||
memcpy(p, &giaddr, sizeof(giaddr));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Done! */
|
||||
return (int)(dlen - sizeof(hmac)); /* should be zero */
|
||||
}
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue