Bump date for CAVEATS; fix punctuation usage in one place;

drop trailing space; use \*[Am] instead of & for HTML generation.
This commit is contained in:
wiz 2003-08-28 09:39:11 +00:00
parent 467deb61ca
commit 520d0eab98

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
.\" $NetBSD: getnameinfo.3,v 1.27 2003/08/28 01:49:30 itojun Exp $
.\" $NetBSD: getnameinfo.3,v 1.28 2003/08/28 09:39:11 wiz Exp $
.\" $KAME: getnameinfo.3,v 1.27 2003/04/30 06:06:42 itojun Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1983, 1987, 1991, 1993
@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
.\"
.\" From: @(#)gethostbyname.3 8.4 (Berkeley) 5/25/95
.\"
.Dd May 25, 1995
.Dd August 28, 2003
.Dt GETNAMEINFO 3
.Os
.\"
@ -295,8 +295,8 @@ returns both numeric and FQDN notation of the address specified in
There is no return value that indicates if the string returned in
.Fa host
is a result of binary to numeric-text translation (like
.Xr inet_ntop 3
), or the result of DNS reverse lookup.
.Xr inet_ntop 3 ) ,
or the result of DNS reverse lookup.
Therefore, malicious parties could set up PTR record like below:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
1.0.0.127.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 10.1.1.1
@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ is
when it actually is
.Li 127.0.0.1 .
.Pp
To prevent such attacks, the use of
To prevent such attacks, the use of
.Li NI_NAMEREQD
like below is recommended when you use the result of
.Nm
@ -326,10 +326,10 @@ int error;
error = getnameinfo(sa, salen, addr, sizeof(addr),
NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD);
if (error == 0) {
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
memset(\*[Am]hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
if (getaddrinfo(addr, "0", &hints, &res) == 0) {
if (getaddrinfo(addr, "0", \*[Am]hints, \*[Am]res) == 0) {
/* malicious PTR record */
freeaddrinfo(res);
printf("bogus PTR record\\n");