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Import openssl-1.0.1q 

OpenSSL Security Advisory [3 Dec 2015] - Updated [4 Dec 2015]
=============================================================

[Updated 4 Dec 2015]: This advisory has been updated to include the details of
CVE-2015-1794, a Low severity issue affecting OpenSSL 1.0.2 which had a fix
included in the released packages but was missed from the advisory text.

NOTE: WE ANTICIPATE THAT 1.0.0t AND 0.9.8zh WILL BE THE LAST RELEASES FOR THE
0.9.8 AND 1.0.0 VERSIONS AND THAT NO MORE SECURITY FIXES WILL BE PROVIDED (AS
PER PREVIOUS ANNOUNCEMENTS). USERS ARE ADVISED TO UPGRADE TO LATER VERSIONS.

BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 (CVE-2015-3193)
==================================================================

Severity: Moderate

There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure. No
EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA
as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not
believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very
difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information
about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources
required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only
accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would
additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target
private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private
key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by
default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites.

This issue affects OpenSSL version 1.0.2.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2e

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on August 13 2015 by Hanno
Böck. The fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL
development team.

Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter (CVE-2015-3194)
===================================================================

Severity: Moderate

The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer dereference
if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS algorithm and absent
mask generation function parameter. Since these routines are used to verify
certificate signature algorithms this can be used to crash any certificate
verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any application which
performs certificate verification is vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and
servers which enable client authentication.

This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2 and 1.0.1.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2e
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1q

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on August 27 2015 by Loïc Jonas Etienne
(Qnective AG). The fix was developed by Dr. Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL
development team.

X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak (CVE-2015-3195)
==========================================

Severity: Moderate

When presented with a malformed X509_ATTRIBUTE structure OpenSSL will leak
memory. This structure is used by the PKCS#7 and CMS routines so any
application which reads PKCS#7 or CMS data from untrusted sources is affected.
SSL/TLS is not affected.

This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2 and 1.0.1, 1.0.0 and 0.9.8.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2e
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1q
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0t
OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zh

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on November 9 2015 by Adam Langley
(Google/BoringSSL) using libFuzzer. The fix was developed by Dr. Stephen
Henson of the OpenSSL development team.

Race condition handling PSK identify hint (CVE-2015-3196)
=========================================================

Severity: Low

If PSK identity hints are received by a multi-threaded client then
the values are wrongly updated in the parent SSL_CTX structure. This can
result in a race condition potentially leading to a double free of the
identify hint data.

This issue was fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2d and 1.0.1p but has not been previously
listed in an OpenSSL security advisory. This issue also affects OpenSSL 1.0.0
and has not been previously fixed in an OpenSSL 1.0.0 release.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2d
OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1p
OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0t

The fix for this issue can be identified in the OpenSSL git repository by commit
ids 3c66a669dfc7 (1.0.2), d6be3124f228 (1.0.1) and 1392c238657e (1.0.0).

The fix was developed by Dr. Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL development team.

Anon DH ServerKeyExchange with 0 p parameter (CVE-2015-1794)
============================================================

Severity: Low

If a client receives a ServerKeyExchange for an anonymous DH ciphersuite with
the value of p set to 0 then a seg fault can occur leading to a possible denial
of service attack.

This issue affects OpenSSL version 1.0.2.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2e

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on August 3 2015 by Guy Leaver (Cisco). The
fix was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team.

Note
====

As per our previous announcements and our Release Strategy
(https://www.openssl.org/about/releasestrat.html), support for OpenSSL versions
1.0.0 and 0.9.8 will cease on 31st December 2015. No security updates for these
versions will be provided after that date. In the absence of significant
security issues being identified prior to that date, the 1.0.0t and 0.9.8zh
releases will be the last for those versions. Users of these versions are
advised to upgrade.


References
==========

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20151203.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional
details over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/about/secpolicy.html
This commit is contained in:
christos 2015-12-06 21:45:41 +00:00
parent 640422f86c
commit 3e7df5c261
98 changed files with 989 additions and 1405 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

38
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/CONTRIBUTING vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL
----------------------------
Development is coordinated on the openssl-dev mailing list (see
http://www.openssl.org for information on subscribing). If you
would like to submit a patch, send it to rt@openssl.org with
the string "[PATCH]" in the subject. Please be sure to include a
textual explanation of what your patch does.
You can also make GitHub pull requests. If you do this, please also send
mail to rt@openssl.org with a brief description and a link to the PR so
that we can more easily keep track of it.
If you are unsure as to whether a feature will be useful for the general
OpenSSL community please discuss it on the openssl-dev mailing list first.
Someone may be already working on the same thing or there may be a good
reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.
Patches should be as up to date as possible, preferably relative to the
current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow our coding style
(see https://www.openssl.org/policies/codingstyle.html) and compile without
warnings using the --strict-warnings flag. OpenSSL compiles on many varied
platforms: try to ensure you only use portable features.
Our preferred format for patch files is "git format-patch" output. For example
to provide a patch file containing the last commit in your local git repository
use the following command:
# git format-patch --stdout HEAD^ >mydiffs.patch
Another method of creating an acceptable patch file without using git is as
follows:
# cd openssl-work
# [your changes]
# ./Configure dist; make clean
# cd ..
# diff -ur openssl-orig openssl-work > mydiffs.patch

1041
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/FAQ vendored
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

31
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/Makefile.org vendored
View File

@ -499,25 +499,28 @@ TABLE: Configure
# would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
# and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
# tar does not support the --files-from option.
tar:
TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
--owner openssl:0 --group openssl:0 \
--transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
-cvf -
../$(TARFILE).list:
find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
\! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \
\! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \
| sort > ../$(TARFILE).list
tar: ../$(TARFILE).list
find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list; \
$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list -cvf - | \
tardy --user_number=0 --user_name=openssl \
--group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
--prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - |\
gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz; \
rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list; \
$(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz
rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz
tar-snap:
@$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) -cvf - \
`find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' | sort` |\
tardy --user_number=0 --user_name=openssl \
--group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
--prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - > ../$(TARFILE);\
tar-snap: ../$(TARFILE).list
$(TAR_COMMAND) > ../$(TARFILE)
rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
ls -l ../$(TARFILE)
dist:

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/Makefile vendored
View File

@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ update: openssl-vms.cnf local_depend
depend: local_depend
@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
local_depend:
@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC); \
@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC)
dclean:
$(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new

9
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/apps.c vendored
View File

@ -119,9 +119,6 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32) && !defined(NETWARE_CLIB)
# include <strings.h>
#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
@ -1247,7 +1244,11 @@ int set_name_ex(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg)
{"ca_default", XN_FLAG_MULTILINE, 0xffffffffL},
{NULL, 0, 0}
};
return set_multi_opts(flags, arg, ex_tbl);
if (set_multi_opts(flags, arg, ex_tbl) == 0)
return 0;
if ((*flags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == 0)
*flags |= XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC;
return 1;
}
int set_ext_copy(int *copy_type, const char *arg)

4
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/asn1pars.c vendored
View File

@ -313,9 +313,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
}
typ = ASN1_TYPE_get(at);
if ((typ == V_ASN1_OBJECT)
|| (typ == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)
|| (typ == V_ASN1_NULL)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't parse %s type\n",
typ == V_ASN1_NULL ? "NULL" : "OBJECT");
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't parse %s type\n", ASN1_tag2str(typ));
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}

7
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/ecparam.c vendored
View File

@ -413,14 +413,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
}
if (check) {
if (group == NULL)
BIO_printf(bio_err, "no elliptic curve parameters\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, "checking elliptic curve parameters: ");
if (!EC_GROUP_check(group, NULL)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
} else
BIO_printf(bio_err, "ok\n");
goto end;
}
BIO_printf(bio_err, "ok\n");
}

5
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/engine.c vendored
View File

@ -99,8 +99,6 @@ static void identity(char *ptr)
static int append_buf(char **buf, const char *s, int *size, int step)
{
int l = strlen(s);
if (*buf == NULL) {
*size = step;
*buf = OPENSSL_malloc(*size);
@ -109,9 +107,6 @@ static int append_buf(char **buf, const char *s, int *size, int step)
**buf = '\0';
}
if (**buf != '\0')
l += 2; /* ", " */
if (strlen(*buf) + strlen(s) >= (unsigned int)*size) {
*size += step;
*buf = OPENSSL_realloc(*buf, *size);

14
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/apps/pkcs12.c vendored
View File

@ -134,13 +134,6 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
apps_startup();
# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode())
cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
else
# endif
cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
enc = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
if (bio_err == NULL)
bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
@ -148,6 +141,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL))
goto end;
# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode())
cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
else
# endif
cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
args = argv + 1;
while (*args) {

60
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/appveyor.yml vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
platform:
- x86
- x64
environment:
matrix:
- VSVER: 9
- VSVER: 10
- VSVER: 11
- VSVER: 12
- VSVER: 14
configuration:
- plain
- shared
matrix:
allow_failures:
- platform: x64
VSVER: 9
- platform: x64
VSVER: 10
- platform: x64
VSVER: 11
before_build:
- ps: >-
If ($env:Platform -Match "x86") {
$env:VCVARS_PLATFORM="x86"
$env:TARGET="VC-WIN32"
$env:DO="do_ms"
} Else {
$env:VCVARS_PLATFORM="amd64"
$env:TARGET="VC-WIN64A"
$env:DO="do_win64a"
}
- ps: >-
If ($env:Configuration -Like "*shared*") {
$env:MAK="ntdll.mak"
} Else {
$env:MAK="nt.mak"
}
- ps: $env:VSCOMNTOOLS=(Get-Content ("env:VS" + "$env:VSVER" + "0COMNTOOLS"))
- call "%VSCOMNTOOLS%\..\..\VC\vcvarsall.bat" %VCVARS_PLATFORM%
- perl Configure %TARGET% no-asm
- call ms\%DO%
build_script:
- nmake /f ms\%MAK%
test_script:
- nmake /f ms\%MAK% test
notifications:
- provider: Email
to:
- openssl-commits@openssl.org
on_build_success: false
on_build_failure: true
on_build_status_changed: true

6
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl vendored
View File

@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
# the undertaken effort was that it appeared that in tight IA-32
# register window little-endian flavor could achieve slightly higher
# Instruction Level Parallelism, and it indeed resulted in up to 15%
# better performance on most recent µ-archs...
# better performance on most recent µ-archs...
#
# Third version adds AES_cbc_encrypt implementation, which resulted in
# up to 40% performance imrovement of CBC benchmark results. 40% was
@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ sub _data_word() { my $i; while(defined($i=shift)) { &data_word($i,$i); } }
$speed_limit=512; # chunks smaller than $speed_limit are
# processed with compact routine in CBC mode
$small_footprint=1; # $small_footprint=1 code is ~5% slower [on
# recent µ-archs], but ~5 times smaller!
# recent µ-archs], but ~5 times smaller!
# I favor compact code to minimize cache
# contention and in hope to "collect" 5% back
# in real-life applications...
@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ sub enctransform()
# Performance is not actually extraordinary in comparison to pure
# x86 code. In particular encrypt performance is virtually the same.
# Decrypt performance on the other hand is 15-20% better on newer
# µ-archs [but we're thankful for *any* improvement here], and ~50%
# µ-archs [but we're thankful for *any* improvement here], and ~50%
# better on PIII:-) And additionally on the pros side this code
# eliminates redundant references to stack and thus relieves/
# minimizes the pressure on the memory bus.

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl vendored
View File

@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ $inout3="xmm5"; $in1="xmm5";
$inout4="xmm6"; $in0="xmm6";
$inout5="xmm7"; $ivec="xmm7";
# AESNI extenstion
# AESNI extension
sub aeskeygenassist
{ my($dst,$src,$imm)=@_;
if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/)

10
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c vendored
View File

@ -62,6 +62,10 @@
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#ifndef ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH
#define ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH 128
#endif
static int asn1_print_info(BIO *bp, int tag, int xclass, int constructed,
int indent);
static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
@ -128,6 +132,12 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
#else
dump_indent = 6; /* Because we know BIO_dump_indent() */
#endif
if (depth > ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH) {
BIO_puts(bp, "BAD RECURSION DEPTH\n");
return 0;
}
p = *pp;
tot = p + length;
op = p - 1;

15
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c vendored
View File

@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
long length)
{
EVP_PKEY *ret;
const unsigned char *p = *pp;
if ((a == NULL) || (*a == NULL)) {
if ((ret = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
@ -94,21 +95,23 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
}
if (!ret->ameth->old_priv_decode ||
!ret->ameth->old_priv_decode(ret, pp, length)) {
!ret->ameth->old_priv_decode(ret, &p, length)) {
if (ret->ameth->priv_decode) {
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = NULL;
p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, pp, length);
p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, length);
if (!p8)
goto err;
EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
if (ret == NULL)
goto err;
} else {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
*pp = p;
if (a != NULL)
(*a) = ret;
return (ret);
@ -136,6 +139,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
* input is surrounded by an ASN1 SEQUENCE.
*/
inkey = d2i_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY(NULL, &p, length);
p = *pp;
/*
* Since we only need to discern "traditional format" RSA and DSA keys we
* can just count the elements.
@ -146,7 +150,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
keytype = EVP_PKEY_EC;
else if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(inkey) == 3) { /* This seems to be PKCS8, not
* traditional format */
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, pp, length);
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, length);
EVP_PKEY *ret;
sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(inkey, ASN1_TYPE_free);
@ -157,6 +161,9 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
}
ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
if (ret == NULL)
return NULL;
*pp = p;
if (a) {
*a = ret;
}

5
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c vendored
View File

@ -141,8 +141,9 @@ static int bn_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
BIGNUM *bn;
if (!*pval)
bn_new(pval, it);
if (*pval == NULL && !bn_new(pval, it))
return 0;
bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
if (!BN_bin2bn(cont, len, bn)) {
bn_free(pval, it);

5
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c vendored
View File

@ -188,13 +188,16 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
{
X509_PUBKEY *xpk;
EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
xpk = d2i_X509_PUBKEY(NULL, pp, length);
const unsigned char *q;
q = *pp;
xpk = d2i_X509_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length);
if (!xpk)
return NULL;
pktmp = X509_PUBKEY_get(xpk);
X509_PUBKEY_free(xpk);
if (!pktmp)
return NULL;
*pp = q;
if (a) {
EVP_PKEY_free(*a);
*a = pktmp;

9
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c vendored
View File

@ -180,16 +180,15 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
if (!a || *a == NULL) {
freeret = 1;
}
ret = d2i_X509(a, pp, length);
ret = d2i_X509(a, &q, length);
/* If certificate unreadable then forget it */
if (!ret)
return NULL;
/* update length */
length -= *pp - q;
if (!length)
return ret;
if (!d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, pp, length))
length -= q - *pp;
if (length > 0 && !d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, &q, length))
goto err;
*pp = q;
return ret;
err:
if (freeret) {

1
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/bio/b_dump.c vendored
View File

@ -104,7 +104,6 @@ int BIO_dump_indent_cb(int (*cb) (const void *data, size_t len, void *u),
if ((rows * dump_width) < len)
rows++;
for (i = 0; i < rows; i++) {
buf[0] = '\0'; /* start with empty string */
BUF_strlcpy(buf, str, sizeof buf);
BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%04x - ", i * dump_width);
BUF_strlcat(buf, tmp, sizeof buf);

24
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl vendored
View File

@ -41,13 +41,13 @@ $code=<<___;
.align 5
mul_1x1_neon:
vshl.u64 `&Dlo("q1")`,d16,#8 @ q1-q3 are slided $a
vmull.p8 `&Q("d0")`,d16,d17 @ a·bb
vmull.p8 `&Q("d0")`,d16,d17 @ a·bb
vshl.u64 `&Dlo("q2")`,d16,#16
vmull.p8 q1,`&Dlo("q1")`,d17 @ a<<8·bb
vmull.p8 q1,`&Dlo("q1")`,d17 @ a<<8·bb
vshl.u64 `&Dlo("q3")`,d16,#24
vmull.p8 q2,`&Dlo("q2")`,d17 @ a<<16·bb
vmull.p8 q2,`&Dlo("q2")`,d17 @ a<<16·bb
vshr.u64 `&Dlo("q1")`,#8
vmull.p8 q3,`&Dlo("q3")`,d17 @ a<<24·bb
vmull.p8 q3,`&Dlo("q3")`,d17 @ a<<24·bb
vshl.u64 `&Dhi("q1")`,#24
veor d0,`&Dlo("q1")`
vshr.u64 `&Dlo("q2")`,#16
@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ ___
################
# void bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r,
# BN_ULONG a1,BN_ULONG a0,
# BN_ULONG b1,BN_ULONG b0); # r[3..0]=a1a0·b1b0
# BN_ULONG b1,BN_ULONG b0); # r[3..0]=a1a0·b1b0
($A1,$B1,$A0,$B0,$A1B1,$A0B0)=map("d$_",(18..23));
@ -184,20 +184,20 @@ bn_GF2m_mul_2x2:
vmov d16,$A1
vmov d17,$B1
bl mul_1x1_neon @ a1·b1
bl mul_1x1_neon @ a1·b1
vmov $A1B1,d0
vmov d16,$A0
vmov d17,$B0
bl mul_1x1_neon @ a0·b0
bl mul_1x1_neon @ a0·b0
vmov $A0B0,d0
veor d16,$A0,$A1
veor d17,$B0,$B1
veor $A0,$A0B0,$A1B1
bl mul_1x1_neon @ (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
bl mul_1x1_neon @ (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
veor d0,$A0 @ (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a0·b0-a1·b1
veor d0,$A0 @ (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a0·b0-a1·b1
vshl.u64 d1,d0,#32
vshr.u64 d0,d0,#32
veor $A0B0,d1
@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov $mask,#7<<2
sub sp,sp,#32 @ allocate tab[8]
bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a1·b1
bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a1·b1
str $lo,[$ret,#8]
str $hi,[$ret,#12]
@ -230,13 +230,13 @@ $code.=<<___;
eor r2,r2,$a
eor $b,$b,r3
eor $a,$a,r2
bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a0·b0
bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a0·b0
str $lo,[$ret]
str $hi,[$ret,#4]
eor $a,$a,r2
eor $b,$b,r3
bl mul_1x1_ialu @ (a1+a0)·(b1+b0)
bl mul_1x1_ialu @ (a1+a0)·(b1+b0)
___
@r=map("r$_",(6..9));
$code.=<<___;

4
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S vendored
View File

@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ bn_mul_add_words:
// This loop spins in 3*(n+10) ticks on Itanium and in 2*(n+10) on
// Itanium 2. Yes, unlike previous versions it scales:-) Previous
// version was peforming *all* additions in IALU and was starving
// version was performing *all* additions in IALU and was starving
// for those even on Itanium 2. In this version one addition is
// moved to FPU and is folded with multiplication. This is at cost
// of propogating the result from previous call to this subroutine
@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ bn_sqr_comba8:
// I've estimated this routine to run in ~120 ticks, but in reality
// (i.e. according to ar.itc) it takes ~160 ticks. Are those extra
// cycles consumed for instructions fetch? Or did I misinterpret some
// clause in Itanium µ-architecture manual? Comments are welcomed and
// clause in Itanium µ-architecture manual? Comments are welcomed and
// highly appreciated.
//
// On Itanium 2 it takes ~190 ticks. This is because of stalls on

6
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl vendored
View File

@ -172,19 +172,19 @@ ___
if ($SIZE_T==8) {
my @r=map("%r$_",(6..9));
$code.=<<___;
bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a1·b1
bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a1·b1
stmg $lo,$hi,16($rp)
lg $a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
lg $b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a0·b0
bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a0·b0
stmg $lo,$hi,0($rp)
lg $a,`$stdframe+128+3*$SIZE_T`($sp)
lg $b,`$stdframe+128+5*$SIZE_T`($sp)
xg $a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
xg $b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
lmg @r[0],@r[3],0($rp)
xgr $lo,$hi

16
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl vendored
View File

@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
# the time being... Except that it has three code paths: pure integer
# code suitable for any x86 CPU, MMX code suitable for PIII and later
# and PCLMULQDQ suitable for Westmere and later. Improvement varies
# from one benchmark and µ-arch to another. Below are interval values
# from one benchmark and µ-arch to another. Below are interval values
# for 163- and 571-bit ECDH benchmarks relative to compiler-generated
# code:
#
@ -226,22 +226,22 @@ if ($sse2) {
&push ("edi");
&mov ($a,&wparam(1));
&mov ($b,&wparam(3));
&call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a1·b1
&call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a1·b1
&movq ("mm7",$R);
&mov ($a,&wparam(2));
&mov ($b,&wparam(4));
&call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a0·b0
&call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a0·b0
&movq ("mm6",$R);
&mov ($a,&wparam(1));
&mov ($b,&wparam(3));
&xor ($a,&wparam(2));
&xor ($b,&wparam(4));
&call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
&call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
&pxor ($R,"mm7");
&mov ($a,&wparam(0));
&pxor ($R,"mm6"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a1·b1-a0·b0
&pxor ($R,"mm6"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a1·b1-a0·b0
&movq ($A,$R);
&psllq ($R,32);
@ -266,13 +266,13 @@ if ($sse2) {
&mov ($a,&wparam(1));
&mov ($b,&wparam(3));
&call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a1·b1
&call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a1·b1
&mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$lo);
&mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),$hi);
&mov ($a,&wparam(2));
&mov ($b,&wparam(4));
&call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a0·b0
&call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a0·b0
&mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$lo);
&mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$hi);
@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ if ($sse2) {
&mov ($b,&wparam(3));
&xor ($a,&wparam(2));
&xor ($b,&wparam(4));
&call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
&call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
&mov ("ebp",&wparam(0));
@r=("ebx","ecx","edi","esi");

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c vendored
View File

@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
* BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually.
*/
pB = &local_B;
local_B.flags = 0;
BN_with_flags(pB, B, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_nnmod(B, pB, A, ctx))
goto err;
@ -610,6 +611,7 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
* BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually.
*/
pA = &local_A;
local_A.flags = 0;
BN_with_flags(pA, A, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
/* (D, M) := (A/B, A%B) ... */

11
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c vendored
View File

@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[],
bn_check_top(a);
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
if ((s = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
return 0;
goto err;
if (!bn_wexpand(s, 2 * a->top))
goto err;
@ -700,18 +700,21 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
int top = p->top;
BN_ULONG *udp, *bdp, *vdp, *cdp;
bn_wexpand(u, top);
if (!bn_wexpand(u, top))
goto err;
udp = u->d;
for (i = u->top; i < top; i++)
udp[i] = 0;
u->top = top;
bn_wexpand(b, top);
if (!bn_wexpand(b, top))
goto err;
bdp = b->d;
bdp[0] = 1;
for (i = 1; i < top; i++)
bdp[i] = 0;
b->top = top;
bn_wexpand(c, top);
if (!bn_wexpand(c, top))
goto err;
cdp = c->d;
for (i = 0; i < top; i++)
cdp[i] = 0;

4
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c vendored
View File

@ -152,8 +152,10 @@ int BN_div_recp(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m,
if (BN_ucmp(m, &(recp->N)) < 0) {
BN_zero(d);
if (!BN_copy(r, m))
if (!BN_copy(r, m)) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return 0;
}
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return (1);
}

7
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c vendored
View File

@ -213,14 +213,14 @@ int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)
* exceeded.
*/
if (!BN_rand(Xp, nbits, 1, 0))
return 0;
goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
if (!BN_rand(Xq, nbits, 1, 0))
return 0;
goto err;
/* Check that |Xp - Xq| > 2^(nbits - 100) */
BN_sub(t, Xp, Xq);
if (BN_num_bits(t) > (nbits - 100))
@ -234,6 +234,9 @@ int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)
return 0;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return 0;
}
/*

21
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c vendored
View File

@ -58,12 +58,13 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <limits.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
char *BUF_strdup(const char *str)
{
if (str == NULL)
return (NULL);
return NULL;
return BUF_strndup(str, strlen(str));
}
@ -72,14 +73,20 @@ char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz)
char *ret;
if (str == NULL)
return (NULL);
return NULL;
if (siz >= INT_MAX)
return NULL;
ret = OPENSSL_malloc(siz + 1);
if (ret == NULL) {
BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_STRNDUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return (NULL);
return NULL;
}
BUF_strlcpy(ret, str, siz + 1);
memcpy(ret, str, siz);
ret[siz] = '\0';
return (ret);
}
@ -87,13 +94,13 @@ void *BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz)
{
void *ret;
if (data == NULL)
return (NULL);
if (data == NULL || siz >= INT_MAX)
return NULL;
ret = OPENSSL_malloc(siz);
if (ret == NULL) {
BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEMDUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return (NULL);
return NULL;
}
return memcpy(ret, data, siz);
}

6
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/buffer/buffer.h vendored
View File

@ -85,7 +85,13 @@ void BUF_MEM_free(BUF_MEM *a);
int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len);
int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len);
char *BUF_strdup(const char *str);
/*
* Like strndup, but in addition, explicitly guarantees to never read past the
* first |siz| bytes of |str|.
*/
char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz);
void *BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz);
void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t siz);

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c vendored
View File

@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
ok = 1;
err:
if (ec->key && !keep_key) {
if (ec->key && (!keep_key || !ok)) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
ec->key = NULL;

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c vendored
View File

@ -714,7 +714,7 @@ int CMS_final(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, BIO *dcont, unsigned int flags)
BIO *cmsbio;
int ret = 0;
if (!(cmsbio = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont))) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL, CMS_R_CMS_LIB);
return 0;
}

1
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c vendored
View File

@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ void OPENSSL_config(const char *config_name)
CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, config_name,
CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION |
CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE);
openssl_configured = 1;
}
void OPENSSL_no_config()

21
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c vendored
View File

@ -112,16 +112,8 @@ int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *ret, int bits,
}
# endif
else {
const EVP_MD *evpmd;
size_t qbits = bits >= 2048 ? 256 : 160;
if (bits >= 2048) {
qbits = 256;
evpmd = EVP_sha256();
} else {
qbits = 160;
evpmd = EVP_sha1();
}
const EVP_MD *evpmd = bits >= 2048 ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_sha1();
size_t qbits = EVP_MD_size(evpmd) * 8;
return dsa_builtin_paramgen(ret, bits, qbits, evpmd,
seed_in, seed_len, NULL, counter_ret,
@ -174,13 +166,14 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
if (seed_in != NULL)
memcpy(seed, seed_in, seed_len);
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
g = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
W = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
@ -201,7 +194,7 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, m++))
goto err;
if (!seed_len) {
if (!seed_len || !seed_in) {
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, qsize) < 0)
goto err;
seed_is_random = 1;

12
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/ec/ec_key.c vendored
View File

@ -366,7 +366,10 @@ int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *tx, *ty;
EC_POINT *point = NULL;
int ok = 0, tmp_nid, is_char_two = 0;
int ok = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
int tmp_nid, is_char_two = 0;
#endif
if (!key || !key->group || !x || !y) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
@ -382,14 +385,15 @@ int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
if (!point)
goto err;
tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
tmp_nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(key->group));
if (tmp_nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
is_char_two = 1;
tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
if (is_char_two) {
if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(key->group, point,
x, y, ctx))

1
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/engine/eng_list.c vendored
View File

@ -260,6 +260,7 @@ int ENGINE_add(ENGINE *e)
}
if ((e->id == NULL) || (e->name == NULL)) {
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD, ENGINE_R_ID_OR_NAME_MISSING);
return 0;
}
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
if (!engine_list_add(e)) {

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/e_des3.c vendored
View File

@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ static int des_ede_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
DES_cblock *deskey = (DES_cblock *)key;
# ifdef EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY
if (DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[0], &data(ctx)->ks1)
! !DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[1], &data(ctx)->ks2))
|| DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[1], &data(ctx)->ks2))
return 0;
# else
DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[0], &data(ctx)->ks1);

206
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/encode.c vendored
View File

@ -60,9 +60,9 @@
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a);
#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
# define conv_bin2ascii(a) (data_bin2ascii[(a)&0x3f])
# define conv_ascii2bin(a) (data_ascii2bin[(a)&0x7f])
#else
/*
* We assume that PEM encoded files are EBCDIC files (i.e., printable text
@ -71,7 +71,6 @@
* as the underlying textstring data_bin2ascii[] is already EBCDIC)
*/
# define conv_bin2ascii(a) (data_bin2ascii[(a)&0x3f])
# define conv_ascii2bin(a) (data_ascii2bin[os_toascii[a]&0x7f])
#endif
/*-
@ -103,6 +102,7 @@ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
#define B64_WS 0xE0
#define B64_ERROR 0xFF
#define B64_NOT_BASE64(a) (((a)|0x13) == 0xF3)
#define B64_BASE64(a) !B64_NOT_BASE64(a)
static const unsigned char data_ascii2bin[128] = {
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
@ -123,6 +123,23 @@ static const unsigned char data_ascii2bin[128] = {
0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
};
#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a)
{
if (a & 0x80)
return B64_ERROR;
return data_ascii2bin[a];
}
#else
static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a)
{
a = os_toascii[a];
if (a & 0x80)
return B64_ERROR;
return data_ascii2bin[a];
}
#endif
void EVP_EncodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx)
{
ctx->length = 48;
@ -218,8 +235,9 @@ int EVP_EncodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int dlen)
void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx)
{
ctx->length = 30;
/* Only ctx->num is used during decoding. */
ctx->num = 0;
ctx->length = 0;
ctx->line_num = 0;
ctx->expect_nl = 0;
}
@ -228,139 +246,123 @@ void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx)
* -1 for error
* 0 for last line
* 1 for full line
*
* Note: even though EVP_DecodeUpdate attempts to detect and report end of
* content, the context doesn't currently remember it and will accept more data
* in the next call. Therefore, the caller is responsible for checking and
* rejecting a 0 return value in the middle of content.
*
* Note: even though EVP_DecodeUpdate has historically tried to detect end of
* content based on line length, this has never worked properly. Therefore,
* we now return 0 when one of the following is true:
* - Padding or B64_EOF was detected and the last block is complete.
* - Input has zero-length.
* -1 is returned if:
* - Invalid characters are detected.
* - There is extra trailing padding, or data after padding.
* - B64_EOF is detected after an incomplete base64 block.
*/
int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
const unsigned char *in, int inl)
{
int seof = -1, eof = 0, rv = -1, ret = 0, i, v, tmp, n, ln, exp_nl;
int seof = 0, eof = 0, rv = -1, ret = 0, i, v, tmp, n, decoded_len;
unsigned char *d;
n = ctx->num;
d = ctx->enc_data;
ln = ctx->line_num;
exp_nl = ctx->expect_nl;
/* last line of input. */
if ((inl == 0) || ((n == 0) && (conv_ascii2bin(in[0]) == B64_EOF))) {
if (n > 0 && d[n - 1] == '=') {
eof++;
if (n > 1 && d[n - 2] == '=')
eof++;
}
/* Legacy behaviour: an empty input chunk signals end of input. */
if (inl == 0) {
rv = 0;
goto end;
}
/* We parse the input data */
for (i = 0; i < inl; i++) {
/* If the current line is > 80 characters, scream alot */
if (ln >= 80) {
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
/* Get char and put it into the buffer */
tmp = *(in++);
v = conv_ascii2bin(tmp);
/* only save the good data :-) */
if (!B64_NOT_BASE64(v)) {
OPENSSL_assert(n < (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
d[n++] = tmp;
ln++;
} else if (v == B64_ERROR) {
if (v == B64_ERROR) {
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
/*
* have we seen a '=' which is 'definitly' the last input line. seof
* will point to the character that holds it. and eof will hold how
* many characters to chop off.
*/
if (tmp == '=') {
if (seof == -1)
seof = n;
eof++;
} else if (eof > 0 && B64_BASE64(v)) {
/* More data after padding. */
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
if (v == B64_CR) {
ln = 0;
if (exp_nl)
continue;
if (eof > 2) {
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
/* eoln */
if (v == B64_EOLN) {
ln = 0;
if (exp_nl) {
exp_nl = 0;
continue;
}
}
exp_nl = 0;
/*
* If we are at the end of input and it looks like a line, process
* it.
*/
if (((i + 1) == inl) && (((n & 3) == 0) || eof)) {
v = B64_EOF;
/*
* In case things were given us in really small records (so two
* '=' were given in separate updates), eof may contain the
* incorrect number of ending bytes to skip, so let's redo the
* count
*/
eof = 0;
if (d[n - 1] == '=')
eof++;
if (d[n - 2] == '=')
eof++;
/* There will never be more than two '=' */
if (v == B64_EOF) {
seof = 1;
goto tail;
}
if ((v == B64_EOF && (n & 3) == 0) || (n >= 64)) {
/*
* This is needed to work correctly on 64 byte input lines. We
* process the line and then need to accept the '\n'
*/
if ((v != B64_EOF) && (n >= 64))
exp_nl = 1;
if (n > 0) {
v = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n);
n = 0;
if (v < 0) {
rv = 0;
goto end;
}
if (eof > v) {
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
ret += (v - eof);
} else {
eof = 1;
v = 0;
}
/*
* This is the case where we have had a short but valid input
* line
*/
if ((v < ctx->length) && eof) {
rv = 0;
goto end;
} else
ctx->length = v;
if (seof >= 0) {
rv = 0;
/* Only save valid base64 characters. */
if (B64_BASE64(v)) {
if (n >= 64) {
/*
* We increment n once per loop, and empty the buffer as soon as
* we reach 64 characters, so this can only happen if someone's
* manually messed with the ctx. Refuse to write any more data.
*/
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
out += v;
OPENSSL_assert(n < (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
d[n++] = tmp;
}
if (n == 64) {
decoded_len = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n);
n = 0;
if (decoded_len < 0 || eof > decoded_len) {
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
ret += decoded_len - eof;
out += decoded_len - eof;
}
}
rv = 1;
end:
/*
* Legacy behaviour: if the current line is a full base64-block (i.e., has
* 0 mod 4 base64 characters), it is processed immediately. We keep this
* behaviour as applications may not be calling EVP_DecodeFinal properly.
*/
tail:
if (n > 0) {
if ((n & 3) == 0) {
decoded_len = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n);
n = 0;
if (decoded_len < 0 || eof > decoded_len) {
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
ret += (decoded_len - eof);
} else if (seof) {
/* EOF in the middle of a base64 block. */
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
}
rv = seof || (n == 0 && eof) ? 0 : 1;
end:
/* Legacy behaviour. This should probably rather be zeroed on error. */
*outl = ret;
ctx->num = n;
ctx->line_num = ln;
ctx->expect_nl = exp_nl;
return (rv);
}

6
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/evp_key.c vendored
View File

@ -104,6 +104,8 @@ int EVP_read_pw_string_min(char *buf, int min, int len, const char *prompt,
if ((prompt == NULL) && (prompt_string[0] != '\0'))
prompt = prompt_string;
ui = UI_new();
if (ui == NULL)
return -1;
UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, 0, buf, min,
(len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len);
if (verify)
@ -137,7 +139,7 @@ int EVP_BytesToKey(const EVP_CIPHER *type, const EVP_MD *md,
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c);
for (;;) {
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c, md, NULL))
return 0;
goto err;
if (addmd++)
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, &(md_buf[0]), mds))
goto err;
@ -188,6 +190,6 @@ int EVP_BytesToKey(const EVP_CIPHER *type, const EVP_MD *md,
rv = type->key_len;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
OPENSSL_cleanse(&(md_buf[0]), EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
OPENSSL_cleanse(md_buf, sizeof(md_buf));
return rv;
}

33
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c vendored
View File

@ -67,9 +67,19 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
if (c->cipher->set_asn1_parameters != NULL)
ret = c->cipher->set_asn1_parameters(c, type);
else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1)
ret = EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv(c, type);
else
else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) {
switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c)) {
case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE:
case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE:
case EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE:
ret = -1;
break;
default:
ret = EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv(c, type);
}
} else
ret = -1;
return (ret);
}
@ -80,9 +90,20 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
if (c->cipher->get_asn1_parameters != NULL)
ret = c->cipher->get_asn1_parameters(c, type);
else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1)
ret = EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(c, type);
else
else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) {
switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c)) {
case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE:
case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE:
case EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE:
ret = -1;
break;
default:
ret = EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(c, type);
break;
}
} else
ret = -1;
return (ret);
}

16
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c vendored
View File

@ -228,12 +228,16 @@ int EVP_PBE_alg_add_type(int pbe_type, int pbe_nid, int cipher_nid,
int md_nid, EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen)
{
EVP_PBE_CTL *pbe_tmp;
if (!pbe_algs)
if (pbe_algs == NULL) {
pbe_algs = sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_new(pbe_cmp);
if (!(pbe_tmp = (EVP_PBE_CTL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_PBE_CTL)))) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
if (pbe_algs == NULL)
goto err;
}
if ((pbe_tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*pbe_tmp))) == NULL)
goto err;
pbe_tmp->pbe_type = pbe_type;
pbe_tmp->pbe_nid = pbe_nid;
pbe_tmp->cipher_nid = cipher_nid;
@ -242,6 +246,10 @@ int EVP_PBE_alg_add_type(int pbe_type, int pbe_nid, int cipher_nid,
sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_push(pbe_algs, pbe_tmp);
return 1;
err:
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
int EVP_PBE_alg_add(int nid, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md,

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/p_lib.c vendored
View File

@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ int EVP_PKEY_set_type_str(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const char *str, int len)
int EVP_PKEY_assign(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type, void *key)
{
if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, type))
if (pkey == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, type))
return 0;
pkey->pkey.ptr = key;
return (key != NULL);

9
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c vendored
View File

@ -96,12 +96,17 @@ int EVP_PKEY_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
return -1;
}
if (!ppkey)
if (ppkey == NULL)
return -1;
if (!*ppkey)
if (*ppkey == NULL)
*ppkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (*ppkey == NULL) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
ret = ctx->pmeth->paramgen(ctx, *ppkey);
if (ret <= 0) {
EVP_PKEY_free(*ppkey);

9
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c vendored
View File

@ -108,9 +108,14 @@ static int old_hmac_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
os = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
if (!os || !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os, *pder, derlen))
return 0;
EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, os);
goto err;
if (!EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, os))
goto err;
return 1;
err:
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
return 0;
}
static int old_hmac_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)

4
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/jpake/jpake.c vendored
View File

@ -218,6 +218,9 @@ static int verify_zkp(const JPAKE_STEP_PART *p, const BIGNUM *zkpg,
BIGNUM *t3 = BN_new();
int ret = 0;
if (h == NULL || t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL || t3 == NULL)
goto end;
zkp_hash(h, zkpg, p, ctx->p.peer_name);
/* t1 = g^b */
@ -233,6 +236,7 @@ static int verify_zkp(const JPAKE_STEP_PART *p, const BIGNUM *zkpg,
else
JPAKEerr(JPAKE_F_VERIFY_ZKP, JPAKE_R_ZKP_VERIFY_FAILED);
end:
/* cleanup */
BN_free(t3);
BN_free(t2);

6
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl vendored
View File

@ -374,8 +374,8 @@ gcm_ghash_neon:
vdup.8 $xi,`&Dlo("$IN")`[0] @ broadcast lowest byte
.Linner_neon:
subs $cnt,$cnt,#1
vmull.p8 $Qlo,$Hlo,$xi @ H.lo·Xi[i]
vmull.p8 $Qhi,$Hhi,$xi @ H.hi·Xi[i]
vmull.p8 $Qlo,$Hlo,$xi @ H.lo·Xi[i]
vmull.p8 $Qhi,$Hhi,$xi @ H.hi·Xi[i]
vext.8 $IN,$zero,#1 @ IN>>=8
veor $Z,$Qpost @ modulo-scheduled part
@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ gcm_ghash_neon:
vsli.8 $Zo,$T,#1 @ compose the "carry" byte
vext.8 $Z,$zero,#1 @ Z>>=8
vmull.p8 $R,$Zo,$mod @ "carry"·0xe1
vmull.p8 $R,$Zo,$mod @ "carry"·0xe1
vshr.u8 $Zo,$T,#7 @ save Z's bottom bit
vext.8 $Qpost,$Qlo,$zero,#1 @ Qlo>>=8
veor $Z,$Qhi

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl vendored
View File

@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ $S=12; # shift factor for rem_4bit
# effective address calculation and finally merge of value to Z.hi.
# Reference to rem_4bit is scheduled so late that I had to >>4
# rem_4bit elements. This resulted in 20-45% procent improvement
# on contemporary µ-archs.
# on contemporary µ-archs.
{
my $cnt;
my $rem_4bit = "eax";

6
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c vendored
View File

@ -246,12 +246,6 @@ int OCSP_parse_url(char *url, char **phost, char **pport, char **ppath,
if ((p = strchr(p, ':'))) {
*p = 0;
port = p + 1;
} else {
/* Not found: set default port */
if (*pssl)
port = "443";
else
port = "80";
}
*pport = BUF_strdup(port);

3
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_prn.c vendored
View File

@ -212,8 +212,7 @@ int OCSP_RESPONSE_print(BIO *bp, OCSP_RESPONSE *o, unsigned long flags)
return 1;
}
i = ASN1_STRING_length(rb->response);
if (!(br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(o)))
if ((br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(o)) == NULL)
goto err;
rd = br->tbsResponseData;
l = ASN1_INTEGER_get(rd->version);

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/opensslconf.h.in vendored
View File

@ -120,7 +120,7 @@
optimization options. Older Sparc's work better with only UNROLL, but
there's no way to tell at compile time what it is you're running on */
#if defined( sun ) /* Newer Sparc's */
#if defined( __sun ) || defined ( sun ) /* Newer Sparc's */
# define DES_PTR
# define DES_RISC1
# define DES_UNROLL

6
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/pem/pem_info.c vendored
View File

@ -172,6 +172,8 @@ STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk,
xi->enc_len = 0;
xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new();
if (xi->x_pkey == NULL)
goto err;
ptype = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey;
if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */
@ -193,6 +195,8 @@ STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk,
xi->enc_len = 0;
xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new();
if (xi->x_pkey == NULL)
goto err;
ptype = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey;
if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */
@ -214,6 +218,8 @@ STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk,
xi->enc_len = 0;
xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new();
if (xi->x_pkey == NULL)
goto err;
ptype = EVP_PKEY_EC;
pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey;
if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */

10
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c vendored
View File

@ -624,13 +624,11 @@ static int do_PVK_header(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT);
return 0;
}
length -= 20;
} else {
if (length < 24) {
PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT);
return 0;
}
length -= 24;
pvk_magic = read_ledword(&p);
if (pvk_magic != MS_PVKMAGIC) {
PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_MAGIC_NUMBER);
@ -692,23 +690,23 @@ static EVP_PKEY *do_PVK_body(const unsigned char **in,
inlen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
if (inlen <= 0) {
PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ);
return NULL;
goto err;
}
enctmp = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen + 8);
if (!enctmp) {
PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
goto err;
}
if (!derive_pvk_key(keybuf, p, saltlen,
(unsigned char *)psbuf, inlen))
return NULL;
goto err;
p += saltlen;
/* Copy BLOBHEADER across, decrypt rest */
memcpy(enctmp, p, 8);
p += 8;
if (keylen < 8) {
PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT);
return NULL;
goto err;
}
inlen = keylen - 8;
q = enctmp + 8;

27
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c vendored
View File

@ -75,15 +75,19 @@ PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_item_pack_safebag(void *obj, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
bag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(nid1);
if (!ASN1_item_pack(obj, it, &bag->value.octet)) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
goto err;
}
if (!(safebag = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_new())) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
goto err;
}
safebag->value.bag = bag;
safebag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(nid2);
return safebag;
err:
PKCS12_BAGS_free(bag);
return NULL;
}
/* Turn PKCS8 object into a keybag */
@ -127,6 +131,7 @@ PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_MAKE_SHKEYBAG(int pbe_nid, const char *pass,
PKCS8_encrypt(pbe_nid, pbe_ciph, pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter,
p8))) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_MAKE_SHKEYBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free(bag);
return NULL;
}
@ -144,14 +149,18 @@ PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7data(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *sk)
p7->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data);
if (!(p7->d.data = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new())) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
goto err;
}
if (!ASN1_item_pack(sk, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS), &p7->d.data)) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA, PKCS12_R_CANT_PACK_STRUCTURE);
return NULL;
goto err;
}
return p7;
err:
PKCS7_free(p7);
return NULL;
}
/* Unpack SAFEBAGS from PKCS#7 data ContentInfo */
@ -181,7 +190,7 @@ PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int passlen,
if (!PKCS7_set_type(p7, NID_pkcs7_encrypted)) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA,
PKCS12_R_ERROR_SETTING_ENCRYPTED_DATA_TYPE);
return NULL;
goto err;
}
pbe_ciph = EVP_get_cipherbynid(pbe_nid);
@ -193,7 +202,7 @@ PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int passlen,
if (!pbe) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
goto err;
}
X509_ALGOR_free(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm);
p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm = pbe;
@ -202,10 +211,14 @@ PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int passlen,
PKCS12_item_i2d_encrypt(pbe, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS), pass,
passlen, bags, 1))) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, PKCS12_R_ENCRYPT_ERROR);
return NULL;
goto err;
}
return p7;
err:
PKCS7_free(p7);
return NULL;
}
STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(PKCS7 *p7, const char *pass,

3
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c vendored
View File

@ -77,6 +77,9 @@ int PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
const unsigned char *pbuf;
unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH], iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
if (cipher == NULL)
return 0;
/* Extract useful info from parameter */
if (param == NULL || param->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
param->value.sequence == NULL) {

4
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c vendored
View File

@ -173,11 +173,11 @@ int PKCS12_setup_mac(PKCS12 *p12, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
}
if (!saltlen)
saltlen = PKCS12_SALT_LEN;
p12->mac->salt->length = saltlen;
if (!(p12->mac->salt->data = OPENSSL_malloc(saltlen))) {
if ((p12->mac->salt->data = OPENSSL_malloc(saltlen)) == NULL) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
p12->mac->salt->length = saltlen;
if (!salt) {
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p12->mac->salt->data, saltlen) < 0)
return 0;

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c vendored
View File

@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg,
if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) {
ASN1_TYPE *param = pss->maskGenAlgorithm->parameter;
if (OBJ_obj2nid(pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) == NID_mgf1
&& param->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
&& param && param->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
p = param->value.sequence->data;
plen = param->value.sequence->length;
*pmaskHash = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen);

4
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c vendored
View File

@ -69,6 +69,8 @@
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
# include <openssl/fips.h>
extern int FIPS_rsa_x931_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e,
BN_GENCB *cb);
#endif
static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
@ -94,7 +96,7 @@ int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode())
return FIPS_rsa_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
return FIPS_rsa_x931_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
#endif
return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
}

32
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c vendored
View File

@ -297,22 +297,30 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
} else
printf("OAEP encryption/decryption ok\n");
/* Try decrypting corrupted ciphertexts */
/* Try decrypting corrupted ciphertexts. */
for (n = 0; n < clen; ++n) {
int b;
unsigned char saved = ctext[n];
for (b = 0; b < 256; ++b) {
if (b == saved)
continue;
ctext[n] = b;
num = RSA_private_decrypt(num, ctext, ptext, key,
ctext[n] ^= 1;
num = RSA_private_decrypt(clen, ctext, ptext, key,
RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
if (num > 0) {
printf("Corrupt data decrypted!\n");
err = 1;
}
if (num > 0) {
printf("Corrupt data decrypted!\n");
err = 1;
break;
}
ctext[n] ^= 1;
}
/* Test truncated ciphertexts, as well as negative length. */
for (n = -1; n < clen; ++n) {
num = RSA_private_decrypt(n, ctext, ptext, key,
RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
if (num > 0) {
printf("Truncated data decrypted!\n");
err = 1;
break;
}
}
next:
RSA_free(key);
}

4
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl vendored
View File

@ -66,9 +66,9 @@
# switch to AVX alone improves performance by as little as 4% in
# comparison to SSSE3 code path. But below result doesn't look like
# 4% improvement... Trouble is that Sandy Bridge decodes 'ro[rl]' as
# pair of µ-ops, and it's the additional µ-ops, two per round, that
# pair of µ-ops, and it's the additional µ-ops, two per round, that
# make it run slower than Core2 and Westmere. But 'sh[rl]d' is decoded
# as single µ-op by Sandy Bridge and it's replacing 'ro[rl]' with
# as single µ-op by Sandy Bridge and it's replacing 'ro[rl]' with
# equivalent 'sh[rl]d' that is responsible for the impressive 5.1
# cycles per processed byte. But 'sh[rl]d' is not something that used
# to be fast, nor does it appear to be fast in upcoming Bulldozer

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl vendored
View File

@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
# purposes.
#
# Performance improvement over compiler generated code varies from
# 10% to 40% [see above]. Not very impressive on some µ-archs, but
# 10% to 40% [see above]. Not very impressive on some µ-archs, but
# it's 5 times smaller and optimizies amount of writes.
$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl vendored
View File

@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
#
# IALU code-path is optimized for elder Pentiums. On vanilla Pentium
# performance improvement over compiler generated code reaches ~60%,
# while on PIII - ~35%. On newer µ-archs improvement varies from 15%
# while on PIII - ~35%. On newer µ-archs improvement varies from 15%
# to 50%, but it's less important as they are expected to execute SSE2
# code-path, which is commonly ~2-3x faster [than compiler generated
# code]. SSE2 code-path is as fast as original sha512-sse2.pl, even

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl vendored
View File

@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
# SHA512 performance is >2.9x better than gcc 3.2 generated code on
# PA-7100LC, PA-RISC 1.1 processor. Then implementation detects if the
# code is executed on PA-RISC 2.0 processor and switches to 64-bit
# code path delivering adequate peformance even in "blended" 32-bit
# code path delivering adequate performance even in "blended" 32-bit
# build. Though 64-bit code is not any faster than code generated by
# vendor compiler on PA-8600...
#

34
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c vendored
View File

@ -521,12 +521,12 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
char **verifier, const char *N, const char *g)
{
int len;
char *result = NULL;
char *vf;
char *result = NULL, *vf = NULL;
BIGNUM *N_bn = NULL, *g_bn = NULL, *s = NULL, *v = NULL;
unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
char *defgNid = NULL;
int vfsize = 0;
if ((user == NULL) ||
(pass == NULL) || (salt == NULL) || (verifier == NULL))
@ -564,22 +564,23 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
goto err;
BN_bn2bin(v, tmp);
if (((vf = OPENSSL_malloc(BN_num_bytes(v) * 2)) == NULL))
vfsize = BN_num_bytes(v) * 2;
if (((vf = OPENSSL_malloc(vfsize)) == NULL))
goto err;
t_tob64(vf, tmp, BN_num_bytes(v));
*verifier = vf;
if (*salt == NULL) {
char *tmp_salt;
if ((tmp_salt = OPENSSL_malloc(SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN * 2)) == NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(vf);
goto err;
}
t_tob64(tmp_salt, tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN);
*salt = tmp_salt;
}
*verifier = vf;
vf = NULL;
result = defgNid;
err:
@ -587,11 +588,21 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
BN_free(N_bn);
BN_free(g_bn);
}
OPENSSL_cleanse(vf, vfsize);
OPENSSL_free(vf);
BN_clear_free(s);
BN_clear_free(v);
return result;
}
/*
* create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are BIGNUMs)
* create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are BIGNUMs). If *salt != NULL
* then the provided salt will be used. On successful exit *verifier will point
* to a newly allocated BIGNUM containing the verifier and (if a salt was not
* provided) *salt will be populated with a newly allocated BIGNUM containing a
* random salt.
* The caller is responsible for freeing the allocated *salt and *verifier
* BIGNUMS.
*/
int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
BIGNUM **verifier, BIGNUM *N, BIGNUM *g)
@ -600,6 +611,7 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
BIGNUM *x = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
BIGNUM *salttmp = NULL;
if ((user == NULL) ||
(pass == NULL) ||
@ -614,10 +626,12 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) < 0)
goto err;
*salt = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
salttmp = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
} else {
salttmp = *salt;
}
x = SRP_Calc_x(*salt, user, pass);
x = SRP_Calc_x(salttmp, user, pass);
*verifier = BN_new();
if (*verifier == NULL)
@ -631,9 +645,11 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
srp_bn_print(*verifier);
result = 1;
*salt = salttmp;
err:
if (*salt != salttmp)
BN_clear_free(salttmp);
BN_clear_free(x);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
return result;

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c vendored
View File

@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ static int TS_check_status_info(TS_RESP *response)
if (ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(info->failure_info,
TS_failure_info[i].code)) {
if (!first)
strcpy(failure_text, ",");
strcat(failure_text, ",");
else
first = 0;
strcat(failure_text, TS_failure_info[i].text);

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl vendored
View File

@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
# table]. I stick to value of 2 for two reasons: 1. smaller table
# minimizes cache trashing and thus mitigates the hazard of side-
# channel leakage similar to AES cache-timing one; 2. performance
# gap among different µ-archs is smaller.
# gap among different µ-archs is smaller.
#
# Performance table lists rounded amounts of CPU cycles spent by
# whirlpool_block_mmx routine on single 64 byte input block, i.e.

15
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c vendored
View File

@ -179,11 +179,24 @@ unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
*/
int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
{
int rv;
/* ensure hash is valid */
X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
if (rv)
return rv;
/* Check for match against stored encoding too */
if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) {
rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len);
if (rv)
return rv;
return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc,
a->cert_info->enc.len);
}
return rv;
}
#endif

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c vendored
View File

@ -523,8 +523,6 @@ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *X509_STORE_get1_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
X509_OBJECT *obj, xobj;
sk = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
/* Check cache first */
idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &cnt);
/*
* Always do lookup to possibly add new CRLs to cache

4
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c vendored
View File

@ -186,6 +186,10 @@ static STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *r2i_certpol(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
goto err;
}
pol = POLICYINFO_new();
if (pol == NULL) {
X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
pol->policyid = pobj;
}
if (!sk_POLICYINFO_push(pols, pol)) {

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c vendored
View File

@ -132,6 +132,8 @@ static void *v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
}
tval.value = val->value;
sub = GENERAL_SUBTREE_new();
if (sub == NULL)
goto memerr;
if (!v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex(sub->base, method, ctx, &tval, 1))
goto err;
if (!*ptree)

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c vendored
View File

@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004 by Richard Levitte
* (richard@levitte.org)
*/
/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
* (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
* All rights reserved.
*

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c vendored
View File

@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004 by Richard Levitte
* (richard@levitte.org)
*/
/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
* (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
* All rights reserved.
*

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/demos/easy_tls/README vendored
View File

@ -62,4 +62,4 @@ As noted above, easy_tls.c will be changed to become a library one
day, which means that future revisions will not be fully compatible to
the current version.
Bodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org>
Bodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org>

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/demos/engines/zencod/hw_zencod.c vendored
View File

@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ static int zencod_init(ENGINE *e)
ptr_zencod_rc4_cipher = ptr_rc4_1;
/*
* We should peform a test to see if there is actually any unit runnig on
* We should perform a test to see if there is actually any unit runnig on
* the system ... Even if the cryptozen library is loaded the module coul
* not be loaded on the system ... For now we may just open and close the
* device !!

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/doc/apps/ciphers.pod vendored
View File

@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ keys or either respectively.
cipher suites using ephemeral ECDH key agreement, including anonymous
cipher suites.
=item B<EECDHE>
=item B<EECDH>
cipher suites using authenticated ephemeral ECDH key agreement.

6
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/doc/apps/genrsa.pod vendored
View File

@ -10,12 +10,6 @@ B<openssl> B<genrsa>
[B<-out filename>]
[B<-passout arg>]
[B<-aes128>]
[B<-aes128>]
[B<-aes192>]
[B<-aes256>]
[B<-camellia128>]
[B<-camellia192>]
[B<-camellia256>]
[B<-aes192>]
[B<-aes256>]
[B<-camellia128>]

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/doc/apps/req.pod vendored
View File

@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ be input by calling it "1.organizationName".
The actual permitted field names are any object identifier short or
long names. These are compiled into OpenSSL and include the usual
values such as commonName, countryName, localityName, organizationName,
organizationUnitName, stateOrProvinceName. Additionally emailAddress
organizationalUnitName, stateOrProvinceName. Additionally emailAddress
is include as well as name, surname, givenName initials and dnQualifier.
Additional object identifiers can be defined with the B<oid_file> or

3
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/doc/apps/x509.pod vendored
View File

@ -529,7 +529,8 @@ very rare and their use is discouraged). The options ending in
"space" additionally place a space after the separator to make it
more readable. The B<sep_multiline> uses a linefeed character for
the RDN separator and a spaced B<+> for the AVA separator. It also
indents the fields by four characters.
indents the fields by four characters. If no field separator is specified
then B<sep_comma_plus_space> is used by default.
=item B<dn_rev>

6
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod vendored
View File

@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ BIO_read, BIO_write, BIO_gets, BIO_puts - BIO I/O functions
#include <openssl/bio.h>
int BIO_read(BIO *b, void *buf, int len);
int BIO_gets(BIO *b,char *buf, int size);
int BIO_gets(BIO *b, char *buf, int size);
int BIO_write(BIO *b, const void *buf, int len);
int BIO_puts(BIO *b,const char *buf);
int BIO_puts(BIO *b, const char *buf);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ return the digest and other BIOs may not support BIO_gets() at all.
BIO_write() attempts to write B<len> bytes from B<buf> to BIO B<b>.
BIO_puts() attempts to write a null terminated string B<buf> to BIO B<b>
BIO_puts() attempts to write a null terminated string B<buf> to BIO B<b>.
=head1 RETURN VALUES

4
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod vendored
View File

@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ BN_rand, BN_pseudo_rand - generate pseudo-random number
=head1 DESCRIPTION
BN_rand() generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random number of
B<bits> bits in length and stores it in B<rnd>. If B<top> is -1, the
B<bits> in length and stores it in B<rnd>. If B<top> is -1, the
most significant bit of the random number can be zero. If B<top> is 0,
it is set to 1, and if B<top> is 1, the two most significant bits of
the number will be set to 1, so that the product of two such random
@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ non-cryptographic purposes and for certain purposes in cryptographic
protocols, but usually not for key generation etc.
BN_rand_range() generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random
number B<rnd> in the range 0 <lt>= B<rnd> E<lt> B<range>.
number B<rnd> in the range 0 E<lt>= B<rnd> E<lt> B<range>.
BN_pseudo_rand_range() does the same, but is based on BN_pseudo_rand(),
and hence numbers generated by it are not necessarily unpredictable.

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod vendored
View File

@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ maximum of 1024 bits.
If B<seed> is B<NULL> or B<seed_len> E<lt> 20, the primes will be
generated at random. Otherwise, the seed is used to generate
them. If the given seed does not yield a prime q, a new random
seed is chosen and placed at B<seed>.
seed is chosen.
DSA_generate_parameters() places the iteration count in
*B<counter_ret> and a counter used for finding a generator in

3
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod vendored
View File

@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
=head1 NAME
EVP_SignInit, EVP_SignUpdate, EVP_SignFinal - EVP signing functions
EVP_SignInit, EVP_SignInit_ex, EVP_SignUpdate, EVP_SignFinal - EVP signing
functions
=head1 SYNOPSIS

47
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/buffer.pod vendored
View File

@ -2,8 +2,11 @@
=head1 NAME
BUF_MEM_new, BUF_MEM_free, BUF_MEM_grow, BUF_strdup - simple
character arrays structure
BUF_MEM_new, BUF_MEM_new_ex, BUF_MEM_free, BUF_MEM_grow - simple
character array structure
BUF_strdup, BUF_strndup, BUF_memdup, BUF_strlcpy, BUF_strlcat -
standard C library equivalents
=head1 SYNOPSIS
@ -15,26 +18,21 @@ character arrays structure
int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, int len);
char * BUF_strdup(const char *str);
char *BUF_strdup(const char *str);
char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz);
void *BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz);
size_t BUF_strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t size);
size_t BUF_strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t size);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
The buffer library handles simple character arrays. Buffers are used for
various purposes in the library, most notably memory BIOs.
The library uses the BUF_MEM structure defined in buffer.h:
typedef struct buf_mem_st
{
int length; /* current number of bytes */
char *data;
int max; /* size of buffer */
} BUF_MEM;
B<length> is the current size of the buffer in bytes, B<max> is the amount of
memory allocated to the buffer. There are three functions which handle these
and one "miscellaneous" function.
BUF_MEM_new() allocates a new buffer of zero size.
BUF_MEM_free() frees up an already existing buffer. The data is zeroed
@ -44,14 +42,17 @@ BUF_MEM_grow() changes the size of an already existing buffer to
B<len>. Any data already in the buffer is preserved if it increases in
size.
BUF_strdup() copies a null terminated string into a block of allocated
memory and returns a pointer to the allocated block.
Unlike the standard C library strdup() this function uses OPENSSL_malloc() and so
should be used in preference to the standard library strdup() because it can
be used for memory leak checking or replacing the malloc() function.
BUF_strdup(), BUF_strndup(), BUF_memdup(), BUF_strlcpy() and
BUF_strlcat() are equivalents of the standard C library functions. The
dup() functions use OPENSSL_malloc() underneath and so should be used
in preference to the standard library for memory leak checking or
replacing the malloc() function.
The memory allocated from BUF_strdup() should be freed up using the OPENSSL_free()
function.
Memory allocated from these functions should be freed up using the
OPENSSL_free() function.
BUF_strndup makes the explicit guarantee that it will never read past
the first B<siz> bytes of B<str>.
=head1 RETURN VALUES

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_NAME.pod vendored
View File

@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ d2i_X509_NAME, i2d_X509_NAME - X509_NAME encoding functions
=head1 DESCRIPTION
These functions decode and encode an B<X509_NAME> structure which is the
the same as the B<Name> type defined in RFC2459 (and elsewhere) and used
same as the B<Name> type defined in RFC2459 (and elsewhere) and used
for example in certificate subject and issuer names.
Othewise the functions behave in a similar way to d2i_X509() and i2d_X509()

15
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/doc/dir-locals.example.el vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
;;; This is an example of what a .dir-locals.el suitable for OpenSSL
;;; development could look like.
;;;
;;; Apart from setting the CC mode style to "OpenSSL-II", it also
;;; makes sure that tabs are never used for indentation in any file,
;;; and that the fill column is 78.
;;;
;;; For more information see (info "(emacs) Directory Variables")
((nil
(indent-tabs-mode . nil)
(fill-column . 78)
)
(c-mode
(c-file-style . "OpenSSL-II")))

62
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/doc/openssl-c-indent.el vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
;;; This Emacs Lisp file defines a C indentation style for OpenSSL.
;;;
;;; This definition is for the "CC mode" package, which is the default
;;; mode for editing C source files in Emacs 20, not for the older
;;; c-mode.el (which was the default in less recent releaes of Emacs 19).
;;;
;;; Recommended use is to add this line in your .emacs:
;;;
;;; (load (expand-file-name "~/PATH/TO/openssl-c-indent.el"))
;;;
;;; To activate this indentation style, visit a C file, type
;;; M-x c-set-style <RET> (or C-c . for short), and enter "eay".
;;; To toggle the auto-newline feature of CC mode, type C-c C-a.
;;;
;;; If you're a OpenSSL developer, you might find it more comfortable
;;; to have this style be permanent in your OpenSSL development
;;; directory. To have that, please perform this:
;;;
;;; M-x add-dir-local-variable <RET> c-mode <RET> c-file-style <RET>
;;; "OpenSSL-II" <RET>
;;;
;;; A new buffer with .dir-locals.el will appear. Save it (C-x C-s).
;;;
;;; Alternatively, have a look at dir-locals.example.el
;;; For suggesting improvements, please send e-mail to levitte@openssl.org.
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;; Note, it could be easy to inherit from the "gnu" style... however,
;; one never knows if that style will change somewhere in the future,
;; so I've chosen to copy the "gnu" style values explicitely instead
;; and mark them with a comment. // RLevitte 2015-08-31
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
(c-add-style "OpenSSL-II"
'((c-basic-offset . 4)
(indent-tabs-mode . nil)
(fill-column . 78)
(comment-column . 33)
(c-comment-only-line-offset 0 . 0) ; From "gnu" style
(c-hanging-braces-alist ; From "gnu" style
(substatement-open before after) ; From "gnu" style
(arglist-cont-nonempty)) ; From "gnu" style
(c-offsets-alist
(statement-block-intro . +) ; From "gnu" style
(knr-argdecl-intro . 0)
(knr-argdecl . 0)
(substatement-open . +) ; From "gnu" style
(substatement-label . 0) ; From "gnu" style
(label . 1)
(statement-case-open . +) ; From "gnu" style
(statement-cont . +) ; From "gnu" style
(arglist-intro . c-lineup-arglist-intro-after-paren) ; From "gnu" style
(arglist-close . c-lineup-arglist) ; From "gnu" style
(inline-open . 0) ; From "gnu" style
(brace-list-open . +) ; From "gnu" style
(topmost-intro-cont first c-lineup-topmost-intro-cont
c-lineup-gnu-DEFUN-intro-cont) ; From "gnu" style
)
(c-special-indent-hook . c-gnu-impose-minimum) ; From "gnu" style
(c-block-comment-prefix . "* ")
))

35
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod vendored
View File

@ -2,29 +2,39 @@
=head1 NAME
SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert - add certificate to chain
SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert, SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs - add or clear
extra chain certificates
=head1 SYNOPSIS
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
long SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(SSL_CTX ctx, X509 *x509)
long SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509);
long SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() adds the certificate B<x509> to the certificate
chain presented together with the certificate. Several certificates
can be added one after the other.
SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() adds the certificate B<x509> to the extra chain
certificates associated with B<ctx>. Several certificates can be added one
after another.
SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs() clears all extra chain certificates
associated with B<ctx>.
These functions are implemented as macros.
=head1 NOTES
When constructing the certificate chain, the chain will be formed from
these certificates explicitly specified. If no chain is specified,
the library will try to complete the chain from the available CA
certificates in the trusted CA storage, see
When sending a certificate chain, extra chain certificates are sent in order
following the end entity certificate.
If no chain is specified, the library will try to complete the chain from the
available CA certificates in the trusted CA storage, see
L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)|SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>.
The B<x509> certificate provided to SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() will be freed by the library when the B<SSL_CTX> is destroyed. An application B<should not> free the B<x509> object.
The B<x509> certificate provided to SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() will be
freed by the library when the B<SSL_CTX> is destroyed. An application
B<should not> free the B<x509> object.
=head1 RESTRICTIONS
@ -36,8 +46,9 @@ function.
=head1 RETURN VALUES
SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() returns 1 on success. Check out the
error stack to find out the reason for failure otherwise.
SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() and SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs() return
1 on success and 0 for failure. Check out the error stack to find out the
reason for failure.
=head1 SEE ALSO

4
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/engines/e_chil.c vendored
View File

@ -839,6 +839,10 @@ static EVP_PKEY *hwcrhk_load_privkey(ENGINE *eng, const char *key_id,
bn_fix_top(rtmp->n);
res = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (res == NULL) {
HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY, HWCRHK_R_CHIL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(res, rtmp);
# endif

4
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/ssl/bio_ssl.c vendored
View File

@ -419,6 +419,10 @@ static long ssl_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
BIO_set_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY);
b->retry_reason = b->next_bio->retry_reason;
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
BIO_set_retry_special(b);
b->retry_reason = BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
break;
default:
break;
}

218
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/ssl/clienthellotest.c vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
/* Written by Matt Caswell for the OpenSSL Project */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#define CLIENT_VERSION_LEN 2
#define SESSION_ID_LEN_LEN 1
#define CIPHERS_LEN_LEN 2
#define COMPRESSION_LEN_LEN 1
#define EXTENSIONS_LEN_LEN 2
#define EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN 2
#define EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN 2
#define TOTAL_NUM_TESTS 2
/*
* Test that explicitly setting ticket data results in it appearing in the
* ClientHello for TLS1.2
*/
#define TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2 0
/*
* Test that explicitly setting ticket data results in it appearing in the
* ClientHello for a negotiated SSL/TLS version
*/
#define TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG 1
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
SSL_CTX *ctx;
SSL *con;
BIO *rbio;
BIO *wbio;
BIO *err;
long len;
unsigned char *data;
unsigned char *dataend;
char *dummytick = "Hello World!";
unsigned int tmplen;
unsigned int type;
unsigned int size;
int testresult = 0;
int currtest = 0;
SSL_library_init();
SSL_load_error_strings();
err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init();
CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL);
CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
/*
* For each test set up an SSL_CTX and SSL and see what ClientHello gets
* produced when we try to connect
*/
for (; currtest < TOTAL_NUM_TESTS; currtest++) {
testresult = 0;
if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2) {
ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_2_method());
} else {
ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method());
}
con = SSL_new(ctx);
rbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
wbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
SSL_set_bio(con, rbio, wbio);
SSL_set_connect_state(con);
if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2
|| currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG) {
if (!SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(con, dummytick, strlen(dummytick)))
goto end;
}
if (SSL_connect(con) > 0) {
/* This shouldn't succeed because we don't have a server! */
goto end;
}
len = BIO_get_mem_data(wbio, (char **)&data);
dataend = data + len;
/* Skip the record header */
data += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
/* Skip the handshake message header */
data += SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
/* Skip client version and random */
data += CLIENT_VERSION_LEN + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
if (data + SESSION_ID_LEN_LEN > dataend)
goto end;
/* Skip session id */
tmplen = *data;
data += SESSION_ID_LEN_LEN + tmplen;
if (data + CIPHERS_LEN_LEN > dataend)
goto end;
/* Skip ciphers */
tmplen = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1);
data += CIPHERS_LEN_LEN + tmplen;
if (data + COMPRESSION_LEN_LEN > dataend)
goto end;
/* Skip compression */
tmplen = *data;
data += COMPRESSION_LEN_LEN + tmplen;
if (data + EXTENSIONS_LEN_LEN > dataend)
goto end;
/* Extensions len */
tmplen = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1);
data += EXTENSIONS_LEN_LEN;
if (data + tmplen > dataend)
goto end;
/* Loop through all extensions */
while (tmplen > EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN + EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN) {
type = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1);
data += EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN;
size = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1);
data += EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN;
if (data + size > dataend)
goto end;
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2
|| currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG) {
if (size == strlen(dummytick)
&& memcmp(data, dummytick, size) == 0) {
/* Ticket data is as we expected */
testresult = 1;
} else {
printf("Received session ticket is not as expected\n");
}
break;
}
}
tmplen -= EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN + EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN + size;
data += size;
}
end:
SSL_free(con);
SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
if (!testresult) {
printf("ClientHello test: FAILED (Test %d)\n", currtest);
break;
}
}
ERR_free_strings();
ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
EVP_cleanup();
CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
CRYPTO_mem_leaks(err);
return testresult?0:1;
}

23
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/ssl/d1_clnt.c vendored
View File

@ -299,13 +299,12 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
#endif
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
s->shutdown = 0;
/* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret = dtls1_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
@ -350,11 +349,15 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey),
labelbuffer,
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
0);
0) <= 0) {
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
@ -362,6 +365,10 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
#endif
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
/* receive renewed session ticket */
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
}
} else
s->state = DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
}
@ -484,9 +491,13 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0);
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);

5
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl_asn1.c vendored
View File

@ -121,13 +121,16 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_asn1_st {
int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp)
{
#define LSIZE2 (sizeof(long)*2)
int v1 = 0, v2 = 0, v3 = 0, v4 = 0, v5 = 0, v7 = 0, v8 = 0;
int v1 = 0, v2 = 0, v3 = 0, v4 = 0, v5 = 0;
unsigned char buf[4], ibuf1[LSIZE2], ibuf2[LSIZE2];
unsigned char ibuf3[LSIZE2], ibuf4[LSIZE2], ibuf5[LSIZE2];
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
int v6 = 0, v9 = 0, v10 = 0;
unsigned char ibuf6[LSIZE2];
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
int v7 = 0, v8 = 0;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
unsigned char cbuf;
int v11 = 0;

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl_cert.c vendored
View File

@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
ret->references = 1;
ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]];
/*
* or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys), if you find that
@ -282,7 +283,6 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
* chain is held inside SSL_CTX
*/
ret->references = 1;
/*
* Set digests to defaults. NB: we don't copy existing values as they
* will be set during handshake.

23
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl_rsa.c vendored
View File

@ -160,7 +160,10 @@ int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa)
}
RSA_up_ref(rsa);
EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) <= 0) {
RSA_free(rsa);
return 0;
}
ret = ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert, pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
@ -181,6 +184,15 @@ static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) {
EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(c->pkeys[i].x509);
if (pktmp == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
return 0;
}
/*
* The return code from EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters is deliberately
* ignored. Some EVP_PKEY types cannot do this.
*/
EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp, pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
ERR_clear_error();
@ -382,6 +394,10 @@ static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x)
}
if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL) {
/*
* The return code from EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters is deliberately
* ignored. Some EVP_PKEY types cannot do this.
*/
EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
ERR_clear_error();
@ -502,7 +518,10 @@ int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa)
}
RSA_up_ref(rsa);
EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) <= 0) {
RSA_free(rsa);
return 0;
}
ret = ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert, pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);

4
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl_sess.c vendored
View File

@ -256,8 +256,8 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
# endif
#endif
dest->tlsext_tick = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
dest->srp_username = NULL;
#endif
@ -324,7 +324,6 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
goto err;
}
# endif
#endif
if (ticket != 0) {
dest->tlsext_tick = BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_tick, src->tlsext_ticklen);
@ -334,6 +333,7 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
dest->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = 0;
dest->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (src->srp_username) {

16
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/util/indent.pro vendored
View File

@ -749,3 +749,19 @@
-T ssl_trace_tbl
-T _stdcall
-T tls12_lookup
-T OPTIONS
-T OPT_PAIR
-T uint64_t
-T int64_t
-T uint32_t
-T int32_t
-T uint16_t
-T int16_t
-T uint8_t
-T int8_t
-T STRINT_PAIR
-T felem
-T felem_bytearray
-T SH_LIST
-T PACKET
-T RECORD_LAYER

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/util/mkrc.pl vendored
View File

@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ BEGIN
VALUE "ProductVersion", "$version\\0"
// Optional:
//VALUE "Comments", "\\0"
VALUE "LegalCopyright", "Copyright © 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. Copyright © 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson. All rights reserved.\\0"
VALUE "LegalCopyright", "Copyright © 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. Copyright © 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson. All rights reserved.\\0"
//VALUE "LegalTrademarks", "\\0"
//VALUE "PrivateBuild", "\\0"
//VALUE "SpecialBuild", "\\0"

2
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/util/mkstack.pl vendored
View File

@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ while(<IN>) {
EOF
}
foreach $type_thing (sort @sstacklst) {
foreach $type_thing (sort { $a->[0] cmp $b->[0]} @sstacklst) {
my $t1 = $type_thing->[0];
my $t2 = $type_thing->[1];
$new_stackfile .= <<EOF;

7
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/util/pl/VC-32.pl vendored
View File

@ -342,15 +342,17 @@ sub do_link_rule
local($ret,$_);
$file =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
$n=&bname($target);
$ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs\n";
$ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs";
if ($standalone == 1)
{
$ret.=" \$(OBJ_D)${o}applink.obj\n";
$ret.=" \$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $efile$target @<<\n\t";
$ret.= "\$(EX_LIBS) " if ($files =~ /O_FIPSCANISTER/ && !$fipscanisterbuild);
$ret.= "\$(EX_LIBS) \$(OBJ_D)${o}applink.obj " if ($files =~ /O_FIPSCANISTER/ && !$fipscanisterbuild);
$ret.="$files $libs\n<<\n";
}
elsif ($standalone == 2)
{
$ret.="\n";
$ret.="\tSET FIPS_LINK=\$(LINK)\n";
$ret.="\tSET FIPS_CC=\$(CC)\n";
$ret.="\tSET FIPS_CC_ARGS=/Fo\$(OBJ_D)${o}fips_premain.obj \$(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c\n";
@ -363,6 +365,7 @@ sub do_link_rule
}
else
{
$ret.="\n";
$ret.="\t\$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $efile$target @<<\n";
$ret.="\t\$(APP_EX_OBJ) $files $libs\n<<\n";
}

1
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/util/selftest.pl vendored
View File

@ -199,3 +199,4 @@ while (<IN>) {
}
print "\nTest report in file $report\n";
die if $ok != 2;

17
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/util/toutf8.sh vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
#! /bin/sh
#
# Very simple script to detect and convert files that we want to re-encode to UTF8
git ls-tree -r --name-only HEAD | \
while read F; do
charset=`file -bi "$F" | sed -e 's|.*charset=||'`
if [ "$charset" != "utf-8" -a "$charset" != "binary" -a "$charset" != "us-ascii" ]; then
iconv -f ISO-8859-1 -t UTF8 < "$F" > "$F.utf8" && \
( cmp -s "$F" "$F.utf8" || \
( echo "$F"
mv "$F" "$F.iso-8859-1"
mv "$F.utf8" "$F"
)
)
fi
done