Don't ENXIO on open("/dev/random") if there is not enough

entropy collected. It's undocumented, noone else does it and
it leads to "named" errors during boot for me.
Generally, consumers of "/dev/random" should be prepared to wait.
(The other uses of "rnd_have_entropy" look bogus to me too,
but this needs more consideration.)
This commit is contained in:
drochner 2005-04-15 20:21:23 +00:00
parent 6dda78f17a
commit 3759e5b9d8
1 changed files with 3 additions and 18 deletions

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $NetBSD: rnd.c,v 1.46 2005/02/27 00:26:58 perry Exp $ */
/* $NetBSD: rnd.c,v 1.47 2005/04/15 20:21:23 drochner Exp $ */
/*-
* Copyright (c) 1997 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: rnd.c,v 1.46 2005/02/27 00:26:58 perry Exp $");
__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: rnd.c,v 1.47 2005/04/15 20:21:23 drochner Exp $");
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
@ -226,9 +226,6 @@ rnd_wakeup_readers(void)
printf("rnd: have initial entropy (%u)\n",
rndpool_get_entropy_count(&rnd_pool));
#endif
/*
* Allow open of /dev/random now, too.
*/
rnd_have_entropy = 1;
}
}
@ -349,21 +346,9 @@ rndopen(dev_t dev, int flags, int ifmt, struct proc *p)
if (rnd_ready == 0)
return (ENXIO);
if (minor(dev) == RND_DEV_URANDOM)
if (minor(dev) == RND_DEV_URANDOM || minor(dev) == RND_DEV_RANDOM)
return (0);
/*
* If this is the strong random device and we have never collected
* entropy (or have not yet) don't allow it to be opened. This will
* prevent waiting forever for something that just will not appear.
*/
if (minor(dev) == RND_DEV_RANDOM) {
if (rnd_have_entropy == 0)
return (ENXIO);
else
return (0);
}
return (ENXIO);
}