Remove securelevel-related text from init(8) man-page as they're now in

secmodel_bsd44(9).

I'm not sure I agree with the BUGS section, but for now move it to
secmodel_bsd44(9) as well.
This commit is contained in:
elad 2006-09-15 20:20:06 +00:00
parent 324633bc37
commit 172a3fa471
2 changed files with 16 additions and 106 deletions

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
.\" $NetBSD: init.8,v 1.41 2006/09/15 20:11:13 wiz Exp $
.\" $NetBSD: init.8,v 1.42 2006/09/15 20:20:06 elad Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1980, 1991, 1993
.\" The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
@ -167,98 +167,6 @@ Type of the node is string capable of holding full pathname, and
is only accessible by the superuser (unless explicitly destroyed
and re-created with different specification).
.Pp
The kernel runs with four different levels of security.
Any superuser process can raise the security level, but only
.Nm
can lower it.
.Pp
The security level mechanism is intended to allow the administrator
to protect the persistent code and data on the system, or a subset
thereof, from modification, even by the superuser.
In order for this protection to be effective, the administrator
must ensure that no program that is run while the security level
is 0 or lower, nor any data or configuration file used by any such
program, can be modified while the security level is greater than
0.
This may be achieved through the careful use of the
.Dq immutable
file flag to define and protect a Trusted Computing Base (TCB)
consisting of all such programs and data, or by ensuring that all
such programs and data are on filesystems that are mounted read-only
and running at security level 2 or higher.
.Em Particular care must be taken to ensure, if relying upon
.Em security level 1 and the use of file flags, that the integrity of the
.Em TCB cannot be compromised through the use of modifications to the
.Em disklabel or access to overlapping disk partitions, including the
.Em raw partition .
.Pp
Do not overlook the fact that shell scripts (or anything else fed to an
interpreter, through any mechanism) and the kernel itself are "programs
that run while the security level is 0" and must be considered part of
the TCB.
.Pp
Security levels are defined as follows:
.Bl -tag -width flag
.It Ic -1
Permanently insecure mode \- always run system in level 0 mode.
.It Ic 0
Insecure mode \- immutable and append-only flags may be changed.
All devices may be read or written subject to their permissions.
.It Ic 1
Secure mode \- system immutable and system append-only flags may not
be turned off; disks for mounted filesystems,
.Pa /dev/mem ,
and
.Pa /dev/kmem
are read-only.
.It Ic 2
Highly secure mode \- same as secure mode, plus disks are always
read-only whether mounted or not, new disks may not be mounted,
and existing mounts may only be downgraded from read-write to read-only.
This level precludes tampering with filesystems by unmounting them,
but also inhibits running
.Xr newfs 8
while the system is multi-user.
.Pp
The
.Xr settimeofday 2
system call can only advance the time.
.Pp
The state of
.Xr ipf 8
(the in-kernel IP filtering facility) may not be changed.
.Pp
Users may not change the per-process core name template format, only the
default can be changed.
.Pp
Downgrading from highly secure mode to insecure mode (that is, to single-user
mode) always requires the root password to be entered on the console, whether
the console is marked as
.Dq secure
in
.Pa /etc/ttys
or not.
.El
.Pp
Normally, the system runs in level 0 mode while single user
and in level 1 mode while multi-user.
If the level 2 mode is desired while running multi-user,
it can be set in the startup script
.Pa /etc/rc
using
.Xr sysctl 8 .
If it is desired to run the system in level 0 mode while multi-user,
the administrator must build a kernel with
.Sy options INSECURE
in the kernel configuration file, which initializes the kernel's
.Va securelevel
variable to -1.
See
.Xr config 1
and
.Xr options 4
for details.
.Pp
In multi-user operation,
.Nm
maintains
@ -441,20 +349,10 @@ device driver because of a persistent device error condition.
.Xr rc 8 ,
.Xr reboot 8 ,
.Xr shutdown 8 ,
.Xr sysctl 8
.Xr sysctl 8 ,
.Xr secmodel_bsd44 9
.Sh HISTORY
A
.Nm
command appeared in
.At v6 .
.Sh BUGS
Systems without
.Xr sysctl 8
behave as though they have security level \-1.
.Pp
The security level 2 restrictions relating to TCB integrity protection
should be enforced at security level 1.
Restrictions dependent upon security level but not relating to TCB
integrity protection should be selected by
.Xr sysctl 8
settings available only at security level 0 or lower.

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
.\" $NetBSD: secmodel_bsd44.9,v 1.2 2006/09/15 20:15:33 wiz Exp $
.\" $NetBSD: secmodel_bsd44.9,v 1.3 2006/09/15 20:20:06 elad Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 2006 Elad Efrat <elad@NetBSD.org>
.\" All rights reserved.
@ -184,5 +184,17 @@ the TCB.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr kauth 9 ,
.Xr secmodel 9
.SH BUGS
.Sh BUGS
Systems without
.Xr sysctl 8
behave as though they have security level \-1.
.Pp
The security level 2 restrictions relating to TCB integrity protection
should be enforced at security level 1.
Restrictions dependent upon security level but not relating to TCB
integrity protection should be selected by
.Xr sysctl 8
settings available only at security level 0 or lower.
.Sh AUTHORS
.An Elad Efrat Aq elad@NetBSD.org