Add cleaned up versions of des_set_random_generator_seed(),
des_new_random_key(), and des_init_random_number_generator() from the crypto-us libdes. While I'm here, fix a serious bug in des_init_random_number_generator() whereby the accumlated data to be hashed was zero'd *before* actually being hashed. NOTE: The bug only affects people who are not using the rnd(4) in-kernel random number generator, and it is worth noting that the resulting keys are not always the same, but are likely easy to determine.
This commit is contained in:
parent
78c90ae276
commit
1013bcab9c
95
lib/libcrypto/rnd_keys.c
Normal file
95
lib/libcrypto/rnd_keys.c
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
|
||||
/* $NetBSD: rnd_keys.c,v 1.1 2000/06/21 19:46:16 thorpej Exp $ */
|
||||
|
||||
#include "des_locl.h"
|
||||
#include <sys/time.h>
|
||||
#include <sys/types.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include <fcntl.h>
|
||||
#include <unistd.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include <sha1.h>
|
||||
|
||||
void
|
||||
des_set_random_generator_seed(des_cblock *seed)
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
||||
des_random_seed(seed);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Generate a sequence of random des keys
|
||||
* using the random block sequence, fixup
|
||||
* parity and skip weak keys.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int
|
||||
des_new_random_key(des_cblock *key)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int urandom;
|
||||
|
||||
again:
|
||||
urandom = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
|
||||
|
||||
if (urandom < 0)
|
||||
des_random_key(key);
|
||||
else {
|
||||
if (read(urandom, key,
|
||||
sizeof(des_cblock)) != sizeof(des_cblock)) {
|
||||
close(urandom);
|
||||
des_random_key(key);
|
||||
} else
|
||||
close(urandom);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* random key must have odd parity and not be weak */
|
||||
des_set_odd_parity(key);
|
||||
if (des_is_weak_key(key))
|
||||
goto again;
|
||||
|
||||
return (0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* des_init_random_number_generator:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This routine takes a secret key possibly shared by a number of servers
|
||||
* and uses it to generate a random number stream that is not shared by
|
||||
* any of the other servers. It does this by using the current process id,
|
||||
* host id, and the current time to the nearest second. The resulting
|
||||
* stream seed is not useful information for cracking the secret key.
|
||||
* Moreover, this routine keeps no copy of the secret key.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void
|
||||
des_init_random_number_generator(des_cblock *seed)
|
||||
{
|
||||
u_int64_t seed_q;
|
||||
des_cblock seed_new;
|
||||
SHA1_CTX sha;
|
||||
|
||||
u_char results[20];
|
||||
char hname[64], accum[512];
|
||||
|
||||
struct timeval when;
|
||||
|
||||
SHA1Init(&sha);
|
||||
|
||||
gethostname(hname, sizeof(hname - 1));
|
||||
gettimeofday(&when, NULL);
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(&seed_q, seed, sizeof(seed_q));
|
||||
|
||||
snprintf(accum, sizeof(accum), "%ld%ld%d%s%d%qd",
|
||||
when.tv_sec, when.tv_usec, getpid(), hname, getuid(),
|
||||
(long long) seed_q);
|
||||
|
||||
SHA1Update(&sha, (u_char *) accum, strlen(accum));
|
||||
|
||||
memset(accum, 0, sizeof(accum));
|
||||
|
||||
SHA1Final(results, &sha);
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(seed_new, results, sizeof(seed_new));
|
||||
des_random_seed(&seed_new);
|
||||
|
||||
memset(seed_new, 0, sizeof(seed_new));
|
||||
memset(results, 0, sizeof(results));
|
||||
}
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user