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Remove cprng initialization order hack. 

cprng_init now runs early enough that the hack should no longer be
needed to address PR port-arm32/55252.
This commit is contained in:
riastradh 2020-05-11 21:40:12 +00:00
parent 64f67209e8
commit 00d0504163
1 changed files with 2 additions and 25 deletions
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27
sys/kern/subr_cprng.c
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $NetBSD: subr_cprng.c,v 1.39 2020/05/11 21:38:54 riastradh Exp $ */
/* $NetBSD: subr_cprng.c,v 1.40 2020/05/11 21:40:12 riastradh Exp $ */
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2019 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: subr_cprng.c,v 1.39 2020/05/11 21:38:54 riastradh Exp $");
__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: subr_cprng.c,v 1.40 2020/05/11 21:40:12 riastradh Exp $");
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/cprng.h>
@ -102,7 +102,6 @@ struct cprng_strong *kern_cprng __read_mostly; /* IPL_VM */
struct cprng_strong *user_cprng __read_mostly; /* IPL_NONE */
static struct sysctllog *cprng_sysctllog __read_mostly;
static bool cprng_initialized __read_mostly = false;
void
cprng_init(void)
@ -129,9 +128,6 @@ cprng_init(void)
CTLFLAG_PERMANENT|CTLFLAG_READONLY, CTLTYPE_INT /*lie*/, "arandom",
SYSCTL_DESCR("Independent uniform random bytes, up to 256 bytes"),
sysctl_kern_arandom, 0, NULL, 0, CTL_KERN, KERN_ARND, CTL_EOL);
/* Ready to go. */
cprng_initialized = true;
}
/*
@ -280,25 +276,6 @@ cprng_strong(struct cprng_strong *cprng, void *buf, size_t len, int flags)
unsigned epoch;
int s;
/*
* Some device drivers try to use cprng_strong in attach during
* autoconf, e.g. to randomly generate MAC addresses, before we
* percpu is available -- percpu is not available until after
* CPUs have been detected during autoconf. We should make
* percpu available sooner, but for now this works around it.
*/
if (__predict_false(!cprng_initialized)) {
struct nist_hash_drbg drbg;
entropy_extract(seed, sizeof seed, 0);
if (__predict_false(nist_hash_drbg_instantiate(&drbg,
seed, sizeof seed, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)))
panic("nist_hash_drbg_instantiate");
if (__predict_false(nist_hash_drbg_generate(&drbg, buf, len,
NULL, 0)))
panic("nist_hash_drbg_generate");
return len;
}
/*
* Verify maximum request length. Caller should really limit
* their requests to 32 bytes to avoid spending much time with