2002-07-02 00:51:25 +04:00
|
|
|
/* $NetBSD: tcp_subr.c,v 1.132 2002/07/01 20:51:25 itojun Exp $ */
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project.
|
|
|
|
* All rights reserved.
|
2002-06-09 20:33:36 +04:00
|
|
|
*
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
|
|
* are met:
|
|
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
|
|
* 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
|
|
|
|
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
|
|
|
|
* without specific prior written permission.
|
2002-06-09 20:33:36 +04:00
|
|
|
*
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
|
|
|
|
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
|
|
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
|
|
|
|
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
|
|
|
|
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
|
|
|
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
|
|
|
|
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
|
|
|
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
|
|
|
|
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
|
|
|
|
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
|
|
|
* SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1998-02-19 05:36:42 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
Two changes, designed to make us even more resilient against TCP
ISS attacks (which we already fend off quite well).
1. First-cut implementation of RFC1948, Steve Bellovin's cryptographic
hash method of generating TCP ISS values. Note, this code is experimental
and disabled by default (experimental enough that I don't export the
variable via sysctl yet, either). There are a couple of issues I'd
like to discuss with Steve, so this code should only be used by people
who really know what they're doing.
2. Per a recent thread on Bugtraq, it's possible to determine a system's
uptime by snooping the RFC1323 TCP timestamp options sent by a host; in
4.4BSD, timestamps are created by incrementing the tcp_now variable
at 2 Hz; there's even a company out there that uses this to determine
web server uptime. According to Newsham's paper "The Problem With
Random Increments", while NetBSD's TCP ISS generation method is much
better than the "random increment" method used by FreeBSD and OpenBSD,
it is still theoretically possible to mount an attack against NetBSD's
method if the attacker knows how many times the tcp_iss_seq variable
has been incremented. By not leaking uptime information, we can make
that much harder to determine. So, we avoid the leak by giving each
TCP connection a timebase of 0.
2001-03-20 23:07:51 +03:00
|
|
|
* Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
|
1998-02-19 05:36:42 +03:00
|
|
|
* All rights reserved.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
|
|
|
|
* by Jason R. Thorpe and Kevin M. Lahey of the Numerical Aerospace Simulation
|
|
|
|
* Facility, NASA Ames Research Center.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
|
|
* are met:
|
|
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
|
|
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
|
|
|
|
* must display the following acknowledgement:
|
|
|
|
* This product includes software developed by the NetBSD
|
|
|
|
* Foundation, Inc. and its contributors.
|
|
|
|
* 4. Neither the name of The NetBSD Foundation nor the names of its
|
|
|
|
* contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
|
|
|
|
* from this software without specific prior written permission.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
|
|
|
|
* ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
|
|
|
|
* TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
|
|
|
|
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
|
|
|
|
* BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
|
|
|
|
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
|
|
|
|
* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
|
|
|
|
* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
|
|
|
|
* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
|
|
|
|
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
|
|
|
|
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1994-06-29 10:29:24 +04:00
|
|
|
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
1998-01-05 13:31:44 +03:00
|
|
|
* Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1995
|
1994-05-13 10:02:48 +04:00
|
|
|
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
|
|
* are met:
|
|
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
|
|
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
|
|
|
|
* must display the following acknowledgement:
|
|
|
|
* This product includes software developed by the University of
|
|
|
|
* California, Berkeley and its contributors.
|
|
|
|
* 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
|
|
|
|
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
|
|
|
|
* without specific prior written permission.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
|
|
|
|
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
|
|
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
|
|
|
|
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
|
|
|
|
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
|
|
|
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
|
|
|
|
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
|
|
|
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
|
|
|
|
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
|
|
|
|
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
|
|
|
* SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
|
|
*
|
1998-01-05 13:31:44 +03:00
|
|
|
* @(#)tcp_subr.c 8.2 (Berkeley) 5/24/95
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2001-11-13 03:32:34 +03:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
|
2002-07-02 00:51:25 +04:00
|
|
|
__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: tcp_subr.c,v 1.132 2002/07/01 20:51:25 itojun Exp $");
|
2001-11-13 03:32:34 +03:00
|
|
|
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
#include "opt_inet.h"
|
1999-07-10 02:57:15 +04:00
|
|
|
#include "opt_ipsec.h"
|
1998-01-12 06:00:42 +03:00
|
|
|
#include "opt_tcp_compat_42.h"
|
2001-06-02 20:17:09 +04:00
|
|
|
#include "opt_inet_csum.h"
|
1997-10-13 04:46:08 +04:00
|
|
|
#include "rnd.h"
|
|
|
|
|
1993-12-18 03:40:47 +03:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/param.h>
|
1994-05-13 10:02:48 +04:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/proc.h>
|
1993-12-18 03:40:47 +03:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/systm.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/malloc.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/mbuf.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/socket.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/protosw.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/errno.h>
|
1997-07-24 01:26:40 +04:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/kernel.h>
|
1998-08-02 04:36:19 +04:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/pool.h>
|
1997-10-13 04:46:08 +04:00
|
|
|
#if NRND > 0
|
Two changes, designed to make us even more resilient against TCP
ISS attacks (which we already fend off quite well).
1. First-cut implementation of RFC1948, Steve Bellovin's cryptographic
hash method of generating TCP ISS values. Note, this code is experimental
and disabled by default (experimental enough that I don't export the
variable via sysctl yet, either). There are a couple of issues I'd
like to discuss with Steve, so this code should only be used by people
who really know what they're doing.
2. Per a recent thread on Bugtraq, it's possible to determine a system's
uptime by snooping the RFC1323 TCP timestamp options sent by a host; in
4.4BSD, timestamps are created by incrementing the tcp_now variable
at 2 Hz; there's even a company out there that uses this to determine
web server uptime. According to Newsham's paper "The Problem With
Random Increments", while NetBSD's TCP ISS generation method is much
better than the "random increment" method used by FreeBSD and OpenBSD,
it is still theoretically possible to mount an attack against NetBSD's
method if the attacker knows how many times the tcp_iss_seq variable
has been incremented. By not leaking uptime information, we can make
that much harder to determine. So, we avoid the leak by giving each
TCP connection a timebase of 0.
2001-03-20 23:07:51 +03:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/md5.h>
|
1997-10-10 05:51:07 +04:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/rnd.h>
|
1997-10-13 04:46:08 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
|
1993-12-18 03:40:47 +03:00
|
|
|
#include <net/route.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <net/if.h>
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
|
1993-12-18 03:40:47 +03:00
|
|
|
#include <netinet/in.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <netinet/ip.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <netinet/in_pcb.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <netinet/ip_var.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <netinet/ip_icmp.h>
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
#ifndef INET
|
|
|
|
#include <netinet/in.h>
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#include <netinet/ip6.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <netinet6/in6_pcb.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>
|
1999-07-22 16:56:56 +04:00
|
|
|
#include <netinet6/in6_var.h>
|
1999-12-08 19:22:20 +03:00
|
|
|
#include <netinet6/ip6protosw.h>
|
2000-10-19 01:14:12 +04:00
|
|
|
#include <netinet/icmp6.h>
|
2002-05-29 11:53:39 +04:00
|
|
|
#include <netinet6/nd6.h>
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
1993-12-18 03:40:47 +03:00
|
|
|
#include <netinet/tcp.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <netinet/tcp_fsm.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <netinet/tcp_seq.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <netinet/tcp_timer.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <netinet/tcp_var.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <netinet/tcpip.h>
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef IPSEC
|
|
|
|
#include <netinet6/ipsec.h>
|
|
|
|
#endif /*IPSEC*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
struct in6pcb tcb6;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2002-05-13 00:33:50 +04:00
|
|
|
struct inpcbtable tcbtable; /* head of queue of active tcpcb's */
|
|
|
|
struct tcpstat tcpstat; /* tcp statistics */
|
|
|
|
u_int32_t tcp_now; /* for RFC 1323 timestamps */
|
|
|
|
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
/* patchable/settable parameters for tcp */
|
|
|
|
int tcp_mssdflt = TCP_MSS;
|
|
|
|
int tcp_rttdflt = TCPTV_SRTTDFLT / PR_SLOWHZ;
|
1998-04-30 00:43:29 +04:00
|
|
|
int tcp_do_rfc1323 = 1; /* window scaling / timestamps (obsolete) */
|
Two changes, designed to make us even more resilient against TCP
ISS attacks (which we already fend off quite well).
1. First-cut implementation of RFC1948, Steve Bellovin's cryptographic
hash method of generating TCP ISS values. Note, this code is experimental
and disabled by default (experimental enough that I don't export the
variable via sysctl yet, either). There are a couple of issues I'd
like to discuss with Steve, so this code should only be used by people
who really know what they're doing.
2. Per a recent thread on Bugtraq, it's possible to determine a system's
uptime by snooping the RFC1323 TCP timestamp options sent by a host; in
4.4BSD, timestamps are created by incrementing the tcp_now variable
at 2 Hz; there's even a company out there that uses this to determine
web server uptime. According to Newsham's paper "The Problem With
Random Increments", while NetBSD's TCP ISS generation method is much
better than the "random increment" method used by FreeBSD and OpenBSD,
it is still theoretically possible to mount an attack against NetBSD's
method if the attacker knows how many times the tcp_iss_seq variable
has been incremented. By not leaking uptime information, we can make
that much harder to determine. So, we avoid the leak by giving each
TCP connection a timebase of 0.
2001-03-20 23:07:51 +03:00
|
|
|
#if NRND > 0
|
|
|
|
int tcp_do_rfc1948 = 0; /* ISS by cryptographic hash */
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1998-04-30 00:43:29 +04:00
|
|
|
int tcp_do_sack = 1; /* selective acknowledgement */
|
|
|
|
int tcp_do_win_scale = 1; /* RFC1323 window scaling */
|
|
|
|
int tcp_do_timestamps = 1; /* RFC1323 timestamps */
|
1998-10-06 04:20:44 +04:00
|
|
|
int tcp_do_newreno = 0; /* Use the New Reno algorithms */
|
1998-05-03 23:54:56 +04:00
|
|
|
int tcp_ack_on_push = 0; /* set to enable immediate ACK-on-PUSH */
|
1997-12-12 01:47:24 +03:00
|
|
|
int tcp_init_win = 1;
|
1998-04-14 01:18:19 +04:00
|
|
|
int tcp_mss_ifmtu = 0;
|
1998-04-29 09:16:46 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef TCP_COMPAT_42
|
|
|
|
int tcp_compat_42 = 1;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
int tcp_compat_42 = 0;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2000-10-18 11:21:10 +04:00
|
|
|
int tcp_rst_ppslim = 100; /* 100pps */
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2000-10-18 11:21:10 +04:00
|
|
|
/* tcb hash */
|
1996-01-31 06:49:23 +03:00
|
|
|
#ifndef TCBHASHSIZE
|
|
|
|
#define TCBHASHSIZE 128
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int tcbhashsize = TCBHASHSIZE;
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2000-10-18 11:21:10 +04:00
|
|
|
/* syn hash parameters */
|
|
|
|
#define TCP_SYN_HASH_SIZE 293
|
|
|
|
#define TCP_SYN_BUCKET_SIZE 35
|
|
|
|
int tcp_syn_cache_size = TCP_SYN_HASH_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
int tcp_syn_cache_limit = TCP_SYN_HASH_SIZE*TCP_SYN_BUCKET_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
int tcp_syn_bucket_limit = 3*TCP_SYN_BUCKET_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
struct syn_cache_head tcp_syn_cache[TCP_SYN_HASH_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
|
1997-12-10 04:58:07 +03:00
|
|
|
int tcp_freeq __P((struct tcpcb *));
|
|
|
|
|
2000-10-19 01:14:12 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
2000-10-18 21:09:14 +04:00
|
|
|
void tcp_mtudisc_callback __P((struct in_addr));
|
2000-10-19 01:14:12 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
void tcp6_mtudisc_callback __P((struct in6_addr *));
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2000-10-18 21:09:14 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void tcp_mtudisc __P((struct inpcb *, int));
|
2000-10-20 00:22:59 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
2000-10-18 21:09:14 +04:00
|
|
|
void tcp6_mtudisc __P((struct in6pcb *, int));
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
1998-08-02 04:36:19 +04:00
|
|
|
struct pool tcpcb_pool;
|
|
|
|
|
2001-06-02 20:17:09 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef TCP_CSUM_COUNTERS
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/device.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct evcnt tcp_hwcsum_bad = EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC,
|
|
|
|
NULL, "tcp", "hwcsum bad");
|
|
|
|
struct evcnt tcp_hwcsum_ok = EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC,
|
|
|
|
NULL, "tcp", "hwcsum ok");
|
|
|
|
struct evcnt tcp_hwcsum_data = EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC,
|
|
|
|
NULL, "tcp", "hwcsum data");
|
|
|
|
struct evcnt tcp_swcsum = EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC,
|
|
|
|
NULL, "tcp", "swcsum");
|
|
|
|
#endif /* TCP_CSUM_COUNTERS */
|
|
|
|
|
2002-04-27 05:47:58 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef TCP_OUTPUT_COUNTERS
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/device.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct evcnt tcp_output_bigheader = EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC,
|
|
|
|
NULL, "tcp", "output big header");
|
|
|
|
struct evcnt tcp_output_copysmall = EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC,
|
|
|
|
NULL, "tcp", "output copy small");
|
|
|
|
struct evcnt tcp_output_copybig = EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC,
|
|
|
|
NULL, "tcp", "output copy big");
|
|
|
|
struct evcnt tcp_output_refbig = EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC,
|
|
|
|
NULL, "tcp", "output reference big");
|
|
|
|
#endif /* TCP_OUTPUT_COUNTERS */
|
|
|
|
|
2002-05-07 06:59:38 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef TCP_REASS_COUNTERS
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/device.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct evcnt tcp_reass_ = EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC,
|
|
|
|
NULL, "tcp_reass", "calls");
|
|
|
|
struct evcnt tcp_reass_empty = EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC,
|
|
|
|
&tcp_reass_, "tcp_reass", "insert into empty queue");
|
|
|
|
struct evcnt tcp_reass_iteration[8] = {
|
|
|
|
EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC, &tcp_reass_, "tcp_reass", ">7 iterations"),
|
|
|
|
EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC, &tcp_reass_, "tcp_reass", "1 iteration"),
|
|
|
|
EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC, &tcp_reass_, "tcp_reass", "2 iterations"),
|
|
|
|
EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC, &tcp_reass_, "tcp_reass", "3 iterations"),
|
|
|
|
EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC, &tcp_reass_, "tcp_reass", "4 iterations"),
|
|
|
|
EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC, &tcp_reass_, "tcp_reass", "5 iterations"),
|
|
|
|
EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC, &tcp_reass_, "tcp_reass", "6 iterations"),
|
|
|
|
EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC, &tcp_reass_, "tcp_reass", "7 iterations"),
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
struct evcnt tcp_reass_prependfirst = EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC,
|
|
|
|
&tcp_reass_, "tcp_reass", "prepend to first");
|
|
|
|
struct evcnt tcp_reass_prepend = EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC,
|
|
|
|
&tcp_reass_, "tcp_reass", "prepend");
|
|
|
|
struct evcnt tcp_reass_insert = EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC,
|
|
|
|
&tcp_reass_, "tcp_reass", "insert");
|
|
|
|
struct evcnt tcp_reass_inserttail = EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC,
|
|
|
|
&tcp_reass_, "tcp_reass", "insert at tail");
|
|
|
|
struct evcnt tcp_reass_append = EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC,
|
|
|
|
&tcp_reass_, "tcp_reass", "append");
|
|
|
|
struct evcnt tcp_reass_appendtail = EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC,
|
|
|
|
&tcp_reass_, "tcp_reass", "append to tail fragment");
|
|
|
|
struct evcnt tcp_reass_overlaptail = EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC,
|
|
|
|
&tcp_reass_, "tcp_reass", "overlap at end");
|
|
|
|
struct evcnt tcp_reass_overlapfront = EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC,
|
|
|
|
&tcp_reass_, "tcp_reass", "overlap at start");
|
|
|
|
struct evcnt tcp_reass_segdup = EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC,
|
|
|
|
&tcp_reass_, "tcp_reass", "duplicate segment");
|
|
|
|
struct evcnt tcp_reass_fragdup = EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC,
|
|
|
|
&tcp_reass_, "tcp_reass", "duplicate fragment");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* TCP_REASS_COUNTERS */
|
|
|
|
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Tcp initialization
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1994-01-09 02:07:16 +03:00
|
|
|
void
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
tcp_init()
|
|
|
|
{
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
int hlen;
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
|
1998-08-02 04:36:19 +04:00
|
|
|
pool_init(&tcpcb_pool, sizeof(struct tcpcb), 0, 0, 0, "tcpcbpl",
|
2002-03-08 23:48:27 +03:00
|
|
|
NULL);
|
1996-09-15 22:11:06 +04:00
|
|
|
in_pcbinit(&tcbtable, tcbhashsize, tcbhashsize);
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
tcb6.in6p_next = tcb6.in6p_prev = &tcb6;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-09-10 08:24:24 +04:00
|
|
|
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
hlen = sizeof(struct ip) + sizeof(struct tcphdr);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
if (sizeof(struct ip) < sizeof(struct ip6_hdr))
|
|
|
|
hlen = sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) + sizeof(struct tcphdr);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (max_protohdr < hlen)
|
|
|
|
max_protohdr = hlen;
|
|
|
|
if (max_linkhdr + hlen > MHLEN)
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
panic("tcp_init");
|
2000-10-18 21:09:14 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2000-10-19 01:14:12 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
2000-10-18 21:09:14 +04:00
|
|
|
icmp_mtudisc_callback_register(tcp_mtudisc_callback);
|
2000-10-19 01:14:12 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
icmp6_mtudisc_callback_register(tcp6_mtudisc_callback);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2000-10-18 21:09:14 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2001-09-11 00:36:43 +04:00
|
|
|
/* Initialize timer state. */
|
|
|
|
tcp_timer_init();
|
|
|
|
|
1998-05-07 05:37:27 +04:00
|
|
|
/* Initialize the compressed state engine. */
|
|
|
|
syn_cache_init();
|
2001-06-02 20:17:09 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TCP_CSUM_COUNTERS
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_hwcsum_bad);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_hwcsum_ok);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_hwcsum_data);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_swcsum);
|
|
|
|
#endif /* TCP_CSUM_COUNTERS */
|
2002-04-27 05:47:58 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TCP_OUTPUT_COUNTERS
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_output_bigheader);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_output_copysmall);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_output_copybig);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_output_refbig);
|
|
|
|
#endif /* TCP_OUTPUT_COUNTERS */
|
2002-05-07 06:59:38 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TCP_REASS_COUNTERS
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_reass_);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_reass_empty);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_reass_iteration[0]);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_reass_iteration[1]);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_reass_iteration[2]);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_reass_iteration[3]);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_reass_iteration[4]);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_reass_iteration[5]);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_reass_iteration[6]);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_reass_iteration[7]);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_reass_prependfirst);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_reass_prepend);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_reass_insert);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_reass_inserttail);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_reass_append);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_reass_appendtail);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_reass_overlaptail);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_reass_overlapfront);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_reass_segdup);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_static(&tcp_reass_fragdup);
|
|
|
|
#endif /* TCP_REASS_COUNTERS */
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Create template to be used to send tcp packets on a connection.
|
|
|
|
* Call after host entry created, allocates an mbuf and fills
|
|
|
|
* in a skeletal tcp/ip header, minimizing the amount of work
|
|
|
|
* necessary when the connection is used.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
struct mbuf *
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
tcp_template(tp)
|
|
|
|
struct tcpcb *tp;
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-03-30 16:51:13 +04:00
|
|
|
struct inpcb *inp = tp->t_inpcb;
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
2000-03-30 16:51:13 +04:00
|
|
|
struct in6pcb *in6p = tp->t_in6pcb;
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2000-03-30 16:51:13 +04:00
|
|
|
struct tcphdr *n;
|
|
|
|
struct mbuf *m;
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
int hlen;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (tp->t_family) {
|
|
|
|
case AF_INET:
|
|
|
|
hlen = sizeof(struct ip);
|
|
|
|
if (inp)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
if (in6p) {
|
|
|
|
/* mapped addr case */
|
|
|
|
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&in6p->in6p_laddr)
|
|
|
|
&& IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&in6p->in6p_faddr))
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return NULL; /*EINVAL*/
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
case AF_INET6:
|
|
|
|
hlen = sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);
|
|
|
|
if (in6p) {
|
|
|
|
/* more sainty check? */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL; /*EINVAL*/
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
default:
|
1999-07-02 16:45:32 +04:00
|
|
|
hlen = 0; /*pacify gcc*/
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
return NULL; /*EAFNOSUPPORT*/
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-19 22:21:41 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC
|
|
|
|
if (hlen + sizeof(struct tcphdr) > MCLBYTES)
|
|
|
|
panic("mclbytes too small for t_template");
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
m = tp->t_template;
|
|
|
|
if (m && m->m_len == hlen + sizeof(struct tcphdr))
|
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
if (m)
|
|
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
|
|
m = tp->t_template = NULL;
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
MGETHDR(m, M_DONTWAIT, MT_HEADER);
|
2000-09-19 22:21:41 +04:00
|
|
|
if (m && hlen + sizeof(struct tcphdr) > MHLEN) {
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
MCLGET(m, M_DONTWAIT);
|
|
|
|
if ((m->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
m_free(m);
|
|
|
|
m = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (m == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
1999-08-27 06:56:14 +04:00
|
|
|
m->m_pkthdr.len = m->m_len = hlen + sizeof(struct tcphdr);
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-06-02 20:17:09 +04:00
|
|
|
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
bzero(mtod(m, caddr_t), m->m_len);
|
2001-06-02 20:17:09 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
n = (struct tcphdr *)(mtod(m, caddr_t) + hlen);
|
|
|
|
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
switch (tp->t_family) {
|
|
|
|
case AF_INET:
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ipovly *ipov;
|
|
|
|
mtod(m, struct ip *)->ip_v = 4;
|
|
|
|
ipov = mtod(m, struct ipovly *);
|
|
|
|
ipov->ih_pr = IPPROTO_TCP;
|
|
|
|
ipov->ih_len = htons(sizeof(struct tcphdr));
|
|
|
|
if (inp) {
|
|
|
|
ipov->ih_src = inp->inp_laddr;
|
|
|
|
ipov->ih_dst = inp->inp_faddr;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
else if (in6p) {
|
|
|
|
/* mapped addr case */
|
|
|
|
bcopy(&in6p->in6p_laddr.s6_addr32[3], &ipov->ih_src,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(ipov->ih_src));
|
|
|
|
bcopy(&in6p->in6p_faddr.s6_addr32[3], &ipov->ih_dst,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(ipov->ih_dst));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-06-02 20:17:09 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Compute the pseudo-header portion of the checksum
|
|
|
|
* now. We incrementally add in the TCP option and
|
|
|
|
* payload lengths later, and then compute the TCP
|
|
|
|
* checksum right before the packet is sent off onto
|
|
|
|
* the wire.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
n->th_sum = in_cksum_phdr(ipov->ih_src.s_addr,
|
|
|
|
ipov->ih_dst.s_addr,
|
|
|
|
htons(sizeof(struct tcphdr) + IPPROTO_TCP));
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
case AF_INET6:
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ip6_hdr *ip6;
|
|
|
|
mtod(m, struct ip *)->ip_v = 6;
|
|
|
|
ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
|
|
|
|
ip6->ip6_nxt = IPPROTO_TCP;
|
|
|
|
ip6->ip6_plen = htons(sizeof(struct tcphdr));
|
|
|
|
ip6->ip6_src = in6p->in6p_laddr;
|
|
|
|
ip6->ip6_dst = in6p->in6p_faddr;
|
|
|
|
ip6->ip6_flow = in6p->in6p_flowinfo & IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK;
|
|
|
|
if (ip6_auto_flowlabel) {
|
|
|
|
ip6->ip6_flow &= ~IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK;
|
2002-06-09 20:33:36 +04:00
|
|
|
ip6->ip6_flow |=
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
(htonl(ip6_flow_seq++) & IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK);
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-12-15 09:28:43 +03:00
|
|
|
ip6->ip6_vfc &= ~IPV6_VERSION_MASK;
|
|
|
|
ip6->ip6_vfc |= IPV6_VERSION;
|
2001-06-02 20:17:09 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Compute the pseudo-header portion of the checksum
|
|
|
|
* now. We incrementally add in the TCP option and
|
|
|
|
* payload lengths later, and then compute the TCP
|
|
|
|
* checksum right before the packet is sent off onto
|
|
|
|
* the wire.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
n->th_sum = in6_cksum_phdr(&in6p->in6p_laddr,
|
|
|
|
&in6p->in6p_faddr, htonl(sizeof(struct tcphdr)),
|
|
|
|
htonl(IPPROTO_TCP));
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (inp) {
|
|
|
|
n->th_sport = inp->inp_lport;
|
|
|
|
n->th_dport = inp->inp_fport;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
else if (in6p) {
|
|
|
|
n->th_sport = in6p->in6p_lport;
|
|
|
|
n->th_dport = in6p->in6p_fport;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
n->th_seq = 0;
|
|
|
|
n->th_ack = 0;
|
|
|
|
n->th_x2 = 0;
|
|
|
|
n->th_off = 5;
|
|
|
|
n->th_flags = 0;
|
|
|
|
n->th_win = 0;
|
|
|
|
n->th_urp = 0;
|
|
|
|
return (m);
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Send a single message to the TCP at address specified by
|
|
|
|
* the given TCP/IP header. If m == 0, then we make a copy
|
|
|
|
* of the tcpiphdr at ti and send directly to the addressed host.
|
|
|
|
* This is used to force keep alive messages out using the TCP
|
|
|
|
* template for a connection tp->t_template. If flags are given
|
|
|
|
* then we send a message back to the TCP which originated the
|
|
|
|
* segment ti, and discard the mbuf containing it and any other
|
|
|
|
* attached mbufs.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* In any case the ack and sequence number of the transmitted
|
|
|
|
* segment are as specified by the parameters.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1997-07-24 01:26:40 +04:00
|
|
|
int
|
1999-07-15 02:37:13 +04:00
|
|
|
tcp_respond(tp, template, m, th0, ack, seq, flags)
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
struct tcpcb *tp;
|
1999-07-15 02:37:13 +04:00
|
|
|
struct mbuf *template;
|
2000-03-30 16:51:13 +04:00
|
|
|
struct mbuf *m;
|
1999-07-15 02:37:13 +04:00
|
|
|
struct tcphdr *th0;
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
tcp_seq ack, seq;
|
|
|
|
int flags;
|
|
|
|
{
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
struct route *ro;
|
1999-01-20 06:39:54 +03:00
|
|
|
int error, tlen, win = 0;
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
int hlen;
|
|
|
|
struct ip *ip;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
struct ip6_hdr *ip6;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int family; /* family on packet, not inpcb/in6pcb! */
|
|
|
|
struct tcphdr *th;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tp != NULL && (flags & TH_RST) == 0) {
|
2000-10-17 07:06:42 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC
|
|
|
|
if (tp->t_inpcb && tp->t_in6pcb)
|
|
|
|
panic("tcp_respond: both t_inpcb and t_in6pcb are set");
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
if (tp->t_inpcb)
|
|
|
|
win = sbspace(&tp->t_inpcb->inp_socket->so_rcv);
|
2000-10-17 07:06:42 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
2000-10-17 07:06:42 +04:00
|
|
|
if (tp->t_in6pcb)
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
win = sbspace(&tp->t_in6pcb->in6p_socket->so_rcv);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
ip = NULL;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
ip6 = NULL;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
if (m == 0) {
|
1999-07-22 16:56:56 +04:00
|
|
|
if (!template)
|
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
/* get family information from template */
|
|
|
|
switch (mtod(template, struct ip *)->ip_v) {
|
|
|
|
case 4:
|
|
|
|
family = AF_INET;
|
|
|
|
hlen = sizeof(struct ip);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
case 6:
|
|
|
|
family = AF_INET6;
|
|
|
|
hlen = sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return EAFNOSUPPORT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
MGETHDR(m, M_DONTWAIT, MT_HEADER);
|
|
|
|
if (m) {
|
|
|
|
MCLGET(m, M_DONTWAIT);
|
1999-07-22 16:56:56 +04:00
|
|
|
if ((m->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) {
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
m_free(m);
|
|
|
|
m = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
if (m == NULL)
|
1997-07-24 01:26:40 +04:00
|
|
|
return (ENOBUFS);
|
1998-04-29 09:16:46 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tcp_compat_42)
|
|
|
|
tlen = 1;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
tlen = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
m->m_data += max_linkhdr;
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
bcopy(mtod(template, caddr_t), mtod(m, caddr_t),
|
|
|
|
template->m_len);
|
|
|
|
switch (family) {
|
|
|
|
case AF_INET:
|
|
|
|
ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
|
|
|
|
th = (struct tcphdr *)(ip + 1);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
case AF_INET6:
|
|
|
|
ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
|
|
|
|
th = (struct tcphdr *)(ip6 + 1);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
/* noone will visit here */
|
|
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
|
|
return EAFNOSUPPORT;
|
1999-07-03 01:02:05 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
flags = TH_ACK;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2000-06-30 20:44:33 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((m->m_flags & M_PKTHDR) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
|
|
printf("non PKTHDR to tcp_respond\n");
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC
|
|
|
|
if (!th0)
|
|
|
|
panic("th0 == NULL in tcp_respond");
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
/* get family information from m */
|
|
|
|
switch (mtod(m, struct ip *)->ip_v) {
|
|
|
|
case 4:
|
|
|
|
family = AF_INET;
|
|
|
|
hlen = sizeof(struct ip);
|
2000-06-30 20:44:33 +04:00
|
|
|
ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
case 6:
|
|
|
|
family = AF_INET6;
|
|
|
|
hlen = sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);
|
2000-06-30 20:44:33 +04:00
|
|
|
ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
default:
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
return EAFNOSUPPORT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-06-30 20:44:33 +04:00
|
|
|
if ((flags & TH_SYN) == 0 || sizeof(*th0) > (th0->th_off << 2))
|
|
|
|
tlen = sizeof(*th0);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
tlen = th0->th_off << 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (m->m_len > hlen + tlen && (m->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0 &&
|
|
|
|
mtod(m, caddr_t) + hlen == (caddr_t)th0) {
|
|
|
|
m->m_len = hlen + tlen;
|
|
|
|
m_freem(m->m_next);
|
|
|
|
m->m_next = NULL;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
struct mbuf *n;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC
|
|
|
|
if (max_linkhdr + hlen + tlen > MCLBYTES) {
|
|
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
|
|
return EMSGSIZE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
MGETHDR(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_HEADER);
|
|
|
|
if (n && max_linkhdr + hlen + tlen > MHLEN) {
|
|
|
|
MCLGET(n, M_DONTWAIT);
|
|
|
|
if ((n->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
m_freem(n);
|
|
|
|
n = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!n) {
|
|
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
|
|
return ENOBUFS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
n->m_data += max_linkhdr;
|
|
|
|
n->m_len = hlen + tlen;
|
|
|
|
m_copyback(n, 0, hlen, mtod(m, caddr_t));
|
|
|
|
m_copyback(n, hlen, tlen, (caddr_t)th0);
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
2000-06-30 20:44:33 +04:00
|
|
|
m = n;
|
|
|
|
n = NULL;
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1994-05-13 10:02:48 +04:00
|
|
|
#define xchg(a,b,type) { type t; t=a; a=b; b=t; }
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
switch (family) {
|
|
|
|
case AF_INET:
|
|
|
|
ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
|
|
|
|
th = (struct tcphdr *)(ip + 1);
|
2000-06-30 20:44:33 +04:00
|
|
|
ip->ip_p = IPPROTO_TCP;
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
xchg(ip->ip_dst, ip->ip_src, struct in_addr);
|
1999-07-15 02:37:13 +04:00
|
|
|
ip->ip_p = IPPROTO_TCP;
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
case AF_INET6:
|
|
|
|
ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
|
|
|
|
th = (struct tcphdr *)(ip6 + 1);
|
2000-06-30 20:44:33 +04:00
|
|
|
ip6->ip6_nxt = IPPROTO_TCP;
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
xchg(ip6->ip6_dst, ip6->ip6_src, struct in6_addr);
|
1999-07-15 02:37:13 +04:00
|
|
|
ip6->ip6_nxt = IPPROTO_TCP;
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2000-06-30 20:44:33 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
/* noone will visit here */
|
|
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
|
|
return EAFNOSUPPORT;
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
xchg(th->th_dport, th->th_sport, u_int16_t);
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
#undef xchg
|
2000-06-30 20:44:33 +04:00
|
|
|
tlen = 0; /*be friendly with the following code*/
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
th->th_seq = htonl(seq);
|
|
|
|
th->th_ack = htonl(ack);
|
|
|
|
th->th_x2 = 0;
|
1997-07-24 01:26:40 +04:00
|
|
|
if ((flags & TH_SYN) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (tp)
|
2000-02-29 08:25:49 +03:00
|
|
|
win >>= tp->rcv_scale;
|
|
|
|
if (win > TCP_MAXWIN)
|
|
|
|
win = TCP_MAXWIN;
|
|
|
|
th->th_win = htons((u_int16_t)win);
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
th->th_off = sizeof (struct tcphdr) >> 2;
|
2000-06-30 20:44:33 +04:00
|
|
|
tlen += sizeof(*th);
|
1997-07-24 01:26:40 +04:00
|
|
|
} else
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
tlen += th->th_off << 2;
|
|
|
|
m->m_len = hlen + tlen;
|
|
|
|
m->m_pkthdr.len = hlen + tlen;
|
1997-07-24 01:26:40 +04:00
|
|
|
m->m_pkthdr.rcvif = (struct ifnet *) 0;
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
th->th_flags = flags;
|
|
|
|
th->th_urp = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (family) {
|
2000-10-17 07:06:42 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
case AF_INET:
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ipovly *ipov = (struct ipovly *)ip;
|
|
|
|
bzero(ipov->ih_x1, sizeof ipov->ih_x1);
|
|
|
|
ipov->ih_len = htons((u_int16_t)tlen);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
th->th_sum = 0;
|
|
|
|
th->th_sum = in_cksum(m, hlen + tlen);
|
|
|
|
ip->ip_len = hlen + tlen; /*will be flipped on output*/
|
|
|
|
ip->ip_ttl = ip_defttl;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-10-17 07:06:42 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
case AF_INET6:
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
th->th_sum = 0;
|
|
|
|
th->th_sum = in6_cksum(m, IPPROTO_TCP, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr),
|
|
|
|
tlen);
|
|
|
|
ip6->ip6_plen = ntohs(tlen);
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
if (tp && tp->t_in6pcb) {
|
|
|
|
struct ifnet *oifp;
|
|
|
|
ro = (struct route *)&tp->t_in6pcb->in6p_route;
|
|
|
|
oifp = ro->ro_rt ? ro->ro_rt->rt_ifp : NULL;
|
|
|
|
ip6->ip6_hlim = in6_selecthlim(tp->t_in6pcb, oifp);
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
ip6->ip6_hlim = ip6_defhlim;
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
ip6->ip6_flow &= ~IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK;
|
|
|
|
if (ip6_auto_flowlabel) {
|
2002-06-09 20:33:36 +04:00
|
|
|
ip6->ip6_flow |=
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
(htonl(ip6_flow_seq++) & IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef IPSEC
|
2001-01-24 12:04:15 +03:00
|
|
|
(void)ipsec_setsocket(m, NULL);
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif /*IPSEC*/
|
1999-01-20 06:39:54 +03:00
|
|
|
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
if (tp != NULL && tp->t_inpcb != NULL) {
|
1999-01-26 11:28:50 +03:00
|
|
|
ro = &tp->t_inpcb->inp_route;
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef IPSEC
|
2001-01-24 12:04:15 +03:00
|
|
|
if (ipsec_setsocket(m, tp->t_inpcb->inp_socket) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
|
|
return ENOBUFS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-01-26 11:28:50 +03:00
|
|
|
#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
if (family != AF_INET)
|
|
|
|
panic("tcp_respond: address family mismatch");
|
|
|
|
if (!in_hosteq(ip->ip_dst, tp->t_inpcb->inp_faddr)) {
|
|
|
|
panic("tcp_respond: ip_dst %x != inp_faddr %x",
|
|
|
|
ntohl(ip->ip_dst.s_addr),
|
1999-01-26 11:28:50 +03:00
|
|
|
ntohl(tp->t_inpcb->inp_faddr.s_addr));
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-01-26 11:28:50 +03:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
else if (tp != NULL && tp->t_in6pcb != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ro = (struct route *)&tp->t_in6pcb->in6p_route;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef IPSEC
|
2001-01-24 12:04:15 +03:00
|
|
|
if (ipsec_setsocket(m, tp->t_in6pcb->in6p_socket) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
|
|
return ENOBUFS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC
|
|
|
|
if (family == AF_INET) {
|
|
|
|
if (!IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&tp->t_in6pcb->in6p_faddr))
|
|
|
|
panic("tcp_respond: not mapped addr");
|
|
|
|
if (bcmp(&ip->ip_dst,
|
|
|
|
&tp->t_in6pcb->in6p_faddr.s6_addr32[3],
|
|
|
|
sizeof(ip->ip_dst)) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
panic("tcp_respond: ip_dst != in6p_faddr");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (family == AF_INET6) {
|
|
|
|
if (!IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&ip6->ip6_dst, &tp->t_in6pcb->in6p_faddr))
|
|
|
|
panic("tcp_respond: ip6_dst != in6p_faddr");
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
panic("tcp_respond: address family mismatch");
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2000-10-17 06:57:01 +04:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
ro = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
switch (family) {
|
2000-10-17 07:06:42 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
case AF_INET:
|
2000-10-17 06:57:01 +04:00
|
|
|
error = ip_output(m, NULL, ro,
|
2002-05-26 20:05:43 +04:00
|
|
|
(tp && tp->t_mtudisc ? IP_MTUDISC : 0),
|
2000-10-17 06:57:01 +04:00
|
|
|
NULL);
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2000-10-17 07:06:42 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
case AF_INET6:
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
error = ip6_output(m, NULL, (struct route_in6 *)ro, 0, NULL,
|
|
|
|
NULL);
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-07-02 16:45:32 +04:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
error = EAFNOSUPPORT;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-01-20 06:39:54 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Create a new TCP control block, making an
|
|
|
|
* empty reassembly queue and hooking it to the argument
|
|
|
|
* protocol control block.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct tcpcb *
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
tcp_newtcpcb(family, aux)
|
|
|
|
int family; /* selects inpcb, or in6pcb */
|
|
|
|
void *aux;
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2000-03-30 16:51:13 +04:00
|
|
|
struct tcpcb *tp;
|
2001-09-11 00:19:54 +04:00
|
|
|
int i;
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
switch (family) {
|
|
|
|
case PF_INET:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
case PF_INET6:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1998-08-02 04:36:19 +04:00
|
|
|
tp = pool_get(&tcpcb_pool, PR_NOWAIT);
|
1994-05-13 10:02:48 +04:00
|
|
|
if (tp == NULL)
|
1998-08-02 04:36:19 +04:00
|
|
|
return (NULL);
|
1996-09-09 18:51:07 +04:00
|
|
|
bzero((caddr_t)tp, sizeof(struct tcpcb));
|
2002-05-07 06:59:38 +04:00
|
|
|
TAILQ_INIT(&tp->segq);
|
|
|
|
TAILQ_INIT(&tp->timeq);
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
tp->t_family = family; /* may be overridden later on */
|
1997-11-08 05:35:22 +03:00
|
|
|
tp->t_peermss = tcp_mssdflt;
|
1997-09-23 01:49:55 +04:00
|
|
|
tp->t_ourmss = tcp_mssdflt;
|
1997-11-08 05:35:22 +03:00
|
|
|
tp->t_segsz = tcp_mssdflt;
|
1999-08-25 19:23:12 +04:00
|
|
|
LIST_INIT(&tp->t_sc);
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2001-09-10 08:24:24 +04:00
|
|
|
callout_init(&tp->t_delack_ch);
|
2001-09-11 00:19:54 +04:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < TCPT_NTIMERS; i++)
|
|
|
|
TCP_TIMER_INIT(tp, i);
|
2001-09-10 08:24:24 +04:00
|
|
|
|
1998-04-30 00:43:29 +04:00
|
|
|
tp->t_flags = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (tcp_do_rfc1323 && tcp_do_win_scale)
|
|
|
|
tp->t_flags |= TF_REQ_SCALE;
|
|
|
|
if (tcp_do_rfc1323 && tcp_do_timestamps)
|
|
|
|
tp->t_flags |= TF_REQ_TSTMP;
|
|
|
|
if (tcp_do_sack == 2)
|
|
|
|
tp->t_flags |= TF_WILL_SACK;
|
|
|
|
else if (tcp_do_sack == 1)
|
|
|
|
tp->t_flags |= TF_WILL_SACK|TF_IGNR_RXSACK;
|
|
|
|
tp->t_flags |= TF_CANT_TXSACK;
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
switch (family) {
|
|
|
|
case PF_INET:
|
|
|
|
tp->t_inpcb = (struct inpcb *)aux;
|
2002-05-26 20:05:43 +04:00
|
|
|
tp->t_mtudisc = ip_mtudisc;
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
case PF_INET6:
|
|
|
|
tp->t_in6pcb = (struct in6pcb *)aux;
|
2002-05-26 20:05:43 +04:00
|
|
|
/* for IPv6, always try to run path MTU discovery */
|
|
|
|
tp->t_mtudisc = 1;
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Init srtt to TCPTV_SRTTBASE (0), so we can tell that we have no
|
|
|
|
* rtt estimate. Set rttvar so that srtt + 2 * rttvar gives
|
|
|
|
* reasonable initial retransmit time.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
tp->t_srtt = TCPTV_SRTTBASE;
|
1995-06-12 00:39:22 +04:00
|
|
|
tp->t_rttvar = tcp_rttdflt * PR_SLOWHZ << (TCP_RTTVAR_SHIFT + 2 - 1);
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
tp->t_rttmin = TCPTV_MIN;
|
1995-06-12 00:39:22 +04:00
|
|
|
TCPT_RANGESET(tp->t_rxtcur, TCP_REXMTVAL(tp),
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
TCPTV_MIN, TCPTV_REXMTMAX);
|
1994-05-13 10:02:48 +04:00
|
|
|
tp->snd_cwnd = TCP_MAXWIN << TCP_MAX_WINSHIFT;
|
|
|
|
tp->snd_ssthresh = TCP_MAXWIN << TCP_MAX_WINSHIFT;
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
if (family == AF_INET) {
|
|
|
|
struct inpcb *inp = (struct inpcb *)aux;
|
|
|
|
inp->inp_ip.ip_ttl = ip_defttl;
|
|
|
|
inp->inp_ppcb = (caddr_t)tp;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
else if (family == AF_INET6) {
|
|
|
|
struct in6pcb *in6p = (struct in6pcb *)aux;
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
in6p->in6p_ip6.ip6_hlim = in6_selecthlim(in6p,
|
|
|
|
in6p->in6p_route.ro_rt ? in6p->in6p_route.ro_rt->rt_ifp
|
|
|
|
: NULL);
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
in6p->in6p_ppcb = (caddr_t)tp;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
Two changes, designed to make us even more resilient against TCP
ISS attacks (which we already fend off quite well).
1. First-cut implementation of RFC1948, Steve Bellovin's cryptographic
hash method of generating TCP ISS values. Note, this code is experimental
and disabled by default (experimental enough that I don't export the
variable via sysctl yet, either). There are a couple of issues I'd
like to discuss with Steve, so this code should only be used by people
who really know what they're doing.
2. Per a recent thread on Bugtraq, it's possible to determine a system's
uptime by snooping the RFC1323 TCP timestamp options sent by a host; in
4.4BSD, timestamps are created by incrementing the tcp_now variable
at 2 Hz; there's even a company out there that uses this to determine
web server uptime. According to Newsham's paper "The Problem With
Random Increments", while NetBSD's TCP ISS generation method is much
better than the "random increment" method used by FreeBSD and OpenBSD,
it is still theoretically possible to mount an attack against NetBSD's
method if the attacker knows how many times the tcp_iss_seq variable
has been incremented. By not leaking uptime information, we can make
that much harder to determine. So, we avoid the leak by giving each
TCP connection a timebase of 0.
2001-03-20 23:07:51 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Initialize our timebase. When we send timestamps, we take
|
|
|
|
* the delta from tcp_now -- this means each connection always
|
|
|
|
* gets a timebase of 0, which makes it, among other things,
|
|
|
|
* more difficult to determine how long a system has been up,
|
|
|
|
* and thus how many TCP sequence increments have occurred.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
tp->ts_timebase = tcp_now;
|
|
|
|
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
return (tp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Drop a TCP connection, reporting
|
|
|
|
* the specified error. If connection is synchronized,
|
|
|
|
* then send a RST to peer.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct tcpcb *
|
|
|
|
tcp_drop(tp, errno)
|
2000-03-30 16:51:13 +04:00
|
|
|
struct tcpcb *tp;
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
int errno;
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-10-29 09:33:59 +03:00
|
|
|
struct socket *so = NULL;
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2000-10-17 07:06:42 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC
|
|
|
|
if (tp->t_inpcb && tp->t_in6pcb)
|
|
|
|
panic("tcp_drop: both t_inpcb and t_in6pcb are set");
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
if (tp->t_inpcb)
|
|
|
|
so = tp->t_inpcb->inp_socket;
|
2000-10-17 07:06:42 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
2000-10-17 07:06:42 +04:00
|
|
|
if (tp->t_in6pcb)
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
so = tp->t_in6pcb->in6p_socket;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2000-10-29 09:33:59 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!so)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (TCPS_HAVERCVDSYN(tp->t_state)) {
|
|
|
|
tp->t_state = TCPS_CLOSED;
|
|
|
|
(void) tcp_output(tp);
|
|
|
|
tcpstat.tcps_drops++;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
tcpstat.tcps_conndrops++;
|
|
|
|
if (errno == ETIMEDOUT && tp->t_softerror)
|
|
|
|
errno = tp->t_softerror;
|
|
|
|
so->so_error = errno;
|
|
|
|
return (tcp_close(tp));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Close a TCP control block:
|
|
|
|
* discard all space held by the tcp
|
|
|
|
* discard internet protocol block
|
|
|
|
* wake up any sleepers
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct tcpcb *
|
|
|
|
tcp_close(tp)
|
2000-03-30 16:51:13 +04:00
|
|
|
struct tcpcb *tp;
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
struct inpcb *inp;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
struct in6pcb *in6p;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
struct socket *so;
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
#ifdef RTV_RTT
|
2000-03-30 16:51:13 +04:00
|
|
|
struct rtentry *rt;
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
struct route *ro;
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
inp = tp->t_inpcb;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
in6p = tp->t_in6pcb;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
so = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ro = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (inp) {
|
|
|
|
so = inp->inp_socket;
|
|
|
|
ro = &inp->inp_route;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
else if (in6p) {
|
|
|
|
so = in6p->in6p_socket;
|
|
|
|
ro = (struct route *)&in6p->in6p_route;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef RTV_RTT
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we sent enough data to get some meaningful characteristics,
|
2002-06-09 20:33:36 +04:00
|
|
|
* save them in the routing entry. 'Enough' is arbitrarily
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
* defined as the sendpipesize (default 4K) * 16. This would
|
|
|
|
* give us 16 rtt samples assuming we only get one sample per
|
|
|
|
* window (the usual case on a long haul net). 16 samples is
|
|
|
|
* enough for the srtt filter to converge to within 5% of the correct
|
|
|
|
* value; fewer samples and we could save a very bogus rtt.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Don't update the default route's characteristics and don't
|
|
|
|
* update anything that the user "locked".
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (SEQ_LT(tp->iss + so->so_snd.sb_hiwat * 16, tp->snd_max) &&
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
ro && (rt = ro->ro_rt) &&
|
1996-09-09 18:51:07 +04:00
|
|
|
!in_nullhost(satosin(rt_key(rt))->sin_addr)) {
|
2000-03-30 16:51:13 +04:00
|
|
|
u_long i = 0;
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((rt->rt_rmx.rmx_locks & RTV_RTT) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
i = tp->t_srtt *
|
1996-12-10 21:20:19 +03:00
|
|
|
((RTM_RTTUNIT / PR_SLOWHZ) >> (TCP_RTT_SHIFT + 2));
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
if (rt->rt_rmx.rmx_rtt && i)
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* filter this update to half the old & half
|
|
|
|
* the new values, converting scale.
|
|
|
|
* See route.h and tcp_var.h for a
|
|
|
|
* description of the scaling constants.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
rt->rt_rmx.rmx_rtt =
|
|
|
|
(rt->rt_rmx.rmx_rtt + i) / 2;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
rt->rt_rmx.rmx_rtt = i;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((rt->rt_rmx.rmx_locks & RTV_RTTVAR) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
i = tp->t_rttvar *
|
1996-12-10 21:20:19 +03:00
|
|
|
((RTM_RTTUNIT / PR_SLOWHZ) >> (TCP_RTTVAR_SHIFT + 2));
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
if (rt->rt_rmx.rmx_rttvar && i)
|
|
|
|
rt->rt_rmx.rmx_rttvar =
|
|
|
|
(rt->rt_rmx.rmx_rttvar + i) / 2;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
rt->rt_rmx.rmx_rttvar = i;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* update the pipelimit (ssthresh) if it has been updated
|
|
|
|
* already or if a pipesize was specified & the threshhold
|
|
|
|
* got below half the pipesize. I.e., wait for bad news
|
|
|
|
* before we start updating, then update on both good
|
|
|
|
* and bad news.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1996-02-14 02:40:59 +03:00
|
|
|
if (((rt->rt_rmx.rmx_locks & RTV_SSTHRESH) == 0 &&
|
|
|
|
(i = tp->snd_ssthresh) && rt->rt_rmx.rmx_ssthresh) ||
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
i < (rt->rt_rmx.rmx_sendpipe / 2)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* convert the limit from user data bytes to
|
|
|
|
* packets then to packet data bytes.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1997-11-08 05:35:22 +03:00
|
|
|
i = (i + tp->t_segsz / 2) / tp->t_segsz;
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
if (i < 2)
|
|
|
|
i = 2;
|
1997-11-08 05:35:22 +03:00
|
|
|
i *= (u_long)(tp->t_segsz + sizeof (struct tcpiphdr));
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
if (rt->rt_rmx.rmx_ssthresh)
|
|
|
|
rt->rt_rmx.rmx_ssthresh =
|
|
|
|
(rt->rt_rmx.rmx_ssthresh + i) / 2;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
rt->rt_rmx.rmx_ssthresh = i;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
1994-01-11 02:27:39 +03:00
|
|
|
#endif /* RTV_RTT */
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
/* free the reassembly queue, if any */
|
1998-12-19 00:38:02 +03:00
|
|
|
TCP_REASS_LOCK(tp);
|
1997-12-10 04:58:07 +03:00
|
|
|
(void) tcp_freeq(tp);
|
1998-12-19 00:38:02 +03:00
|
|
|
TCP_REASS_UNLOCK(tp);
|
|
|
|
|
2001-09-11 02:14:26 +04:00
|
|
|
tcp_canceltimers(tp);
|
1998-01-30 11:42:11 +03:00
|
|
|
TCP_CLEAR_DELACK(tp);
|
1999-08-25 19:23:12 +04:00
|
|
|
syn_cache_cleanup(tp);
|
1997-12-10 04:58:07 +03:00
|
|
|
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
if (tp->t_template) {
|
|
|
|
m_free(tp->t_template);
|
|
|
|
tp->t_template = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-08-02 04:36:19 +04:00
|
|
|
pool_put(&tcpcb_pool, tp);
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
if (inp) {
|
|
|
|
inp->inp_ppcb = 0;
|
|
|
|
soisdisconnected(so);
|
|
|
|
in_pcbdetach(inp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
else if (in6p) {
|
|
|
|
in6p->in6p_ppcb = 0;
|
|
|
|
soisdisconnected(so);
|
|
|
|
in6_pcbdetach(in6p);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
tcpstat.tcps_closed++;
|
|
|
|
return ((struct tcpcb *)0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1997-12-10 04:58:07 +03:00
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
tcp_freeq(tp)
|
|
|
|
struct tcpcb *tp;
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-03-30 16:51:13 +04:00
|
|
|
struct ipqent *qe;
|
1997-12-10 04:58:07 +03:00
|
|
|
int rv = 0;
|
1998-04-30 00:43:29 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef TCPREASS_DEBUG
|
|
|
|
int i = 0;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1997-12-10 04:58:07 +03:00
|
|
|
|
1998-12-19 00:38:02 +03:00
|
|
|
TCP_REASS_LOCK_CHECK(tp);
|
|
|
|
|
2002-05-07 06:59:38 +04:00
|
|
|
while ((qe = TAILQ_FIRST(&tp->segq)) != NULL) {
|
1998-04-30 00:43:29 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef TCPREASS_DEBUG
|
|
|
|
printf("tcp_freeq[%p,%d]: %u:%u(%u) 0x%02x\n",
|
|
|
|
tp, i++, qe->ipqe_seq, qe->ipqe_seq + qe->ipqe_len,
|
|
|
|
qe->ipqe_len, qe->ipqe_flags & (TH_SYN|TH_FIN|TH_RST));
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2002-05-07 06:59:38 +04:00
|
|
|
TAILQ_REMOVE(&tp->segq, qe, ipqe_q);
|
|
|
|
TAILQ_REMOVE(&tp->timeq, qe, ipqe_timeq);
|
1997-12-10 04:58:07 +03:00
|
|
|
m_freem(qe->ipqe_m);
|
1998-10-08 05:19:25 +04:00
|
|
|
pool_put(&ipqent_pool, qe);
|
1997-12-10 04:58:07 +03:00
|
|
|
rv = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (rv);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Protocol drain routine. Called when memory is in short supply.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1994-01-09 02:07:16 +03:00
|
|
|
void
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
tcp_drain()
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-03-30 16:51:13 +04:00
|
|
|
struct inpcb *inp;
|
|
|
|
struct tcpcb *tp;
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
|
1997-12-10 04:58:07 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Free the sequence queue of all TCP connections.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2001-11-04 23:55:25 +03:00
|
|
|
inp = CIRCLEQ_FIRST(&tcbtable.inpt_queue);
|
1997-12-10 04:58:07 +03:00
|
|
|
if (inp) /* XXX */
|
2001-11-04 23:55:25 +03:00
|
|
|
CIRCLEQ_FOREACH(inp, &tcbtable.inpt_queue, inp_queue) {
|
1997-12-10 04:58:07 +03:00
|
|
|
if ((tp = intotcpcb(inp)) != NULL) {
|
1998-12-19 00:38:02 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We may be called from a device's interrupt
|
|
|
|
* context. If the tcpcb is already busy,
|
|
|
|
* just bail out now.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (tcp_reass_lock_try(tp) == 0)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
1997-12-10 04:58:07 +03:00
|
|
|
if (tcp_freeq(tp))
|
|
|
|
tcpstat.tcps_connsdrained++;
|
1998-12-19 00:38:02 +03:00
|
|
|
TCP_REASS_UNLOCK(tp);
|
1997-12-10 04:58:07 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2002-03-15 12:25:41 +03:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
tcp6_drain()
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct in6pcb *in6p;
|
|
|
|
struct tcpcb *tp;
|
|
|
|
struct in6pcb *head = &tcb6;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Free the sequence queue of all TCP connections.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
for (in6p = head->in6p_next; in6p != head; in6p = in6p->in6p_next) {
|
|
|
|
if ((tp = in6totcpcb(in6p)) != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We may be called from a device's interrupt
|
|
|
|
* context. If the tcpcb is already busy,
|
|
|
|
* just bail out now.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (tcp_reass_lock_try(tp) == 0)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (tcp_freeq(tp))
|
|
|
|
tcpstat.tcps_connsdrained++;
|
|
|
|
TCP_REASS_UNLOCK(tp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Notify a tcp user of an asynchronous error;
|
|
|
|
* store error as soft error, but wake up user
|
|
|
|
* (for now, won't do anything until can select for soft error).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1994-01-09 02:07:16 +03:00
|
|
|
void
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
tcp_notify(inp, error)
|
1994-05-13 10:02:48 +04:00
|
|
|
struct inpcb *inp;
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-03-30 16:51:13 +04:00
|
|
|
struct tcpcb *tp = (struct tcpcb *)inp->inp_ppcb;
|
|
|
|
struct socket *so = inp->inp_socket;
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
|
1994-05-13 10:02:48 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Ignore some errors if we are hooked up.
|
|
|
|
* If connection hasn't completed, has retransmitted several times,
|
|
|
|
* and receives a second error, give up now. This is better
|
|
|
|
* than waiting a long time to establish a connection that
|
|
|
|
* can never complete.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (tp->t_state == TCPS_ESTABLISHED &&
|
|
|
|
(error == EHOSTUNREACH || error == ENETUNREACH ||
|
|
|
|
error == EHOSTDOWN)) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
1994-10-14 19:01:48 +03:00
|
|
|
} else if (TCPS_HAVEESTABLISHED(tp->t_state) == 0 &&
|
|
|
|
tp->t_rxtshift > 3 && tp->t_softerror)
|
1994-05-13 10:02:48 +04:00
|
|
|
so->so_error = error;
|
2002-06-09 20:33:36 +04:00
|
|
|
else
|
1994-05-13 10:02:48 +04:00
|
|
|
tp->t_softerror = error;
|
|
|
|
wakeup((caddr_t) &so->so_timeo);
|
|
|
|
sorwakeup(so);
|
|
|
|
sowwakeup(so);
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-10-20 00:22:59 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
1999-07-22 16:56:56 +04:00
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
tcp6_notify(in6p, error)
|
|
|
|
struct in6pcb *in6p;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-03-30 16:51:13 +04:00
|
|
|
struct tcpcb *tp = (struct tcpcb *)in6p->in6p_ppcb;
|
|
|
|
struct socket *so = in6p->in6p_socket;
|
1999-07-22 16:56:56 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Ignore some errors if we are hooked up.
|
|
|
|
* If connection hasn't completed, has retransmitted several times,
|
|
|
|
* and receives a second error, give up now. This is better
|
|
|
|
* than waiting a long time to establish a connection that
|
|
|
|
* can never complete.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (tp->t_state == TCPS_ESTABLISHED &&
|
|
|
|
(error == EHOSTUNREACH || error == ENETUNREACH ||
|
|
|
|
error == EHOSTDOWN)) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
} else if (TCPS_HAVEESTABLISHED(tp->t_state) == 0 &&
|
|
|
|
tp->t_rxtshift > 3 && tp->t_softerror)
|
|
|
|
so->so_error = error;
|
2002-06-09 20:33:36 +04:00
|
|
|
else
|
1999-07-22 16:56:56 +04:00
|
|
|
tp->t_softerror = error;
|
|
|
|
wakeup((caddr_t) &so->so_timeo);
|
|
|
|
sorwakeup(so);
|
|
|
|
sowwakeup(so);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2000-10-20 00:22:59 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
void
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
tcp6_ctlinput(cmd, sa, d)
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
int cmd;
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr *sa;
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
void *d;
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
1999-07-22 16:56:56 +04:00
|
|
|
struct tcphdr th;
|
|
|
|
void (*notify) __P((struct in6pcb *, int)) = tcp6_notify;
|
|
|
|
int nmatch;
|
2000-03-30 16:51:13 +04:00
|
|
|
struct ip6_hdr *ip6;
|
2001-02-11 09:49:49 +03:00
|
|
|
const struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6_src = NULL;
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
struct mbuf *m;
|
|
|
|
int off;
|
1999-07-22 16:56:56 +04:00
|
|
|
|
1999-08-09 14:55:29 +04:00
|
|
|
if (sa->sa_family != AF_INET6 ||
|
|
|
|
sa->sa_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
if ((unsigned)cmd >= PRC_NCMDS)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
else if (cmd == PRC_QUENCH) {
|
|
|
|
/* XXX there's no PRC_QUENCH in IPv6 */
|
1999-07-22 16:56:56 +04:00
|
|
|
notify = tcp6_quench;
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
} else if (PRC_IS_REDIRECT(cmd))
|
|
|
|
notify = in6_rtchange, d = NULL;
|
1999-07-22 16:56:56 +04:00
|
|
|
else if (cmd == PRC_MSGSIZE)
|
2000-10-19 01:14:12 +04:00
|
|
|
; /* special code is present, see below */
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
else if (cmd == PRC_HOSTDEAD)
|
|
|
|
d = NULL;
|
|
|
|
else if (inet6ctlerrmap[cmd] == 0)
|
1999-07-22 16:56:56 +04:00
|
|
|
return;
|
1999-07-31 22:41:15 +04:00
|
|
|
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
/* if the parameter is from icmp6, decode it. */
|
|
|
|
if (d != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
struct ip6ctlparam *ip6cp = (struct ip6ctlparam *)d;
|
|
|
|
m = ip6cp->ip6c_m;
|
|
|
|
ip6 = ip6cp->ip6c_ip6;
|
|
|
|
off = ip6cp->ip6c_off;
|
2001-02-11 09:49:49 +03:00
|
|
|
sa6_src = ip6cp->ip6c_src;
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
m = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ip6 = NULL;
|
2001-02-11 09:49:49 +03:00
|
|
|
sa6_src = &sa6_any;
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-07-22 16:56:56 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ip6) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* XXX: We assume that when ip6 is non NULL,
|
|
|
|
* M and OFF are valid.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2000-10-13 21:53:44 +04:00
|
|
|
/* check if we can safely examine src and dst ports */
|
2001-05-24 11:22:27 +04:00
|
|
|
if (m->m_pkthdr.len < off + sizeof(th)) {
|
|
|
|
if (cmd == PRC_MSGSIZE)
|
|
|
|
icmp6_mtudisc_update((struct ip6ctlparam *)d, 0);
|
2000-10-13 21:53:44 +04:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2001-05-24 11:22:27 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2000-10-13 21:53:44 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2001-02-11 09:49:49 +03:00
|
|
|
bzero(&th, sizeof(th));
|
|
|
|
m_copydata(m, off, sizeof(th), (caddr_t)&th);
|
2000-10-19 01:14:12 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (cmd == PRC_MSGSIZE) {
|
2000-12-09 04:29:45 +03:00
|
|
|
int valid = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2000-10-19 01:14:12 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Check to see if we have a valid TCP connection
|
|
|
|
* corresponding to the address in the ICMPv6 message
|
|
|
|
* payload.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2001-02-11 09:49:49 +03:00
|
|
|
if (in6_pcblookup_connect(&tcb6, &sa6->sin6_addr,
|
|
|
|
th.th_dport, (struct in6_addr *)&sa6_src->sin6_addr,
|
|
|
|
th.th_sport, 0))
|
2000-12-09 04:29:45 +03:00
|
|
|
valid++;
|
2000-10-19 01:14:12 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2001-02-11 09:49:49 +03:00
|
|
|
* Depending on the value of "valid" and routing table
|
|
|
|
* size (mtudisc_{hi,lo}wat), we will:
|
|
|
|
* - recalcurate the new MTU and create the
|
|
|
|
* corresponding routing entry, or
|
|
|
|
* - ignore the MTU change notification.
|
2000-10-19 01:14:12 +04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2000-12-09 04:29:45 +03:00
|
|
|
icmp6_mtudisc_update((struct ip6ctlparam *)d, valid);
|
2000-10-19 01:14:12 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2001-02-11 09:49:49 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* no need to call in6_pcbnotify, it should have been
|
|
|
|
* called via callback if necessary
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2000-10-19 01:14:12 +04:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-02-11 09:49:49 +03:00
|
|
|
nmatch = in6_pcbnotify(&tcb6, sa, th.th_dport,
|
|
|
|
(struct sockaddr *)sa6_src, th.th_sport, cmd, NULL, notify);
|
1999-07-22 16:56:56 +04:00
|
|
|
if (nmatch == 0 && syn_cache_count &&
|
|
|
|
(inet6ctlerrmap[cmd] == EHOSTUNREACH ||
|
|
|
|
inet6ctlerrmap[cmd] == ENETUNREACH ||
|
2001-02-11 09:49:49 +03:00
|
|
|
inet6ctlerrmap[cmd] == EHOSTDOWN))
|
|
|
|
syn_cache_unreach((struct sockaddr *)sa6_src,
|
|
|
|
sa, &th);
|
1999-07-22 16:56:56 +04:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2001-02-11 09:49:49 +03:00
|
|
|
(void) in6_pcbnotify(&tcb6, sa, 0, (struct sockaddr *)sa6_src,
|
|
|
|
0, cmd, NULL, notify);
|
1999-07-22 16:56:56 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2000-10-17 07:06:42 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
/* assumes that ip header and tcp header are contiguous on mbuf */
|
1996-02-14 02:40:59 +03:00
|
|
|
void *
|
|
|
|
tcp_ctlinput(cmd, sa, v)
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
int cmd;
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr *sa;
|
2000-03-30 16:51:13 +04:00
|
|
|
void *v;
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2000-03-30 16:51:13 +04:00
|
|
|
struct ip *ip = v;
|
|
|
|
struct tcphdr *th;
|
2000-10-18 21:09:14 +04:00
|
|
|
struct icmp *icp;
|
2001-11-04 16:42:27 +03:00
|
|
|
extern const int inetctlerrmap[];
|
1994-01-09 02:07:16 +03:00
|
|
|
void (*notify) __P((struct inpcb *, int)) = tcp_notify;
|
1995-06-12 10:48:54 +04:00
|
|
|
int errno;
|
1997-07-24 01:26:40 +04:00
|
|
|
int nmatch;
|
2002-07-02 00:51:25 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
struct in6_addr src6, dst6;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
|
1999-08-09 14:55:29 +04:00
|
|
|
if (sa->sa_family != AF_INET ||
|
|
|
|
sa->sa_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
1995-06-12 10:46:34 +04:00
|
|
|
if ((unsigned)cmd >= PRC_NCMDS)
|
1996-02-14 02:40:59 +03:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
1995-06-12 10:46:34 +04:00
|
|
|
errno = inetctlerrmap[cmd];
|
1995-06-12 10:24:21 +04:00
|
|
|
if (cmd == PRC_QUENCH)
|
|
|
|
notify = tcp_quench;
|
|
|
|
else if (PRC_IS_REDIRECT(cmd))
|
|
|
|
notify = in_rtchange, ip = 0;
|
2002-05-26 20:05:43 +04:00
|
|
|
else if (cmd == PRC_MSGSIZE && ip && ip->ip_v == 4) {
|
2000-10-18 21:09:14 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Check to see if we have a valid TCP connection
|
|
|
|
* corresponding to the address in the ICMP message
|
|
|
|
* payload.
|
2001-05-24 11:22:27 +04:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Boundary check is made in icmp_input(), with ICMP_ADVLENMIN.
|
2000-10-18 21:09:14 +04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
th = (struct tcphdr *)((caddr_t)ip + (ip->ip_hl << 2));
|
2002-07-02 00:51:25 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
memset(&src6, 0, sizeof(src6));
|
|
|
|
memset(&dst6, 0, sizeof(dst6));
|
|
|
|
src6.s6_addr16[5] = dst6.s6_addr16[5] = 0xffff;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&src6.s6_addr32[3], &ip->ip_src, sizeof(struct in_addr));
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&dst6.s6_addr32[3], &ip->ip_dst, sizeof(struct in_addr));
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (in_pcblookup_connect(&tcbtable, ip->ip_dst, th->th_dport,
|
|
|
|
ip->ip_src, th->th_sport) != NULL)
|
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
else if (in6_pcblookup_connect(&tcb6, &dst6,
|
|
|
|
th->th_dport, &src6, th->th_sport, 0) != NULL)
|
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
else
|
2000-10-18 21:09:14 +04:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Now that we've validated that we are actually communicating
|
|
|
|
* with the host indicated in the ICMP message, locate the
|
|
|
|
* ICMP header, recalculate the new MTU, and create the
|
|
|
|
* corresponding routing entry.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
icp = (struct icmp *)((caddr_t)ip -
|
|
|
|
offsetof(struct icmp, icmp_ip));
|
|
|
|
icmp_mtudisc(icp, ip->ip_dst);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
} else if (cmd == PRC_HOSTDEAD)
|
1995-06-12 10:24:21 +04:00
|
|
|
ip = 0;
|
1995-06-12 10:46:34 +04:00
|
|
|
else if (errno == 0)
|
1996-02-14 02:40:59 +03:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ip && ip->ip_v == 4 && sa->sa_family == AF_INET) {
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
th = (struct tcphdr *)((caddr_t)ip + (ip->ip_hl << 2));
|
1997-07-24 01:26:40 +04:00
|
|
|
nmatch = in_pcbnotify(&tcbtable, satosin(sa)->sin_addr,
|
|
|
|
th->th_dport, ip->ip_src, th->th_sport, errno, notify);
|
|
|
|
if (nmatch == 0 && syn_cache_count &&
|
|
|
|
(inetctlerrmap[cmd] == EHOSTUNREACH ||
|
|
|
|
inetctlerrmap[cmd] == ENETUNREACH ||
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
inetctlerrmap[cmd] == EHOSTDOWN)) {
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in sin;
|
|
|
|
bzero(&sin, sizeof(sin));
|
|
|
|
sin.sin_len = sizeof(sin);
|
|
|
|
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
|
|
|
|
sin.sin_port = th->th_sport;
|
|
|
|
sin.sin_addr = ip->ip_src;
|
|
|
|
syn_cache_unreach((struct sockaddr *)&sin, sa, th);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XXX mapped address case */
|
2000-10-18 21:09:14 +04:00
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
in_pcbnotifyall(&tcbtable, satosin(sa)->sin_addr, errno,
|
1996-09-09 18:51:07 +04:00
|
|
|
notify);
|
1996-02-14 02:40:59 +03:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
1998-07-18 03:02:38 +04:00
|
|
|
* When a source quence is received, we are being notifed of congestion.
|
|
|
|
* Close the congestion window down to the Loss Window (one segment).
|
|
|
|
* We will gradually open it again as we proceed.
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
*/
|
1994-01-09 02:07:16 +03:00
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
tcp_quench(inp, errno)
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
struct inpcb *inp;
|
1994-01-09 02:07:16 +03:00
|
|
|
int errno;
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct tcpcb *tp = intotcpcb(inp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tp)
|
1998-07-18 03:02:38 +04:00
|
|
|
tp->snd_cwnd = tp->t_segsz;
|
1993-03-21 12:45:37 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2000-10-17 07:06:42 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1997-09-23 01:49:55 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2000-10-20 00:22:59 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
1999-07-22 16:56:56 +04:00
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
tcp6_quench(in6p, errno)
|
|
|
|
struct in6pcb *in6p;
|
|
|
|
int errno;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct tcpcb *tp = in6totcpcb(in6p);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tp)
|
|
|
|
tp->snd_cwnd = tp->t_segsz;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2000-10-19 01:14:12 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
2000-10-18 21:09:14 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Path MTU Discovery handlers.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
tcp_mtudisc_callback(faddr)
|
|
|
|
struct in_addr faddr;
|
|
|
|
{
|
2002-07-02 00:51:25 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
struct in6_addr in6;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2000-10-18 21:09:14 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
in_pcbnotifyall(&tcbtable, faddr, EMSGSIZE, tcp_mtudisc);
|
2002-07-02 00:51:25 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
memset(&in6, 0, sizeof(in6));
|
|
|
|
in6.s6_addr16[5] = 0xffff;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&in6.s6_addr32[3], &faddr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
|
|
|
|
tcp6_mtudisc_callback(&in6);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2000-10-18 21:09:14 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1997-10-18 02:12:14 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* On receipt of path MTU corrections, flush old route and replace it
|
|
|
|
* with the new one. Retransmit all unacknowledged packets, to ensure
|
|
|
|
* that all packets will be received.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
tcp_mtudisc(inp, errno)
|
|
|
|
struct inpcb *inp;
|
|
|
|
int errno;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct tcpcb *tp = intotcpcb(inp);
|
|
|
|
struct rtentry *rt = in_pcbrtentry(inp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tp != 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (rt != 0) {
|
1997-12-12 01:47:24 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If this was not a host route, remove and realloc.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1997-10-18 02:12:14 +04:00
|
|
|
if ((rt->rt_flags & RTF_HOST) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
in_rtchange(inp, errno);
|
|
|
|
if ((rt = in_pcbrtentry(inp)) == 0)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1997-12-12 01:47:24 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Slow start out of the error condition. We
|
|
|
|
* use the MTU because we know it's smaller
|
|
|
|
* than the previously transmitted segment.
|
1998-07-18 03:09:58 +04:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Note: This is more conservative than the
|
|
|
|
* suggestion in draft-floyd-incr-init-win-03.
|
1997-12-12 01:47:24 +03:00
|
|
|
*/
|
1997-11-08 05:35:22 +03:00
|
|
|
if (rt->rt_rmx.rmx_mtu != 0)
|
1997-12-12 01:47:24 +03:00
|
|
|
tp->snd_cwnd =
|
1998-04-01 02:49:09 +04:00
|
|
|
TCP_INITIAL_WINDOW(tcp_init_win,
|
|
|
|
rt->rt_rmx.rmx_mtu);
|
1997-10-18 02:12:14 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-09 20:33:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
1997-12-12 01:47:24 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Resend unacknowledged packets.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1997-10-18 02:12:14 +04:00
|
|
|
tp->snd_nxt = tp->snd_una;
|
|
|
|
tcp_output(tp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-10-19 01:14:12 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1997-10-18 02:12:14 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2000-10-20 00:22:59 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
2000-10-19 01:14:12 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Path MTU Discovery handlers.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
tcp6_mtudisc_callback(faddr)
|
|
|
|
struct in6_addr *faddr;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in6 sin6;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bzero(&sin6, sizeof(sin6));
|
|
|
|
sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
|
|
|
|
sin6.sin6_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
|
|
|
|
sin6.sin6_addr = *faddr;
|
|
|
|
(void) in6_pcbnotify(&tcb6, (struct sockaddr *)&sin6, 0,
|
2001-02-11 09:49:49 +03:00
|
|
|
(struct sockaddr *)&sa6_any, 0, PRC_MSGSIZE, NULL, tcp6_mtudisc);
|
2000-10-19 01:14:12 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-07-22 16:56:56 +04:00
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
tcp6_mtudisc(in6p, errno)
|
|
|
|
struct in6pcb *in6p;
|
|
|
|
int errno;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct tcpcb *tp = in6totcpcb(in6p);
|
|
|
|
struct rtentry *rt = in6_pcbrtentry(in6p);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tp != 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (rt != 0) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If this was not a host route, remove and realloc.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((rt->rt_flags & RTF_HOST) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
in6_rtchange(in6p, errno);
|
|
|
|
if ((rt = in6_pcbrtentry(in6p)) == 0)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Slow start out of the error condition. We
|
|
|
|
* use the MTU because we know it's smaller
|
|
|
|
* than the previously transmitted segment.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Note: This is more conservative than the
|
|
|
|
* suggestion in draft-floyd-incr-init-win-03.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (rt->rt_rmx.rmx_mtu != 0)
|
|
|
|
tp->snd_cwnd =
|
|
|
|
TCP_INITIAL_WINDOW(tcp_init_win,
|
|
|
|
rt->rt_rmx.rmx_mtu);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Resend unacknowledged packets.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
tp->snd_nxt = tp->snd_una;
|
|
|
|
tcp_output(tp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-10-20 00:22:59 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif /* INET6 */
|
1997-10-18 02:12:14 +04:00
|
|
|
|
1997-09-23 01:49:55 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Compute the MSS to advertise to the peer. Called only during
|
|
|
|
* the 3-way handshake. If we are the server (peer initiated
|
1998-05-08 02:30:23 +04:00
|
|
|
* connection), we are called with a pointer to the interface
|
2002-06-09 20:33:36 +04:00
|
|
|
* on which the SYN packet arrived. If we are the client (we
|
1998-05-08 02:30:23 +04:00
|
|
|
* initiated connection), we are called with a pointer to the
|
|
|
|
* interface out which this connection should go.
|
1999-09-23 06:21:30 +04:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* NOTE: Do not subtract IP option/extension header size nor IPsec
|
|
|
|
* header size from MSS advertisement. MSS option must hold the maximum
|
|
|
|
* segment size we can accept, so it must always be:
|
|
|
|
* max(if mtu) - ip header - tcp header
|
1997-09-23 01:49:55 +04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
1998-04-14 01:18:19 +04:00
|
|
|
u_long
|
1999-09-23 06:21:30 +04:00
|
|
|
tcp_mss_to_advertise(ifp, af)
|
1998-04-14 01:18:19 +04:00
|
|
|
const struct ifnet *ifp;
|
1999-09-23 06:21:30 +04:00
|
|
|
int af;
|
1997-09-23 01:49:55 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
extern u_long in_maxmtu;
|
1998-04-14 01:18:19 +04:00
|
|
|
u_long mss = 0;
|
1999-09-23 06:21:30 +04:00
|
|
|
u_long hdrsiz;
|
1997-09-23 01:49:55 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* In order to avoid defeating path MTU discovery on the peer,
|
|
|
|
* we advertise the max MTU of all attached networks as our MSS,
|
|
|
|
* per RFC 1191, section 3.1.
|
1998-04-14 01:18:19 +04:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We provide the option to advertise just the MTU of
|
|
|
|
* the interface on which we hope this connection will
|
|
|
|
* be receiving. If we are responding to a SYN, we
|
|
|
|
* will have a pretty good idea about this, but when
|
|
|
|
* initiating a connection there is a bit more doubt.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We also need to ensure that loopback has a large enough
|
|
|
|
* MSS, as the loopback MTU is never included in in_maxmtu.
|
1997-09-23 01:49:55 +04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
1998-04-14 01:18:19 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ifp != NULL)
|
2002-05-29 11:53:39 +04:00
|
|
|
switch (af) {
|
|
|
|
case AF_INET:
|
|
|
|
mss = ifp->if_mtu;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
case AF_INET6:
|
|
|
|
mss = IN6_LINKMTU(ifp);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-04-14 01:18:19 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tcp_mss_ifmtu == 0)
|
2001-07-23 19:17:58 +04:00
|
|
|
switch (af) {
|
|
|
|
case AF_INET:
|
|
|
|
mss = max(in_maxmtu, mss);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2001-07-23 19:20:41 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
2001-07-23 19:17:58 +04:00
|
|
|
case AF_INET6:
|
|
|
|
mss = max(in6_maxmtu, mss);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2001-07-23 19:20:41 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-07-23 19:17:58 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
1998-04-14 01:18:19 +04:00
|
|
|
|
1999-09-23 06:21:30 +04:00
|
|
|
switch (af) {
|
|
|
|
case AF_INET:
|
|
|
|
hdrsiz = sizeof(struct ip);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
1999-09-23 08:02:27 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
1999-09-23 06:21:30 +04:00
|
|
|
case AF_INET6:
|
|
|
|
hdrsiz = sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
1999-09-23 08:02:27 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-09-23 06:21:30 +04:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
hdrsiz = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hdrsiz += sizeof(struct tcphdr);
|
|
|
|
if (mss > hdrsiz)
|
|
|
|
mss -= hdrsiz;
|
1998-04-14 01:18:19 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mss = max(tcp_mssdflt, mss);
|
1997-09-23 01:49:55 +04:00
|
|
|
return (mss);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Set connection variables based on the peer's advertised MSS.
|
|
|
|
* We are passed the TCPCB for the actual connection. If we
|
|
|
|
* are the server, we are called by the compressed state engine
|
|
|
|
* when the 3-way handshake is complete. If we are the client,
|
2001-06-12 19:17:10 +04:00
|
|
|
* we are called when we receive the SYN,ACK from the server.
|
1997-09-23 01:49:55 +04:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* NOTE: Our advertised MSS value must be initialized in the TCPCB
|
|
|
|
* before this routine is called!
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
tcp_mss_from_peer(tp, offer)
|
|
|
|
struct tcpcb *tp;
|
|
|
|
int offer;
|
|
|
|
{
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
struct socket *so;
|
1997-09-23 01:49:55 +04:00
|
|
|
#if defined(RTV_SPIPE) || defined(RTV_SSTHRESH)
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
struct rtentry *rt;
|
1997-09-23 01:49:55 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
u_long bufsize;
|
|
|
|
int mss;
|
|
|
|
|
2000-10-17 07:06:42 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC
|
|
|
|
if (tp->t_inpcb && tp->t_in6pcb)
|
|
|
|
panic("tcp_mss_from_peer: both t_inpcb and t_in6pcb are set");
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
so = NULL;
|
|
|
|
rt = NULL;
|
2000-10-17 07:06:42 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
if (tp->t_inpcb) {
|
|
|
|
so = tp->t_inpcb->inp_socket;
|
|
|
|
#if defined(RTV_SPIPE) || defined(RTV_SSTHRESH)
|
|
|
|
rt = in_pcbrtentry(tp->t_inpcb);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-10-17 07:06:42 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
2000-10-17 07:06:42 +04:00
|
|
|
if (tp->t_in6pcb) {
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
so = tp->t_in6pcb->in6p_socket;
|
|
|
|
#if defined(RTV_SPIPE) || defined(RTV_SSTHRESH)
|
|
|
|
rt = in6_pcbrtentry(tp->t_in6pcb);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
1997-09-23 01:49:55 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2002-06-09 20:33:36 +04:00
|
|
|
* As per RFC1122, use the default MSS value, unless they
|
1998-03-18 02:50:30 +03:00
|
|
|
* sent us an offer. Do not accept offers less than 32 bytes.
|
1997-09-23 01:49:55 +04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
1998-03-18 02:50:30 +03:00
|
|
|
mss = tcp_mssdflt;
|
1997-09-23 01:49:55 +04:00
|
|
|
if (offer)
|
|
|
|
mss = offer;
|
|
|
|
mss = max(mss, 32); /* sanity */
|
1998-05-13 01:45:51 +04:00
|
|
|
tp->t_peermss = mss;
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
mss -= tcp_optlen(tp);
|
2000-10-17 07:06:42 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
if (tp->t_inpcb)
|
|
|
|
mss -= ip_optlen(tp->t_inpcb);
|
2000-10-17 07:06:42 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
2000-10-17 07:06:42 +04:00
|
|
|
if (tp->t_in6pcb)
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
mss -= ip6_optlen(tp->t_in6pcb);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1997-09-23 01:49:55 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If there's a pipesize, change the socket buffer to that size.
|
|
|
|
* Make the socket buffer an integral number of MSS units. If
|
|
|
|
* the MSS is larger than the socket buffer, artificially decrease
|
|
|
|
* the MSS.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifdef RTV_SPIPE
|
|
|
|
if (rt != NULL && rt->rt_rmx.rmx_sendpipe != 0)
|
|
|
|
bufsize = rt->rt_rmx.rmx_sendpipe;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
bufsize = so->so_snd.sb_hiwat;
|
|
|
|
if (bufsize < mss)
|
|
|
|
mss = bufsize;
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
bufsize = roundup(bufsize, mss);
|
|
|
|
if (bufsize > sb_max)
|
|
|
|
bufsize = sb_max;
|
|
|
|
(void) sbreserve(&so->so_snd, bufsize);
|
|
|
|
}
|
1997-11-08 05:35:22 +03:00
|
|
|
tp->t_segsz = mss;
|
1997-09-23 01:49:55 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef RTV_SSTHRESH
|
|
|
|
if (rt != NULL && rt->rt_rmx.rmx_ssthresh) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* There's some sort of gateway or interface buffer
|
|
|
|
* limit on the path. Use this to set the slow
|
|
|
|
* start threshold, but set the threshold to no less
|
|
|
|
* than 2 * MSS.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
tp->snd_ssthresh = max(2 * mss, rt->rt_rmx.rmx_ssthresh);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Processing necessary when a TCP connection is established.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
tcp_established(tp)
|
|
|
|
struct tcpcb *tp;
|
|
|
|
{
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
struct socket *so;
|
1997-09-23 01:49:55 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef RTV_RPIPE
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
struct rtentry *rt;
|
1997-09-23 01:49:55 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
u_long bufsize;
|
|
|
|
|
2000-10-17 07:06:42 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC
|
|
|
|
if (tp->t_inpcb && tp->t_in6pcb)
|
|
|
|
panic("tcp_established: both t_inpcb and t_in6pcb are set");
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
so = NULL;
|
|
|
|
rt = NULL;
|
2000-10-17 07:06:42 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
if (tp->t_inpcb) {
|
|
|
|
so = tp->t_inpcb->inp_socket;
|
|
|
|
#if defined(RTV_RPIPE)
|
|
|
|
rt = in_pcbrtentry(tp->t_inpcb);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-10-17 07:06:42 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
2000-10-17 07:06:42 +04:00
|
|
|
if (tp->t_in6pcb) {
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
so = tp->t_in6pcb->in6p_socket;
|
|
|
|
#if defined(RTV_RPIPE)
|
|
|
|
rt = in6_pcbrtentry(tp->t_in6pcb);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
1997-09-23 01:49:55 +04:00
|
|
|
tp->t_state = TCPS_ESTABLISHED;
|
1998-05-06 05:21:20 +04:00
|
|
|
TCP_TIMER_ARM(tp, TCPT_KEEP, tcp_keepidle);
|
1997-09-23 01:49:55 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef RTV_RPIPE
|
|
|
|
if (rt != NULL && rt->rt_rmx.rmx_recvpipe != 0)
|
|
|
|
bufsize = rt->rt_rmx.rmx_recvpipe;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
bufsize = so->so_rcv.sb_hiwat;
|
|
|
|
if (bufsize > tp->t_ourmss) {
|
|
|
|
bufsize = roundup(bufsize, tp->t_ourmss);
|
|
|
|
if (bufsize > sb_max)
|
|
|
|
bufsize = sb_max;
|
|
|
|
(void) sbreserve(&so->so_rcv, bufsize);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Check if there's an initial rtt or rttvar. Convert from the
|
|
|
|
* route-table units to scaled multiples of the slow timeout timer.
|
|
|
|
* Called only during the 3-way handshake.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
tcp_rmx_rtt(tp)
|
|
|
|
struct tcpcb *tp;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
#ifdef RTV_RTT
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
struct rtentry *rt = NULL;
|
1997-09-23 01:49:55 +04:00
|
|
|
int rtt;
|
|
|
|
|
2000-10-17 07:06:42 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC
|
|
|
|
if (tp->t_inpcb && tp->t_in6pcb)
|
|
|
|
panic("tcp_rmx_rtt: both t_inpcb and t_in6pcb are set");
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
if (tp->t_inpcb)
|
|
|
|
rt = in_pcbrtentry(tp->t_inpcb);
|
2000-10-17 07:06:42 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
2000-10-20 00:22:59 +04:00
|
|
|
if (tp->t_in6pcb)
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
rt = in6_pcbrtentry(tp->t_in6pcb);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (rt == NULL)
|
1997-09-23 01:49:55 +04:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tp->t_srtt == 0 && (rtt = rt->rt_rmx.rmx_rtt)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* XXX The lock bit for MTU indicates that the value
|
|
|
|
* is also a minimum value; this is subject to time.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (rt->rt_rmx.rmx_locks & RTV_RTT)
|
1998-03-20 01:29:33 +03:00
|
|
|
TCPT_RANGESET(tp->t_rttmin,
|
|
|
|
rtt / (RTM_RTTUNIT / PR_SLOWHZ),
|
|
|
|
TCPTV_MIN, TCPTV_REXMTMAX);
|
1997-09-23 01:49:55 +04:00
|
|
|
tp->t_srtt = rtt /
|
|
|
|
((RTM_RTTUNIT / PR_SLOWHZ) >> (TCP_RTT_SHIFT + 2));
|
|
|
|
if (rt->rt_rmx.rmx_rttvar) {
|
|
|
|
tp->t_rttvar = rt->rt_rmx.rmx_rttvar /
|
|
|
|
((RTM_RTTUNIT / PR_SLOWHZ) >>
|
|
|
|
(TCP_RTTVAR_SHIFT + 2));
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* Default variation is +- 1 rtt */
|
|
|
|
tp->t_rttvar =
|
|
|
|
tp->t_srtt >> (TCP_RTT_SHIFT - TCP_RTTVAR_SHIFT);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
TCPT_RANGESET(tp->t_rxtcur,
|
|
|
|
((tp->t_srtt >> 2) + tp->t_rttvar) >> (1 + 2),
|
|
|
|
tp->t_rttmin, TCPTV_REXMTMAX);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
1997-10-10 05:51:07 +04:00
|
|
|
|
1997-10-13 04:46:08 +04:00
|
|
|
tcp_seq tcp_iss_seq = 0; /* tcp initial seq # */
|
Two changes, designed to make us even more resilient against TCP
ISS attacks (which we already fend off quite well).
1. First-cut implementation of RFC1948, Steve Bellovin's cryptographic
hash method of generating TCP ISS values. Note, this code is experimental
and disabled by default (experimental enough that I don't export the
variable via sysctl yet, either). There are a couple of issues I'd
like to discuss with Steve, so this code should only be used by people
who really know what they're doing.
2. Per a recent thread on Bugtraq, it's possible to determine a system's
uptime by snooping the RFC1323 TCP timestamp options sent by a host; in
4.4BSD, timestamps are created by incrementing the tcp_now variable
at 2 Hz; there's even a company out there that uses this to determine
web server uptime. According to Newsham's paper "The Problem With
Random Increments", while NetBSD's TCP ISS generation method is much
better than the "random increment" method used by FreeBSD and OpenBSD,
it is still theoretically possible to mount an attack against NetBSD's
method if the attacker knows how many times the tcp_iss_seq variable
has been incremented. By not leaking uptime information, we can make
that much harder to determine. So, we avoid the leak by giving each
TCP connection a timebase of 0.
2001-03-20 23:07:51 +03:00
|
|
|
#if NRND > 0
|
|
|
|
u_int8_t tcp_iss_secret[16]; /* 128 bits; should be plenty */
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1997-10-13 04:46:08 +04:00
|
|
|
|
1997-10-10 05:51:07 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Get a new sequence value given a tcp control block
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
tcp_seq
|
Two changes, designed to make us even more resilient against TCP
ISS attacks (which we already fend off quite well).
1. First-cut implementation of RFC1948, Steve Bellovin's cryptographic
hash method of generating TCP ISS values. Note, this code is experimental
and disabled by default (experimental enough that I don't export the
variable via sysctl yet, either). There are a couple of issues I'd
like to discuss with Steve, so this code should only be used by people
who really know what they're doing.
2. Per a recent thread on Bugtraq, it's possible to determine a system's
uptime by snooping the RFC1323 TCP timestamp options sent by a host; in
4.4BSD, timestamps are created by incrementing the tcp_now variable
at 2 Hz; there's even a company out there that uses this to determine
web server uptime. According to Newsham's paper "The Problem With
Random Increments", while NetBSD's TCP ISS generation method is much
better than the "random increment" method used by FreeBSD and OpenBSD,
it is still theoretically possible to mount an attack against NetBSD's
method if the attacker knows how many times the tcp_iss_seq variable
has been incremented. By not leaking uptime information, we can make
that much harder to determine. So, we avoid the leak by giving each
TCP connection a timebase of 0.
2001-03-20 23:07:51 +03:00
|
|
|
tcp_new_iss(struct tcpcb *tp, tcp_seq addin)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
|
|
|
if (tp->t_inpcb != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return (tcp_new_iss1(&tp->t_inpcb->inp_laddr,
|
|
|
|
&tp->t_inpcb->inp_faddr, tp->t_inpcb->inp_lport,
|
|
|
|
tp->t_inpcb->inp_fport, sizeof(tp->t_inpcb->inp_laddr),
|
|
|
|
addin));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
|
|
if (tp->t_in6pcb != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return (tcp_new_iss1(&tp->t_in6pcb->in6p_laddr,
|
|
|
|
&tp->t_in6pcb->in6p_faddr, tp->t_in6pcb->in6p_lport,
|
|
|
|
tp->t_in6pcb->in6p_fport, sizeof(tp->t_in6pcb->in6p_laddr),
|
|
|
|
addin));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Not possible. */
|
|
|
|
panic("tcp_new_iss");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This routine actually generates a new TCP initial sequence number.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
tcp_seq
|
|
|
|
tcp_new_iss1(void *laddr, void *faddr, u_int16_t lport, u_int16_t fport,
|
|
|
|
size_t addrsz, tcp_seq addin)
|
1997-10-10 05:51:07 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
Two changes, designed to make us even more resilient against TCP
ISS attacks (which we already fend off quite well).
1. First-cut implementation of RFC1948, Steve Bellovin's cryptographic
hash method of generating TCP ISS values. Note, this code is experimental
and disabled by default (experimental enough that I don't export the
variable via sysctl yet, either). There are a couple of issues I'd
like to discuss with Steve, so this code should only be used by people
who really know what they're doing.
2. Per a recent thread on Bugtraq, it's possible to determine a system's
uptime by snooping the RFC1323 TCP timestamp options sent by a host; in
4.4BSD, timestamps are created by incrementing the tcp_now variable
at 2 Hz; there's even a company out there that uses this to determine
web server uptime. According to Newsham's paper "The Problem With
Random Increments", while NetBSD's TCP ISS generation method is much
better than the "random increment" method used by FreeBSD and OpenBSD,
it is still theoretically possible to mount an attack against NetBSD's
method if the attacker knows how many times the tcp_iss_seq variable
has been incremented. By not leaking uptime information, we can make
that much harder to determine. So, we avoid the leak by giving each
TCP connection a timebase of 0.
2001-03-20 23:07:51 +03:00
|
|
|
tcp_seq tcp_iss;
|
1997-10-10 05:51:07 +04:00
|
|
|
|
Two changes, designed to make us even more resilient against TCP
ISS attacks (which we already fend off quite well).
1. First-cut implementation of RFC1948, Steve Bellovin's cryptographic
hash method of generating TCP ISS values. Note, this code is experimental
and disabled by default (experimental enough that I don't export the
variable via sysctl yet, either). There are a couple of issues I'd
like to discuss with Steve, so this code should only be used by people
who really know what they're doing.
2. Per a recent thread on Bugtraq, it's possible to determine a system's
uptime by snooping the RFC1323 TCP timestamp options sent by a host; in
4.4BSD, timestamps are created by incrementing the tcp_now variable
at 2 Hz; there's even a company out there that uses this to determine
web server uptime. According to Newsham's paper "The Problem With
Random Increments", while NetBSD's TCP ISS generation method is much
better than the "random increment" method used by FreeBSD and OpenBSD,
it is still theoretically possible to mount an attack against NetBSD's
method if the attacker knows how many times the tcp_iss_seq variable
has been incremented. By not leaking uptime information, we can make
that much harder to determine. So, we avoid the leak by giving each
TCP connection a timebase of 0.
2001-03-20 23:07:51 +03:00
|
|
|
#if NRND > 0
|
2001-03-21 06:35:11 +03:00
|
|
|
static int beenhere;
|
|
|
|
|
1997-10-10 05:51:07 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
Two changes, designed to make us even more resilient against TCP
ISS attacks (which we already fend off quite well).
1. First-cut implementation of RFC1948, Steve Bellovin's cryptographic
hash method of generating TCP ISS values. Note, this code is experimental
and disabled by default (experimental enough that I don't export the
variable via sysctl yet, either). There are a couple of issues I'd
like to discuss with Steve, so this code should only be used by people
who really know what they're doing.
2. Per a recent thread on Bugtraq, it's possible to determine a system's
uptime by snooping the RFC1323 TCP timestamp options sent by a host; in
4.4BSD, timestamps are created by incrementing the tcp_now variable
at 2 Hz; there's even a company out there that uses this to determine
web server uptime. According to Newsham's paper "The Problem With
Random Increments", while NetBSD's TCP ISS generation method is much
better than the "random increment" method used by FreeBSD and OpenBSD,
it is still theoretically possible to mount an attack against NetBSD's
method if the attacker knows how many times the tcp_iss_seq variable
has been incremented. By not leaking uptime information, we can make
that much harder to determine. So, we avoid the leak by giving each
TCP connection a timebase of 0.
2001-03-20 23:07:51 +03:00
|
|
|
* If we haven't been here before, initialize our cryptographic
|
|
|
|
* hash secret.
|
1997-10-10 05:51:07 +04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
Two changes, designed to make us even more resilient against TCP
ISS attacks (which we already fend off quite well).
1. First-cut implementation of RFC1948, Steve Bellovin's cryptographic
hash method of generating TCP ISS values. Note, this code is experimental
and disabled by default (experimental enough that I don't export the
variable via sysctl yet, either). There are a couple of issues I'd
like to discuss with Steve, so this code should only be used by people
who really know what they're doing.
2. Per a recent thread on Bugtraq, it's possible to determine a system's
uptime by snooping the RFC1323 TCP timestamp options sent by a host; in
4.4BSD, timestamps are created by incrementing the tcp_now variable
at 2 Hz; there's even a company out there that uses this to determine
web server uptime. According to Newsham's paper "The Problem With
Random Increments", while NetBSD's TCP ISS generation method is much
better than the "random increment" method used by FreeBSD and OpenBSD,
it is still theoretically possible to mount an attack against NetBSD's
method if the attacker knows how many times the tcp_iss_seq variable
has been incremented. By not leaking uptime information, we can make
that much harder to determine. So, we avoid the leak by giving each
TCP connection a timebase of 0.
2001-03-20 23:07:51 +03:00
|
|
|
if (beenhere == 0) {
|
|
|
|
rnd_extract_data(tcp_iss_secret, sizeof(tcp_iss_secret),
|
|
|
|
RND_EXTRACT_ANY);
|
|
|
|
beenhere = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tcp_do_rfc1948) {
|
|
|
|
MD5_CTX ctx;
|
|
|
|
u_int8_t hash[16]; /* XXX MD5 knowledge */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Compute the base value of the ISS. It is a hash
|
|
|
|
* of (saddr, sport, daddr, dport, secret).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
MD5Init(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
MD5Update(&ctx, (u_char *) laddr, addrsz);
|
|
|
|
MD5Update(&ctx, (u_char *) &lport, sizeof(lport));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
MD5Update(&ctx, (u_char *) faddr, addrsz);
|
|
|
|
MD5Update(&ctx, (u_char *) &fport, sizeof(fport));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
MD5Update(&ctx, tcp_iss_secret, sizeof(tcp_iss_secret));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
MD5Final(hash, &ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&tcp_iss, hash, sizeof(tcp_iss));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Now increment our "timer", and add it in to
|
|
|
|
* the computed value.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* XXX Use `addin'?
|
|
|
|
* XXX TCP_ISSINCR too large to use?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
tcp_iss_seq += TCP_ISSINCR;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TCPISS_DEBUG
|
|
|
|
printf("ISS hash 0x%08x, ", tcp_iss);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
tcp_iss += tcp_iss_seq + addin;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TCPISS_DEBUG
|
|
|
|
printf("new ISS 0x%08x\n", tcp_iss);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
#endif /* NRND > 0 */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Randomize.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1997-10-13 04:46:08 +04:00
|
|
|
#if NRND > 0
|
Two changes, designed to make us even more resilient against TCP
ISS attacks (which we already fend off quite well).
1. First-cut implementation of RFC1948, Steve Bellovin's cryptographic
hash method of generating TCP ISS values. Note, this code is experimental
and disabled by default (experimental enough that I don't export the
variable via sysctl yet, either). There are a couple of issues I'd
like to discuss with Steve, so this code should only be used by people
who really know what they're doing.
2. Per a recent thread on Bugtraq, it's possible to determine a system's
uptime by snooping the RFC1323 TCP timestamp options sent by a host; in
4.4BSD, timestamps are created by incrementing the tcp_now variable
at 2 Hz; there's even a company out there that uses this to determine
web server uptime. According to Newsham's paper "The Problem With
Random Increments", while NetBSD's TCP ISS generation method is much
better than the "random increment" method used by FreeBSD and OpenBSD,
it is still theoretically possible to mount an attack against NetBSD's
method if the attacker knows how many times the tcp_iss_seq variable
has been incremented. By not leaking uptime information, we can make
that much harder to determine. So, we avoid the leak by giving each
TCP connection a timebase of 0.
2001-03-20 23:07:51 +03:00
|
|
|
rnd_extract_data(&tcp_iss, sizeof(tcp_iss), RND_EXTRACT_ANY);
|
1997-10-13 04:46:08 +04:00
|
|
|
#else
|
2002-05-28 14:17:27 +04:00
|
|
|
tcp_iss = arc4random();
|
1997-10-13 04:46:08 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1997-10-10 05:51:07 +04:00
|
|
|
|
Two changes, designed to make us even more resilient against TCP
ISS attacks (which we already fend off quite well).
1. First-cut implementation of RFC1948, Steve Bellovin's cryptographic
hash method of generating TCP ISS values. Note, this code is experimental
and disabled by default (experimental enough that I don't export the
variable via sysctl yet, either). There are a couple of issues I'd
like to discuss with Steve, so this code should only be used by people
who really know what they're doing.
2. Per a recent thread on Bugtraq, it's possible to determine a system's
uptime by snooping the RFC1323 TCP timestamp options sent by a host; in
4.4BSD, timestamps are created by incrementing the tcp_now variable
at 2 Hz; there's even a company out there that uses this to determine
web server uptime. According to Newsham's paper "The Problem With
Random Increments", while NetBSD's TCP ISS generation method is much
better than the "random increment" method used by FreeBSD and OpenBSD,
it is still theoretically possible to mount an attack against NetBSD's
method if the attacker knows how many times the tcp_iss_seq variable
has been incremented. By not leaking uptime information, we can make
that much harder to determine. So, we avoid the leak by giving each
TCP connection a timebase of 0.
2001-03-20 23:07:51 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we were asked to add some amount to a known value,
|
|
|
|
* we will take a random value obtained above, mask off
|
|
|
|
* the upper bits, and add in the known value. We also
|
|
|
|
* add in a constant to ensure that we are at least a
|
|
|
|
* certain distance from the original value.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This is used when an old connection is in timed wait
|
|
|
|
* and we have a new one coming in, for instance.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (addin != 0) {
|
1997-10-10 05:51:07 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef TCPISS_DEBUG
|
Two changes, designed to make us even more resilient against TCP
ISS attacks (which we already fend off quite well).
1. First-cut implementation of RFC1948, Steve Bellovin's cryptographic
hash method of generating TCP ISS values. Note, this code is experimental
and disabled by default (experimental enough that I don't export the
variable via sysctl yet, either). There are a couple of issues I'd
like to discuss with Steve, so this code should only be used by people
who really know what they're doing.
2. Per a recent thread on Bugtraq, it's possible to determine a system's
uptime by snooping the RFC1323 TCP timestamp options sent by a host; in
4.4BSD, timestamps are created by incrementing the tcp_now variable
at 2 Hz; there's even a company out there that uses this to determine
web server uptime. According to Newsham's paper "The Problem With
Random Increments", while NetBSD's TCP ISS generation method is much
better than the "random increment" method used by FreeBSD and OpenBSD,
it is still theoretically possible to mount an attack against NetBSD's
method if the attacker knows how many times the tcp_iss_seq variable
has been incremented. By not leaking uptime information, we can make
that much harder to determine. So, we avoid the leak by giving each
TCP connection a timebase of 0.
2001-03-20 23:07:51 +03:00
|
|
|
printf("Random %08x, ", tcp_iss);
|
1997-10-10 05:51:07 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
Two changes, designed to make us even more resilient against TCP
ISS attacks (which we already fend off quite well).
1. First-cut implementation of RFC1948, Steve Bellovin's cryptographic
hash method of generating TCP ISS values. Note, this code is experimental
and disabled by default (experimental enough that I don't export the
variable via sysctl yet, either). There are a couple of issues I'd
like to discuss with Steve, so this code should only be used by people
who really know what they're doing.
2. Per a recent thread on Bugtraq, it's possible to determine a system's
uptime by snooping the RFC1323 TCP timestamp options sent by a host; in
4.4BSD, timestamps are created by incrementing the tcp_now variable
at 2 Hz; there's even a company out there that uses this to determine
web server uptime. According to Newsham's paper "The Problem With
Random Increments", while NetBSD's TCP ISS generation method is much
better than the "random increment" method used by FreeBSD and OpenBSD,
it is still theoretically possible to mount an attack against NetBSD's
method if the attacker knows how many times the tcp_iss_seq variable
has been incremented. By not leaking uptime information, we can make
that much harder to determine. So, we avoid the leak by giving each
TCP connection a timebase of 0.
2001-03-20 23:07:51 +03:00
|
|
|
tcp_iss &= TCP_ISS_RANDOM_MASK;
|
|
|
|
tcp_iss += addin + TCP_ISSINCR;
|
1997-10-10 05:51:07 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef TCPISS_DEBUG
|
Two changes, designed to make us even more resilient against TCP
ISS attacks (which we already fend off quite well).
1. First-cut implementation of RFC1948, Steve Bellovin's cryptographic
hash method of generating TCP ISS values. Note, this code is experimental
and disabled by default (experimental enough that I don't export the
variable via sysctl yet, either). There are a couple of issues I'd
like to discuss with Steve, so this code should only be used by people
who really know what they're doing.
2. Per a recent thread on Bugtraq, it's possible to determine a system's
uptime by snooping the RFC1323 TCP timestamp options sent by a host; in
4.4BSD, timestamps are created by incrementing the tcp_now variable
at 2 Hz; there's even a company out there that uses this to determine
web server uptime. According to Newsham's paper "The Problem With
Random Increments", while NetBSD's TCP ISS generation method is much
better than the "random increment" method used by FreeBSD and OpenBSD,
it is still theoretically possible to mount an attack against NetBSD's
method if the attacker knows how many times the tcp_iss_seq variable
has been incremented. By not leaking uptime information, we can make
that much harder to determine. So, we avoid the leak by giving each
TCP connection a timebase of 0.
2001-03-20 23:07:51 +03:00
|
|
|
printf("Old ISS %08x, ISS %08x\n", addin, tcp_iss);
|
1997-10-10 05:51:07 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
Two changes, designed to make us even more resilient against TCP
ISS attacks (which we already fend off quite well).
1. First-cut implementation of RFC1948, Steve Bellovin's cryptographic
hash method of generating TCP ISS values. Note, this code is experimental
and disabled by default (experimental enough that I don't export the
variable via sysctl yet, either). There are a couple of issues I'd
like to discuss with Steve, so this code should only be used by people
who really know what they're doing.
2. Per a recent thread on Bugtraq, it's possible to determine a system's
uptime by snooping the RFC1323 TCP timestamp options sent by a host; in
4.4BSD, timestamps are created by incrementing the tcp_now variable
at 2 Hz; there's even a company out there that uses this to determine
web server uptime. According to Newsham's paper "The Problem With
Random Increments", while NetBSD's TCP ISS generation method is much
better than the "random increment" method used by FreeBSD and OpenBSD,
it is still theoretically possible to mount an attack against NetBSD's
method if the attacker knows how many times the tcp_iss_seq variable
has been incremented. By not leaking uptime information, we can make
that much harder to determine. So, we avoid the leak by giving each
TCP connection a timebase of 0.
2001-03-20 23:07:51 +03:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
tcp_iss &= TCP_ISS_RANDOM_MASK;
|
|
|
|
tcp_iss += tcp_iss_seq;
|
|
|
|
tcp_iss_seq += TCP_ISSINCR;
|
1997-10-10 05:51:07 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef TCPISS_DEBUG
|
Two changes, designed to make us even more resilient against TCP
ISS attacks (which we already fend off quite well).
1. First-cut implementation of RFC1948, Steve Bellovin's cryptographic
hash method of generating TCP ISS values. Note, this code is experimental
and disabled by default (experimental enough that I don't export the
variable via sysctl yet, either). There are a couple of issues I'd
like to discuss with Steve, so this code should only be used by people
who really know what they're doing.
2. Per a recent thread on Bugtraq, it's possible to determine a system's
uptime by snooping the RFC1323 TCP timestamp options sent by a host; in
4.4BSD, timestamps are created by incrementing the tcp_now variable
at 2 Hz; there's even a company out there that uses this to determine
web server uptime. According to Newsham's paper "The Problem With
Random Increments", while NetBSD's TCP ISS generation method is much
better than the "random increment" method used by FreeBSD and OpenBSD,
it is still theoretically possible to mount an attack against NetBSD's
method if the attacker knows how many times the tcp_iss_seq variable
has been incremented. By not leaking uptime information, we can make
that much harder to determine. So, we avoid the leak by giving each
TCP connection a timebase of 0.
2001-03-20 23:07:51 +03:00
|
|
|
printf("ISS %08x\n", tcp_iss);
|
1997-10-10 05:51:07 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
Two changes, designed to make us even more resilient against TCP
ISS attacks (which we already fend off quite well).
1. First-cut implementation of RFC1948, Steve Bellovin's cryptographic
hash method of generating TCP ISS values. Note, this code is experimental
and disabled by default (experimental enough that I don't export the
variable via sysctl yet, either). There are a couple of issues I'd
like to discuss with Steve, so this code should only be used by people
who really know what they're doing.
2. Per a recent thread on Bugtraq, it's possible to determine a system's
uptime by snooping the RFC1323 TCP timestamp options sent by a host; in
4.4BSD, timestamps are created by incrementing the tcp_now variable
at 2 Hz; there's even a company out there that uses this to determine
web server uptime. According to Newsham's paper "The Problem With
Random Increments", while NetBSD's TCP ISS generation method is much
better than the "random increment" method used by FreeBSD and OpenBSD,
it is still theoretically possible to mount an attack against NetBSD's
method if the attacker knows how many times the tcp_iss_seq variable
has been incremented. By not leaking uptime information, we can make
that much harder to determine. So, we avoid the leak by giving each
TCP connection a timebase of 0.
2001-03-20 23:07:51 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
1997-10-10 05:51:07 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1998-04-29 09:16:46 +04:00
|
|
|
if (tcp_compat_42) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Limit it to the positive range for really old TCP
|
|
|
|
* implementations.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1998-09-05 02:29:54 +04:00
|
|
|
if (tcp_iss >= 0x80000000)
|
1998-04-29 09:16:46 +04:00
|
|
|
tcp_iss &= 0x7fffffff; /* XXX */
|
|
|
|
}
|
1997-10-10 05:51:07 +04:00
|
|
|
|
Two changes, designed to make us even more resilient against TCP
ISS attacks (which we already fend off quite well).
1. First-cut implementation of RFC1948, Steve Bellovin's cryptographic
hash method of generating TCP ISS values. Note, this code is experimental
and disabled by default (experimental enough that I don't export the
variable via sysctl yet, either). There are a couple of issues I'd
like to discuss with Steve, so this code should only be used by people
who really know what they're doing.
2. Per a recent thread on Bugtraq, it's possible to determine a system's
uptime by snooping the RFC1323 TCP timestamp options sent by a host; in
4.4BSD, timestamps are created by incrementing the tcp_now variable
at 2 Hz; there's even a company out there that uses this to determine
web server uptime. According to Newsham's paper "The Problem With
Random Increments", while NetBSD's TCP ISS generation method is much
better than the "random increment" method used by FreeBSD and OpenBSD,
it is still theoretically possible to mount an attack against NetBSD's
method if the attacker knows how many times the tcp_iss_seq variable
has been incremented. By not leaking uptime information, we can make
that much harder to determine. So, we avoid the leak by giving each
TCP connection a timebase of 0.
2001-03-20 23:07:51 +03:00
|
|
|
return (tcp_iss);
|
1997-10-10 05:51:07 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
1998-03-18 02:50:30 +03:00
|
|
|
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef IPSEC
|
|
|
|
/* compute ESP/AH header size for TCP, including outer IP header. */
|
|
|
|
size_t
|
|
|
|
ipsec4_hdrsiz_tcp(tp)
|
|
|
|
struct tcpcb *tp;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct inpcb *inp;
|
|
|
|
size_t hdrsiz;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XXX mapped addr case (tp->t_in6pcb) */
|
|
|
|
if (!tp || !tp->t_template || !(inp = tp->t_inpcb))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
switch (tp->t_family) {
|
|
|
|
case AF_INET:
|
2000-01-31 17:18:52 +03:00
|
|
|
/* XXX: should use currect direction. */
|
|
|
|
hdrsiz = ipsec4_hdrsiz(tp->t_template, IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND, inp);
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
hdrsiz = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return hdrsiz;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-10-20 00:22:59 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
size_t
|
|
|
|
ipsec6_hdrsiz_tcp(tp)
|
|
|
|
struct tcpcb *tp;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct in6pcb *in6p;
|
|
|
|
size_t hdrsiz;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!tp || !tp->t_template || !(in6p = tp->t_in6pcb))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
switch (tp->t_family) {
|
|
|
|
case AF_INET6:
|
2000-01-31 17:18:52 +03:00
|
|
|
/* XXX: should use currect direction. */
|
|
|
|
hdrsiz = ipsec6_hdrsiz(tp->t_template, IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND, in6p);
|
1999-07-01 12:12:45 +04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AF_INET:
|
|
|
|
/* mapped address case - tricky */
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
hdrsiz = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return hdrsiz;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#endif /*IPSEC*/
|
1998-03-18 02:50:30 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Determine the length of the TCP options for this connection.
|
2002-06-09 20:33:36 +04:00
|
|
|
*
|
1998-03-18 02:50:30 +03:00
|
|
|
* XXX: What do we do for SACK, when we add that? Just reserve
|
|
|
|
* all of the space? Otherwise we can't exactly be incrementing
|
|
|
|
* cwnd by an amount that varies depending on the amount we last
|
|
|
|
* had to SACK!
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
u_int
|
|
|
|
tcp_optlen(tp)
|
|
|
|
struct tcpcb *tp;
|
|
|
|
{
|
2002-06-09 20:33:36 +04:00
|
|
|
if ((tp->t_flags & (TF_REQ_TSTMP|TF_RCVD_TSTMP|TF_NOOPT)) ==
|
1998-03-18 02:50:30 +03:00
|
|
|
(TF_REQ_TSTMP | TF_RCVD_TSTMP))
|
|
|
|
return TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_APPA;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|