NetBSD/sys/kern/vfs_syscalls.c

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/* $NetBSD: vfs_syscalls.c,v 1.462 2012/11/30 13:26:37 njoly Exp $ */
/*-
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* Copyright (c) 2008, 2009 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
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* This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
* by Andrew Doran.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
* ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
* TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
* BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
* (c) UNIX System Laboratories, Inc.
* All or some portions of this file are derived from material licensed
* to the University of California by American Telephone and Telegraph
* Co. or Unix System Laboratories, Inc. and are reproduced herein with
* the permission of UNIX System Laboratories, Inc.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
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* @(#)vfs_syscalls.c 8.42 (Berkeley) 7/31/95
*/
/*
* Virtual File System System Calls
*/
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: vfs_syscalls.c,v 1.462 2012/11/30 13:26:37 njoly Exp $");
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#ifdef _KERNEL_OPT
#include "opt_fileassoc.h"
#include "veriexec.h"
#endif
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/namei.h>
#include <sys/filedesc.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/fcntl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/kmem.h>
#include <sys/dirent.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/syscallargs.h>
#include <sys/vfs_syscalls.h>
#include <sys/quota.h>
#include <sys/quotactl.h>
#include <sys/ktrace.h>
#ifdef FILEASSOC
#include <sys/fileassoc.h>
#endif /* FILEASSOC */
#include <sys/extattr.h>
#include <sys/verified_exec.h>
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#include <sys/kauth.h>
#include <sys/atomic.h>
#include <sys/module.h>
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#include <sys/buf.h>
#include <miscfs/genfs/genfs.h>
#include <miscfs/syncfs/syncfs.h>
#include <miscfs/specfs/specdev.h>
#include <nfs/rpcv2.h>
#include <nfs/nfsproto.h>
#include <nfs/nfs.h>
#include <nfs/nfs_var.h>
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static int change_flags(struct vnode *, u_long, struct lwp *);
static int change_mode(struct vnode *, int, struct lwp *l);
static int change_owner(struct vnode *, uid_t, gid_t, struct lwp *, int);
static int do_open(lwp_t *, struct vnode *, struct pathbuf *, int, int, int *);
static int do_sys_openat(lwp_t *, int, const char *, int, int, int *);
static int do_sys_mknodat(struct lwp *, int, const char *, mode_t,
dev_t, register_t *, enum uio_seg);
static int do_sys_mkdirat(struct lwp *l, int, const char *, mode_t,
enum uio_seg);
static int do_sys_mkfifoat(struct lwp *, int, const char *, mode_t);
static int do_sys_chmodat(struct lwp *, int, const char *, int, int);
static int do_sys_chownat(struct lwp *, int, const char *, uid_t, gid_t, int);
static int do_sys_utimensat(struct lwp *, int, struct vnode *,
const char *, int, const struct timespec *, enum uio_seg);
static int do_sys_accessat(struct lwp *, int, const char *, int ,int);
static int do_sys_statat(struct lwp *, int, const char *, unsigned int,
struct stat *);
static int do_sys_symlinkat(struct lwp *, const char *, int, const char *,
enum uio_seg);
static int do_sys_linkat(struct lwp *, int, const char *, int, const char *,
int, register_t *);
static int do_sys_renameat(struct lwp *l, int, const char *, int, const char *,
enum uio_seg, int);
static int do_sys_readlinkat(struct lwp *, int, const char *, char *,
size_t, register_t *);
static int do_sys_unlinkat(struct lwp *, int, const char *, int, enum uio_seg);
static int fd_nameiat(struct lwp *, int, struct nameidata *);
static int fd_nameiat_simple_user(struct lwp *, int, const char *,
namei_simple_flags_t, struct vnode **);
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/*
* This table is used to maintain compatibility with 4.3BSD
* and NetBSD 0.9 mount syscalls - and possibly other systems.
* Note, the order is important!
*
* Do not modify this table. It should only contain filesystems
* supported by NetBSD 0.9 and 4.3BSD.
*/
const char * const mountcompatnames[] = {
NULL, /* 0 = MOUNT_NONE */
MOUNT_FFS, /* 1 = MOUNT_UFS */
MOUNT_NFS, /* 2 */
MOUNT_MFS, /* 3 */
MOUNT_MSDOS, /* 4 */
MOUNT_CD9660, /* 5 = MOUNT_ISOFS */
MOUNT_FDESC, /* 6 */
MOUNT_KERNFS, /* 7 */
NULL, /* 8 = MOUNT_DEVFS */
MOUNT_AFS, /* 9 */
};
const int nmountcompatnames = __arraycount(mountcompatnames);
static int
fd_nameiat(struct lwp *l, int fdat, struct nameidata *ndp)
{
file_t *dfp;
int error;
if (fdat != AT_FDCWD) {
if ((error = fd_getvnode(fdat, &dfp)) != 0)
goto out;
if (!(dfp->f_flag & FSEARCH)) {
vn_lock(dfp->f_data, LK_EXCLUSIVE);
error = VOP_ACCESS(dfp->f_data, VEXEC, l->l_cred);
VOP_UNLOCK(dfp->f_data);
if (error)
goto cleanup;
}
NDAT(ndp, dfp->f_data);
}
error = namei(ndp);
cleanup:
if (fdat != AT_FDCWD)
fd_putfile(fdat);
out:
return error;
}
static int
fd_nameiat_simple_user(struct lwp *l, int fdat, const char *path,
namei_simple_flags_t sflags, struct vnode **vp_ret)
{
file_t *dfp;
struct vnode *dvp;
int error;
if (fdat != AT_FDCWD) {
if ((error = fd_getvnode(fdat, &dfp)) != 0)
goto out;
if (!(dfp->f_flag & FSEARCH)) {
vn_lock(dfp->f_data, LK_EXCLUSIVE);
error = VOP_ACCESS(dfp->f_data, VEXEC, l->l_cred);
VOP_UNLOCK(dfp->f_data);
if (error)
goto cleanup;
}
dvp = dfp->f_data;
} else {
dvp = NULL;
}
error = nameiat_simple_user(dvp, path, sflags, vp_ret);
cleanup:
if (fdat != AT_FDCWD)
fd_putfile(fdat);
out:
return error;
}
static int
open_setfp(struct lwp *l, file_t *fp, struct vnode *vp, int indx, int flags)
{
int error;
fp->f_flag = flags & FMASK;
fp->f_type = DTYPE_VNODE;
fp->f_ops = &vnops;
fp->f_data = vp;
if (flags & (O_EXLOCK | O_SHLOCK)) {
struct flock lf;
int type;
lf.l_whence = SEEK_SET;
lf.l_start = 0;
lf.l_len = 0;
if (flags & O_EXLOCK)
lf.l_type = F_WRLCK;
else
lf.l_type = F_RDLCK;
type = F_FLOCK;
if ((flags & FNONBLOCK) == 0)
type |= F_WAIT;
VOP_UNLOCK(vp);
error = VOP_ADVLOCK(vp, fp, F_SETLK, &lf, type);
if (error) {
(void) vn_close(vp, fp->f_flag, fp->f_cred);
fd_abort(l->l_proc, fp, indx);
return error;
}
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
atomic_or_uint(&fp->f_flag, FHASLOCK);
}
if (flags & O_CLOEXEC)
fd_set_exclose(l, indx, true);
return 0;
}
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static int
mount_update(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, const char *path, int flags,
void *data, size_t *data_len)
{
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struct mount *mp;
int error = 0, saved_flags;
mp = vp->v_mount;
saved_flags = mp->mnt_flag;
/* We can operate only on VV_ROOT nodes. */
if ((vp->v_vflag & VV_ROOT) == 0) {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/*
* We only allow the filesystem to be reloaded if it
* is currently mounted read-only. Additionally, we
* prevent read-write to read-only downgrades.
*/
if ((flags & (MNT_RELOAD | MNT_RDONLY)) != 0 &&
(mp->mnt_flag & MNT_RDONLY) == 0 &&
(mp->mnt_iflag & IMNT_CAN_RWTORO) == 0) {
error = EOPNOTSUPP; /* Needs translation */
goto out;
}
error = kauth_authorize_system(l->l_cred, KAUTH_SYSTEM_MOUNT,
KAUTH_REQ_SYSTEM_MOUNT_UPDATE, mp, KAUTH_ARG(flags), data);
if (error)
goto out;
if (vfs_busy(mp, NULL)) {
error = EPERM;
goto out;
}
mutex_enter(&mp->mnt_updating);
mp->mnt_flag &= ~MNT_OP_FLAGS;
mp->mnt_flag |= flags & MNT_OP_FLAGS;
/*
* Set the mount level flags.
*/
if (flags & MNT_RDONLY)
mp->mnt_flag |= MNT_RDONLY;
else if (mp->mnt_flag & MNT_RDONLY)
mp->mnt_iflag |= IMNT_WANTRDWR;
mp->mnt_flag &= ~MNT_BASIC_FLAGS;
mp->mnt_flag |= flags & MNT_BASIC_FLAGS;
error = VFS_MOUNT(mp, path, data, data_len);
if (error && data != NULL) {
int error2;
/*
* Update failed; let's try and see if it was an
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* export request. For compat with 3.0 and earlier.
*/
error2 = vfs_hooks_reexport(mp, path, data);
/*
* Only update error code if the export request was
* understood but some problem occurred while
* processing it.
*/
if (error2 != EJUSTRETURN)
error = error2;
}
if (mp->mnt_iflag & IMNT_WANTRDWR)
mp->mnt_flag &= ~MNT_RDONLY;
if (error)
mp->mnt_flag = saved_flags;
mp->mnt_flag &= ~MNT_OP_FLAGS;
mp->mnt_iflag &= ~IMNT_WANTRDWR;
if ((mp->mnt_flag & (MNT_RDONLY | MNT_ASYNC)) == 0) {
if (mp->mnt_syncer == NULL)
error = vfs_allocate_syncvnode(mp);
} else {
if (mp->mnt_syncer != NULL)
vfs_deallocate_syncvnode(mp);
}
mutex_exit(&mp->mnt_updating);
vfs_unbusy(mp, false, NULL);
if ((error == 0) && !(saved_flags & MNT_EXTATTR) &&
(flags & MNT_EXTATTR)) {
if (VFS_EXTATTRCTL(mp, EXTATTR_CMD_START,
NULL, 0, NULL) != 0) {
printf("%s: failed to start extattr, error = %d",
mp->mnt_stat.f_mntonname, error);
mp->mnt_flag &= ~MNT_EXTATTR;
}
}
if ((error == 0) && (saved_flags & MNT_EXTATTR) &&
!(flags & MNT_EXTATTR)) {
if (VFS_EXTATTRCTL(mp, EXTATTR_CMD_STOP,
NULL, 0, NULL) != 0) {
printf("%s: failed to stop extattr, error = %d",
mp->mnt_stat.f_mntonname, error);
mp->mnt_flag |= MNT_RDONLY;
}
}
out:
return (error);
}
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static int
mount_get_vfsops(const char *fstype, struct vfsops **vfsops)
{
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char fstypename[sizeof(((struct statvfs *)NULL)->f_fstypename)];
int error;
/* Copy file-system type from userspace. */
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error = copyinstr(fstype, fstypename, sizeof(fstypename), NULL);
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if (error) {
/*
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* Historically, filesystem types were identified by numbers.
* If we get an integer for the filesystem type instead of a
* string, we check to see if it matches one of the historic
* filesystem types.
2004-03-23 16:22:32 +03:00
*/
u_long fsindex = (u_long)fstype;
if (fsindex >= nmountcompatnames ||
mountcompatnames[fsindex] == NULL)
return ENODEV;
strlcpy(fstypename, mountcompatnames[fsindex],
sizeof(fstypename));
}
/* Accept `ufs' as an alias for `ffs', for compatibility. */
if (strcmp(fstypename, "ufs") == 0)
fstypename[0] = 'f';
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if ((*vfsops = vfs_getopsbyname(fstypename)) != NULL)
return 0;
/* If we can autoload a vfs module, try again */
(void)module_autoload(fstypename, MODULE_CLASS_VFS);
if ((*vfsops = vfs_getopsbyname(fstypename)) != NULL)
return 0;
return ENODEV;
}
static int
mount_getargs(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, const char *path, int flags,
void *data, size_t *data_len)
{
struct mount *mp;
int error;
/* If MNT_GETARGS is specified, it should be the only flag. */
if (flags & ~MNT_GETARGS)
return EINVAL;
mp = vp->v_mount;
/* XXX: probably some notion of "can see" here if we want isolation. */
error = kauth_authorize_system(l->l_cred, KAUTH_SYSTEM_MOUNT,
KAUTH_REQ_SYSTEM_MOUNT_GET, mp, data, NULL);
if (error)
return error;
if ((vp->v_vflag & VV_ROOT) == 0)
return EINVAL;
if (vfs_busy(mp, NULL))
return EPERM;
mutex_enter(&mp->mnt_updating);
mp->mnt_flag &= ~MNT_OP_FLAGS;
mp->mnt_flag |= MNT_GETARGS;
error = VFS_MOUNT(mp, path, data, data_len);
mp->mnt_flag &= ~MNT_OP_FLAGS;
mutex_exit(&mp->mnt_updating);
vfs_unbusy(mp, false, NULL);
return (error);
}
int
sys___mount50(struct lwp *l, const struct sys___mount50_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) type;
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(int) flags;
syscallarg(void *) data;
syscallarg(size_t) data_len;
} */
return do_sys_mount(l, NULL, SCARG(uap, type), SCARG(uap, path),
SCARG(uap, flags), SCARG(uap, data), UIO_USERSPACE,
SCARG(uap, data_len), retval);
}
int
do_sys_mount(struct lwp *l, struct vfsops *vfsops, const char *type,
const char *path, int flags, void *data, enum uio_seg data_seg,
size_t data_len, register_t *retval)
{
struct vnode *vp;
void *data_buf = data;
bool vfsopsrele = false;
int error;
/* XXX: The calling convention of this routine is totally bizarre */
if (vfsops)
vfsopsrele = true;
/*
* Get vnode to be covered
*/
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error = namei_simple_user(path, NSM_FOLLOW_TRYEMULROOT, &vp);
if (error != 0) {
vp = NULL;
goto done;
}
if (vfsops == NULL) {
if (flags & (MNT_GETARGS | MNT_UPDATE)) {
vfsops = vp->v_mount->mnt_op;
} else {
/* 'type' is userspace */
error = mount_get_vfsops(type, &vfsops);
if (error != 0)
goto done;
vfsopsrele = true;
}
}
if (data != NULL && data_seg == UIO_USERSPACE) {
if (data_len == 0) {
/* No length supplied, use default for filesystem */
data_len = vfsops->vfs_min_mount_data;
if (data_len > VFS_MAX_MOUNT_DATA) {
error = EINVAL;
goto done;
}
/*
* Hopefully a longer buffer won't make copyin() fail.
* For compatibility with 3.0 and earlier.
*/
if (flags & MNT_UPDATE
&& data_len < sizeof (struct mnt_export_args30))
data_len = sizeof (struct mnt_export_args30);
}
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data_buf = kmem_alloc(data_len, KM_SLEEP);
/* NFS needs the buffer even for mnt_getargs .... */
error = copyin(data, data_buf, data_len);
if (error != 0)
goto done;
}
if (flags & MNT_GETARGS) {
if (data_len == 0) {
error = EINVAL;
goto done;
}
error = mount_getargs(l, vp, path, flags, data_buf, &data_len);
if (error != 0)
goto done;
if (data_seg == UIO_USERSPACE)
error = copyout(data_buf, data, data_len);
*retval = data_len;
} else if (flags & MNT_UPDATE) {
error = mount_update(l, vp, path, flags, data_buf, &data_len);
} else {
/* Locking is handled internally in mount_domount(). */
KASSERT(vfsopsrele == true);
error = mount_domount(l, &vp, vfsops, path, flags, data_buf,
&data_len);
vfsopsrele = false;
}
done:
if (vfsopsrele)
vfs_delref(vfsops);
if (vp != NULL) {
vrele(vp);
}
if (data_buf != data)
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kmem_free(data_buf, data_len);
return (error);
}
/*
* Unmount a file system.
*
* Note: unmount takes a path to the vnode mounted on as argument,
* not special file (as before).
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
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int
sys_unmount(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_unmount_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(int) flags;
} */
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struct vnode *vp;
struct mount *mp;
int error;
struct pathbuf *pb;
struct nameidata nd;
error = pathbuf_copyin(SCARG(uap, path), &pb);
if (error) {
return error;
}
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | TRYEMULROOT, pb);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0) {
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
return error;
}
vp = nd.ni_vp;
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
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mp = vp->v_mount;
atomic_inc_uint(&mp->mnt_refcnt);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp);
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error = kauth_authorize_system(l->l_cred, KAUTH_SYSTEM_MOUNT,
KAUTH_REQ_SYSTEM_MOUNT_UNMOUNT, mp, NULL, NULL);
if (error) {
vrele(vp);
vfs_destroy(mp);
return (error);
}
/*
* Don't allow unmounting the root file system.
*/
if (mp->mnt_flag & MNT_ROOTFS) {
vrele(vp);
vfs_destroy(mp);
return (EINVAL);
}
/*
* Must be the root of the filesystem
*/
if ((vp->v_vflag & VV_ROOT) == 0) {
vrele(vp);
vfs_destroy(mp);
return (EINVAL);
}
vrele(vp);
error = dounmount(mp, SCARG(uap, flags), l);
vfs_destroy(mp);
return error;
}
/*
* Sync each mounted filesystem.
*/
#ifdef DEBUG
int syncprt = 0;
struct ctldebug debug0 = { "syncprt", &syncprt };
#endif
void
do_sys_sync(struct lwp *l)
{
2000-03-30 13:27:11 +04:00
struct mount *mp, *nmp;
int asyncflag;
mutex_enter(&mountlist_lock);
for (mp = CIRCLEQ_FIRST(&mountlist); mp != (void *)&mountlist;
mp = nmp) {
if (vfs_busy(mp, &nmp)) {
1998-03-01 05:20:01 +03:00
continue;
}
mutex_enter(&mp->mnt_updating);
if ((mp->mnt_flag & MNT_RDONLY) == 0) {
asyncflag = mp->mnt_flag & MNT_ASYNC;
mp->mnt_flag &= ~MNT_ASYNC;
VFS_SYNC(mp, MNT_NOWAIT, l->l_cred);
if (asyncflag)
1998-03-01 05:20:01 +03:00
mp->mnt_flag |= MNT_ASYNC;
}
mutex_exit(&mp->mnt_updating);
vfs_unbusy(mp, false, &nmp);
}
mutex_exit(&mountlist_lock);
#ifdef DEBUG
if (syncprt)
vfs_bufstats();
#endif /* DEBUG */
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_sync(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval)
{
do_sys_sync(l);
return (0);
}
/*
* Access or change filesystem quotas.
*
* (this is really 14 different calls bundled into one)
*/
static int
do_sys_quotactl_stat(struct mount *mp, struct quotastat *info_u)
{
struct quotastat info_k;
int error;
/* ensure any padding bytes are cleared */
memset(&info_k, 0, sizeof(info_k));
error = vfs_quotactl_stat(mp, &info_k);
if (error) {
return error;
}
return copyout(&info_k, info_u, sizeof(info_k));
}
static int
do_sys_quotactl_idtypestat(struct mount *mp, int idtype,
struct quotaidtypestat *info_u)
{
struct quotaidtypestat info_k;
int error;
/* ensure any padding bytes are cleared */
memset(&info_k, 0, sizeof(info_k));
error = vfs_quotactl_idtypestat(mp, idtype, &info_k);
if (error) {
return error;
}
return copyout(&info_k, info_u, sizeof(info_k));
}
static int
do_sys_quotactl_objtypestat(struct mount *mp, int objtype,
struct quotaobjtypestat *info_u)
{
struct quotaobjtypestat info_k;
int error;
/* ensure any padding bytes are cleared */
memset(&info_k, 0, sizeof(info_k));
error = vfs_quotactl_objtypestat(mp, objtype, &info_k);
if (error) {
return error;
}
return copyout(&info_k, info_u, sizeof(info_k));
}
static int
do_sys_quotactl_get(struct mount *mp, const struct quotakey *key_u,
struct quotaval *val_u)
{
struct quotakey key_k;
struct quotaval val_k;
int error;
/* ensure any padding bytes are cleared */
memset(&val_k, 0, sizeof(val_k));
error = copyin(key_u, &key_k, sizeof(key_k));
if (error) {
return error;
}
error = vfs_quotactl_get(mp, &key_k, &val_k);
if (error) {
return error;
}
return copyout(&val_k, val_u, sizeof(val_k));
}
static int
do_sys_quotactl_put(struct mount *mp, const struct quotakey *key_u,
const struct quotaval *val_u)
{
struct quotakey key_k;
struct quotaval val_k;
int error;
error = copyin(key_u, &key_k, sizeof(key_k));
if (error) {
return error;
}
error = copyin(val_u, &val_k, sizeof(val_k));
if (error) {
return error;
}
return vfs_quotactl_put(mp, &key_k, &val_k);
}
static int
do_sys_quotactl_delete(struct mount *mp, const struct quotakey *key_u)
{
struct quotakey key_k;
int error;
error = copyin(key_u, &key_k, sizeof(key_k));
if (error) {
return error;
}
return vfs_quotactl_delete(mp, &key_k);
}
static int
do_sys_quotactl_cursoropen(struct mount *mp, struct quotakcursor *cursor_u)
{
struct quotakcursor cursor_k;
int error;
/* ensure any padding bytes are cleared */
memset(&cursor_k, 0, sizeof(cursor_k));
error = vfs_quotactl_cursoropen(mp, &cursor_k);
if (error) {
return error;
}
return copyout(&cursor_k, cursor_u, sizeof(cursor_k));
}
static int
do_sys_quotactl_cursorclose(struct mount *mp, struct quotakcursor *cursor_u)
{
struct quotakcursor cursor_k;
int error;
error = copyin(cursor_u, &cursor_k, sizeof(cursor_k));
if (error) {
return error;
}
return vfs_quotactl_cursorclose(mp, &cursor_k);
}
static int
do_sys_quotactl_cursorskipidtype(struct mount *mp,
struct quotakcursor *cursor_u, int idtype)
{
struct quotakcursor cursor_k;
int error;
error = copyin(cursor_u, &cursor_k, sizeof(cursor_k));
if (error) {
return error;
}
error = vfs_quotactl_cursorskipidtype(mp, &cursor_k, idtype);
if (error) {
return error;
}
return copyout(&cursor_k, cursor_u, sizeof(cursor_k));
}
static int
do_sys_quotactl_cursorget(struct mount *mp, struct quotakcursor *cursor_u,
struct quotakey *keys_u, struct quotaval *vals_u, unsigned maxnum,
unsigned *ret_u)
{
#define CGET_STACK_MAX 8
struct quotakcursor cursor_k;
struct quotakey stackkeys[CGET_STACK_MAX];
struct quotaval stackvals[CGET_STACK_MAX];
struct quotakey *keys_k;
struct quotaval *vals_k;
unsigned ret_k;
int error;
if (maxnum > 128) {
maxnum = 128;
}
error = copyin(cursor_u, &cursor_k, sizeof(cursor_k));
if (error) {
return error;
}
if (maxnum <= CGET_STACK_MAX) {
keys_k = stackkeys;
vals_k = stackvals;
/* ensure any padding bytes are cleared */
memset(keys_k, 0, maxnum * sizeof(keys_k[0]));
memset(vals_k, 0, maxnum * sizeof(vals_k[0]));
} else {
keys_k = kmem_zalloc(maxnum * sizeof(keys_k[0]), KM_SLEEP);
vals_k = kmem_zalloc(maxnum * sizeof(vals_k[0]), KM_SLEEP);
}
error = vfs_quotactl_cursorget(mp, &cursor_k, keys_k, vals_k, maxnum,
&ret_k);
if (error) {
goto fail;
}
error = copyout(keys_k, keys_u, ret_k * sizeof(keys_k[0]));
if (error) {
goto fail;
}
error = copyout(vals_k, vals_u, ret_k * sizeof(vals_k[0]));
if (error) {
goto fail;
}
error = copyout(&ret_k, ret_u, sizeof(ret_k));
if (error) {
goto fail;
}
/* do last to maximize the chance of being able to recover a failure */
error = copyout(&cursor_k, cursor_u, sizeof(cursor_k));
fail:
if (keys_k != stackkeys) {
kmem_free(keys_k, maxnum * sizeof(keys_k[0]));
}
if (vals_k != stackvals) {
kmem_free(vals_k, maxnum * sizeof(vals_k[0]));
}
return error;
}
static int
do_sys_quotactl_cursoratend(struct mount *mp, struct quotakcursor *cursor_u,
int *ret_u)
{
struct quotakcursor cursor_k;
int ret_k;
int error;
error = copyin(cursor_u, &cursor_k, sizeof(cursor_k));
if (error) {
return error;
}
error = vfs_quotactl_cursoratend(mp, &cursor_k, &ret_k);
if (error) {
return error;
}
error = copyout(&ret_k, ret_u, sizeof(ret_k));
if (error) {
return error;
}
return copyout(&cursor_k, cursor_u, sizeof(cursor_k));
}
static int
do_sys_quotactl_cursorrewind(struct mount *mp, struct quotakcursor *cursor_u)
{
struct quotakcursor cursor_k;
int error;
error = copyin(cursor_u, &cursor_k, sizeof(cursor_k));
if (error) {
return error;
}
error = vfs_quotactl_cursorrewind(mp, &cursor_k);
if (error) {
return error;
}
return copyout(&cursor_k, cursor_u, sizeof(cursor_k));
}
static int
do_sys_quotactl_quotaon(struct mount *mp, int idtype, const char *path_u)
{
char *path_k;
int error;
/* XXX this should probably be a struct pathbuf */
path_k = PNBUF_GET();
error = copyin(path_u, path_k, PATH_MAX);
if (error) {
PNBUF_PUT(path_k);
return error;
}
error = vfs_quotactl_quotaon(mp, idtype, path_k);
PNBUF_PUT(path_k);
return error;
}
static int
do_sys_quotactl_quotaoff(struct mount *mp, int idtype)
{
return vfs_quotactl_quotaoff(mp, idtype);
}
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
do_sys_quotactl(const char *path_u, const struct quotactl_args *args)
{
2000-03-30 13:27:11 +04:00
struct mount *mp;
2009-06-29 09:08:15 +04:00
struct vnode *vp;
int error;
error = namei_simple_user(path_u, NSM_FOLLOW_TRYEMULROOT, &vp);
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if (error != 0)
return (error);
2009-06-29 09:08:15 +04:00
mp = vp->v_mount;
switch (args->qc_op) {
case QUOTACTL_STAT:
error = do_sys_quotactl_stat(mp, args->u.stat.qc_info);
break;
case QUOTACTL_IDTYPESTAT:
error = do_sys_quotactl_idtypestat(mp,
args->u.idtypestat.qc_idtype,
args->u.idtypestat.qc_info);
break;
case QUOTACTL_OBJTYPESTAT:
error = do_sys_quotactl_objtypestat(mp,
args->u.objtypestat.qc_objtype,
args->u.objtypestat.qc_info);
break;
case QUOTACTL_GET:
error = do_sys_quotactl_get(mp,
args->u.get.qc_key,
args->u.get.qc_val);
break;
case QUOTACTL_PUT:
error = do_sys_quotactl_put(mp,
args->u.put.qc_key,
args->u.put.qc_val);
break;
case QUOTACTL_DELETE:
error = do_sys_quotactl_delete(mp, args->u.delete.qc_key);
break;
case QUOTACTL_CURSOROPEN:
error = do_sys_quotactl_cursoropen(mp,
args->u.cursoropen.qc_cursor);
break;
case QUOTACTL_CURSORCLOSE:
error = do_sys_quotactl_cursorclose(mp,
args->u.cursorclose.qc_cursor);
break;
case QUOTACTL_CURSORSKIPIDTYPE:
error = do_sys_quotactl_cursorskipidtype(mp,
args->u.cursorskipidtype.qc_cursor,
args->u.cursorskipidtype.qc_idtype);
break;
case QUOTACTL_CURSORGET:
error = do_sys_quotactl_cursorget(mp,
args->u.cursorget.qc_cursor,
args->u.cursorget.qc_keys,
args->u.cursorget.qc_vals,
args->u.cursorget.qc_maxnum,
args->u.cursorget.qc_ret);
break;
case QUOTACTL_CURSORATEND:
error = do_sys_quotactl_cursoratend(mp,
args->u.cursoratend.qc_cursor,
args->u.cursoratend.qc_ret);
break;
case QUOTACTL_CURSORREWIND:
error = do_sys_quotactl_cursorrewind(mp,
args->u.cursorrewind.qc_cursor);
break;
case QUOTACTL_QUOTAON:
error = do_sys_quotactl_quotaon(mp,
args->u.quotaon.qc_idtype,
args->u.quotaon.qc_quotafile);
break;
case QUOTACTL_QUOTAOFF:
error = do_sys_quotactl_quotaoff(mp,
args->u.quotaoff.qc_idtype);
break;
default:
error = EINVAL;
break;
}
2009-06-29 09:08:15 +04:00
vrele(vp);
return error;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys___quotactl(struct lwp *l, const struct sys___quotactl_args *uap,
register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(struct quotactl_args *) args;
} */
struct quotactl_args args;
int error;
error = copyin(SCARG(uap, args), &args, sizeof(args));
if (error) {
return error;
}
return do_sys_quotactl(SCARG(uap, path), &args);
}
int
2005-12-11 15:16:03 +03:00
dostatvfs(struct mount *mp, struct statvfs *sp, struct lwp *l, int flags,
int root)
{
2005-12-11 15:16:03 +03:00
struct cwdinfo *cwdi = l->l_proc->p_cwdi;
int error = 0;
/*
* If MNT_NOWAIT or MNT_LAZY is specified, do not
* refresh the fsstat cache. MNT_WAIT or MNT_LAZY
* overrides MNT_NOWAIT.
*/
if (flags == MNT_NOWAIT || flags == MNT_LAZY ||
(flags != MNT_WAIT && flags != 0)) {
memcpy(sp, &mp->mnt_stat, sizeof(*sp));
goto done;
}
2004-03-23 16:22:32 +03:00
/* Get the filesystem stats now */
memset(sp, 0, sizeof(*sp));
if ((error = VFS_STATVFS(mp, sp)) != 0) {
return error;
}
if (cwdi->cwdi_rdir == NULL)
(void)memcpy(&mp->mnt_stat, sp, sizeof(mp->mnt_stat));
done:
if (cwdi->cwdi_rdir != NULL) {
size_t len;
char *bp;
char c;
char *path = PNBUF_GET();
bp = path + MAXPATHLEN;
*--bp = '\0';
rw_enter(&cwdi->cwdi_lock, RW_READER);
error = getcwd_common(cwdi->cwdi_rdir, rootvnode, &bp, path,
2005-12-11 15:16:03 +03:00
MAXPATHLEN / 2, 0, l);
rw_exit(&cwdi->cwdi_lock);
if (error) {
PNBUF_PUT(path);
return error;
}
len = strlen(bp);
if (len != 1) {
/*
* for mount points that are below our root, we can see
* them, so we fix up the pathname and return them. The
* rest we cannot see, so we don't allow viewing the
* data.
*/
if (strncmp(bp, sp->f_mntonname, len) == 0 &&
((c = sp->f_mntonname[len]) == '/' || c == '\0')) {
(void)strlcpy(sp->f_mntonname,
c == '\0' ? "/" : &sp->f_mntonname[len],
sizeof(sp->f_mntonname));
} else {
if (root)
(void)strlcpy(sp->f_mntonname, "/",
sizeof(sp->f_mntonname));
else
error = EPERM;
}
}
PNBUF_PUT(path);
}
sp->f_flag = mp->mnt_flag & MNT_VISFLAGMASK;
return error;
}
/*
* Get filesystem statistics by path.
*/
int
do_sys_pstatvfs(struct lwp *l, const char *path, int flags, struct statvfs *sb)
{
struct mount *mp;
int error;
2009-06-29 09:08:15 +04:00
struct vnode *vp;
2009-06-29 09:08:15 +04:00
error = namei_simple_user(path, NSM_FOLLOW_TRYEMULROOT, &vp);
if (error != 0)
return error;
2009-06-29 09:08:15 +04:00
mp = vp->v_mount;
error = dostatvfs(mp, sb, l, flags, 1);
2009-06-29 09:08:15 +04:00
vrele(vp);
return error;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
sys_statvfs1(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_statvfs1_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(struct statvfs *) buf;
syscallarg(int) flags;
} */
struct statvfs *sb;
int error;
sb = STATVFSBUF_GET();
error = do_sys_pstatvfs(l, SCARG(uap, path), SCARG(uap, flags), sb);
if (error == 0)
error = copyout(sb, SCARG(uap, buf), sizeof(*sb));
STATVFSBUF_PUT(sb);
return error;
}
/*
* Get filesystem statistics by fd.
*/
int
do_sys_fstatvfs(struct lwp *l, int fd, int flags, struct statvfs *sb)
{
file_t *fp;
struct mount *mp;
int error;
/* fd_getvnode() will use the descriptor for us */
if ((error = fd_getvnode(fd, &fp)) != 0)
return (error);
mp = ((struct vnode *)fp->f_data)->v_mount;
error = dostatvfs(mp, sb, curlwp, flags, 1);
fd_putfile(fd);
return error;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
sys_fstatvfs1(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_fstatvfs1_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(struct statvfs *) buf;
syscallarg(int) flags;
} */
struct statvfs *sb;
int error;
sb = STATVFSBUF_GET();
error = do_sys_fstatvfs(l, SCARG(uap, fd), SCARG(uap, flags), sb);
if (error == 0)
error = copyout(sb, SCARG(uap, buf), sizeof(*sb));
STATVFSBUF_PUT(sb);
return error;
}
/*
* Get statistics on all filesystems.
*/
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
do_sys_getvfsstat(struct lwp *l, void *sfsp, size_t bufsize, int flags,
int (*copyfn)(const void *, void *, size_t), size_t entry_sz,
register_t *retval)
{
int root = 0;
2003-01-18 13:06:22 +03:00
struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
2000-03-30 13:27:11 +04:00
struct mount *mp, *nmp;
struct statvfs *sb;
size_t count, maxcount;
int error = 0;
sb = STATVFSBUF_GET();
maxcount = bufsize / entry_sz;
mutex_enter(&mountlist_lock);
1998-03-01 05:20:01 +03:00
count = 0;
for (mp = CIRCLEQ_FIRST(&mountlist); mp != (void *)&mountlist;
mp = nmp) {
if (vfs_busy(mp, &nmp)) {
1998-03-01 05:20:01 +03:00
continue;
}
if (sfsp && count < maxcount) {
error = dostatvfs(mp, sb, l, flags, 0);
if (error) {
vfs_unbusy(mp, false, &nmp);
error = 0;
continue;
1998-03-01 05:20:01 +03:00
}
error = copyfn(sb, sfsp, entry_sz);
if (error) {
vfs_unbusy(mp, false, NULL);
goto out;
}
sfsp = (char *)sfsp + entry_sz;
root |= strcmp(sb->f_mntonname, "/") == 0;
}
count++;
vfs_unbusy(mp, false, &nmp);
}
mutex_exit(&mountlist_lock);
if (root == 0 && p->p_cwdi->cwdi_rdir) {
/*
* fake a root entry
*/
error = dostatvfs(p->p_cwdi->cwdi_rdir->v_mount,
sb, l, flags, 1);
if (error != 0)
goto out;
if (sfsp) {
error = copyfn(sb, sfsp, entry_sz);
if (error != 0)
goto out;
}
count++;
}
if (sfsp && count > maxcount)
*retval = maxcount;
else
*retval = count;
out:
STATVFSBUF_PUT(sb);
return error;
}
int
sys_getvfsstat(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_getvfsstat_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(struct statvfs *) buf;
syscallarg(size_t) bufsize;
syscallarg(int) flags;
} */
return do_sys_getvfsstat(l, SCARG(uap, buf), SCARG(uap, bufsize),
SCARG(uap, flags), copyout, sizeof (struct statvfs), retval);
}
/*
* Change current working directory to a given file descriptor.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
sys_fchdir(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_fchdir_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
} */
2003-01-18 13:06:22 +03:00
struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
struct cwdinfo *cwdi;
1994-12-14 19:30:40 +03:00
struct vnode *vp, *tdp;
struct mount *mp;
file_t *fp;
int error, fd;
/* fd_getvnode() will use the descriptor for us */
fd = SCARG(uap, fd);
if ((error = fd_getvnode(fd, &fp)) != 0)
return (error);
vp = fp->f_data;
vref(vp);
1998-03-01 05:20:01 +03:00
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
if (vp->v_type != VDIR)
error = ENOTDIR;
else
error = VOP_ACCESS(vp, VEXEC, l->l_cred);
if (error) {
vput(vp);
goto out;
}
while ((mp = vp->v_mountedhere) != NULL) {
error = vfs_busy(mp, NULL);
vput(vp);
2008-05-06 17:31:02 +04:00
if (error != 0)
goto out;
error = VFS_ROOT(mp, &tdp);
vfs_unbusy(mp, false, NULL);
1998-03-01 05:20:01 +03:00
if (error)
goto out;
1994-12-14 19:30:40 +03:00
vp = tdp;
}
VOP_UNLOCK(vp);
/*
* Disallow changing to a directory not under the process's
* current root directory (if there is one).
*/
cwdi = p->p_cwdi;
rw_enter(&cwdi->cwdi_lock, RW_WRITER);
2005-12-11 15:16:03 +03:00
if (cwdi->cwdi_rdir && !vn_isunder(vp, NULL, l)) {
vrele(vp);
error = EPERM; /* operation not permitted */
} else {
vrele(cwdi->cwdi_cdir);
cwdi->cwdi_cdir = vp;
}
rw_exit(&cwdi->cwdi_lock);
2004-03-23 16:22:32 +03:00
out:
fd_putfile(fd);
return (error);
}
/*
2005-06-06 03:47:48 +04:00
* Change this process's notion of the root directory to a given file
* descriptor.
*/
int
sys_fchroot(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_fchroot_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
2003-01-18 13:06:22 +03:00
struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
struct vnode *vp;
file_t *fp;
int error, fd = SCARG(uap, fd);
First take at security model abstraction. - Add a few scopes to the kernel: system, network, and machdep. - Add a few more actions/sub-actions (requests), and start using them as opposed to the KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER place-holders. - Introduce a basic set of listeners that implement our "traditional" security model, called "bsd44". This is the default (and only) model we have at the moment. - Update all relevant documentation. - Add some code and docs to help folks who want to actually use this stuff: * There's a sample overlay model, sitting on-top of "bsd44", for fast experimenting with tweaking just a subset of an existing model. This is pretty cool because it's *really* straightforward to do stuff you had to use ugly hacks for until now... * And of course, documentation describing how to do the above for quick reference, including code samples. All of these changes were tested for regressions using a Python-based testsuite that will be (I hope) available soon via pkgsrc. Information about the tests, and how to write new ones, can be found on: http://kauth.linbsd.org/kauthwiki NOTE FOR DEVELOPERS: *PLEASE* don't add any code that does any of the following: - Uses a KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER kauth(9) request, - Checks 'securelevel' directly, - Checks a uid/gid directly. (or if you feel you have to, contact me first) This is still work in progress; It's far from being done, but now it'll be a lot easier. Relevant mailing list threads: http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/01/25/0011.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/03/24/0001.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/04/18/0000.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/05/15/0000.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/08/01/0000.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/08/25/0000.html Many thanks to YAMAMOTO Takashi, Matt Thomas, and Christos Zoulas for help stablizing kauth(9). Full credit for the regression tests, making sure these changes didn't break anything, goes to Matt Fleming and Jaime Fournier. Happy birthday Randi! :)
2006-09-09 00:58:56 +04:00
if ((error = kauth_authorize_system(l->l_cred, KAUTH_SYSTEM_CHROOT,
KAUTH_REQ_SYSTEM_CHROOT_FCHROOT, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0)
return error;
/* fd_getvnode() will use the descriptor for us */
if ((error = fd_getvnode(fd, &fp)) != 0)
return error;
vp = fp->f_data;
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
if (vp->v_type != VDIR)
error = ENOTDIR;
else
error = VOP_ACCESS(vp, VEXEC, l->l_cred);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp);
if (error)
goto out;
vref(vp);
change_root(p->p_cwdi, vp, l);
out:
fd_putfile(fd);
return (error);
}
/*
* Change current working directory (``.'').
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
sys_chdir(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_chdir_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
} */
2003-01-18 13:06:22 +03:00
struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
struct cwdinfo *cwdi;
int error;
struct vnode *vp;
if ((error = chdir_lookup(SCARG(uap, path), UIO_USERSPACE,
&vp, l)) != 0)
return (error);
cwdi = p->p_cwdi;
rw_enter(&cwdi->cwdi_lock, RW_WRITER);
vrele(cwdi->cwdi_cdir);
cwdi->cwdi_cdir = vp;
rw_exit(&cwdi->cwdi_lock);
return (0);
}
/*
* Change notion of root (``/'') directory.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
sys_chroot(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_chroot_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
} */
2003-01-18 13:06:22 +03:00
struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
int error;
struct vnode *vp;
First take at security model abstraction. - Add a few scopes to the kernel: system, network, and machdep. - Add a few more actions/sub-actions (requests), and start using them as opposed to the KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER place-holders. - Introduce a basic set of listeners that implement our "traditional" security model, called "bsd44". This is the default (and only) model we have at the moment. - Update all relevant documentation. - Add some code and docs to help folks who want to actually use this stuff: * There's a sample overlay model, sitting on-top of "bsd44", for fast experimenting with tweaking just a subset of an existing model. This is pretty cool because it's *really* straightforward to do stuff you had to use ugly hacks for until now... * And of course, documentation describing how to do the above for quick reference, including code samples. All of these changes were tested for regressions using a Python-based testsuite that will be (I hope) available soon via pkgsrc. Information about the tests, and how to write new ones, can be found on: http://kauth.linbsd.org/kauthwiki NOTE FOR DEVELOPERS: *PLEASE* don't add any code that does any of the following: - Uses a KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER kauth(9) request, - Checks 'securelevel' directly, - Checks a uid/gid directly. (or if you feel you have to, contact me first) This is still work in progress; It's far from being done, but now it'll be a lot easier. Relevant mailing list threads: http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/01/25/0011.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/03/24/0001.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/04/18/0000.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/05/15/0000.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/08/01/0000.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/08/25/0000.html Many thanks to YAMAMOTO Takashi, Matt Thomas, and Christos Zoulas for help stablizing kauth(9). Full credit for the regression tests, making sure these changes didn't break anything, goes to Matt Fleming and Jaime Fournier. Happy birthday Randi! :)
2006-09-09 00:58:56 +04:00
if ((error = kauth_authorize_system(l->l_cred, KAUTH_SYSTEM_CHROOT,
KAUTH_REQ_SYSTEM_CHROOT_CHROOT, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0)
return (error);
if ((error = chdir_lookup(SCARG(uap, path), UIO_USERSPACE,
&vp, l)) != 0)
return (error);
change_root(p->p_cwdi, vp, l);
return (0);
}
/*
* Common routine for chroot and fchroot.
* NB: callers need to properly authorize the change root operation.
*/
void
change_root(struct cwdinfo *cwdi, struct vnode *vp, struct lwp *l)
{
struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
kauth_cred_t ncred;
ncred = kauth_cred_alloc();
rw_enter(&cwdi->cwdi_lock, RW_WRITER);
if (cwdi->cwdi_rdir != NULL)
vrele(cwdi->cwdi_rdir);
cwdi->cwdi_rdir = vp;
/*
* Prevent escaping from chroot by putting the root under
* the working directory. Silently chdir to / if we aren't
* already there.
*/
2005-12-11 15:16:03 +03:00
if (!vn_isunder(cwdi->cwdi_cdir, vp, l)) {
/*
* XXX would be more failsafe to change directory to a
* deadfs node here instead
*/
vrele(cwdi->cwdi_cdir);
vref(vp);
cwdi->cwdi_cdir = vp;
}
rw_exit(&cwdi->cwdi_lock);
/* Get a write lock on the process credential. */
proc_crmod_enter();
kauth_cred_clone(p->p_cred, ncred);
kauth_proc_chroot(ncred, p->p_cwdi);
/* Broadcast our credentials to the process and other LWPs. */
proc_crmod_leave(ncred, p->p_cred, true);
}
/*
* Common routine for chroot and chdir.
* XXX "where" should be enum uio_seg
*/
int
chdir_lookup(const char *path, int where, struct vnode **vpp, struct lwp *l)
{
struct pathbuf *pb;
struct nameidata nd;
int error;
error = pathbuf_maybe_copyin(path, where, &pb);
if (error) {
return error;
}
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | TRYEMULROOT, pb);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0) {
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
return error;
}
*vpp = nd.ni_vp;
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
if ((*vpp)->v_type != VDIR)
error = ENOTDIR;
else
error = VOP_ACCESS(*vpp, VEXEC, l->l_cred);
2004-03-23 16:22:32 +03:00
if (error)
vput(*vpp);
1998-03-01 05:20:01 +03:00
else
VOP_UNLOCK(*vpp);
return (error);
}
/*
* Internals of sys_open - path has already been converted into a pathbuf
* (so we can easily reuse this function from other parts of the kernel,
* like posix_spawn post-processing).
*/
static int
do_open(lwp_t *l, struct vnode *dvp, struct pathbuf *pb, int open_flags,
int open_mode, int *fd)
{
2003-01-18 13:06:22 +03:00
struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
struct cwdinfo *cwdi = p->p_cwdi;
file_t *fp;
struct vnode *vp;
int flags, cmode;
int indx, error;
struct nameidata nd;
flags = FFLAGS(open_flags);
if ((flags & (FREAD | FWRITE)) == 0)
return EINVAL;
if ((error = fd_allocfile(&fp, &indx)) != 0) {
return error;
}
/* We're going to read cwdi->cwdi_cmask unlocked here. */
cmode = ((open_mode &~ cwdi->cwdi_cmask) & ALLPERMS) &~ S_ISTXT;
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | TRYEMULROOT, pb);
if (dvp != NULL)
NDAT(&nd, dvp);
l->l_dupfd = -indx - 1; /* XXX check for fdopen */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
if ((error = vn_open(&nd, flags, cmode)) != 0) {
fd_abort(p, fp, indx);
if ((error == EDUPFD || error == EMOVEFD) &&
l->l_dupfd >= 0 && /* XXX from fdopen */
1994-12-14 22:36:15 +03:00
(error =
fd_dupopen(l->l_dupfd, &indx, flags, error)) == 0) {
*fd = indx;
return 0;
}
1994-12-14 22:36:15 +03:00
if (error == ERESTART)
error = EINTR;
return error;
}
l->l_dupfd = 0;
vp = nd.ni_vp;
if ((error = open_setfp(l, fp, vp, indx, flags)))
return error;
VOP_UNLOCK(vp);
*fd = indx;
fd_affix(p, fp, indx);
return 0;
}
int
fd_open(const char *path, int open_flags, int open_mode, int *fd)
{
struct pathbuf *pb;
int error, oflags;
oflags = FFLAGS(open_flags);
if ((oflags & (FREAD | FWRITE)) == 0)
return EINVAL;
pb = pathbuf_create(path);
if (pb == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
error = do_open(curlwp, NULL, pb, open_flags, open_mode, fd);
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
return error;
}
/*
* Check permissions, allocate an open file structure,
* and call the device open routine if any.
* XXX implement O_SEARCH
*/
static int
do_sys_openat(lwp_t *l, int fdat, const char *path, int flags,
int mode, int *fd)
{
file_t *dfp = NULL;
struct vnode *dvp = NULL;
struct pathbuf *pb;
int error;
error = pathbuf_copyin(path, &pb);
if (error)
return error;
if (fdat != AT_FDCWD) {
/* fd_getvnode() will use the descriptor for us */
if ((error = fd_getvnode(fdat, &dfp)) != 0)
goto out;
dvp = dfp->f_data;
if (!(dfp->f_flag & FSEARCH)) {
vn_lock(dfp->f_data, LK_EXCLUSIVE);
error = VOP_ACCESS(dfp->f_data, VEXEC, l->l_cred);
VOP_UNLOCK(dfp->f_data);
if (error)
goto cleanup;
}
}
error = do_open(l, dvp, pb, flags, mode, fd);
cleanup:
if (dfp != NULL)
fd_putfile(fdat);
out:
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
return error;
}
int
sys_open(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_open_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(int) flags;
syscallarg(int) mode;
} */
int error;
int fd;
error = do_sys_openat(l, AT_FDCWD, SCARG(uap, path),
SCARG(uap, flags), SCARG(uap, mode), &fd);
if (error == 0)
*retval = fd;
return error;
}
int
sys_openat(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_openat_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(int) oflags;
syscallarg(int) mode;
} */
int error;
int fd;
error = do_sys_openat(l, SCARG(uap, fd), SCARG(uap, path),
SCARG(uap, oflags), SCARG(uap, mode), &fd);
if (error == 0)
*retval = fd;
return error;
}
static void
vfs__fhfree(fhandle_t *fhp)
{
size_t fhsize;
if (fhp == NULL) {
return;
}
fhsize = FHANDLE_SIZE(fhp);
kmem_free(fhp, fhsize);
}
/*
* vfs_composefh: compose a filehandle.
*/
int
vfs_composefh(struct vnode *vp, fhandle_t *fhp, size_t *fh_size)
{
struct mount *mp;
struct fid *fidp;
int error;
size_t needfhsize;
size_t fidsize;
mp = vp->v_mount;
fidp = NULL;
if (*fh_size < FHANDLE_SIZE_MIN) {
fidsize = 0;
} else {
fidsize = *fh_size - offsetof(fhandle_t, fh_fid);
if (fhp != NULL) {
memset(fhp, 0, *fh_size);
fhp->fh_fsid = mp->mnt_stat.f_fsidx;
fidp = &fhp->fh_fid;
}
}
error = VFS_VPTOFH(vp, fidp, &fidsize);
needfhsize = FHANDLE_SIZE_FROM_FILEID_SIZE(fidsize);
if (error == 0 && *fh_size < needfhsize) {
error = E2BIG;
}
*fh_size = needfhsize;
return error;
}
int
vfs_composefh_alloc(struct vnode *vp, fhandle_t **fhpp)
{
struct mount *mp;
fhandle_t *fhp;
size_t fhsize;
size_t fidsize;
int error;
*fhpp = NULL;
mp = vp->v_mount;
fidsize = 0;
error = VFS_VPTOFH(vp, NULL, &fidsize);
KASSERT(error != 0);
if (error != E2BIG) {
goto out;
}
fhsize = FHANDLE_SIZE_FROM_FILEID_SIZE(fidsize);
fhp = kmem_zalloc(fhsize, KM_SLEEP);
if (fhp == NULL) {
error = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
fhp->fh_fsid = mp->mnt_stat.f_fsidx;
error = VFS_VPTOFH(vp, &fhp->fh_fid, &fidsize);
if (error == 0) {
KASSERT((FHANDLE_SIZE(fhp) == fhsize &&
FHANDLE_FILEID(fhp)->fid_len == fidsize));
*fhpp = fhp;
} else {
kmem_free(fhp, fhsize);
}
out:
return error;
}
void
vfs_composefh_free(fhandle_t *fhp)
{
vfs__fhfree(fhp);
}
/*
* vfs_fhtovp: lookup a vnode by a filehandle.
*/
int
vfs_fhtovp(fhandle_t *fhp, struct vnode **vpp)
{
struct mount *mp;
int error;
*vpp = NULL;
mp = vfs_getvfs(FHANDLE_FSID(fhp));
if (mp == NULL) {
error = ESTALE;
goto out;
}
if (mp->mnt_op->vfs_fhtovp == NULL) {
error = EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
error = VFS_FHTOVP(mp, FHANDLE_FILEID(fhp), vpp);
out:
return error;
}
/*
* vfs_copyinfh_alloc: allocate and copyin a filehandle, given
2006-07-31 20:34:42 +04:00
* the needed size.
*/
int
vfs_copyinfh_alloc(const void *ufhp, size_t fhsize, fhandle_t **fhpp)
2006-07-31 20:34:42 +04:00
{
fhandle_t *fhp;
int error;
*fhpp = NULL;
if (fhsize > FHANDLE_SIZE_MAX) {
return EINVAL;
}
if (fhsize < FHANDLE_SIZE_MIN) {
return EINVAL;
}
again:
fhp = kmem_alloc(fhsize, KM_SLEEP);
if (fhp == NULL) {
return ENOMEM;
}
error = copyin(ufhp, fhp, fhsize);
if (error == 0) {
/* XXX this check shouldn't be here */
if (FHANDLE_SIZE(fhp) == fhsize) {
2006-07-31 20:34:42 +04:00
*fhpp = fhp;
return 0;
} else if (fhsize == NFSX_V2FH && FHANDLE_SIZE(fhp) < fhsize) {
/*
* a kludge for nfsv2 padded handles.
*/
size_t sz;
sz = FHANDLE_SIZE(fhp);
kmem_free(fhp, fhsize);
fhsize = sz;
goto again;
2006-08-04 17:31:51 +04:00
} else {
/*
* userland told us wrong size.
*/
2006-07-31 20:34:42 +04:00
error = EINVAL;
2006-08-04 17:31:51 +04:00
}
}
2006-07-31 20:34:42 +04:00
kmem_free(fhp, fhsize);
return error;
}
void
vfs_copyinfh_free(fhandle_t *fhp)
{
vfs__fhfree(fhp);
}
/*
* Get file handle system call
*/
int
sys___getfh30(struct lwp *l, const struct sys___getfh30_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(char *) fname;
syscallarg(fhandle_t *) fhp;
syscallarg(size_t *) fh_size;
} */
2000-03-30 13:27:11 +04:00
struct vnode *vp;
fhandle_t *fh;
int error;
struct pathbuf *pb;
struct nameidata nd;
size_t sz;
size_t usz;
/*
* Must be super user
*/
First take at security model abstraction. - Add a few scopes to the kernel: system, network, and machdep. - Add a few more actions/sub-actions (requests), and start using them as opposed to the KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER place-holders. - Introduce a basic set of listeners that implement our "traditional" security model, called "bsd44". This is the default (and only) model we have at the moment. - Update all relevant documentation. - Add some code and docs to help folks who want to actually use this stuff: * There's a sample overlay model, sitting on-top of "bsd44", for fast experimenting with tweaking just a subset of an existing model. This is pretty cool because it's *really* straightforward to do stuff you had to use ugly hacks for until now... * And of course, documentation describing how to do the above for quick reference, including code samples. All of these changes were tested for regressions using a Python-based testsuite that will be (I hope) available soon via pkgsrc. Information about the tests, and how to write new ones, can be found on: http://kauth.linbsd.org/kauthwiki NOTE FOR DEVELOPERS: *PLEASE* don't add any code that does any of the following: - Uses a KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER kauth(9) request, - Checks 'securelevel' directly, - Checks a uid/gid directly. (or if you feel you have to, contact me first) This is still work in progress; It's far from being done, but now it'll be a lot easier. Relevant mailing list threads: http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/01/25/0011.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/03/24/0001.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/04/18/0000.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/05/15/0000.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/08/01/0000.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/08/25/0000.html Many thanks to YAMAMOTO Takashi, Matt Thomas, and Christos Zoulas for help stablizing kauth(9). Full credit for the regression tests, making sure these changes didn't break anything, goes to Matt Fleming and Jaime Fournier. Happy birthday Randi! :)
2006-09-09 00:58:56 +04:00
error = kauth_authorize_system(l->l_cred, KAUTH_SYSTEM_FILEHANDLE,
0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (error)
return (error);
error = pathbuf_copyin(SCARG(uap, fname), &pb);
if (error) {
return error;
}
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | TRYEMULROOT, pb);
error = namei(&nd);
if (error) {
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
return error;
}
vp = nd.ni_vp;
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
error = vfs_composefh_alloc(vp, &fh);
vput(vp);
if (error != 0) {
goto out;
}
error = copyin(SCARG(uap, fh_size), &usz, sizeof(size_t));
if (error != 0) {
goto out;
}
sz = FHANDLE_SIZE(fh);
error = copyout(&sz, SCARG(uap, fh_size), sizeof(size_t));
if (error != 0) {
goto out;
}
if (usz >= sz) {
error = copyout(fh, SCARG(uap, fhp), sz);
} else {
error = E2BIG;
}
out:
vfs_composefh_free(fh);
return (error);
}
/*
* Open a file given a file handle.
*
* Check permissions, allocate an open file structure,
* and call the device open routine if any.
*/
int
dofhopen(struct lwp *l, const void *ufhp, size_t fhsize, int oflags,
register_t *retval)
{
file_t *fp;
struct vnode *vp = NULL;
kauth_cred_t cred = l->l_cred;
file_t *nfp;
int indx, error = 0;
struct vattr va;
fhandle_t *fh;
int flags;
proc_t *p;
p = curproc;
/*
* Must be super user
*/
if ((error = kauth_authorize_system(l->l_cred, KAUTH_SYSTEM_FILEHANDLE,
0, NULL, NULL, NULL)))
return (error);
flags = FFLAGS(oflags);
if ((flags & (FREAD | FWRITE)) == 0)
return (EINVAL);
if ((flags & O_CREAT))
return (EINVAL);
if ((error = fd_allocfile(&nfp, &indx)) != 0)
return (error);
fp = nfp;
error = vfs_copyinfh_alloc(ufhp, fhsize, &fh);
if (error != 0) {
Apply the NFS exports list rototill patch: - Remove all NFS related stuff from file system specific code. - Drop the vfs_checkexp hook and generalize it in the new nfs_check_export function, thus removing redundancy from all file systems. - Move all NFS export-related stuff from kern/vfs_subr.c to the new file sys/nfs/nfs_export.c. The former was becoming large and its code is always compiled, regardless of the build options. Using the latter, the code is only compiled in when NFSSERVER is enabled. While doing this, also make some functions in nfs_subs.c conditional to NFSSERVER. - Add a new command in nfssvc(2), called NFSSVC_SETEXPORTSLIST, that takes a path and a set of export entries. At the moment it can only clear the exports list or append entries, one by one, but it is done in a way that allows setting the whole set of entries atomically in the future (see the comment in mountd_set_exports_list or in doc/TODO). - Change mountd(8) to use the nfssvc(2) system call instead of mount(2) so that it becomes file system agnostic. In fact, all this whole thing was done to remove a 'XXX' block from this utility! - Change the mount*, newfs and fsck* userland utilities to not deal with NFS exports initialization; done internally by the kernel when initializing the NFS support for each file system. - Implement an interface for VFS (called VFS hooks) so that several kernel subsystems can run arbitrary code upon receipt of specific VFS events. At the moment, this only provides support for unmount and is used to destroy NFS exports lists from the file systems being unmounted, though it has room for extension. Thanks go to yamt@, chs@, thorpej@, wrstuden@ and others for their comments and advice in the development of this patch.
2005-09-23 16:10:31 +04:00
goto bad;
}
error = vfs_fhtovp(fh, &vp);
if (error != 0) {
goto bad;
}
/* Now do an effective vn_open */
if (vp->v_type == VSOCK) {
error = EOPNOTSUPP;
goto bad;
}
error = vn_openchk(vp, cred, flags);
if (error != 0)
goto bad;
if (flags & O_TRUNC) {
VOP_UNLOCK(vp); /* XXX */
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY); /* XXX */
vattr_null(&va);
va.va_size = 0;
error = VOP_SETATTR(vp, &va, cred);
if (error)
goto bad;
}
if ((error = VOP_OPEN(vp, flags, cred)) != 0)
goto bad;
if (flags & FWRITE) {
mutex_enter(vp->v_interlock);
vp->v_writecount++;
mutex_exit(vp->v_interlock);
}
/* done with modified vn_open, now finish what sys_open does. */
if ((error = open_setfp(l, fp, vp, indx, flags)))
return error;
VOP_UNLOCK(vp);
*retval = indx;
fd_affix(p, fp, indx);
vfs_copyinfh_free(fh);
return (0);
bad:
fd_abort(p, fp, indx);
if (vp != NULL)
vput(vp);
vfs_copyinfh_free(fh);
return (error);
}
int
sys___fhopen40(struct lwp *l, const struct sys___fhopen40_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
2006-07-31 20:34:42 +04:00
syscallarg(const void *) fhp;
syscallarg(size_t) fh_size;
syscallarg(int) flags;
} */
return dofhopen(l, SCARG(uap, fhp), SCARG(uap, fh_size),
SCARG(uap, flags), retval);
}
int
do_fhstat(struct lwp *l, const void *ufhp, size_t fhsize, struct stat *sb)
{
int error;
fhandle_t *fh;
struct vnode *vp;
/*
* Must be super user
*/
First take at security model abstraction. - Add a few scopes to the kernel: system, network, and machdep. - Add a few more actions/sub-actions (requests), and start using them as opposed to the KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER place-holders. - Introduce a basic set of listeners that implement our "traditional" security model, called "bsd44". This is the default (and only) model we have at the moment. - Update all relevant documentation. - Add some code and docs to help folks who want to actually use this stuff: * There's a sample overlay model, sitting on-top of "bsd44", for fast experimenting with tweaking just a subset of an existing model. This is pretty cool because it's *really* straightforward to do stuff you had to use ugly hacks for until now... * And of course, documentation describing how to do the above for quick reference, including code samples. All of these changes were tested for regressions using a Python-based testsuite that will be (I hope) available soon via pkgsrc. Information about the tests, and how to write new ones, can be found on: http://kauth.linbsd.org/kauthwiki NOTE FOR DEVELOPERS: *PLEASE* don't add any code that does any of the following: - Uses a KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER kauth(9) request, - Checks 'securelevel' directly, - Checks a uid/gid directly. (or if you feel you have to, contact me first) This is still work in progress; It's far from being done, but now it'll be a lot easier. Relevant mailing list threads: http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/01/25/0011.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/03/24/0001.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/04/18/0000.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/05/15/0000.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/08/01/0000.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/08/25/0000.html Many thanks to YAMAMOTO Takashi, Matt Thomas, and Christos Zoulas for help stablizing kauth(9). Full credit for the regression tests, making sure these changes didn't break anything, goes to Matt Fleming and Jaime Fournier. Happy birthday Randi! :)
2006-09-09 00:58:56 +04:00
if ((error = kauth_authorize_system(l->l_cred, KAUTH_SYSTEM_FILEHANDLE,
0, NULL, NULL, NULL)))
return (error);
error = vfs_copyinfh_alloc(ufhp, fhsize, &fh);
if (error != 0)
return error;
error = vfs_fhtovp(fh, &vp);
vfs_copyinfh_free(fh);
if (error != 0)
return error;
error = vn_stat(vp, sb);
vput(vp);
return error;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
2009-01-11 05:45:45 +03:00
sys___fhstat50(struct lwp *l, const struct sys___fhstat50_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const void *) fhp;
2006-07-31 20:34:42 +04:00
syscallarg(size_t) fh_size;
syscallarg(struct stat *) sb;
} */
struct stat sb;
int error;
error = do_fhstat(l, SCARG(uap, fhp), SCARG(uap, fh_size), &sb);
if (error)
return error;
return copyout(&sb, SCARG(uap, sb), sizeof(sb));
}
int
do_fhstatvfs(struct lwp *l, const void *ufhp, size_t fhsize, struct statvfs *sb,
int flags)
{
fhandle_t *fh;
struct mount *mp;
struct vnode *vp;
int error;
/*
* Must be super user
*/
First take at security model abstraction. - Add a few scopes to the kernel: system, network, and machdep. - Add a few more actions/sub-actions (requests), and start using them as opposed to the KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER place-holders. - Introduce a basic set of listeners that implement our "traditional" security model, called "bsd44". This is the default (and only) model we have at the moment. - Update all relevant documentation. - Add some code and docs to help folks who want to actually use this stuff: * There's a sample overlay model, sitting on-top of "bsd44", for fast experimenting with tweaking just a subset of an existing model. This is pretty cool because it's *really* straightforward to do stuff you had to use ugly hacks for until now... * And of course, documentation describing how to do the above for quick reference, including code samples. All of these changes were tested for regressions using a Python-based testsuite that will be (I hope) available soon via pkgsrc. Information about the tests, and how to write new ones, can be found on: http://kauth.linbsd.org/kauthwiki NOTE FOR DEVELOPERS: *PLEASE* don't add any code that does any of the following: - Uses a KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER kauth(9) request, - Checks 'securelevel' directly, - Checks a uid/gid directly. (or if you feel you have to, contact me first) This is still work in progress; It's far from being done, but now it'll be a lot easier. Relevant mailing list threads: http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/01/25/0011.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/03/24/0001.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/04/18/0000.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/05/15/0000.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/08/01/0000.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/08/25/0000.html Many thanks to YAMAMOTO Takashi, Matt Thomas, and Christos Zoulas for help stablizing kauth(9). Full credit for the regression tests, making sure these changes didn't break anything, goes to Matt Fleming and Jaime Fournier. Happy birthday Randi! :)
2006-09-09 00:58:56 +04:00
if ((error = kauth_authorize_system(l->l_cred, KAUTH_SYSTEM_FILEHANDLE,
0, NULL, NULL, NULL)))
return error;
error = vfs_copyinfh_alloc(ufhp, fhsize, &fh);
if (error != 0)
return error;
error = vfs_fhtovp(fh, &vp);
vfs_copyinfh_free(fh);
if (error != 0)
return error;
mp = vp->v_mount;
error = dostatvfs(mp, sb, l, flags, 1);
vput(vp);
return error;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys___fhstatvfs140(struct lwp *l, const struct sys___fhstatvfs140_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
2006-08-04 21:07:32 +04:00
syscallarg(const void *) fhp;
syscallarg(size_t) fh_size;
syscallarg(struct statvfs *) buf;
syscallarg(int) flags;
} */
struct statvfs *sb = STATVFSBUF_GET();
int error;
error = do_fhstatvfs(l, SCARG(uap, fhp), SCARG(uap, fh_size), sb,
SCARG(uap, flags));
if (error == 0)
error = copyout(sb, SCARG(uap, buf), sizeof(*sb));
STATVFSBUF_PUT(sb);
return error;
}
/*
* Create a special file.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
2009-01-11 05:45:45 +03:00
sys___mknod50(struct lwp *l, const struct sys___mknod50_args *uap,
register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
2009-01-11 05:45:45 +03:00
syscallarg(mode_t) mode;
syscallarg(dev_t) dev;
} */
return do_sys_mknodat(l, AT_FDCWD, SCARG(uap, path), SCARG(uap, mode),
SCARG(uap, dev), retval, UIO_USERSPACE);
2009-01-11 05:45:45 +03:00
}
int
sys_mknodat(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_mknodat_args *uap,
register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(mode_t) mode;
syscallarg(uint32_t) dev;
} */
return do_sys_mknodat(l, SCARG(uap, fd), SCARG(uap, path),
SCARG(uap, mode), SCARG(uap, dev), retval, UIO_USERSPACE);
}
2009-01-11 05:45:45 +03:00
int
do_sys_mknod(struct lwp *l, const char *pathname, mode_t mode, dev_t dev,
register_t *retval, enum uio_seg seg)
{
return do_sys_mknodat(l, AT_FDCWD, pathname, mode, dev, retval, seg);
}
int
do_sys_mknodat(struct lwp *l, int fdat, const char *pathname, mode_t mode,
dev_t dev, register_t *retval, enum uio_seg seg)
2009-01-11 05:45:45 +03:00
{
2003-01-18 13:06:22 +03:00
struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
2000-03-30 13:27:11 +04:00
struct vnode *vp;
struct vattr vattr;
int error, optype;
struct pathbuf *pb;
struct nameidata nd;
const char *pathstring;
First take at security model abstraction. - Add a few scopes to the kernel: system, network, and machdep. - Add a few more actions/sub-actions (requests), and start using them as opposed to the KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER place-holders. - Introduce a basic set of listeners that implement our "traditional" security model, called "bsd44". This is the default (and only) model we have at the moment. - Update all relevant documentation. - Add some code and docs to help folks who want to actually use this stuff: * There's a sample overlay model, sitting on-top of "bsd44", for fast experimenting with tweaking just a subset of an existing model. This is pretty cool because it's *really* straightforward to do stuff you had to use ugly hacks for until now... * And of course, documentation describing how to do the above for quick reference, including code samples. All of these changes were tested for regressions using a Python-based testsuite that will be (I hope) available soon via pkgsrc. Information about the tests, and how to write new ones, can be found on: http://kauth.linbsd.org/kauthwiki NOTE FOR DEVELOPERS: *PLEASE* don't add any code that does any of the following: - Uses a KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER kauth(9) request, - Checks 'securelevel' directly, - Checks a uid/gid directly. (or if you feel you have to, contact me first) This is still work in progress; It's far from being done, but now it'll be a lot easier. Relevant mailing list threads: http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/01/25/0011.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/03/24/0001.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/04/18/0000.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/05/15/0000.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/08/01/0000.html http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2006/08/25/0000.html Many thanks to YAMAMOTO Takashi, Matt Thomas, and Christos Zoulas for help stablizing kauth(9). Full credit for the regression tests, making sure these changes didn't break anything, goes to Matt Fleming and Jaime Fournier. Happy birthday Randi! :)
2006-09-09 00:58:56 +04:00
if ((error = kauth_authorize_system(l->l_cred, KAUTH_SYSTEM_MKNOD,
0, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0)
return (error);
optype = VOP_MKNOD_DESCOFFSET;
error = pathbuf_maybe_copyin(pathname, seg, &pb);
if (error) {
return error;
}
pathstring = pathbuf_stringcopy_get(pb);
if (pathstring == NULL) {
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
return ENOMEM;
}
NDINIT(&nd, CREATE, LOCKPARENT | TRYEMULROOT, pb);
if ((error = fd_nameiat(l, fdat, &nd)) != 0)
goto out;
vp = nd.ni_vp;
1994-12-14 19:30:40 +03:00
if (vp != NULL)
error = EEXIST;
1994-12-14 19:30:40 +03:00
else {
vattr_null(&vattr);
/* We will read cwdi->cwdi_cmask unlocked. */
2009-01-11 05:45:45 +03:00
vattr.va_mode = (mode & ALLPERMS) &~ p->p_cwdi->cwdi_cmask;
vattr.va_rdev = dev;
2009-01-11 05:45:45 +03:00
switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1994-12-14 19:30:40 +03:00
case S_IFMT: /* used by badsect to flag bad sectors */
vattr.va_type = VBAD;
break;
case S_IFCHR:
vattr.va_type = VCHR;
break;
case S_IFBLK:
vattr.va_type = VBLK;
break;
case S_IFWHT:
optype = VOP_WHITEOUT_DESCOFFSET;
break;
case S_IFREG:
#if NVERIEXEC > 0
error = veriexec_openchk(l, nd.ni_vp, pathstring,
O_CREAT);
#endif /* NVERIEXEC > 0 */
vattr.va_type = VREG;
vattr.va_rdev = VNOVAL;
optype = VOP_CREATE_DESCOFFSET;
1994-12-14 19:30:40 +03:00
break;
default:
error = EINVAL;
break;
}
}
if (error == 0 && optype == VOP_MKNOD_DESCOFFSET
&& vattr.va_rdev == VNOVAL)
error = EINVAL;
1994-12-14 19:30:40 +03:00
if (!error) {
switch (optype) {
case VOP_WHITEOUT_DESCOFFSET:
1994-12-14 19:30:40 +03:00
error = VOP_WHITEOUT(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_cnd, CREATE);
if (error)
VOP_ABORTOP(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_cnd);
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
break;
case VOP_MKNOD_DESCOFFSET:
1994-12-14 19:30:40 +03:00
error = VOP_MKNOD(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_vp,
&nd.ni_cnd, &vattr);
if (error == 0)
vput(nd.ni_vp);
break;
case VOP_CREATE_DESCOFFSET:
error = VOP_CREATE(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_vp,
&nd.ni_cnd, &vattr);
if (error == 0)
vput(nd.ni_vp);
break;
1994-12-14 19:30:40 +03:00
}
} else {
VOP_ABORTOP(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_cnd);
if (nd.ni_dvp == vp)
vrele(nd.ni_dvp);
else
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
if (vp)
vrele(vp);
}
out:
pathbuf_stringcopy_put(pb, pathstring);
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
return (error);
}
/*
* Create a named pipe.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
sys_mkfifo(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_mkfifo_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(int) mode;
} */
return do_sys_mkfifoat(l, AT_FDCWD, SCARG(uap, path), SCARG(uap, mode));
}
int
sys_mkfifoat(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_mkfifoat_args *uap,
register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(int) mode;
} */
return do_sys_mkfifoat(l, SCARG(uap, fd), SCARG(uap, path),
SCARG(uap, mode));
}
static int
do_sys_mkfifoat(struct lwp *l, int fdat, const char *path, mode_t mode)
{
2003-01-18 13:06:22 +03:00
struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
struct vattr vattr;
int error;
struct pathbuf *pb;
struct nameidata nd;
error = pathbuf_copyin(path, &pb);
if (error) {
return error;
}
NDINIT(&nd, CREATE, LOCKPARENT | TRYEMULROOT, pb);
if ((error = fd_nameiat(l, fdat, &nd)) != 0) {
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
return error;
}
if (nd.ni_vp != NULL) {
VOP_ABORTOP(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_cnd);
if (nd.ni_dvp == nd.ni_vp)
vrele(nd.ni_dvp);
else
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
return (EEXIST);
}
vattr_null(&vattr);
vattr.va_type = VFIFO;
/* We will read cwdi->cwdi_cmask unlocked. */
vattr.va_mode = (mode & ALLPERMS) &~ p->p_cwdi->cwdi_cmask;
error = VOP_MKNOD(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_vp, &nd.ni_cnd, &vattr);
if (error == 0)
vput(nd.ni_vp);
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
return (error);
}
/*
* Make a hard file link.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
do_sys_linkat(struct lwp *l, int fdpath, const char *path, int fdlink,
const char *link, int follow, register_t *retval)
{
2000-03-30 13:27:11 +04:00
struct vnode *vp;
struct pathbuf *linkpb;
struct nameidata nd;
namei_simple_flags_t ns_flags;
int error;
if (follow & AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW)
ns_flags = NSM_FOLLOW_TRYEMULROOT;
else
ns_flags = NSM_NOFOLLOW_TRYEMULROOT;
error = fd_nameiat_simple_user(l, fdpath, path, ns_flags, &vp);
2009-06-29 09:08:15 +04:00
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = pathbuf_copyin(link, &linkpb);
if (error) {
goto out1;
}
NDINIT(&nd, CREATE, LOCKPARENT | TRYEMULROOT, linkpb);
if ((error = fd_nameiat(l, fdlink, &nd)) != 0)
goto out2;
if (nd.ni_vp) {
error = EEXIST;
2011-03-12 10:16:50 +03:00
goto abortop;
}
/* Prevent hard links on directories. */
if (vp->v_type == VDIR) {
error = EPERM;
goto abortop;
}
/* Prevent cross-mount operation. */
2011-03-12 10:16:50 +03:00
if (nd.ni_dvp->v_mount != vp->v_mount) {
error = EXDEV;
goto abortop;
}
error = VOP_LINK(nd.ni_dvp, vp, &nd.ni_cnd);
out2:
pathbuf_destroy(linkpb);
out1:
vrele(vp);
return (error);
2011-03-12 10:16:50 +03:00
abortop:
VOP_ABORTOP(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_cnd);
if (nd.ni_dvp == nd.ni_vp)
vrele(nd.ni_dvp);
else
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
if (nd.ni_vp != NULL)
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
goto out2;
}
int
sys_link(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_link_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(const char *) link;
} */
const char *path = SCARG(uap, path);
const char *link = SCARG(uap, link);
return do_sys_linkat(l, AT_FDCWD, path, AT_FDCWD, link,
AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW, retval);
}
int
sys_linkat(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_linkat_args *uap,
register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd1;
syscallarg(const char *) name1;
syscallarg(int) fd2;
syscallarg(const char *) name2;
syscallarg(int) flags;
} */
int fd1 = SCARG(uap, fd1);
const char *name1 = SCARG(uap, name1);
int fd2 = SCARG(uap, fd2);
const char *name2 = SCARG(uap, name2);
int follow;
follow = SCARG(uap, flags) & AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW;
return do_sys_linkat(l, fd1, name1, fd2, name2, follow, retval);
}
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
do_sys_symlink(const char *patharg, const char *link, enum uio_seg seg)
{
return do_sys_symlinkat(NULL, patharg, AT_FDCWD, link, seg);
}
static int
do_sys_symlinkat(struct lwp *l, const char *patharg, int fdat,
const char *link, enum uio_seg seg)
{
struct proc *p = curproc;
struct vattr vattr;
char *path;
int error;
struct pathbuf *linkpb;
struct nameidata nd;
KASSERT(l != NULL || fdat == AT_FDCWD);
path = PNBUF_GET();
if (seg == UIO_USERSPACE) {
if ((error = copyinstr(patharg, path, MAXPATHLEN, NULL)) != 0)
goto out1;
if ((error = pathbuf_copyin(link, &linkpb)) != 0)
goto out1;
} else {
KASSERT(strlen(patharg) < MAXPATHLEN);
strcpy(path, patharg);
linkpb = pathbuf_create(link);
if (linkpb == NULL) {
error = ENOMEM;
goto out1;
}
}
ktrkuser("symlink-target", path, strlen(path));
NDINIT(&nd, CREATE, LOCKPARENT | TRYEMULROOT, linkpb);
if ((error = fd_nameiat(l, fdat, &nd)) != 0)
goto out2;
if (nd.ni_vp) {
VOP_ABORTOP(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_cnd);
if (nd.ni_dvp == nd.ni_vp)
vrele(nd.ni_dvp);
else
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
error = EEXIST;
goto out2;
}
vattr_null(&vattr);
vattr.va_type = VLNK;
/* We will read cwdi->cwdi_cmask unlocked. */
vattr.va_mode = ACCESSPERMS &~ p->p_cwdi->cwdi_cmask;
error = VOP_SYMLINK(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_vp, &nd.ni_cnd, &vattr, path);
if (error == 0)
vput(nd.ni_vp);
out2:
pathbuf_destroy(linkpb);
out1:
PNBUF_PUT(path);
return (error);
}
/*
* Make a symbolic link.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_symlink(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_symlink_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(const char *) link;
} */
return do_sys_symlinkat(l, SCARG(uap, path), AT_FDCWD, SCARG(uap, link),
UIO_USERSPACE);
}
int
sys_symlinkat(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_symlinkat_args *uap,
register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path1;
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(const char *) path2;
} */
return do_sys_symlinkat(l, SCARG(uap, path1), SCARG(uap, fd),
SCARG(uap, path2), UIO_USERSPACE);
}
1994-12-14 19:30:40 +03:00
/*
* Delete a whiteout from the filesystem.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
sys_undelete(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_undelete_args *uap, register_t *retval)
1994-12-14 19:30:40 +03:00
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
} */
1994-12-14 19:30:40 +03:00
int error;
struct pathbuf *pb;
1994-12-14 19:30:40 +03:00
struct nameidata nd;
error = pathbuf_copyin(SCARG(uap, path), &pb);
if (error) {
return error;
}
NDINIT(&nd, DELETE, LOCKPARENT | DOWHITEOUT | TRYEMULROOT, pb);
1994-12-14 19:30:40 +03:00
error = namei(&nd);
if (error) {
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
1994-12-14 19:30:40 +03:00
return (error);
}
1994-12-14 19:30:40 +03:00
if (nd.ni_vp != NULLVP || !(nd.ni_cnd.cn_flags & ISWHITEOUT)) {
VOP_ABORTOP(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_cnd);
if (nd.ni_dvp == nd.ni_vp)
vrele(nd.ni_dvp);
else
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
if (nd.ni_vp)
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
1994-12-14 19:30:40 +03:00
return (EEXIST);
}
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
if ((error = VOP_WHITEOUT(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_cnd, DELETE)) != 0)
1994-12-14 19:30:40 +03:00
VOP_ABORTOP(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_cnd);
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
1994-12-14 19:30:40 +03:00
return (error);
}
/*
* Delete a name from the filesystem.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
sys_unlink(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_unlink_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
} */
return do_sys_unlinkat(l, AT_FDCWD, SCARG(uap, path), 0, UIO_USERSPACE);
}
int
sys_unlinkat(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_unlinkat_args *uap,
register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(int) flag;
} */
return do_sys_unlinkat(l, SCARG(uap, fd), SCARG(uap, path),
SCARG(uap, flag), UIO_USERSPACE);
}
int
do_sys_unlink(const char *arg, enum uio_seg seg)
{
return do_sys_unlinkat(NULL, AT_FDCWD, arg, 0, seg);
}
static int
do_sys_unlinkat(struct lwp *l, int fdat, const char *arg, int flags,
enum uio_seg seg)
{
2000-03-30 13:27:11 +04:00
struct vnode *vp;
int error;
struct pathbuf *pb;
struct nameidata nd;
const char *pathstring;
Some Veriexec stuff that's been rotting in my tree for months. Bug fixes: - Fix crash reported by Scott Ellis on current-users@. - Fix race conditions in enforcing the Veriexec rename and remove policies. These are NOT security issues. - Fix memory leak in rename handling when overwriting a monitored file. - Fix table deletion logic. - Don't prevent query requests if not in learning mode. KPI updates: - fileassoc_table_run() now takes a cookie to pass to the callback. - veriexec_table_add() was removed, it is now done internally. As a result, there's no longer a need for VERIEXEC_TABLESIZE. - veriexec_report() was removed, it is now internal. - Perform sanity checks on the entry type, and enforce default type in veriexec_file_add() rather than in veriexecctl. - Add veriexec_flush(), used to delete all Veriexec tables, and veriexec_dump(), used to fill an array with all Veriexec entries. New features: - Add a '-k' flag to veriexecctl, to keep the filenames in the kernel database. This allows Veriexec to produce slightly more accurate logs under certain circumstances. In the future, this can be either replaced by vnode->pathname translation, or combined with it. - Add a VERIEXEC_DUMP ioctl, to dump the entire Veriexec database. This can be used to recover a database if the file was lost. Example usage: # veriexecctl dump > /etc/signatures Note that only entries with the filename kept (that is, were loaded with the '-k' flag) will be dumped. Idea from Brett Lymn. - Add a VERIEXEC_FLUSH ioctl, to delete all Veriexec entries. Sample usage: # veriexecctl flush - Add a 'veriexec_flags' rc(8) variable, and make its default have the '-k' flag. On systems using the default signatures file (generaetd from running 'veriexecgen' with no arguments), this will use additional 32kb of kernel memory on average. - Add a '-e' flag to veriexecctl, to evaluate the fingerprint during load. This is done automatically for files marked as 'untrusted'. Misc. stuff: - The code for veriexecctl was massively simplified as a result of eliminating the need for VERIEXEC_TABLESIZE, and now uses a single pass of the signatures file, making the loading somewhat faster. - Lots of minor fixes found using the (still under development) Veriexec regression testsuite. - Some of the messages Veriexec prints were improved. - Various documentation fixes. All relevant man-pages were updated to reflect the above changes. Binary compatibility with existing veriexecctl binaries is maintained.
2007-05-15 23:47:43 +04:00
KASSERT(l != NULL || fdat == AT_FDCWD);
error = pathbuf_maybe_copyin(arg, seg, &pb);
if (error) {
return error;
}
pathstring = pathbuf_stringcopy_get(pb);
if (pathstring == NULL) {
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
return ENOMEM;
}
Some Veriexec stuff that's been rotting in my tree for months. Bug fixes: - Fix crash reported by Scott Ellis on current-users@. - Fix race conditions in enforcing the Veriexec rename and remove policies. These are NOT security issues. - Fix memory leak in rename handling when overwriting a monitored file. - Fix table deletion logic. - Don't prevent query requests if not in learning mode. KPI updates: - fileassoc_table_run() now takes a cookie to pass to the callback. - veriexec_table_add() was removed, it is now done internally. As a result, there's no longer a need for VERIEXEC_TABLESIZE. - veriexec_report() was removed, it is now internal. - Perform sanity checks on the entry type, and enforce default type in veriexec_file_add() rather than in veriexecctl. - Add veriexec_flush(), used to delete all Veriexec tables, and veriexec_dump(), used to fill an array with all Veriexec entries. New features: - Add a '-k' flag to veriexecctl, to keep the filenames in the kernel database. This allows Veriexec to produce slightly more accurate logs under certain circumstances. In the future, this can be either replaced by vnode->pathname translation, or combined with it. - Add a VERIEXEC_DUMP ioctl, to dump the entire Veriexec database. This can be used to recover a database if the file was lost. Example usage: # veriexecctl dump > /etc/signatures Note that only entries with the filename kept (that is, were loaded with the '-k' flag) will be dumped. Idea from Brett Lymn. - Add a VERIEXEC_FLUSH ioctl, to delete all Veriexec entries. Sample usage: # veriexecctl flush - Add a 'veriexec_flags' rc(8) variable, and make its default have the '-k' flag. On systems using the default signatures file (generaetd from running 'veriexecgen' with no arguments), this will use additional 32kb of kernel memory on average. - Add a '-e' flag to veriexecctl, to evaluate the fingerprint during load. This is done automatically for files marked as 'untrusted'. Misc. stuff: - The code for veriexecctl was massively simplified as a result of eliminating the need for VERIEXEC_TABLESIZE, and now uses a single pass of the signatures file, making the loading somewhat faster. - Lots of minor fixes found using the (still under development) Veriexec regression testsuite. - Some of the messages Veriexec prints were improved. - Various documentation fixes. All relevant man-pages were updated to reflect the above changes. Binary compatibility with existing veriexecctl binaries is maintained.
2007-05-15 23:47:43 +04:00
NDINIT(&nd, DELETE, LOCKPARENT | LOCKLEAF | TRYEMULROOT, pb);
if ((error = fd_nameiat(l, fdat, &nd)) != 0)
Some Veriexec stuff that's been rotting in my tree for months. Bug fixes: - Fix crash reported by Scott Ellis on current-users@. - Fix race conditions in enforcing the Veriexec rename and remove policies. These are NOT security issues. - Fix memory leak in rename handling when overwriting a monitored file. - Fix table deletion logic. - Don't prevent query requests if not in learning mode. KPI updates: - fileassoc_table_run() now takes a cookie to pass to the callback. - veriexec_table_add() was removed, it is now done internally. As a result, there's no longer a need for VERIEXEC_TABLESIZE. - veriexec_report() was removed, it is now internal. - Perform sanity checks on the entry type, and enforce default type in veriexec_file_add() rather than in veriexecctl. - Add veriexec_flush(), used to delete all Veriexec tables, and veriexec_dump(), used to fill an array with all Veriexec entries. New features: - Add a '-k' flag to veriexecctl, to keep the filenames in the kernel database. This allows Veriexec to produce slightly more accurate logs under certain circumstances. In the future, this can be either replaced by vnode->pathname translation, or combined with it. - Add a VERIEXEC_DUMP ioctl, to dump the entire Veriexec database. This can be used to recover a database if the file was lost. Example usage: # veriexecctl dump > /etc/signatures Note that only entries with the filename kept (that is, were loaded with the '-k' flag) will be dumped. Idea from Brett Lymn. - Add a VERIEXEC_FLUSH ioctl, to delete all Veriexec entries. Sample usage: # veriexecctl flush - Add a 'veriexec_flags' rc(8) variable, and make its default have the '-k' flag. On systems using the default signatures file (generaetd from running 'veriexecgen' with no arguments), this will use additional 32kb of kernel memory on average. - Add a '-e' flag to veriexecctl, to evaluate the fingerprint during load. This is done automatically for files marked as 'untrusted'. Misc. stuff: - The code for veriexecctl was massively simplified as a result of eliminating the need for VERIEXEC_TABLESIZE, and now uses a single pass of the signatures file, making the loading somewhat faster. - Lots of minor fixes found using the (still under development) Veriexec regression testsuite. - Some of the messages Veriexec prints were improved. - Various documentation fixes. All relevant man-pages were updated to reflect the above changes. Binary compatibility with existing veriexecctl binaries is maintained.
2007-05-15 23:47:43 +04:00
goto out;
vp = nd.ni_vp;
/*
* The root of a mounted filesystem cannot be deleted.
*/
if ((vp->v_vflag & VV_ROOT) != 0) {
error = EBUSY;
goto abort;
}
if ((vp->v_type == VDIR) && (vp->v_mountedhere != NULL)) {
error = EBUSY;
goto abort;
}
/*
* No rmdir "." please.
*/
if (nd.ni_dvp == vp) {
error = EINVAL;
goto abort;
}
/*
* AT_REMOVEDIR is required to remove a directory
*/
if (vp->v_type == VDIR) {
if (!(flags & AT_REMOVEDIR)) {
error = EPERM;
goto abort;
} else {
error = VOP_RMDIR(nd.ni_dvp, nd.ni_vp, &nd.ni_cnd);
goto out;
}
}
/*
* Starting here we only deal with non directories.
*/
if (flags & AT_REMOVEDIR) {
error = ENOTDIR;
goto abort;
}
#if NVERIEXEC > 0
/* Handle remove requests for veriexec entries. */
if ((error = veriexec_removechk(curlwp, nd.ni_vp, pathstring)) != 0) {
VOP_ABORTOP(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_cnd);
if (nd.ni_dvp == vp)
vrele(nd.ni_dvp);
else
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
vput(vp);
goto out;
}
#endif /* NVERIEXEC > 0 */
#ifdef FILEASSOC
(void)fileassoc_file_delete(vp);
#endif /* FILEASSOC */
error = VOP_REMOVE(nd.ni_dvp, nd.ni_vp, &nd.ni_cnd);
goto out;
abort:
VOP_ABORTOP(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_cnd);
if (nd.ni_dvp == vp)
vrele(nd.ni_dvp);
else
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
vput(vp);
out:
pathbuf_stringcopy_put(pb, pathstring);
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
return (error);
}
/*
* Reposition read/write file offset.
*/
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
sys_lseek(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_lseek_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(int) pad;
syscallarg(off_t) offset;
syscallarg(int) whence;
} */
kauth_cred_t cred = l->l_cred;
file_t *fp;
1997-04-12 02:03:58 +04:00
struct vnode *vp;
struct vattr vattr;
2000-03-30 13:27:11 +04:00
off_t newoff;
int error, fd;
fd = SCARG(uap, fd);
if ((fp = fd_getfile(fd)) == NULL)
return (EBADF);
1997-04-12 02:03:58 +04:00
vp = fp->f_data;
if (fp->f_type != DTYPE_VNODE || vp->v_type == VFIFO) {
error = ESPIPE;
goto out;
}
1997-04-12 02:03:58 +04:00
switch (SCARG(uap, whence)) {
case SEEK_CUR:
1997-04-12 02:03:58 +04:00
newoff = fp->f_offset + SCARG(uap, offset);
break;
case SEEK_END:
vn_lock(vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vattr, cred);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp);
if (error) {
goto out;
}
1997-04-12 02:03:58 +04:00
newoff = SCARG(uap, offset) + vattr.va_size;
break;
case SEEK_SET:
1997-04-12 02:03:58 +04:00
newoff = SCARG(uap, offset);
break;
default:
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if ((error = VOP_SEEK(vp, fp->f_offset, newoff, cred)) == 0) {
*(off_t *)retval = fp->f_offset = newoff;
}
out:
fd_putfile(fd);
return (error);
}
/*
* Positional read system call.
*/
int
sys_pread(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_pread_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(void *) buf;
syscallarg(size_t) nbyte;
syscallarg(off_t) offset;
} */
file_t *fp;
struct vnode *vp;
off_t offset;
int error, fd = SCARG(uap, fd);
if ((fp = fd_getfile(fd)) == NULL)
return (EBADF);
if ((fp->f_flag & FREAD) == 0) {
fd_putfile(fd);
return (EBADF);
}
vp = fp->f_data;
if (fp->f_type != DTYPE_VNODE || vp->v_type == VFIFO) {
error = ESPIPE;
goto out;
}
offset = SCARG(uap, offset);
/*
* XXX This works because no file systems actually
* XXX take any action on the seek operation.
*/
if ((error = VOP_SEEK(vp, fp->f_offset, offset, fp->f_cred)) != 0)
goto out;
/* dofileread() will unuse the descriptor for us */
return (dofileread(fd, fp, SCARG(uap, buf), SCARG(uap, nbyte),
&offset, 0, retval));
out:
fd_putfile(fd);
return (error);
}
/*
* Positional scatter read system call.
*/
int
sys_preadv(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_preadv_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(const struct iovec *) iovp;
syscallarg(int) iovcnt;
syscallarg(off_t) offset;
} */
off_t offset = SCARG(uap, offset);
return do_filereadv(SCARG(uap, fd), SCARG(uap, iovp),
SCARG(uap, iovcnt), &offset, 0, retval);
}
/*
* Positional write system call.
*/
int
sys_pwrite(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_pwrite_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(const void *) buf;
syscallarg(size_t) nbyte;
syscallarg(off_t) offset;
} */
file_t *fp;
struct vnode *vp;
off_t offset;
int error, fd = SCARG(uap, fd);
if ((fp = fd_getfile(fd)) == NULL)
return (EBADF);
if ((fp->f_flag & FWRITE) == 0) {
fd_putfile(fd);
return (EBADF);
}
vp = fp->f_data;
if (fp->f_type != DTYPE_VNODE || vp->v_type == VFIFO) {
error = ESPIPE;
goto out;
}
offset = SCARG(uap, offset);
/*
* XXX This works because no file systems actually
* XXX take any action on the seek operation.
*/
if ((error = VOP_SEEK(vp, fp->f_offset, offset, fp->f_cred)) != 0)
goto out;
/* dofilewrite() will unuse the descriptor for us */
return (dofilewrite(fd, fp, SCARG(uap, buf), SCARG(uap, nbyte),
&offset, 0, retval));
out:
fd_putfile(fd);
return (error);
}
/*
* Positional gather write system call.
*/
int
sys_pwritev(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_pwritev_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(const struct iovec *) iovp;
syscallarg(int) iovcnt;
syscallarg(off_t) offset;
} */
off_t offset = SCARG(uap, offset);
return do_filewritev(SCARG(uap, fd), SCARG(uap, iovp),
SCARG(uap, iovcnt), &offset, 0, retval);
}
/*
* Check access permissions.
*/
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
sys_access(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_access_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(int) flags;
} */
return do_sys_accessat(l, AT_FDCWD, SCARG(uap, path),
SCARG(uap, flags), 0);
}
static int
do_sys_accessat(struct lwp *l, int fdat, const char *path,
int mode, int flags)
{
2006-05-15 01:15:11 +04:00
kauth_cred_t cred;
2000-03-30 13:27:11 +04:00
struct vnode *vp;
int error, nd_flag, vmode;
struct pathbuf *pb;
struct nameidata nd;
CTASSERT(F_OK == 0);
if ((mode & ~(R_OK | W_OK | X_OK)) != 0) {
/* nonsense mode */
return EINVAL;
}
nd_flag = FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | TRYEMULROOT;
if (flags & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
nd_flag &= ~FOLLOW;
error = pathbuf_copyin(path, &pb);
if (error)
return error;
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, nd_flag, pb);
/* Override default credentials */
cred = kauth_cred_dup(l->l_cred);
if (!(flags & AT_EACCESS)) {
kauth_cred_seteuid(cred, kauth_cred_getuid(l->l_cred));
kauth_cred_setegid(cred, kauth_cred_getgid(l->l_cred));
}
nd.ni_cnd.cn_cred = cred;
if ((error = fd_nameiat(l, fdat, &nd)) != 0) {
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
goto out;
}
vp = nd.ni_vp;
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
/* Flags == 0 means only check for existence. */
if (mode) {
vmode = 0;
if (mode & R_OK)
vmode |= VREAD;
if (mode & W_OK)
vmode |= VWRITE;
if (mode & X_OK)
vmode |= VEXEC;
error = VOP_ACCESS(vp, vmode, cred);
if (!error && (vmode & VWRITE))
error = vn_writechk(vp);
}
vput(vp);
out:
2006-05-15 01:15:11 +04:00
kauth_cred_free(cred);
return (error);
}
int
sys_faccessat(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_faccessat_args *uap,
register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(int) amode;
syscallarg(int) flag;
} */
return do_sys_accessat(l, SCARG(uap, fd), SCARG(uap, path),
SCARG(uap, amode), SCARG(uap, flag));
}
/*
* Common code for all sys_stat functions, including compat versions.
*/
int
do_sys_stat(const char *userpath, unsigned int nd_flag,
struct stat *sb)
{
return do_sys_statat(NULL, AT_FDCWD, userpath, nd_flag, sb);
}
static int
do_sys_statat(struct lwp *l, int fdat, const char *userpath,
unsigned int nd_flag, struct stat *sb)
{
int error;
struct pathbuf *pb;
struct nameidata nd;
KASSERT(l != NULL || fdat == AT_FDCWD);
error = pathbuf_copyin(userpath, &pb);
if (error) {
return error;
}
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, nd_flag | LOCKLEAF | TRYEMULROOT, pb);
error = fd_nameiat(l, fdat, &nd);
if (error != 0) {
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
return error;
}
error = vn_stat(nd.ni_vp, sb);
vput(nd.ni_vp);
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
return error;
}
/*
* Get file status; this version follows links.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
2009-01-11 05:45:45 +03:00
sys___stat50(struct lwp *l, const struct sys___stat50_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(struct stat *) ub;
} */
struct stat sb;
int error;
error = do_sys_statat(l, AT_FDCWD, SCARG(uap, path), FOLLOW, &sb);
if (error)
return error;
return copyout(&sb, SCARG(uap, ub), sizeof(sb));
}
/*
* Get file status; this version does not follow links.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
2009-01-11 05:45:45 +03:00
sys___lstat50(struct lwp *l, const struct sys___lstat50_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(struct stat *) ub;
} */
struct stat sb;
int error;
error = do_sys_statat(l, AT_FDCWD, SCARG(uap, path), NOFOLLOW, &sb);
if (error)
return error;
return copyout(&sb, SCARG(uap, ub), sizeof(sb));
}
int
sys_fstatat(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_fstatat_args *uap,
register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(struct stat *) buf;
syscallarg(int) flag;
} */
unsigned int nd_flag;
struct stat sb;
int error;
if (SCARG(uap, flag) & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
nd_flag = NOFOLLOW;
else
nd_flag = FOLLOW;
error = do_sys_statat(l, SCARG(uap, fd), SCARG(uap, path), nd_flag,
&sb);
if (error)
return error;
return copyout(&sb, SCARG(uap, buf), sizeof(sb));
}
/*
* Get configurable pathname variables.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
sys_pathconf(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_pathconf_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(int) name;
} */
int error;
struct pathbuf *pb;
struct nameidata nd;
error = pathbuf_copyin(SCARG(uap, path), &pb);
if (error) {
return error;
}
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | TRYEMULROOT, pb);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0) {
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
return (error);
}
error = VOP_PATHCONF(nd.ni_vp, SCARG(uap, name), retval);
vput(nd.ni_vp);
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
return (error);
}
/*
* Return target name of a symbolic link.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
sys_readlink(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_readlink_args *uap,
register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(char *) buf;
syscallarg(size_t) count;
} */
return do_sys_readlinkat(l, AT_FDCWD, SCARG(uap, path),
SCARG(uap, buf), SCARG(uap, count), retval);
}
static int
do_sys_readlinkat(struct lwp *l, int fdat, const char *path, char *buf,
size_t count, register_t *retval)
{
2000-03-30 13:27:11 +04:00
struct vnode *vp;
struct iovec aiov;
struct uio auio;
int error;
struct pathbuf *pb;
struct nameidata nd;
error = pathbuf_copyin(path, &pb);
if (error) {
return error;
}
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, NOFOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | TRYEMULROOT, pb);
if ((error = fd_nameiat(l, fdat, &nd)) != 0) {
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
return error;
}
vp = nd.ni_vp;
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
if (vp->v_type != VLNK)
error = EINVAL;
else if (!(vp->v_mount->mnt_flag & MNT_SYMPERM) ||
(error = VOP_ACCESS(vp, VREAD, l->l_cred)) == 0) {
aiov.iov_base = buf;
aiov.iov_len = count;
auio.uio_iov = &aiov;
auio.uio_iovcnt = 1;
auio.uio_offset = 0;
auio.uio_rw = UIO_READ;
KASSERT(l == curlwp);
auio.uio_vmspace = l->l_proc->p_vmspace;
auio.uio_resid = count;
error = VOP_READLINK(vp, &auio, l->l_cred);
}
vput(vp);
*retval = count - auio.uio_resid;
return (error);
}
int
sys_readlinkat(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_readlinkat_args *uap,
register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(char *) buf;
syscallarg(size_t) bufsize;
} */
return do_sys_readlinkat(l, SCARG(uap, fd), SCARG(uap, path),
SCARG(uap, buf), SCARG(uap, bufsize), retval);
}
/*
* Change flags of a file given a path name.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
sys_chflags(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_chflags_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(u_long) flags;
} */
2000-03-30 13:27:11 +04:00
struct vnode *vp;
int error;
2009-06-29 09:08:15 +04:00
error = namei_simple_user(SCARG(uap, path),
NSM_FOLLOW_TRYEMULROOT, &vp);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
2005-12-11 15:16:03 +03:00
error = change_flags(vp, SCARG(uap, flags), l);
vput(vp);
return (error);
}
/*
* Change flags of a file given a file descriptor.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
sys_fchflags(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_fchflags_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(u_long) flags;
} */
struct vnode *vp;
file_t *fp;
int error;
/* fd_getvnode() will use the descriptor for us */
if ((error = fd_getvnode(SCARG(uap, fd), &fp)) != 0)
return (error);
vp = fp->f_data;
2005-12-11 15:16:03 +03:00
error = change_flags(vp, SCARG(uap, flags), l);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp);
fd_putfile(SCARG(uap, fd));
return (error);
}
/*
* Change flags of a file given a path name; this version does
* not follow links.
*/
int
sys_lchflags(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_lchflags_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(u_long) flags;
} */
struct vnode *vp;
int error;
2009-06-29 09:08:15 +04:00
error = namei_simple_user(SCARG(uap, path),
NSM_NOFOLLOW_TRYEMULROOT, &vp);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
2005-12-11 15:16:03 +03:00
error = change_flags(vp, SCARG(uap, flags), l);
vput(vp);
return (error);
}
/*
* Common routine to change flags of a file.
*/
int
2005-12-11 15:16:03 +03:00
change_flags(struct vnode *vp, u_long flags, struct lwp *l)
{
struct vattr vattr;
int error;
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
vattr_null(&vattr);
vattr.va_flags = flags;
error = VOP_SETATTR(vp, &vattr, l->l_cred);
return (error);
}
/*
* Change mode of a file given path name; this version follows links.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
sys_chmod(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_chmod_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(int) mode;
} */
return do_sys_chmodat(l, AT_FDCWD, SCARG(uap, path),
SCARG(uap, mode), 0);
}
static int
do_sys_chmodat(struct lwp *l, int fdat, const char *path, int mode, int flags)
{
int error;
2009-06-29 09:08:15 +04:00
struct vnode *vp;
namei_simple_flags_t ns_flag;
if (flags & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
ns_flag = NSM_NOFOLLOW_TRYEMULROOT;
else
ns_flag = NSM_FOLLOW_TRYEMULROOT;
error = fd_nameiat_simple_user(l, fdat, path, ns_flag, &vp);
2009-06-29 09:08:15 +04:00
if (error != 0)
return error;
error = change_mode(vp, mode, l);
2009-06-29 09:08:15 +04:00
vrele(vp);
return (error);
}
/*
* Change mode of a file given a file descriptor.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
sys_fchmod(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_fchmod_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(int) mode;
} */
file_t *fp;
int error;
/* fd_getvnode() will use the descriptor for us */
if ((error = fd_getvnode(SCARG(uap, fd), &fp)) != 0)
return (error);
error = change_mode(fp->f_data, SCARG(uap, mode), l);
fd_putfile(SCARG(uap, fd));
return (error);
}
int
sys_fchmodat(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_fchmodat_args *uap,
register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(int) mode;
syscallarg(int) flag;
} */
return do_sys_chmodat(l, SCARG(uap, fd), SCARG(uap, path),
SCARG(uap, mode), SCARG(uap, flag));
}
/*
* Change mode of a file given path name; this version does not follow links.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_lchmod(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_lchmod_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(int) mode;
} */
int error;
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struct vnode *vp;
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error = namei_simple_user(SCARG(uap, path),
NSM_NOFOLLOW_TRYEMULROOT, &vp);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
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error = change_mode(vp, SCARG(uap, mode), l);
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vrele(vp);
return (error);
}
/*
* Common routine to set mode given a vnode.
*/
static int
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change_mode(struct vnode *vp, int mode, struct lwp *l)
{
struct vattr vattr;
int error;
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vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
vattr_null(&vattr);
1998-03-01 05:20:01 +03:00
vattr.va_mode = mode & ALLPERMS;
error = VOP_SETATTR(vp, &vattr, l->l_cred);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp);
return (error);
}
/*
* Set ownership given a path name; this version follows links.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
sys_chown(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_chown_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(uid_t) uid;
syscallarg(gid_t) gid;
} */
return do_sys_chownat(l, AT_FDCWD, SCARG(uap, path), SCARG(uap,uid),
SCARG(uap, gid), 0);
}
static int
do_sys_chownat(struct lwp *l, int fdat, const char *path, uid_t uid,
gid_t gid, int flags)
{
int error;
2009-06-29 09:08:15 +04:00
struct vnode *vp;
namei_simple_flags_t ns_flag;
if (flags & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
ns_flag = NSM_NOFOLLOW_TRYEMULROOT;
else
ns_flag = NSM_FOLLOW_TRYEMULROOT;
error = fd_nameiat_simple_user(l, fdat, path, ns_flag, &vp);
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if (error != 0)
return error;
error = change_owner(vp, uid, gid, l, 0);
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vrele(vp);
return (error);
}
/*
* Set ownership given a path name; this version follows links.
* Provides POSIX semantics.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys___posix_chown(struct lwp *l, const struct sys___posix_chown_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(uid_t) uid;
syscallarg(gid_t) gid;
} */
int error;
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struct vnode *vp;
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error = namei_simple_user(SCARG(uap, path),
NSM_FOLLOW_TRYEMULROOT, &vp);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
2009-06-29 09:08:15 +04:00
error = change_owner(vp, SCARG(uap, uid), SCARG(uap, gid), l, 1);
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vrele(vp);
return (error);
}
/*
* Set ownership given a file descriptor.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
sys_fchown(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_fchown_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(uid_t) uid;
syscallarg(gid_t) gid;
} */
int error;
file_t *fp;
/* fd_getvnode() will use the descriptor for us */
if ((error = fd_getvnode(SCARG(uap, fd), &fp)) != 0)
return (error);
error = change_owner(fp->f_data, SCARG(uap, uid), SCARG(uap, gid),
l, 0);
fd_putfile(SCARG(uap, fd));
return (error);
}
int
sys_fchownat(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_fchownat_args *uap,
register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(uid_t) owner;
syscallarg(gid_t) group;
syscallarg(int) flag;
} */
return do_sys_chownat(l, SCARG(uap, fd), SCARG(uap, path),
SCARG(uap, owner), SCARG(uap, group),
SCARG(uap, flag));
}
/*
* Set ownership given a file descriptor, providing POSIX/XPG semantics.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys___posix_fchown(struct lwp *l, const struct sys___posix_fchown_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(uid_t) uid;
syscallarg(gid_t) gid;
} */
int error;
file_t *fp;
/* fd_getvnode() will use the descriptor for us */
if ((error = fd_getvnode(SCARG(uap, fd), &fp)) != 0)
return (error);
error = change_owner(fp->f_data, SCARG(uap, uid), SCARG(uap, gid),
l, 1);
fd_putfile(SCARG(uap, fd));
return (error);
}
/*
* Set ownership given a path name; this version does not follow links.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_lchown(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_lchown_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(uid_t) uid;
syscallarg(gid_t) gid;
} */
int error;
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struct vnode *vp;
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error = namei_simple_user(SCARG(uap, path),
NSM_NOFOLLOW_TRYEMULROOT, &vp);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
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error = change_owner(vp, SCARG(uap, uid), SCARG(uap, gid), l, 0);
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vrele(vp);
return (error);
}
/*
* Set ownership given a path name; this version does not follow links.
* Provides POSIX/XPG semantics.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys___posix_lchown(struct lwp *l, const struct sys___posix_lchown_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(uid_t) uid;
syscallarg(gid_t) gid;
} */
int error;
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struct vnode *vp;
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error = namei_simple_user(SCARG(uap, path),
NSM_NOFOLLOW_TRYEMULROOT, &vp);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
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error = change_owner(vp, SCARG(uap, uid), SCARG(uap, gid), l, 1);
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vrele(vp);
return (error);
}
/*
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* Common routine to set ownership given a vnode.
*/
static int
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change_owner(struct vnode *vp, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, struct lwp *l,
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int posix_semantics)
{
struct vattr vattr;
mode_t newmode;
int error;
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vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
if ((error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vattr, l->l_cred)) != 0)
goto out;
#define CHANGED(x) ((int)(x) != -1)
newmode = vattr.va_mode;
if (posix_semantics) {
/*
* POSIX/XPG semantics: if the caller is not the super-user,
* clear set-user-id and set-group-id bits. Both POSIX and
* the XPG consider the behaviour for calls by the super-user
* implementation-defined; we leave the set-user-id and set-
* group-id settings intact in that case.
*/
if (vattr.va_mode & S_ISUID) {
if (kauth_authorize_vnode(l->l_cred,
KAUTH_VNODE_RETAIN_SUID, vp, NULL, EPERM) != 0)
newmode &= ~S_ISUID;
}
if (vattr.va_mode & S_ISGID) {
if (kauth_authorize_vnode(l->l_cred,
KAUTH_VNODE_RETAIN_SGID, vp, NULL, EPERM) != 0)
newmode &= ~S_ISGID;
}
} else {
/*
* NetBSD semantics: when changing owner and/or group,
* clear the respective bit(s).
*/
if (CHANGED(uid))
newmode &= ~S_ISUID;
if (CHANGED(gid))
newmode &= ~S_ISGID;
}
/* Update va_mode iff altered. */
if (vattr.va_mode == newmode)
newmode = VNOVAL;
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vattr_null(&vattr);
vattr.va_uid = CHANGED(uid) ? uid : (uid_t)VNOVAL;
vattr.va_gid = CHANGED(gid) ? gid : (gid_t)VNOVAL;
vattr.va_mode = newmode;
error = VOP_SETATTR(vp, &vattr, l->l_cred);
#undef CHANGED
2004-03-23 16:22:32 +03:00
out:
VOP_UNLOCK(vp);
return (error);
}
/*
* Set the access and modification times given a path name; this
* version follows links.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
2009-01-11 05:45:45 +03:00
sys___utimes50(struct lwp *l, const struct sys___utimes50_args *uap,
register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(const struct timeval *) tptr;
} */
return do_sys_utimes(l, NULL, SCARG(uap, path), FOLLOW,
SCARG(uap, tptr), UIO_USERSPACE);
}
1996-04-23 14:29:02 +04:00
/*
* Set the access and modification times given a file descriptor.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
2009-01-11 05:45:45 +03:00
sys___futimes50(struct lwp *l, const struct sys___futimes50_args *uap,
register_t *retval)
1996-04-23 14:29:02 +04:00
{
/* {
1996-04-23 14:29:02 +04:00
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(const struct timeval *) tptr;
} */
1996-04-23 14:29:02 +04:00
int error;
file_t *fp;
1996-04-23 14:29:02 +04:00
/* fd_getvnode() will use the descriptor for us */
if ((error = fd_getvnode(SCARG(uap, fd), &fp)) != 0)
return (error);
error = do_sys_utimes(l, fp->f_data, NULL, 0, SCARG(uap, tptr),
UIO_USERSPACE);
fd_putfile(SCARG(uap, fd));
return (error);
}
int
sys_futimens(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_futimens_args *uap,
register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(const struct timespec *) tptr;
} */
int error;
file_t *fp;
/* fd_getvnode() will use the descriptor for us */
if ((error = fd_getvnode(SCARG(uap, fd), &fp)) != 0)
return (error);
error = do_sys_utimensat(l, AT_FDCWD, fp->f_data, NULL, 0,
SCARG(uap, tptr), UIO_USERSPACE);
fd_putfile(SCARG(uap, fd));
return (error);
}
/*
* Set the access and modification times given a path name; this
* version does not follow links.
*/
int
2009-01-11 05:45:45 +03:00
sys___lutimes50(struct lwp *l, const struct sys___lutimes50_args *uap,
register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(const struct timeval *) tptr;
} */
return do_sys_utimes(l, NULL, SCARG(uap, path), NOFOLLOW,
SCARG(uap, tptr), UIO_USERSPACE);
}
int
sys_utimensat(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_utimensat_args *uap,
register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(const struct timespec *) tptr;
syscallarg(int) flag;
} */
int follow;
const struct timespec *tptr;
int error;
tptr = SCARG(uap, tptr);
follow = (SCARG(uap, flag) & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) ? NOFOLLOW : FOLLOW;
error = do_sys_utimensat(l, SCARG(uap, fd), NULL,
SCARG(uap, path), follow, tptr, UIO_USERSPACE);
return error;
}
/*
* Common routine to set access and modification times given a vnode.
*/
int
do_sys_utimens(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, const char *path, int flag,
const struct timespec *tptr, enum uio_seg seg)
{
return do_sys_utimensat(l, AT_FDCWD, vp, path, flag, tptr, seg);
}
static int
do_sys_utimensat(struct lwp *l, int fdat, struct vnode *vp,
const char *path, int flag, const struct timespec *tptr, enum uio_seg seg)
{
struct vattr vattr;
2009-06-29 09:08:15 +04:00
int error, dorele = 0;
namei_simple_flags_t sflags;
bool vanull, setbirthtime;
struct timespec ts[2];
KASSERT(l != NULL || fdat == AT_FDCWD);
2009-06-29 09:08:15 +04:00
/*
* I have checked all callers and they pass either FOLLOW,
* NOFOLLOW, or 0 (when they don't pass a path), and NOFOLLOW
* is 0. More to the point, they don't pass anything else.
* Let's keep it that way at least until the namei interfaces
* are fully sanitized.
*/
KASSERT(flag == NOFOLLOW || flag == FOLLOW);
sflags = (flag == FOLLOW) ?
NSM_FOLLOW_TRYEMULROOT : NSM_NOFOLLOW_TRYEMULROOT;
if (tptr == NULL) {
vanull = true;
nanotime(&ts[0]);
ts[1] = ts[0];
1996-04-23 14:29:02 +04:00
} else {
vanull = false;
if (seg != UIO_SYSSPACE) {
error = copyin(tptr, ts, sizeof (ts));
if (error != 0)
return error;
} else {
ts[0] = tptr[0];
ts[1] = tptr[1];
}
1996-04-23 14:29:02 +04:00
}
if (ts[0].tv_nsec == UTIME_NOW) {
nanotime(&ts[0]);
if (ts[1].tv_nsec == UTIME_NOW) {
vanull = true;
ts[1] = ts[0];
}
} else if (ts[1].tv_nsec == UTIME_NOW)
nanotime(&ts[1]);
if (vp == NULL) {
2009-06-29 09:08:15 +04:00
/* note: SEG describes TPTR, not PATH; PATH is always user */
error = fd_nameiat_simple_user(l, fdat, path, sflags, &vp);
2009-06-29 09:08:15 +04:00
if (error != 0)
return error;
2009-06-29 09:08:15 +04:00
dorele = 1;
}
1998-03-01 05:20:01 +03:00
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
setbirthtime = (VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vattr, l->l_cred) == 0 &&
timespeccmp(&ts[1], &vattr.va_birthtime, <));
vattr_null(&vattr);
if (ts[0].tv_nsec != UTIME_OMIT)
vattr.va_atime = ts[0];
if (ts[1].tv_nsec != UTIME_OMIT) {
vattr.va_mtime = ts[1];
if (setbirthtime)
vattr.va_birthtime = ts[1];
}
if (vanull)
vattr.va_vaflags |= VA_UTIMES_NULL;
error = VOP_SETATTR(vp, &vattr, l->l_cred);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp);
2009-06-29 09:08:15 +04:00
if (dorele != 0)
vrele(vp);
return error;
1996-04-23 14:29:02 +04:00
}
int
do_sys_utimes(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, const char *path, int flag,
const struct timeval *tptr, enum uio_seg seg)
{
struct timespec ts[2];
struct timespec *tsptr = NULL;
int error;
if (tptr != NULL) {
struct timeval tv[2];
if (seg != UIO_SYSSPACE) {
error = copyin(tptr, tv, sizeof (tv));
if (error != 0)
return error;
tptr = tv;
}
if ((tv[0].tv_usec == UTIME_NOW) ||
(tv[0].tv_usec == UTIME_OMIT))
ts[0].tv_nsec = tv[0].tv_usec;
else
TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&tptr[0], &ts[0]);
if ((tv[1].tv_usec == UTIME_NOW) ||
(tv[1].tv_usec == UTIME_OMIT))
ts[1].tv_nsec = tv[1].tv_usec;
else
TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&tptr[1], &ts[1]);
tsptr = &ts[0];
}
return do_sys_utimens(l, vp, path, flag, tsptr, UIO_SYSSPACE);
}
/*
* Truncate a file given its path name.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
sys_truncate(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_truncate_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(int) pad;
syscallarg(off_t) length;
} */
2000-03-30 13:27:11 +04:00
struct vnode *vp;
struct vattr vattr;
int error;
2009-06-29 09:08:15 +04:00
error = namei_simple_user(SCARG(uap, path),
NSM_FOLLOW_TRYEMULROOT, &vp);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
1998-03-01 05:20:01 +03:00
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
if (vp->v_type == VDIR)
error = EISDIR;
else if ((error = vn_writechk(vp)) == 0 &&
(error = VOP_ACCESS(vp, VWRITE, l->l_cred)) == 0) {
vattr_null(&vattr);
vattr.va_size = SCARG(uap, length);
error = VOP_SETATTR(vp, &vattr, l->l_cred);
}
vput(vp);
return (error);
}
/*
* Truncate a file given a file descriptor.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
sys_ftruncate(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_ftruncate_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(int) pad;
syscallarg(off_t) length;
} */
struct vattr vattr;
struct vnode *vp;
file_t *fp;
int error;
/* fd_getvnode() will use the descriptor for us */
if ((error = fd_getvnode(SCARG(uap, fd), &fp)) != 0)
return (error);
if ((fp->f_flag & FWRITE) == 0) {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
vp = fp->f_data;
1998-03-01 05:20:01 +03:00
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
if (vp->v_type == VDIR)
error = EISDIR;
else if ((error = vn_writechk(vp)) == 0) {
vattr_null(&vattr);
vattr.va_size = SCARG(uap, length);
error = VOP_SETATTR(vp, &vattr, fp->f_cred);
}
VOP_UNLOCK(vp);
out:
fd_putfile(SCARG(uap, fd));
return (error);
}
/*
* Sync an open file.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
sys_fsync(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_fsync_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
} */
2000-03-30 13:27:11 +04:00
struct vnode *vp;
file_t *fp;
int error;
/* fd_getvnode() will use the descriptor for us */
if ((error = fd_getvnode(SCARG(uap, fd), &fp)) != 0)
return (error);
vp = fp->f_data;
1998-03-01 05:20:01 +03:00
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
error = VOP_FSYNC(vp, fp->f_cred, FSYNC_WAIT, 0, 0);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp);
fd_putfile(SCARG(uap, fd));
return (error);
}
/*
* Sync a range of file data. API modeled after that found in AIX.
*
* FDATASYNC indicates that we need only save enough metadata to be able
* to re-read the written data. Note we duplicate AIX's requirement that
* the file be open for writing.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_fsync_range(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_fsync_range_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(int) flags;
syscallarg(off_t) start;
syscallarg(off_t) length;
} */
struct vnode *vp;
file_t *fp;
int flags, nflags;
off_t s, e, len;
int error;
/* fd_getvnode() will use the descriptor for us */
if ((error = fd_getvnode(SCARG(uap, fd), &fp)) != 0)
return (error);
if ((fp->f_flag & FWRITE) == 0) {
error = EBADF;
goto out;
}
flags = SCARG(uap, flags);
if (((flags & (FDATASYNC | FFILESYNC)) == 0) ||
((~flags & (FDATASYNC | FFILESYNC)) == 0)) {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* Now set up the flags for value(s) to pass to VOP_FSYNC() */
if (flags & FDATASYNC)
nflags = FSYNC_DATAONLY | FSYNC_WAIT;
else
nflags = FSYNC_WAIT;
if (flags & FDISKSYNC)
nflags |= FSYNC_CACHE;
len = SCARG(uap, length);
/* If length == 0, we do the whole file, and s = e = 0 will do that */
if (len) {
s = SCARG(uap, start);
e = s + len;
if (e < s) {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
} else {
e = 0;
s = 0;
}
vp = fp->f_data;
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
error = VOP_FSYNC(vp, fp->f_cred, nflags, s, e);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp);
out:
fd_putfile(SCARG(uap, fd));
return (error);
}
/*
* Sync the data of an open file.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_fdatasync(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_fdatasync_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
} */
struct vnode *vp;
file_t *fp;
int error;
/* fd_getvnode() will use the descriptor for us */
if ((error = fd_getvnode(SCARG(uap, fd), &fp)) != 0)
return (error);
if ((fp->f_flag & FWRITE) == 0) {
fd_putfile(SCARG(uap, fd));
return (EBADF);
}
vp = fp->f_data;
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
error = VOP_FSYNC(vp, fp->f_cred, FSYNC_WAIT|FSYNC_DATAONLY, 0, 0);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp);
fd_putfile(SCARG(uap, fd));
return (error);
}
/*
1997-05-18 23:56:48 +04:00
* Rename files, (standard) BSD semantics frontend.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
sys_rename(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_rename_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) from;
syscallarg(const char *) to;
} */
1997-05-18 23:56:48 +04:00
return (do_sys_renameat(l, AT_FDCWD, SCARG(uap, from), AT_FDCWD,
SCARG(uap, to), UIO_USERSPACE, 0));
1997-05-18 23:56:48 +04:00
}
int
sys_renameat(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_renameat_args *uap,
register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fromfd;
syscallarg(const char *) from;
syscallarg(int) tofd;
syscallarg(const char *) to;
} */
return (do_sys_renameat(l, SCARG(uap, fromfd), SCARG(uap, from),
SCARG(uap, tofd), SCARG(uap, to), UIO_USERSPACE, 0));
}
1997-05-18 23:56:48 +04:00
/*
* Rename files, POSIX semantics frontend.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys___posix_rename(struct lwp *l, const struct sys___posix_rename_args *uap, register_t *retval)
1997-05-18 23:56:48 +04:00
{
/* {
1997-05-18 23:56:48 +04:00
syscallarg(const char *) from;
syscallarg(const char *) to;
} */
1997-05-18 23:56:48 +04:00
return (do_sys_renameat(l, AT_FDCWD, SCARG(uap, from), AT_FDCWD,
SCARG(uap, to), UIO_USERSPACE, 1));
1997-05-18 23:56:48 +04:00
}
/*
* Rename files. Source and destination must either both be directories,
* or both not be directories. If target is a directory, it must be empty.
* If `from' and `to' refer to the same object, the value of the `retain'
* argument is used to determine whether `from' will be
*
* (retain == 0) deleted unless `from' and `to' refer to the same
* object in the file system's name space (BSD).
* (retain == 1) always retained (POSIX).
*
* XXX Synchronize with nfsrv_rename in nfs_serv.c.
1997-05-18 23:56:48 +04:00
*/
int
do_sys_rename(const char *from, const char *to, enum uio_seg seg, int retain)
{
return do_sys_renameat(NULL, AT_FDCWD, from, AT_FDCWD, to, seg, retain);
}
static int
do_sys_renameat(struct lwp *l, int fromfd, const char *from, int tofd,
const char *to, enum uio_seg seg, int retain)
1997-05-18 23:56:48 +04:00
{
struct pathbuf *fpb, *tpb;
struct nameidata fnd, tnd;
struct vnode *fdvp, *fvp;
struct vnode *tdvp, *tvp;
struct mount *mp, *tmp;
int error;
KASSERT(l != NULL || (fromfd == AT_FDCWD && tofd == AT_FDCWD));
KASSERT(from != NULL);
KASSERT(to != NULL);
error = pathbuf_maybe_copyin(from, seg, &fpb);
if (error)
goto out0;
KASSERT(fpb != NULL);
error = pathbuf_maybe_copyin(to, seg, &tpb);
if (error)
goto out1;
KASSERT(tpb != NULL);
/*
* Lookup from.
*
* XXX LOCKPARENT is wrong because we don't actually want it
* locked yet, but (a) namei is insane, and (b) VOP_RENAME is
* insane, so for the time being we need to leave it like this.
*/
NDINIT(&fnd, DELETE, (LOCKPARENT | TRYEMULROOT | INRENAME), fpb);
if ((error = fd_nameiat(l, fromfd, &fnd)) != 0)
goto out2;
/*
* Pull out the important results of the lookup, fdvp and fvp.
* Of course, fvp is bogus because we're about to unlock fdvp.
*/
fdvp = fnd.ni_dvp;
fvp = fnd.ni_vp;
KASSERT(fdvp != NULL);
KASSERT(fvp != NULL);
KASSERT((fdvp == fvp) || (VOP_ISLOCKED(fdvp) == LK_EXCLUSIVE));
/*
* Make sure neither fdvp nor fvp is locked.
*/
if (fdvp != fvp)
VOP_UNLOCK(fdvp);
/* XXX KASSERT(VOP_ISLOCKED(fdvp) != LK_EXCLUSIVE); */
/* XXX KASSERT(VOP_ISLOCKED(fvp) != LK_EXCLUSIVE); */
/*
* Reject renaming `.' and `..'. Can't do this until after
* namei because we need namei's parsing to find the final
* component name. (namei should just leave us with the final
* component name and not look it up itself, but anyway...)
*
* This was here before because we used to relookup from
* instead of to and relookup requires the caller to check
* this, but now file systems may depend on this check, so we
* must retain it until the file systems are all rototilled.
*/
if (((fnd.ni_cnd.cn_namelen == 1) &&
(fnd.ni_cnd.cn_nameptr[0] == '.')) ||
((fnd.ni_cnd.cn_namelen == 2) &&
(fnd.ni_cnd.cn_nameptr[0] == '.') &&
(fnd.ni_cnd.cn_nameptr[1] == '.'))) {
error = EINVAL; /* XXX EISDIR? */
goto abort0;
}
/*
* Lookup to.
*
* XXX LOCKPARENT is wrong, but...insanity, &c. Also, using
* fvp here to decide whether to add CREATEDIR is a load of
* bollocks because fvp might be the wrong node by now, since
* fdvp is unlocked.
*
* XXX Why not pass CREATEDIR always?
*/
NDINIT(&tnd, RENAME,
(LOCKPARENT | NOCACHE | TRYEMULROOT | INRENAME |
((fvp->v_type == VDIR)? CREATEDIR : 0)),
tpb);
if ((error = fd_nameiat(l, tofd, &tnd)) != 0)
goto abort0;
/*
* Pull out the important results of the lookup, tdvp and tvp.
* Of course, tvp is bogus because we're about to unlock tdvp.
*/
tdvp = tnd.ni_dvp;
tvp = tnd.ni_vp;
KASSERT(tdvp != NULL);
KASSERT((tdvp == tvp) || (VOP_ISLOCKED(tdvp) == LK_EXCLUSIVE));
/*
* Make sure neither tdvp nor tvp is locked.
*/
if (tdvp != tvp)
VOP_UNLOCK(tdvp);
/* XXX KASSERT(VOP_ISLOCKED(tdvp) != LK_EXCLUSIVE); */
/* XXX KASSERT((tvp == NULL) || (VOP_ISLOCKED(tvp) != LK_EXCLUSIVE)); */
/*
* Reject renaming onto `.' or `..'. relookup is unhappy with
* these, which is why we must do this here. Once upon a time
* we relooked up from instead of to, and consequently didn't
* need this check, but now that we relookup to instead of
* from, we need this; and we shall need it forever forward
* until the VOP_RENAME protocol changes, because file systems
* will no doubt begin to depend on this check.
*/
if (((tnd.ni_cnd.cn_namelen == 1) &&
(tnd.ni_cnd.cn_nameptr[0] == '.')) ||
((tnd.ni_cnd.cn_namelen == 2) &&
(tnd.ni_cnd.cn_nameptr[0] == '.') &&
(tnd.ni_cnd.cn_nameptr[1] == '.'))) {
error = EINVAL; /* XXX EISDIR? */
goto abort1;
}
/*
* Get the mount point. If the file system has been unmounted,
* which it may be because we're not holding any vnode locks,
* then v_mount will be NULL. We're not really supposed to
* read v_mount without holding the vnode lock, but since we
* have fdvp referenced, if fdvp->v_mount changes then at worst
* it will be set to NULL, not changed to another mount point.
* And, of course, since it is up to the file system to
* determine the real lock order, we can't lock both fdvp and
* tdvp at the same time.
*/
mp = fdvp->v_mount;
if (mp == NULL) {
error = ENOENT;
goto abort1;
}
/*
* Make sure the mount points match. Again, although we don't
* hold any vnode locks, the v_mount fields may change -- but
* at worst they will change to NULL, so this will never become
* a cross-device rename, because we hold vnode references.
*
* XXX Because nothing is locked and the compiler may reorder
* things here, unmounting the file system at an inopportune
* moment may cause rename to fail with ENXDEV when it really
* should fail with ENOENT.
*/
tmp = tdvp->v_mount;
if (tmp == NULL) {
error = ENOENT;
goto abort1;
}
if (mp != tmp) {
error = EXDEV;
goto abort1;
}
1997-05-18 23:56:48 +04:00
/*
* Take the vfs rename lock to avoid cross-directory screw cases.
* Nothing is locked currently, so taking this lock is safe.
*/
error = VFS_RENAMELOCK_ENTER(mp);
if (error)
goto abort1;
/*
* Now fdvp, fvp, tdvp, and (if nonnull) tvp are referenced,
* and nothing is locked except for the vfs rename lock.
*
* The next step is a little rain dance to conform to the
* insane lock protocol, even though it does nothing to ward
* off race conditions.
*
* We need tdvp and tvp to be locked. However, because we have
* unlocked tdvp in order to hold no locks while we take the
* vfs rename lock, tvp may be wrong here, and we can't safely
* lock it even if the sensible file systems will just unlock
* it straight away. Consequently, we must lock tdvp and then
* relookup tvp to get it locked.
*
* Finally, because the VOP_RENAME protocol is brain-damaged
* and various file systems insanely depend on the semantics of
* this brain damage, the lookup of to must be the last lookup
* before VOP_RENAME.
*/
vn_lock(tdvp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
error = relookup(tdvp, &tnd.ni_vp, &tnd.ni_cnd, 0);
if (error)
goto abort2;
/*
* Drop the old tvp and pick up the new one -- which might be
* the same, but that doesn't matter to us. After this, tdvp
* and tvp should both be locked.
*/
if (tvp != NULL)
vrele(tvp);
tvp = tnd.ni_vp;
KASSERT(VOP_ISLOCKED(tdvp) == LK_EXCLUSIVE);
KASSERT((tvp == NULL) || (VOP_ISLOCKED(tvp) == LK_EXCLUSIVE));
/*
* The old do_sys_rename had various consistency checks here
* involving fvp and tvp. fvp is bogus already here, and tvp
* will become bogus soon in any sensible file system, so the
* only purpose in putting these checks here is to give lip
* service to these screw cases and to acknowledge that they
* exist, not actually to handle them, but here you go
* anyway...
*/
/*
* Acknowledge that directories and non-directories aren't
* suposed to mix.
*/
if (tvp != NULL) {
if ((fvp->v_type == VDIR) && (tvp->v_type != VDIR)) {
error = ENOTDIR;
goto abort3;
} else if ((fvp->v_type != VDIR) && (tvp->v_type == VDIR)) {
error = EISDIR;
goto abort3;
}
}
1997-05-18 23:56:48 +04:00
/*
* Acknowledge some random screw case, among the dozens that
* might arise.
*/
if (fvp == tdvp) {
error = EINVAL;
goto abort3;
}
1997-05-18 23:56:48 +04:00
/*
* Acknowledge that POSIX has a wacky screw case.
*
* XXX Eventually the retain flag needs to be passed on to
* VOP_RENAME.
*/
1997-05-18 23:56:48 +04:00
if (fvp == tvp) {
if (retain) {
error = 0;
goto abort3;
} else if ((fdvp == tdvp) &&
(fnd.ni_cnd.cn_namelen == tnd.ni_cnd.cn_namelen) &&
(0 == memcmp(fnd.ni_cnd.cn_nameptr, tnd.ni_cnd.cn_nameptr,
fnd.ni_cnd.cn_namelen))) {
error = 0;
goto abort3;
}
1997-05-18 23:56:48 +04:00
}
2011-03-12 10:16:50 +03:00
/*
* Make sure veriexec can screw us up. (But a race can screw
* up veriexec, of course -- remember, fvp and (soon) tvp are
* bogus.)
2011-03-12 10:16:50 +03:00
*/
#if NVERIEXEC > 0
{
Some Veriexec stuff that's been rotting in my tree for months. Bug fixes: - Fix crash reported by Scott Ellis on current-users@. - Fix race conditions in enforcing the Veriexec rename and remove policies. These are NOT security issues. - Fix memory leak in rename handling when overwriting a monitored file. - Fix table deletion logic. - Don't prevent query requests if not in learning mode. KPI updates: - fileassoc_table_run() now takes a cookie to pass to the callback. - veriexec_table_add() was removed, it is now done internally. As a result, there's no longer a need for VERIEXEC_TABLESIZE. - veriexec_report() was removed, it is now internal. - Perform sanity checks on the entry type, and enforce default type in veriexec_file_add() rather than in veriexecctl. - Add veriexec_flush(), used to delete all Veriexec tables, and veriexec_dump(), used to fill an array with all Veriexec entries. New features: - Add a '-k' flag to veriexecctl, to keep the filenames in the kernel database. This allows Veriexec to produce slightly more accurate logs under certain circumstances. In the future, this can be either replaced by vnode->pathname translation, or combined with it. - Add a VERIEXEC_DUMP ioctl, to dump the entire Veriexec database. This can be used to recover a database if the file was lost. Example usage: # veriexecctl dump > /etc/signatures Note that only entries with the filename kept (that is, were loaded with the '-k' flag) will be dumped. Idea from Brett Lymn. - Add a VERIEXEC_FLUSH ioctl, to delete all Veriexec entries. Sample usage: # veriexecctl flush - Add a 'veriexec_flags' rc(8) variable, and make its default have the '-k' flag. On systems using the default signatures file (generaetd from running 'veriexecgen' with no arguments), this will use additional 32kb of kernel memory on average. - Add a '-e' flag to veriexecctl, to evaluate the fingerprint during load. This is done automatically for files marked as 'untrusted'. Misc. stuff: - The code for veriexecctl was massively simplified as a result of eliminating the need for VERIEXEC_TABLESIZE, and now uses a single pass of the signatures file, making the loading somewhat faster. - Lots of minor fixes found using the (still under development) Veriexec regression testsuite. - Some of the messages Veriexec prints were improved. - Various documentation fixes. All relevant man-pages were updated to reflect the above changes. Binary compatibility with existing veriexecctl binaries is maintained.
2007-05-15 23:47:43 +04:00
char *f1, *f2;
2009-01-17 10:02:35 +03:00
size_t f1_len;
size_t f2_len;
Some Veriexec stuff that's been rotting in my tree for months. Bug fixes: - Fix crash reported by Scott Ellis on current-users@. - Fix race conditions in enforcing the Veriexec rename and remove policies. These are NOT security issues. - Fix memory leak in rename handling when overwriting a monitored file. - Fix table deletion logic. - Don't prevent query requests if not in learning mode. KPI updates: - fileassoc_table_run() now takes a cookie to pass to the callback. - veriexec_table_add() was removed, it is now done internally. As a result, there's no longer a need for VERIEXEC_TABLESIZE. - veriexec_report() was removed, it is now internal. - Perform sanity checks on the entry type, and enforce default type in veriexec_file_add() rather than in veriexecctl. - Add veriexec_flush(), used to delete all Veriexec tables, and veriexec_dump(), used to fill an array with all Veriexec entries. New features: - Add a '-k' flag to veriexecctl, to keep the filenames in the kernel database. This allows Veriexec to produce slightly more accurate logs under certain circumstances. In the future, this can be either replaced by vnode->pathname translation, or combined with it. - Add a VERIEXEC_DUMP ioctl, to dump the entire Veriexec database. This can be used to recover a database if the file was lost. Example usage: # veriexecctl dump > /etc/signatures Note that only entries with the filename kept (that is, were loaded with the '-k' flag) will be dumped. Idea from Brett Lymn. - Add a VERIEXEC_FLUSH ioctl, to delete all Veriexec entries. Sample usage: # veriexecctl flush - Add a 'veriexec_flags' rc(8) variable, and make its default have the '-k' flag. On systems using the default signatures file (generaetd from running 'veriexecgen' with no arguments), this will use additional 32kb of kernel memory on average. - Add a '-e' flag to veriexecctl, to evaluate the fingerprint during load. This is done automatically for files marked as 'untrusted'. Misc. stuff: - The code for veriexecctl was massively simplified as a result of eliminating the need for VERIEXEC_TABLESIZE, and now uses a single pass of the signatures file, making the loading somewhat faster. - Lots of minor fixes found using the (still under development) Veriexec regression testsuite. - Some of the messages Veriexec prints were improved. - Various documentation fixes. All relevant man-pages were updated to reflect the above changes. Binary compatibility with existing veriexecctl binaries is maintained.
2007-05-15 23:47:43 +04:00
f1_len = fnd.ni_cnd.cn_namelen + 1;
2009-01-17 10:02:35 +03:00
f1 = kmem_alloc(f1_len, KM_SLEEP);
strlcpy(f1, fnd.ni_cnd.cn_nameptr, f1_len);
Some Veriexec stuff that's been rotting in my tree for months. Bug fixes: - Fix crash reported by Scott Ellis on current-users@. - Fix race conditions in enforcing the Veriexec rename and remove policies. These are NOT security issues. - Fix memory leak in rename handling when overwriting a monitored file. - Fix table deletion logic. - Don't prevent query requests if not in learning mode. KPI updates: - fileassoc_table_run() now takes a cookie to pass to the callback. - veriexec_table_add() was removed, it is now done internally. As a result, there's no longer a need for VERIEXEC_TABLESIZE. - veriexec_report() was removed, it is now internal. - Perform sanity checks on the entry type, and enforce default type in veriexec_file_add() rather than in veriexecctl. - Add veriexec_flush(), used to delete all Veriexec tables, and veriexec_dump(), used to fill an array with all Veriexec entries. New features: - Add a '-k' flag to veriexecctl, to keep the filenames in the kernel database. This allows Veriexec to produce slightly more accurate logs under certain circumstances. In the future, this can be either replaced by vnode->pathname translation, or combined with it. - Add a VERIEXEC_DUMP ioctl, to dump the entire Veriexec database. This can be used to recover a database if the file was lost. Example usage: # veriexecctl dump > /etc/signatures Note that only entries with the filename kept (that is, were loaded with the '-k' flag) will be dumped. Idea from Brett Lymn. - Add a VERIEXEC_FLUSH ioctl, to delete all Veriexec entries. Sample usage: # veriexecctl flush - Add a 'veriexec_flags' rc(8) variable, and make its default have the '-k' flag. On systems using the default signatures file (generaetd from running 'veriexecgen' with no arguments), this will use additional 32kb of kernel memory on average. - Add a '-e' flag to veriexecctl, to evaluate the fingerprint during load. This is done automatically for files marked as 'untrusted'. Misc. stuff: - The code for veriexecctl was massively simplified as a result of eliminating the need for VERIEXEC_TABLESIZE, and now uses a single pass of the signatures file, making the loading somewhat faster. - Lots of minor fixes found using the (still under development) Veriexec regression testsuite. - Some of the messages Veriexec prints were improved. - Various documentation fixes. All relevant man-pages were updated to reflect the above changes. Binary compatibility with existing veriexecctl binaries is maintained.
2007-05-15 23:47:43 +04:00
f2_len = tnd.ni_cnd.cn_namelen + 1;
2009-01-17 10:02:35 +03:00
f2 = kmem_alloc(f2_len, KM_SLEEP);
strlcpy(f2, tnd.ni_cnd.cn_nameptr, f2_len);
Some Veriexec stuff that's been rotting in my tree for months. Bug fixes: - Fix crash reported by Scott Ellis on current-users@. - Fix race conditions in enforcing the Veriexec rename and remove policies. These are NOT security issues. - Fix memory leak in rename handling when overwriting a monitored file. - Fix table deletion logic. - Don't prevent query requests if not in learning mode. KPI updates: - fileassoc_table_run() now takes a cookie to pass to the callback. - veriexec_table_add() was removed, it is now done internally. As a result, there's no longer a need for VERIEXEC_TABLESIZE. - veriexec_report() was removed, it is now internal. - Perform sanity checks on the entry type, and enforce default type in veriexec_file_add() rather than in veriexecctl. - Add veriexec_flush(), used to delete all Veriexec tables, and veriexec_dump(), used to fill an array with all Veriexec entries. New features: - Add a '-k' flag to veriexecctl, to keep the filenames in the kernel database. This allows Veriexec to produce slightly more accurate logs under certain circumstances. In the future, this can be either replaced by vnode->pathname translation, or combined with it. - Add a VERIEXEC_DUMP ioctl, to dump the entire Veriexec database. This can be used to recover a database if the file was lost. Example usage: # veriexecctl dump > /etc/signatures Note that only entries with the filename kept (that is, were loaded with the '-k' flag) will be dumped. Idea from Brett Lymn. - Add a VERIEXEC_FLUSH ioctl, to delete all Veriexec entries. Sample usage: # veriexecctl flush - Add a 'veriexec_flags' rc(8) variable, and make its default have the '-k' flag. On systems using the default signatures file (generaetd from running 'veriexecgen' with no arguments), this will use additional 32kb of kernel memory on average. - Add a '-e' flag to veriexecctl, to evaluate the fingerprint during load. This is done automatically for files marked as 'untrusted'. Misc. stuff: - The code for veriexecctl was massively simplified as a result of eliminating the need for VERIEXEC_TABLESIZE, and now uses a single pass of the signatures file, making the loading somewhat faster. - Lots of minor fixes found using the (still under development) Veriexec regression testsuite. - Some of the messages Veriexec prints were improved. - Various documentation fixes. All relevant man-pages were updated to reflect the above changes. Binary compatibility with existing veriexecctl binaries is maintained.
2007-05-15 23:47:43 +04:00
error = veriexec_renamechk(curlwp, fvp, f1, tvp, f2);
Some Veriexec stuff that's been rotting in my tree for months. Bug fixes: - Fix crash reported by Scott Ellis on current-users@. - Fix race conditions in enforcing the Veriexec rename and remove policies. These are NOT security issues. - Fix memory leak in rename handling when overwriting a monitored file. - Fix table deletion logic. - Don't prevent query requests if not in learning mode. KPI updates: - fileassoc_table_run() now takes a cookie to pass to the callback. - veriexec_table_add() was removed, it is now done internally. As a result, there's no longer a need for VERIEXEC_TABLESIZE. - veriexec_report() was removed, it is now internal. - Perform sanity checks on the entry type, and enforce default type in veriexec_file_add() rather than in veriexecctl. - Add veriexec_flush(), used to delete all Veriexec tables, and veriexec_dump(), used to fill an array with all Veriexec entries. New features: - Add a '-k' flag to veriexecctl, to keep the filenames in the kernel database. This allows Veriexec to produce slightly more accurate logs under certain circumstances. In the future, this can be either replaced by vnode->pathname translation, or combined with it. - Add a VERIEXEC_DUMP ioctl, to dump the entire Veriexec database. This can be used to recover a database if the file was lost. Example usage: # veriexecctl dump > /etc/signatures Note that only entries with the filename kept (that is, were loaded with the '-k' flag) will be dumped. Idea from Brett Lymn. - Add a VERIEXEC_FLUSH ioctl, to delete all Veriexec entries. Sample usage: # veriexecctl flush - Add a 'veriexec_flags' rc(8) variable, and make its default have the '-k' flag. On systems using the default signatures file (generaetd from running 'veriexecgen' with no arguments), this will use additional 32kb of kernel memory on average. - Add a '-e' flag to veriexecctl, to evaluate the fingerprint during load. This is done automatically for files marked as 'untrusted'. Misc. stuff: - The code for veriexecctl was massively simplified as a result of eliminating the need for VERIEXEC_TABLESIZE, and now uses a single pass of the signatures file, making the loading somewhat faster. - Lots of minor fixes found using the (still under development) Veriexec regression testsuite. - Some of the messages Veriexec prints were improved. - Various documentation fixes. All relevant man-pages were updated to reflect the above changes. Binary compatibility with existing veriexecctl binaries is maintained.
2007-05-15 23:47:43 +04:00
2009-01-17 10:02:35 +03:00
kmem_free(f1, f1_len);
kmem_free(f2, f2_len);
if (error)
goto abort3;
}
#endif /* NVERIEXEC > 0 */
/*
* All ready. Incant the rename vop.
*/
/* XXX KASSERT(VOP_ISLOCKED(fdvp) != LK_EXCLUSIVE); */
/* XXX KASSERT(VOP_ISLOCKED(fvp) != LK_EXCLUSIVE); */
KASSERT(VOP_ISLOCKED(tdvp) == LK_EXCLUSIVE);
KASSERT((tvp == NULL) || (VOP_ISLOCKED(tvp) == LK_EXCLUSIVE));
error = VOP_RENAME(fdvp, fvp, &fnd.ni_cnd, tdvp, tvp, &tnd.ni_cnd);
/*
* VOP_RENAME releases fdvp, fvp, tdvp, and tvp, and unlocks
* tdvp and tvp. But we can't assert any of that.
*/
/* XXX KASSERT(VOP_ISLOCKED(fdvp) != LK_EXCLUSIVE); */
/* XXX KASSERT(VOP_ISLOCKED(fvp) != LK_EXCLUSIVE); */
/* XXX KASSERT(VOP_ISLOCKED(tdvp) != LK_EXCLUSIVE); */
/* XXX KASSERT((tvp == NULL) || (VOP_ISLOCKED(tvp) != LK_EXCLUSIVE)); */
/*
* So all we have left to do is to drop the rename lock and
* destroy the pathbufs.
*/
VFS_RENAMELOCK_EXIT(mp);
goto out2;
abort3: if ((tvp != NULL) && (tvp != tdvp))
VOP_UNLOCK(tvp);
abort2: VOP_UNLOCK(tdvp);
VFS_RENAMELOCK_EXIT(mp);
abort1: VOP_ABORTOP(tdvp, &tnd.ni_cnd);
vrele(tdvp);
if (tvp != NULL)
vrele(tvp);
abort0: VOP_ABORTOP(fdvp, &fnd.ni_cnd);
vrele(fdvp);
vrele(fvp);
out2: pathbuf_destroy(tpb);
out1: pathbuf_destroy(fpb);
out0: return error;
}
/*
* Make a directory file.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
1996-02-04 05:17:43 +03:00
int
sys_mkdir(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_mkdir_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(int) mode;
} */
2009-07-02 16:53:47 +04:00
return do_sys_mkdirat(l, AT_FDCWD, SCARG(uap, path),
SCARG(uap, mode), UIO_USERSPACE);
2009-07-02 16:53:47 +04:00
}
int
sys_mkdirat(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_mkdirat_args *uap,
register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(int) mode;
} */
return do_sys_mkdirat(l, SCARG(uap, fd), SCARG(uap, path),
SCARG(uap, mode), UIO_USERSPACE);
}
2009-07-02 16:53:47 +04:00
int
do_sys_mkdir(const char *path, mode_t mode, enum uio_seg seg)
{
return do_sys_mkdirat(NULL, AT_FDCWD, path, mode, UIO_USERSPACE);
}
static int
do_sys_mkdirat(struct lwp *l, int fdat, const char *path, mode_t mode,
enum uio_seg seg)
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{
struct proc *p = curlwp->l_proc;
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struct vnode *vp;
struct vattr vattr;
int error;
struct pathbuf *pb;
struct nameidata nd;
KASSERT(l != NULL || fdat == AT_FDCWD);
/* XXX bollocks, should pass in a pathbuf */
error = pathbuf_maybe_copyin(path, seg, &pb);
if (error) {
return error;
}
NDINIT(&nd, CREATE, LOCKPARENT | CREATEDIR | TRYEMULROOT, pb);
if ((error = fd_nameiat(l, fdat, &nd)) != 0) {
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
return (error);
}
vp = nd.ni_vp;
if (vp != NULL) {
VOP_ABORTOP(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_cnd);
if (nd.ni_dvp == vp)
vrele(nd.ni_dvp);
else
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
vrele(vp);
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
return (EEXIST);
}
vattr_null(&vattr);
vattr.va_type = VDIR;
/* We will read cwdi->cwdi_cmask unlocked. */
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vattr.va_mode = (mode & ACCESSPERMS) &~ p->p_cwdi->cwdi_cmask;
error = VOP_MKDIR(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_vp, &nd.ni_cnd, &vattr);
if (!error)
vput(nd.ni_vp);
pathbuf_destroy(pb);
return (error);
}
/*
* Remove a directory file.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
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int
sys_rmdir(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_rmdir_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
return do_sys_unlinkat(l, AT_FDCWD, SCARG(uap, path),
AT_REMOVEDIR, UIO_USERSPACE);
}
/*
* Read a block of directory entries in a file system independent format.
*/
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int
sys___getdents30(struct lwp *l, const struct sys___getdents30_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(char *) buf;
syscallarg(size_t) count;
} */
file_t *fp;
int error, done;
/* fd_getvnode() will use the descriptor for us */
if ((error = fd_getvnode(SCARG(uap, fd), &fp)) != 0)
return (error);
if ((fp->f_flag & FREAD) == 0) {
error = EBADF;
goto out;
}
error = vn_readdir(fp, SCARG(uap, buf), UIO_USERSPACE,
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SCARG(uap, count), &done, l, 0, 0);
ktrgenio(SCARG(uap, fd), UIO_READ, SCARG(uap, buf), done, error);
*retval = done;
out:
fd_putfile(SCARG(uap, fd));
return (error);
}
/*
* Set the mode mask for creation of filesystem nodes.
*/
int
sys_umask(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_umask_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
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syscallarg(mode_t) newmask;
} */
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struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
struct cwdinfo *cwdi;
/*
* cwdi->cwdi_cmask will be read unlocked elsewhere. What's
* important is that we serialize changes to the mask. The
* rw_exit() will issue a write memory barrier on our behalf,
* and force the changes out to other CPUs (as it must use an
* atomic operation, draining the local CPU's store buffers).
*/
cwdi = p->p_cwdi;
rw_enter(&cwdi->cwdi_lock, RW_WRITER);
*retval = cwdi->cwdi_cmask;
cwdi->cwdi_cmask = SCARG(uap, newmask) & ALLPERMS;
rw_exit(&cwdi->cwdi_lock);
return (0);
}
int
dorevoke(struct vnode *vp, kauth_cred_t cred)
{
struct vattr vattr;
int error, fs_decision;
vn_lock(vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vattr, cred);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp);
if (error != 0)
return error;
fs_decision = (kauth_cred_geteuid(cred) == vattr.va_uid) ? 0 : EPERM;
error = kauth_authorize_vnode(cred, KAUTH_VNODE_REVOKE, vp, NULL,
fs_decision);
if (!error)
VOP_REVOKE(vp, REVOKEALL);
return (error);
}
/*
* Void all references to file by ripping underlying filesystem
* away from vnode.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
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int
sys_revoke(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_revoke_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
} */
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struct vnode *vp;
int error;
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error = namei_simple_user(SCARG(uap, path),
NSM_FOLLOW_TRYEMULROOT, &vp);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = dorevoke(vp, l->l_cred);
vrele(vp);
return (error);
}