NetBSD/sys/kern/init_main.c

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/* $NetBSD: init_main.c,v 1.445 2012/07/29 18:05:48 mlelstv Exp $ */
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2008, 2009 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
* ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
* TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
* BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
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/*
* Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
* (c) UNIX System Laboratories, Inc.
* All or some portions of this file are derived from material licensed
* to the University of California by American Telephone and Telegraph
* Co. or Unix System Laboratories, Inc. and are reproduced herein with
* the permission of UNIX System Laboratories, Inc.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* @(#)init_main.c 8.16 (Berkeley) 5/14/95
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Christopher G. Demetriou. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* This product includes software developed by the University of
* California, Berkeley and its contributors.
* 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
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* @(#)init_main.c 8.16 (Berkeley) 5/14/95
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*/
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: init_main.c,v 1.445 2012/07/29 18:05:48 mlelstv Exp $");
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#include "opt_ddb.h"
#include "opt_ipsec.h"
#include "opt_modular.h"
#include "opt_ntp.h"
#include "opt_pipe.h"
#include "opt_syscall_debug.h"
#include "opt_sysv.h"
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#include "opt_fileassoc.h"
#include "opt_ktrace.h"
#include "opt_pax.h"
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#include "opt_compat_netbsd.h"
#include "opt_wapbl.h"
#include "opt_ptrace.h"
#include "drvctl.h"
#include "ksyms.h"
#include "sysmon_envsys.h"
#include "sysmon_power.h"
#include "sysmon_taskq.h"
#include "sysmon_wdog.h"
#include "veriexec.h"
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#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/acct.h>
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#include <sys/filedesc.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
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#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <sys/callout.h>
#include <sys/cpu.h>
#include <sys/cpufreq.h>
#include <sys/spldebug.h>
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#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/kthread.h>
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#include <sys/resourcevar.h>
#include <sys/signalvar.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <sys/fstrans.h>
#include <sys/tty.h>
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#include <sys/conf.h>
#include <sys/disklabel.h>
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#include <sys/buf.h>
#include <sys/device.h>
#include <sys/exec.h>
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#include <sys/socketvar.h>
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#include <sys/protosw.h>
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#include <sys/percpu.h>
#include <sys/pserialize.h>
#include <sys/pset.h>
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#include <sys/sysctl.h>
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#include <sys/reboot.h>
#include <sys/event.h>
#include <sys/mbuf.h>
#include <sys/sched.h>
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#include <sys/sleepq.h>
#include <sys/iostat.h>
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#include <sys/vmem.h>
#include <sys/uuid.h>
#include <sys/extent.h>
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#include <sys/disk.h>
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#include <sys/msgbuf.h>
#include <sys/module.h>
#include <sys/event.h>
#include <sys/lockf.h>
#include <sys/once.h>
#include <sys/kcpuset.h>
#include <sys/ksyms.h>
#include <sys/uidinfo.h>
#include <sys/kprintf.h>
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#ifdef FAST_IPSEC
#include <netipsec/ipsec.h>
#endif
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#ifdef SYSVSHM
#include <sys/shm.h>
#endif
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#ifdef SYSVSEM
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#include <sys/sem.h>
#endif
#ifdef SYSVMSG
#include <sys/msg.h>
#endif
#include <sys/domain.h>
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#include <sys/namei.h>
#include <sys/rnd.h>
#include <sys/pipe.h>
#if NVERIEXEC > 0
#include <sys/verified_exec.h>
#endif /* NVERIEXEC > 0 */
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#ifdef KTRACE
#include <sys/ktrace.h>
#endif
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#include <sys/kauth.h>
Resolve conflicts and adapt to NetBSD. Thanks to dyoung@, scw@, and perry@ for help testing. 2005-08-30 15:27 avatar Properly set ic_curchan before calling back to device driver to do channel switching(ifconfig devX channel Y). This fix should make channel changing works again in monitor mode. Submitted by: sam X-MFC-With: other ic_curchan changes 2005-08-13 18:50 sam revert 1.64: we cannot use the channel characteristics to decide when to do 11g erp sta accounting because b/g channels show up as false positives when operating in 11b. Noticed by: Michal Mertl 2005-08-13 18:31 sam Extend acl support to pass ioctl requests through and use this to add support for getting the current policy setting and collecting the list of mac addresses in the acl table. Submitted by: Michal Mertl (original version) MFC after: 2 weeks 2005-08-10 18:42 sam Don't use ic_curmode to decide when to do 11g station accounting, use the station channel properties. Fixes assert failure/bogus operation when an ap is operating in 11a and has associated stations then switches to 11g. Noticed by: Michal Mertl Reviewed by: avatar MFC after: 2 weeks 2005-08-10 17:22 sam Clarify/fix handling of the current channel: o add ic_curchan and use it uniformly for specifying the current channel instead of overloading ic->ic_bss->ni_chan (or in some drivers ic_ibss_chan) o add ieee80211_scanparams structure to encapsulate scanning-related state captured for rx frames o move rx beacon+probe response frame handling into separate routines o change beacon+probe response handling to treat the scan table more like a scan cache--look for an existing entry before adding a new one; this combined with ic_curchan use corrects handling of stations that were previously found at a different channel o move adhoc neighbor discovery by beacon+probe response frames to a new ieee80211_add_neighbor routine Reviewed by: avatar Tested by: avatar, Michal Mertl MFC after: 2 weeks 2005-08-09 11:19 rwatson Propagate rename of IFF_OACTIVE and IFF_RUNNING to IFF_DRV_OACTIVE and IFF_DRV_RUNNING, as well as the move from ifnet.if_flags to ifnet.if_drv_flags. Device drivers are now responsible for synchronizing access to these flags, as they are in if_drv_flags. This helps prevent races between the network stack and device driver in maintaining the interface flags field. Many __FreeBSD__ and __FreeBSD_version checks maintained and continued; some less so. Reviewed by: pjd, bz MFC after: 7 days 2005-08-08 19:46 sam Split crypto tx+rx key indices and add a key index -> node mapping table: Crypto changes: o change driver/net80211 key_alloc api to return tx+rx key indices; a driver can leave the rx key index set to IEEE80211_KEYIX_NONE or set it to be the same as the tx key index (the former disables use of the key index in building the keyix->node mapping table and is the default setup for naive drivers by null_key_alloc) o add cs_max_keyid to crypto state to specify the max h/w key index a driver will return; this is used to allocate the key index mapping table and to bounds check table loookups o while here introduce ieee80211_keyix (finally) for the type of a h/w key index o change crypto notifiers for rx failures to pass the rx key index up as appropriate (michael failure, replay, etc.) Node table changes: o optionally allocate a h/w key index to node mapping table for the station table using the max key index setting supplied by drivers (note the scan table does not get a map) o defer node table allocation to lateattach so the driver has a chance to set the max key id to size the key index map o while here also defer the aid bitmap allocation o add new ieee80211_find_rxnode_withkey api to find a sta/node entry on frame receive with an optional h/w key index to use in checking mapping table; also updates the map if it does a hash lookup and the found node has a rx key index set in the unicast key; note this work is separated from the old ieee80211_find_rxnode call so drivers do not need to be aware of the new mechanism o move some node table manipulation under the node table lock to close a race on node delete o add ieee80211_node_delucastkey to do the dirty work of deleting unicast key state for a node (deletes any key and handles key map references) Ath driver: o nuke private sc_keyixmap mechansim in favor of net80211 support o update key alloc api These changes close several race conditions for the ath driver operating in ap mode. Other drivers should see no change. Station mode operation for ath no longer uses the key index map but performance tests show no noticeable change and this will be fixed when the scan table is eliminated with the new scanning support. Tested by: Michal Mertl, avatar, others Reviewed by: avatar, others MFC after: 2 weeks 2005-08-08 06:49 sam use ieee80211_iterate_nodes to retrieve station data; the previous code walked the list w/o locking MFC after: 1 week 2005-08-08 04:30 sam Cleanup beacon/listen interval handling: o separate configured beacon interval from listen interval; this avoids potential use of one value for the other (e.g. setting powersavesleep to 0 clobbers the beacon interval used in hostap or ibss mode) o bounds check the beacon interval received in probe response and beacon frames and drop frames with bogus settings; not clear if we should instead clamp the value as any alteration would result in mismatched sta+ap configuration and probably be more confusing (don't want to log to the console but perhaps ok with rate limiting) o while here up max beacon interval to reflect WiFi standard Noticed by: Martin <nakal@nurfuerspam.de> MFC after: 1 week 2005-08-06 05:57 sam fix debug msg typo MFC after: 3 days 2005-08-06 05:56 sam Fix handling of frames sent prior to a station being authorized when operating in ap mode. Previously we allocated a node from the station table, sent the frame (using the node), then released the reference that "held the frame in the table". But while the frame was in flight the node might be reclaimed which could lead to problems. The solution is to add an ieee80211_tmp_node routine that crafts a node that does exist in a table and so isn't ever reclaimed; it exists only so long as the associated frame is in flight. MFC after: 5 days 2005-07-31 07:12 sam close a race between reclaiming a node when a station is inactive and sending the null data frame used to probe inactive stations MFC after: 5 days 2005-07-27 05:41 sam when bridging internally bypass the bss node as traffic to it must follow the normal input path Submitted by: Michal Mertl MFC after: 5 days 2005-07-27 03:53 sam bandaid ni_fails handling so ap's with association failures are reconsidered after a bit; a proper fix involves more changes to the scanning infrastructure Reviewed by: avatar, David Young MFC after: 5 days 2005-07-23 01:16 sam the AREF flag is only meaningful in ap mode; adhoc neighbors now are timed out of the sta/neighbor table 2005-07-23 00:25 sam o move inactivity-related debug msgs under IEEE80211_MSG_INACT o probe inactive neighbors in adhoc mode (they don't have an association id so previously were being timed out) MFC after: 3 days 2005-07-22 22:11 sam split xmit of probe request frame out into a separate routine that takes explicit parameters; this will be needed when scanning is decoupled from the state machine to do bg scanning MFC after: 3 days 2005-07-22 21:48 sam split 802.11 frame xmit setup code into ieee80211_send_setup MFC after: 3 days 2005-07-22 18:57 sam simplify ic_newassoc callback MFC after: 3 days 2005-07-22 18:54 sam simplify ieee80211_ibss_merge api MFC after: 3 days 2005-07-22 18:50 sam add stats we know we'll need soon and some spare fields for future expansion MFC after: 3 days 2005-07-22 18:45 sam simplify tim callback api MFC after: 3 days 2005-07-22 18:42 sam don't include 802.3 header in min frame length calculation as it may not be present for a frag; fixes problem with small (fragmented) frames being dropped Obtained from: Atheros MFC after: 3 days 2005-07-22 18:36 sam simplify ieee80211_node_authorize and ieee80211_node_unauthorize api's MFC after: 3 days 2005-07-22 18:31 sam simplifiy ieee80211_send_nulldata api MFC after: 3 days 2005-07-22 18:29 sam simplify rate set api's by removing ic parameter (implicit in node reference) MFC after: 3 days 2005-07-22 18:21 sam reject association requests with a wpa/rsn ie when wpa/rsn is not configured on the ap; previously we either ignored the ie or (possibly) failed an assertion Obtained from: Atheros MFC after: 3 days 2005-07-22 18:16 sam missed one in last commit; add device name to discard msgs 2005-07-22 18:13 sam include device name in discard msgs 2005-07-22 18:12 sam add diag msgs for frames discarded because the direction field is wrong 2005-07-22 18:08 sam split data frame delivery out to a new function ieee80211_deliver_data 2005-07-22 18:00 sam o add IEEE80211_IOC_FRAGTHRESHOLD for getting+setting the tx fragmentation threshold o fix bounds checking on IEEE80211_IOC_RTSTHRESHOLD MFC after: 3 days 2005-07-22 17:55 sam o add IEEE80211_FRAG_DEFAULT o move default settings for RTS and frag thresholds to ieee80211_var.h 2005-07-22 17:50 sam diff reduction against p4: define IEEE80211_FIXED_RATE_NONE and use it instead of -1 2005-07-22 17:37 sam add flags missed in last merge 2005-07-22 17:36 sam Diff reduction against p4: o add ic_flags_ext for eventual extention of ic_flags o define/reserve flag+capabilities bits for superg, bg scan, and roaming support o refactor debug msg macros MFC after: 3 days 2005-07-22 06:17 sam send a response when an auth request is denied due to an acl; might be better to silently ignore the frame but this way we give stations a chance of figuring out what's wrong 2005-07-22 06:15 sam remove excess whitespace 2005-07-22 05:55 sam use IF_HANDOFF when bridging frames internally so if_start gets called; fixes communication between associated sta's MFC after: 3 days 2005-07-11 04:06 sam Handle encrypt of arbitarily fragmented mbuf chains: previously we bailed if we couldn't collect the 16-bytes of data required for an aes block cipher in 2 mbufs; now we deal with it. While here make space accounting signed so a sanity check does the right thing for malformed mbuf chains. Approved by: re (scottl) 2005-07-11 04:00 sam nuke assert that duplicates real check Reviewed by: avatar Approved by: re (scottl)
2005-11-18 19:40:08 +03:00
#include <net80211/ieee80211_netbsd.h>
#ifdef PTRACE
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#endif /* PTRACE */
First step of random number subsystem rework described in <20111022023242.BA26F14A158@mail.netbsd.org>. This change includes the following: An initial cleanup and minor reorganization of the entropy pool code in sys/dev/rnd.c and sys/dev/rndpool.c. Several bugs are fixed. Some effort is made to accumulate entropy more quickly at boot time. A generic interface, "rndsink", is added, for stream generators to request that they be re-keyed with good quality entropy from the pool as soon as it is available. The arc4random()/arc4randbytes() implementation in libkern is adjusted to use the rndsink interface for rekeying, which helps address the problem of low-quality keys at boot time. An implementation of the FIPS 140-2 statistical tests for random number generator quality is provided (libkern/rngtest.c). This is based on Greg Rose's implementation from Qualcomm. A new random stream generator, nist_ctr_drbg, is provided. It is based on an implementation of the NIST SP800-90 CTR_DRBG by Henric Jungheim. This generator users AES in a modified counter mode to generate a backtracking-resistant random stream. An abstraction layer, "cprng", is provided for in-kernel consumers of randomness. The arc4random/arc4randbytes API is deprecated for in-kernel use. It is replaced by "cprng_strong". The current cprng_fast implementation wraps the existing arc4random implementation. The current cprng_strong implementation wraps the new CTR_DRBG implementation. Both interfaces are rekeyed from the entropy pool automatically at intervals justifiable from best current cryptographic practice. In some quick tests, cprng_fast() is about the same speed as the old arc4randbytes(), and cprng_strong() is about 20% faster than rnd_extract_data(). Performance is expected to improve. The AES code in src/crypto/rijndael is no longer an optional kernel component, as it is required by cprng_strong, which is not an optional kernel component. The entropy pool output is subjected to the rngtest tests at startup time; if it fails, the system will reboot. There is approximately a 3/10000 chance of a false positive from these tests. Entropy pool _input_ from hardware random numbers is subjected to the rngtest tests at attach time, as well as the FIPS continuous-output test, to detect bad or stuck hardware RNGs; if any are detected, they are detached, but the system continues to run. A problem with rndctl(8) is fixed -- datastructures with pointers in arrays are no longer passed to userspace (this was not a security problem, but rather a major issue for compat32). A new kernel will require a new rndctl. The sysctl kern.arandom() and kern.urandom() nodes are hooked up to the new generators, but the /dev/*random pseudodevices are not, yet. Manual pages for the new kernel interfaces are forthcoming.
2011-11-20 02:51:18 +04:00
#include <sys/cprng.h>
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#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/syscallargs.h>
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#if defined(PAX_MPROTECT) || defined(PAX_SEGVGUARD) || defined(PAX_ASLR)
#include <sys/pax.h>
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#endif /* PAX_MPROTECT || PAX_SEGVGUARD || PAX_ASLR */
Implement the register/deregister/evaluation API for secmodel(9). It allows registration of callbacks that can be used later for cross-secmodel "safe" communication. When a secmodel wishes to know a property maintained by another secmodel, it has to submit a request to it so the other secmodel can proceed to evaluating the request. This is done through the secmodel_eval(9) call; example: bool isroot; error = secmodel_eval("org.netbsd.secmodel.suser", "is-root", cred, &isroot); if (error == 0 && !isroot) result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY; This one asks the suser module if the credentials are assumed to be root when evaluated by suser module. If the module is present, it will respond. If absent, the call will return an error. Args and command are arbitrarily defined; it's up to the secmodel(9) to document what it expects. Typical example is securelevel testing: when someone wants to know whether securelevel is raised above a certain level or not, the caller has to request this property to the secmodel_securelevel(9) module. Given that securelevel module may be absent from system's context (thus making access to the global "securelevel" variable impossible or unsafe), this API can cope with this absence and return an error. We are using secmodel_eval(9) to implement a secmodel_extensions(9) module, which plugs with the bsd44, suser and securelevel secmodels to provide the logic behind curtain, usermount and user_set_cpu_affinity modes, without adding hooks to traditional secmodels. This solves a real issue with the current secmodel(9) code, as usermount or user_set_cpu_affinity are not really tied to secmodel_suser(9). The secmodel_eval(9) is also used to restrict security.models settings when securelevel is above 0, through the "is-securelevel-above" evaluation: - curtain can be enabled any time, but cannot be disabled if securelevel is above 0. - usermount/user_set_cpu_affinity can be disabled any time, but cannot be enabled if securelevel is above 0. Regarding sysctl(7) entries: curtain and usermount are now found under security.models.extensions tree. The security.curtain and vfs.generic.usermount are still accessible for backwards compat. Documentation is incoming, I am proof-reading my writings. Written by elad@, reviewed and tested (anita test + interact for rights tests) by me. ok elad@. See also http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2011/11/29/msg000422.html XXX might consider va0 mapping too. XXX Having a secmodel(9) specific printf (like aprint_*) for reporting secmodel(9) errors might be a good idea, but I am not sure on how to design such a function right now.
2011-12-04 23:24:58 +04:00
#include <secmodel/secmodel.h>
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#include <ufs/ufs/quota.h>
#include <miscfs/genfs/genfs.h>
#include <miscfs/syncfs/syncfs.h>
#include <miscfs/specfs/specdev.h>
#include <sys/cpu.h>
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#include <uvm/uvm.h> /* extern struct uvm uvm */
#if NSYSMON_TASKQ > 0
#include <dev/sysmon/sysmon_taskq.h>
#endif
#include <dev/cons.h>
#if NSYSMON_ENVSYS > 0 || NSYSMON_POWER > 0 || NSYSMON_WDOG > 0
#include <dev/sysmon/sysmonvar.h>
#endif
#include <net/bpf.h>
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#include <net/if.h>
#include <net/raw_cb.h>
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#include <prop/proplib.h>
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#ifdef COMPAT_50
#include <compat/sys/time.h>
struct timeval50 boottime50;
#endif
#include <sys/userconf.h>
extern struct lwp lwp0;
extern time_t rootfstime;
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#ifndef curlwp
struct lwp *curlwp = &lwp0;
#endif
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struct proc *initproc;
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struct vnode *rootvp, *swapdev_vp;
int boothowto;
int cold = 1; /* still working on startup */
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struct timespec boottime; /* time at system startup - will only follow settime deltas */
1994-07-03 15:45:41 +04:00
int start_init_exec; /* semaphore for start_init() */
First step of random number subsystem rework described in <20111022023242.BA26F14A158@mail.netbsd.org>. This change includes the following: An initial cleanup and minor reorganization of the entropy pool code in sys/dev/rnd.c and sys/dev/rndpool.c. Several bugs are fixed. Some effort is made to accumulate entropy more quickly at boot time. A generic interface, "rndsink", is added, for stream generators to request that they be re-keyed with good quality entropy from the pool as soon as it is available. The arc4random()/arc4randbytes() implementation in libkern is adjusted to use the rndsink interface for rekeying, which helps address the problem of low-quality keys at boot time. An implementation of the FIPS 140-2 statistical tests for random number generator quality is provided (libkern/rngtest.c). This is based on Greg Rose's implementation from Qualcomm. A new random stream generator, nist_ctr_drbg, is provided. It is based on an implementation of the NIST SP800-90 CTR_DRBG by Henric Jungheim. This generator users AES in a modified counter mode to generate a backtracking-resistant random stream. An abstraction layer, "cprng", is provided for in-kernel consumers of randomness. The arc4random/arc4randbytes API is deprecated for in-kernel use. It is replaced by "cprng_strong". The current cprng_fast implementation wraps the existing arc4random implementation. The current cprng_strong implementation wraps the new CTR_DRBG implementation. Both interfaces are rekeyed from the entropy pool automatically at intervals justifiable from best current cryptographic practice. In some quick tests, cprng_fast() is about the same speed as the old arc4randbytes(), and cprng_strong() is about 20% faster than rnd_extract_data(). Performance is expected to improve. The AES code in src/crypto/rijndael is no longer an optional kernel component, as it is required by cprng_strong, which is not an optional kernel component. The entropy pool output is subjected to the rngtest tests at startup time; if it fails, the system will reboot. There is approximately a 3/10000 chance of a false positive from these tests. Entropy pool _input_ from hardware random numbers is subjected to the rngtest tests at attach time, as well as the FIPS continuous-output test, to detect bad or stuck hardware RNGs; if any are detected, they are detached, but the system continues to run. A problem with rndctl(8) is fixed -- datastructures with pointers in arrays are no longer passed to userspace (this was not a security problem, but rather a major issue for compat32). A new kernel will require a new rndctl. The sysctl kern.arandom() and kern.urandom() nodes are hooked up to the new generators, but the /dev/*random pseudodevices are not, yet. Manual pages for the new kernel interfaces are forthcoming.
2011-11-20 02:51:18 +04:00
cprng_strong_t *kern_cprng;
2005-12-11 15:16:03 +03:00
static void check_console(struct lwp *l);
static void start_init(void *);
static void configure(void);
static void configure2(void);
static void configure3(void);
void main(void);
1994-07-03 15:45:41 +04:00
/*
* System startup; initialize the world, create process 0, mount root
* filesystem, and fork to create init and pagedaemon. Most of the
* hard work is done in the lower-level initialization routines including
* startup(), which does memory initialization and autoconfiguration.
*/
1996-02-04 05:15:01 +03:00
void
main(void)
1994-07-03 15:45:41 +04:00
{
2009-01-11 05:45:45 +03:00
struct timespec time;
2003-01-18 13:06:22 +03:00
struct lwp *l;
struct proc *p;
int s, error;
#ifdef NVNODE_IMPLICIT
int usevnodes;
#endif
CPU_INFO_ITERATOR cii;
struct cpu_info *ci;
1994-07-03 15:45:41 +04:00
2003-01-18 13:06:22 +03:00
l = &lwp0;
#ifndef LWP0_CPU_INFO
2003-01-18 13:06:22 +03:00
l->l_cpu = curcpu();
#endif
l->l_pflag |= LP_RUNNING;
2004-03-09 05:35:45 +03:00
1994-07-03 15:45:41 +04:00
/*
* Attempt to find console and initialize
* in case of early panic or other messages.
*/
consinit();
kernel_lock_init();
once_init();
mi_cpu_init();
kernconfig_lock_init();
kthread_sysinit();
/* Initialize the device switch tables. */
devsw_init();
/* Initialize event counters. */
evcnt_init();
uvm_init();
kcpuset_sysinit();
prop_kern_init();
#if ((NKSYMS > 0) || (NDDB > 0) || (NMODULAR > 0))
ksyms_init();
#endif
kprintf_init();
2008-01-14 15:40:02 +03:00
percpu_init();
/* Initialize lock caches. */
mutex_obj_init();
2009-04-19 18:04:51 +04:00
rw_obj_init();
/* Passive serialization. */
pserialize_init();
/* Initialize the extent manager. */
extent_init();
/* Do machine-dependent initialization. */
cpu_startup();
/* Initialize the sysctl subsystem. */
sysctl_init();
/* Initialize callouts, part 1. */
callout_startup();
/* Initialize the kernel authorization subsystem. */
kauth_init();
Implement the register/deregister/evaluation API for secmodel(9). It allows registration of callbacks that can be used later for cross-secmodel "safe" communication. When a secmodel wishes to know a property maintained by another secmodel, it has to submit a request to it so the other secmodel can proceed to evaluating the request. This is done through the secmodel_eval(9) call; example: bool isroot; error = secmodel_eval("org.netbsd.secmodel.suser", "is-root", cred, &isroot); if (error == 0 && !isroot) result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY; This one asks the suser module if the credentials are assumed to be root when evaluated by suser module. If the module is present, it will respond. If absent, the call will return an error. Args and command are arbitrarily defined; it's up to the secmodel(9) to document what it expects. Typical example is securelevel testing: when someone wants to know whether securelevel is raised above a certain level or not, the caller has to request this property to the secmodel_securelevel(9) module. Given that securelevel module may be absent from system's context (thus making access to the global "securelevel" variable impossible or unsafe), this API can cope with this absence and return an error. We are using secmodel_eval(9) to implement a secmodel_extensions(9) module, which plugs with the bsd44, suser and securelevel secmodels to provide the logic behind curtain, usermount and user_set_cpu_affinity modes, without adding hooks to traditional secmodels. This solves a real issue with the current secmodel(9) code, as usermount or user_set_cpu_affinity are not really tied to secmodel_suser(9). The secmodel_eval(9) is also used to restrict security.models settings when securelevel is above 0, through the "is-securelevel-above" evaluation: - curtain can be enabled any time, but cannot be disabled if securelevel is above 0. - usermount/user_set_cpu_affinity can be disabled any time, but cannot be enabled if securelevel is above 0. Regarding sysctl(7) entries: curtain and usermount are now found under security.models.extensions tree. The security.curtain and vfs.generic.usermount are still accessible for backwards compat. Documentation is incoming, I am proof-reading my writings. Written by elad@, reviewed and tested (anita test + interact for rights tests) by me. ok elad@. See also http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2011/11/29/msg000422.html XXX might consider va0 mapping too. XXX Having a secmodel(9) specific printf (like aprint_*) for reporting secmodel(9) errors might be a good idea, but I am not sure on how to design such a function right now.
2011-12-04 23:24:58 +04:00
secmodel_init();
spec_init();
/*
* Set BPF op vector. Can't do this in bpf attach, since
* network drivers attach before bpf.
*/
bpf_setops();
First part of secmodel cleanup and other misc. changes: - Separate the suser part of the bsd44 secmodel into its own secmodel and directory, pending even more cleanups. For revision history purposes, the original location of the files was src/sys/secmodel/bsd44/secmodel_bsd44_suser.c src/sys/secmodel/bsd44/suser.h - Add a man-page for secmodel_suser(9) and update the one for secmodel_bsd44(9). - Add a "secmodel" module class and use it. Userland program and documentation updated. - Manage secmodel count (nsecmodels) through the module framework. This eliminates the need for secmodel_{,de}register() calls in secmodel code. - Prepare for secmodel modularization by adding relevant module bits. The secmodels don't allow auto unload. The bsd44 secmodel depends on the suser and securelevel secmodels. The overlay secmodel depends on the bsd44 secmodel. As the module class is only cosmetic, and to prevent ambiguity, the bsd44 and overlay secmodels are prefixed with "secmodel_". - Adapt the overlay secmodel to recent changes (mainly vnode scope). - Stop using link-sets for the sysctl node(s) creation. - Keep sysctl variables under nodes of their relevant secmodels. In other words, don't create duplicates for the suser/securelevel secmodels under the bsd44 secmodel, as the latter is merely used for "grouping". - For the suser and securelevel secmodels, "advertise presence" in relevant sysctl nodes (sysctl.security.models.{suser,securelevel}). - Get rid of the LKM preprocessor stuff. - As secmodels are now modules, there's no need for an explicit call to secmodel_start(); it's handled by the module framework. That said, the module framework was adjusted to properly load secmodels early during system startup. - Adapt rump to changes: Instead of using empty stubs for securelevel, simply use the suser secmodel. Also replace secmodel_start() with a call to secmodel_suser_start(). - 5.99.20. Testing was done on i386 ("release" build). Spearated module_init() changes were tested on sparc and sparc64 as well by martin@ (thanks!). Mailing list reference: http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2009/09/25/msg006135.html
2009-10-02 22:50:12 +04:00
/* Start module system. */
module_init();
First part of secmodel cleanup and other misc. changes: - Separate the suser part of the bsd44 secmodel into its own secmodel and directory, pending even more cleanups. For revision history purposes, the original location of the files was src/sys/secmodel/bsd44/secmodel_bsd44_suser.c src/sys/secmodel/bsd44/suser.h - Add a man-page for secmodel_suser(9) and update the one for secmodel_bsd44(9). - Add a "secmodel" module class and use it. Userland program and documentation updated. - Manage secmodel count (nsecmodels) through the module framework. This eliminates the need for secmodel_{,de}register() calls in secmodel code. - Prepare for secmodel modularization by adding relevant module bits. The secmodels don't allow auto unload. The bsd44 secmodel depends on the suser and securelevel secmodels. The overlay secmodel depends on the bsd44 secmodel. As the module class is only cosmetic, and to prevent ambiguity, the bsd44 and overlay secmodels are prefixed with "secmodel_". - Adapt the overlay secmodel to recent changes (mainly vnode scope). - Stop using link-sets for the sysctl node(s) creation. - Keep sysctl variables under nodes of their relevant secmodels. In other words, don't create duplicates for the suser/securelevel secmodels under the bsd44 secmodel, as the latter is merely used for "grouping". - For the suser and securelevel secmodels, "advertise presence" in relevant sysctl nodes (sysctl.security.models.{suser,securelevel}). - Get rid of the LKM preprocessor stuff. - As secmodels are now modules, there's no need for an explicit call to secmodel_start(); it's handled by the module framework. That said, the module framework was adjusted to properly load secmodels early during system startup. - Adapt rump to changes: Instead of using empty stubs for securelevel, simply use the suser secmodel. Also replace secmodel_start() with a call to secmodel_suser_start(). - 5.99.20. Testing was done on i386 ("release" build). Spearated module_init() changes were tested on sparc and sparc64 as well by martin@ (thanks!). Mailing list reference: http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2009/09/25/msg006135.html
2009-10-02 22:50:12 +04:00
/*
* Initialize the kernel authorization subsystem and start the
* default security model, if any. We need to do this early
* enough so that subsystems relying on any of the aforementioned
* can work properly. Since the security model may dictate the
* credential inheritance policy, it is needed at least before
* any process is created, specifically proc0.
*/
First part of secmodel cleanup and other misc. changes: - Separate the suser part of the bsd44 secmodel into its own secmodel and directory, pending even more cleanups. For revision history purposes, the original location of the files was src/sys/secmodel/bsd44/secmodel_bsd44_suser.c src/sys/secmodel/bsd44/suser.h - Add a man-page for secmodel_suser(9) and update the one for secmodel_bsd44(9). - Add a "secmodel" module class and use it. Userland program and documentation updated. - Manage secmodel count (nsecmodels) through the module framework. This eliminates the need for secmodel_{,de}register() calls in secmodel code. - Prepare for secmodel modularization by adding relevant module bits. The secmodels don't allow auto unload. The bsd44 secmodel depends on the suser and securelevel secmodels. The overlay secmodel depends on the bsd44 secmodel. As the module class is only cosmetic, and to prevent ambiguity, the bsd44 and overlay secmodels are prefixed with "secmodel_". - Adapt the overlay secmodel to recent changes (mainly vnode scope). - Stop using link-sets for the sysctl node(s) creation. - Keep sysctl variables under nodes of their relevant secmodels. In other words, don't create duplicates for the suser/securelevel secmodels under the bsd44 secmodel, as the latter is merely used for "grouping". - For the suser and securelevel secmodels, "advertise presence" in relevant sysctl nodes (sysctl.security.models.{suser,securelevel}). - Get rid of the LKM preprocessor stuff. - As secmodels are now modules, there's no need for an explicit call to secmodel_start(); it's handled by the module framework. That said, the module framework was adjusted to properly load secmodels early during system startup. - Adapt rump to changes: Instead of using empty stubs for securelevel, simply use the suser secmodel. Also replace secmodel_start() with a call to secmodel_suser_start(). - 5.99.20. Testing was done on i386 ("release" build). Spearated module_init() changes were tested on sparc and sparc64 as well by martin@ (thanks!). Mailing list reference: http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2009/09/25/msg006135.html
2009-10-02 22:50:12 +04:00
module_init_class(MODULE_CLASS_SECMODEL);
/* Initialize the buffer cache */
bufinit();
1998-08-02 08:53:11 +04:00
/* Initialize sockets. */
soinit();
/*
* The following things must be done before autoconfiguration.
*/
First step of random number subsystem rework described in <20111022023242.BA26F14A158@mail.netbsd.org>. This change includes the following: An initial cleanup and minor reorganization of the entropy pool code in sys/dev/rnd.c and sys/dev/rndpool.c. Several bugs are fixed. Some effort is made to accumulate entropy more quickly at boot time. A generic interface, "rndsink", is added, for stream generators to request that they be re-keyed with good quality entropy from the pool as soon as it is available. The arc4random()/arc4randbytes() implementation in libkern is adjusted to use the rndsink interface for rekeying, which helps address the problem of low-quality keys at boot time. An implementation of the FIPS 140-2 statistical tests for random number generator quality is provided (libkern/rngtest.c). This is based on Greg Rose's implementation from Qualcomm. A new random stream generator, nist_ctr_drbg, is provided. It is based on an implementation of the NIST SP800-90 CTR_DRBG by Henric Jungheim. This generator users AES in a modified counter mode to generate a backtracking-resistant random stream. An abstraction layer, "cprng", is provided for in-kernel consumers of randomness. The arc4random/arc4randbytes API is deprecated for in-kernel use. It is replaced by "cprng_strong". The current cprng_fast implementation wraps the existing arc4random implementation. The current cprng_strong implementation wraps the new CTR_DRBG implementation. Both interfaces are rekeyed from the entropy pool automatically at intervals justifiable from best current cryptographic practice. In some quick tests, cprng_fast() is about the same speed as the old arc4randbytes(), and cprng_strong() is about 20% faster than rnd_extract_data(). Performance is expected to improve. The AES code in src/crypto/rijndael is no longer an optional kernel component, as it is required by cprng_strong, which is not an optional kernel component. The entropy pool output is subjected to the rngtest tests at startup time; if it fails, the system will reboot. There is approximately a 3/10000 chance of a false positive from these tests. Entropy pool _input_ from hardware random numbers is subjected to the rngtest tests at attach time, as well as the FIPS continuous-output test, to detect bad or stuck hardware RNGs; if any are detected, they are detached, but the system continues to run. A problem with rndctl(8) is fixed -- datastructures with pointers in arrays are no longer passed to userspace (this was not a security problem, but rather a major issue for compat32). A new kernel will require a new rndctl. The sysctl kern.arandom() and kern.urandom() nodes are hooked up to the new generators, but the /dev/*random pseudodevices are not, yet. Manual pages for the new kernel interfaces are forthcoming.
2011-11-20 02:51:18 +04:00
rnd_init(); /* initialize entropy pool */
cprng_init(); /* initialize cryptographic PRNG */
/* Initialize process and pgrp structures. */
procinit();
lwpinit();
/* Initialize signal-related data structures. */
signal_init();
1994-07-03 15:45:41 +04:00
/* Initialize resource management. */
resource_init();
2009-10-26 22:03:17 +03:00
/* Create process 0. */
proc0_init();
lwp0_init();
1994-07-03 15:45:41 +04:00
/* Disable preemption during boot. */
kpreempt_disable();
/* Initialize the UID hash table. */
uid_init();
/* Charge root for one process. */
1994-07-03 15:45:41 +04:00
(void)chgproccnt(0, 1);
/* Initialize timekeeping. */
time_init();
2007-02-10 00:55:00 +03:00
/* Initialize the run queues, turnstiles and sleep queues. */
sched_rqinit();
2007-02-10 00:55:00 +03:00
turnstile_init();
sleeptab_init(&sleeptab);
sched_init();
/* Initialize processor-sets */
psets_init();
/* Initialize cpufreq(9) */
cpufreq_init();
/* MI initialization of the boot cpu */
error = mi_cpu_attach(curcpu());
KASSERT(error == 0);
/* Initialize timekeeping, part 2. */
time_init2();
2008-01-14 15:40:02 +03:00
/*
* Initialize mbuf's. Do this now because we might attempt to
* allocate mbufs or mbuf clusters during autoconfiguration.
*/
mbinit();
/* Initialize I/O statistics. */
iostat_init();
2007-11-07 03:19:08 +03:00
/* Initialize the log device. */
loginit();
First part of secmodel cleanup and other misc. changes: - Separate the suser part of the bsd44 secmodel into its own secmodel and directory, pending even more cleanups. For revision history purposes, the original location of the files was src/sys/secmodel/bsd44/secmodel_bsd44_suser.c src/sys/secmodel/bsd44/suser.h - Add a man-page for secmodel_suser(9) and update the one for secmodel_bsd44(9). - Add a "secmodel" module class and use it. Userland program and documentation updated. - Manage secmodel count (nsecmodels) through the module framework. This eliminates the need for secmodel_{,de}register() calls in secmodel code. - Prepare for secmodel modularization by adding relevant module bits. The secmodels don't allow auto unload. The bsd44 secmodel depends on the suser and securelevel secmodels. The overlay secmodel depends on the bsd44 secmodel. As the module class is only cosmetic, and to prevent ambiguity, the bsd44 and overlay secmodels are prefixed with "secmodel_". - Adapt the overlay secmodel to recent changes (mainly vnode scope). - Stop using link-sets for the sysctl node(s) creation. - Keep sysctl variables under nodes of their relevant secmodels. In other words, don't create duplicates for the suser/securelevel secmodels under the bsd44 secmodel, as the latter is merely used for "grouping". - For the suser and securelevel secmodels, "advertise presence" in relevant sysctl nodes (sysctl.security.models.{suser,securelevel}). - Get rid of the LKM preprocessor stuff. - As secmodels are now modules, there's no need for an explicit call to secmodel_start(); it's handled by the module framework. That said, the module framework was adjusted to properly load secmodels early during system startup. - Adapt rump to changes: Instead of using empty stubs for securelevel, simply use the suser secmodel. Also replace secmodel_start() with a call to secmodel_suser_start(). - 5.99.20. Testing was done on i386 ("release" build). Spearated module_init() changes were tested on sparc and sparc64 as well by martin@ (thanks!). Mailing list reference: http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2009/09/25/msg006135.html
2009-10-02 22:50:12 +04:00
/* Second part of module system initialization. */
module_start_unload_thread();
1994-07-03 15:45:41 +04:00
/* Initialize the file systems. */
#ifdef NVNODE_IMPLICIT
/*
* If maximum number of vnodes in namei vnode cache is not explicitly
* defined in kernel config, adjust the number such as we use roughly
* 10% of memory for vnodes and associated data structures in the
* assumed worst case. Do not provide fewer than NVNODE vnodes.
*/
usevnodes =
calc_cache_size(kernel_map, 10, VNODE_VA_MAXPCT) / VNODE_COST;
if (usevnodes > desiredvnodes)
desiredvnodes = usevnodes;
#endif
1994-07-03 15:45:41 +04:00
vfsinit();
lf_init();
1994-07-03 15:45:41 +04:00
/* Initialize fstrans. */
fstrans_init();
/* Initialize the file descriptor system. */
fd_sys_init();
/* Initialize cwd structures */
cwd_sys_init();
/* Initialize kqueue. */
kqueue_init();
/* Initialize the system monitor subsystems. */
#if NSYSMON_TASKQ > 0
sysmon_task_queue_preinit();
#endif
#if NSYSMON_ENVSYS > 0
sysmon_envsys_init();
#endif
#if NSYSMON_POWER > 0
sysmon_power_init();
#endif
#if NSYSMON_WDOG > 0
sysmon_wdog_init();
#endif
inittimecounter();
ntp_init();
/* Initialize tty subsystem. */
tty_init();
ttyldisc_init();
2008-01-02 14:48:20 +03:00
/* Initialize the buffer cache, part 2. */
bufinit2();
2007-07-21 23:51:47 +04:00
/* Initialize the disk wedge subsystem. */
dkwedge_init();
First step of random number subsystem rework described in <20111022023242.BA26F14A158@mail.netbsd.org>. This change includes the following: An initial cleanup and minor reorganization of the entropy pool code in sys/dev/rnd.c and sys/dev/rndpool.c. Several bugs are fixed. Some effort is made to accumulate entropy more quickly at boot time. A generic interface, "rndsink", is added, for stream generators to request that they be re-keyed with good quality entropy from the pool as soon as it is available. The arc4random()/arc4randbytes() implementation in libkern is adjusted to use the rndsink interface for rekeying, which helps address the problem of low-quality keys at boot time. An implementation of the FIPS 140-2 statistical tests for random number generator quality is provided (libkern/rngtest.c). This is based on Greg Rose's implementation from Qualcomm. A new random stream generator, nist_ctr_drbg, is provided. It is based on an implementation of the NIST SP800-90 CTR_DRBG by Henric Jungheim. This generator users AES in a modified counter mode to generate a backtracking-resistant random stream. An abstraction layer, "cprng", is provided for in-kernel consumers of randomness. The arc4random/arc4randbytes API is deprecated for in-kernel use. It is replaced by "cprng_strong". The current cprng_fast implementation wraps the existing arc4random implementation. The current cprng_strong implementation wraps the new CTR_DRBG implementation. Both interfaces are rekeyed from the entropy pool automatically at intervals justifiable from best current cryptographic practice. In some quick tests, cprng_fast() is about the same speed as the old arc4randbytes(), and cprng_strong() is about 20% faster than rnd_extract_data(). Performance is expected to improve. The AES code in src/crypto/rijndael is no longer an optional kernel component, as it is required by cprng_strong, which is not an optional kernel component. The entropy pool output is subjected to the rngtest tests at startup time; if it fails, the system will reboot. There is approximately a 3/10000 chance of a false positive from these tests. Entropy pool _input_ from hardware random numbers is subjected to the rngtest tests at attach time, as well as the FIPS continuous-output test, to detect bad or stuck hardware RNGs; if any are detected, they are detached, but the system continues to run. A problem with rndctl(8) is fixed -- datastructures with pointers in arrays are no longer passed to userspace (this was not a security problem, but rather a major issue for compat32). A new kernel will require a new rndctl. The sysctl kern.arandom() and kern.urandom() nodes are hooked up to the new generators, but the /dev/*random pseudodevices are not, yet. Manual pages for the new kernel interfaces are forthcoming.
2011-11-20 02:51:18 +04:00
/* Initialize the kernel strong PRNG. */
kern_cprng = cprng_strong_create("kernel", IPL_VM,
CPRNG_INIT_ANY|CPRNG_REKEY_ANY);
/* Initialize interfaces. */
ifinit1();
spldebug_start();
/* Initialize sockets thread(s) */
soinit1();
/* Configure the system hardware. This will enable interrupts. */
configure();
1994-07-03 15:45:41 +04:00
ssp_init();
ubc_init(); /* must be after autoconfig */
mm_init();
configure2();
/* Now timer is working. Enable preemption. */
kpreempt_enable();
1994-07-03 15:45:41 +04:00
#ifdef SYSVSHM
/* Initialize System V style shared memory. */
shminit();
#endif
vmem_rehash_start(); /* must be before exec_init */
/* Initialize exec structures */
exec_init(1); /* seminit calls exithook_establish() */
1994-07-03 15:45:41 +04:00
#ifdef SYSVSEM
/* Initialize System V style semaphores. */
seminit();
#endif
#ifdef SYSVMSG
/* Initialize System V style message queues. */
msginit();
#endif
#if NVERIEXEC > 0
/*
* Initialise the Veriexec subsystem.
*/
veriexec_init();
#endif /* NVERIEXEC > 0 */
2007-12-27 16:34:43 +03:00
#if defined(PAX_MPROTECT) || defined(PAX_SEGVGUARD) || defined(PAX_ASLR)
pax_init();
2007-12-27 16:34:43 +03:00
#endif /* PAX_MPROTECT || PAX_SEGVGUARD || PAX_ASLR */
#ifdef FAST_IPSEC
/* Attach network crypto subsystem */
ipsec_attach();
#endif
1994-07-03 15:45:41 +04:00
/*
* Initialize protocols. Block reception of incoming packets
* until everything is ready.
*/
s = splnet();
1994-07-03 15:45:41 +04:00
ifinit();
domaininit(true);
if_attachdomain();
1994-07-03 15:45:41 +04:00
splx(s);
#ifdef GPROF
/* Initialize kernel profiling. */
kmstartup();
#endif
/* Initialize system accounting. */
acct_init();
#ifndef PIPE_SOCKETPAIR
2007-03-13 00:31:03 +03:00
/* Initialize pipes. */
pipe_init();
#endif
2007-03-13 00:31:03 +03:00
2007-02-10 00:55:00 +03:00
#ifdef KTRACE
/* Initialize ktrace. */
ktrinit();
#endif
#ifdef PTRACE
/* Initialize ptrace. */
ptrace_init();
#endif /* PTRACE */
/* Initialize the UUID system calls. */
uuid_init();
machdep_init();
procinit_sysctl();
/*
* Create process 1 (init(8)). We do this now, as Unix has
* historically had init be process 1, and changing this would
* probably upset a lot of people.
*
* Note that process 1 won't immediately exec init(8), but will
* wait for us to inform it that the root file system has been
* mounted.
*/
2003-01-18 13:06:22 +03:00
if (fork1(l, 0, SIGCHLD, NULL, 0, start_init, NULL, NULL, &initproc))
panic("fork init");
/*
* Load any remaining builtin modules, and hand back temporary
* storage to the VM system. Then require force when loading any
* remaining un-init'ed built-in modules to avoid later surprises.
*/
module_init_class(MODULE_CLASS_ANY);
module_builtin_require_force();
/*
* Finalize configuration now that all real devices have been
* found. This needs to be done before the root device is
* selected, since finalization may create the root device.
*/
config_finalize();
sysctl_finalize();
/*
* Now that autoconfiguration has completed, we can determine
* the root and dump devices.
*/
cpu_rootconf();
cpu_dumpconf();
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/* Mount the root file system. */
do {
domountroothook(root_device);
if ((error = vfs_mountroot())) {
printf("cannot mount root, error = %d\n", error);
boothowto |= RB_ASKNAME;
setroot(root_device,
(rootdev != NODEV) ? DISKPART(rootdev) : 0);
}
} while (error != 0);
mountroothook_destroy();
configure3();
/*
* Initialise the time-of-day clock, passing the time recorded
* in the root filesystem (if any) for use by systems that
* don't have a non-volatile time-of-day device.
*/
inittodr(rootfstime);
/*
* Now can look at time, having had a chance to verify the time
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* from the file system. Reset l->l_rtime as it may have been
* munched in mi_switch() after the time got set.
*/
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getnanotime(&time);
boottime = time;
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#ifdef COMPAT_50
{
struct timeval tv;
TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(&tv, &time);
timeval_to_timeval50(&tv, &boottime50);
}
#endif
mutex_enter(proc_lock);
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LIST_FOREACH(p, &allproc, p_list) {
KASSERT((p->p_flag & PK_MARKER) == 0);
mutex_enter(p->p_lock);
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TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(&p->p_stats->p_start, &time);
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LIST_FOREACH(l, &p->p_lwps, l_sibling) {
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lwp_lock(l);
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memset(&l->l_rtime, 0, sizeof(l->l_rtime));
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lwp_unlock(l);
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}
mutex_exit(p->p_lock);
}
mutex_exit(proc_lock);
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binuptime(&curlwp->l_stime);
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for (CPU_INFO_FOREACH(cii, ci)) {
ci->ci_schedstate.spc_lastmod = time_second;
}
/* Create the pageout daemon kernel thread. */
uvm_swap_init();
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if (kthread_create(PRI_PGDAEMON, KTHREAD_MPSAFE, NULL, uvm_pageout,
NULL, NULL, "pgdaemon"))
panic("fork pagedaemon");
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/* Create the filesystem syncer kernel thread. */
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if (kthread_create(PRI_IOFLUSH, KTHREAD_MPSAFE, NULL, sched_sync,
NULL, NULL, "ioflush"))
panic("fork syncer");
/* Create the aiodone daemon kernel thread. */
if (workqueue_create(&uvm.aiodone_queue, "aiodoned",
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uvm_aiodone_worker, NULL, PRI_VM, IPL_NONE, WQ_MPSAFE))
panic("fork aiodoned");
/*
* Okay, now we can let init(8) exec! It's off to userland!
*/
mutex_enter(proc_lock);
start_init_exec = 1;
cv_broadcast(&lbolt);
mutex_exit(proc_lock);
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/* The scheduler is an infinite loop. */
uvm_scheduler();
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/* NOTREACHED */
}
/*
* Configure the system's hardware.
*/
static void
configure(void)
{
/* Initialize autoconf data structures. */
config_init_mi();
/*
* XXX
* callout_setfunc() requires mutex(9) so it can't be in config_init()
* on amiga and atari which use config_init() and autoconf(9) fucntions
* to initialize console devices.
*/
config_twiddle_init();
pmf_init();
#if NDRVCTL > 0
drvctl_init();
#endif
userconf_init();
if (boothowto & RB_USERCONF)
userconf_prompt();
if ((boothowto & (AB_SILENT|AB_VERBOSE)) == AB_SILENT) {
printf_nolog("Detecting hardware...");
}
/*
* Do the machine-dependent portion of autoconfiguration. This
* sets the configuration machinery here in motion by "finding"
* the root bus. When this function returns, we expect interrupts
* to be enabled.
*/
cpu_configure();
}
static void
configure2(void)
{
CPU_INFO_ITERATOR cii;
struct cpu_info *ci;
int s;
/*
* Now that we've found all the hardware, start the real time
* and statistics clocks.
*/
initclocks();
cold = 0; /* clocks are running, we're warm now! */
s = splsched();
curcpu()->ci_schedstate.spc_flags |= SPCF_RUNNING;
splx(s);
/* Boot the secondary processors. */
for (CPU_INFO_FOREACH(cii, ci)) {
uvm_cpu_attach(ci);
}
mp_online = true;
#if defined(MULTIPROCESSOR)
cpu_boot_secondary_processors();
#endif
/* Setup the runqueues and scheduler. */
runq_init();
synch_init();
/*
* Bus scans can make it appear as if the system has paused, so
* twiddle constantly while config_interrupts() jobs are running.
*/
config_twiddle_fn(NULL);
/*
* Create threads to call back and finish configuration for
* devices that want interrupts enabled.
*/
config_create_interruptthreads();
/* Get the threads going and into any sleeps before continuing. */
yield();
}
static void
configure3(void)
{
/*
* Create threads to call back and finish configuration for
* devices that want the mounted root file system.
*/
config_create_mountrootthreads();
/* Get the threads going and into any sleeps before continuing. */
yield();
}
static void
rootconf_handle_wedges(void)
{
struct partinfo dpart;
struct partition *p;
struct vnode *vp;
daddr_t startblk;
uint64_t nblks;
device_t dev;
int error;
if (booted_nblks) {
/*
* bootloader passed geometry
*/
dev = booted_device;
startblk = booted_startblk;
nblks = booted_nblks;
/*
* keep booted_device and booted_partition
* in case the kernel doesn't identify a wedge
*/
} else {
/*
* bootloader passed partition number
*
* We cannot ask the partition device directly when it is
* covered by a wedge. Instead we look up the geometry in
* the disklabel.
*/
vp = opendisk(booted_device);
if (vp == NULL)
return;
error = VOP_IOCTL(vp, DIOCGPART, &dpart, FREAD, NOCRED);
VOP_CLOSE(vp, FREAD, NOCRED);
vput(vp);
if (error)
return;
KASSERT(booted_partition >= 0
&& booted_partition < MAXPARTITIONS);
p = &dpart.disklab->d_partitions[booted_partition];
dev = booted_device;
startblk = p->p_offset;
nblks = p->p_size;
}
dev = dkwedge_find_partition(dev, startblk, nblks);
if (dev != NULL) {
booted_device = dev;
booted_partition = 0;
}
}
void
rootconf(void)
{
if (booted_device != NULL)
rootconf_handle_wedges();
setroot(booted_device, booted_partition);
}
static void
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check_console(struct lwp *l)
{
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struct vnode *vp;
int error;
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error = namei_simple_kernel("/dev/console",
NSM_FOLLOW_NOEMULROOT, &vp);
if (error == 0)
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vrele(vp);
else if (error == ENOENT)
printf("warning: no /dev/console\n");
else
printf("warning: lookup /dev/console: error %d\n", error);
}
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/*
* List of paths to try when searching for "init".
*/
static const char * const initpaths[] = {
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"/sbin/init",
"/sbin/oinit",
"/sbin/init.bak",
NULL,
};
/*
* Start the initial user process; try exec'ing each pathname in "initpaths".
* The program is invoked with one argument containing the boot flags.
*/
static void
start_init(void *arg)
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{
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struct lwp *l = arg;
struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
vaddr_t addr;
struct sys_execve_args /* {
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syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(char * const *) argp;
syscallarg(char * const *) envp;
} */ args;
int options, i, error;
register_t retval[2];
char flags[4], *flagsp;
const char *path, *slash;
char *ucp, **uap, *arg0, *arg1 = NULL;
char ipath[129];
int ipx, len;
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/*
* Now in process 1.
*/
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strncpy(p->p_comm, "init", MAXCOMLEN);
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/*
* Wait for main() to tell us that it's safe to exec.
*/
mutex_enter(proc_lock);
while (start_init_exec == 0)
cv_wait(&lbolt, proc_lock);
mutex_exit(proc_lock);
/*
* This is not the right way to do this. We really should
* hand-craft a descriptor onto /dev/console to hand to init,
* but that's a _lot_ more work, and the benefit from this easy
* hack makes up for the "good is the enemy of the best" effect.
*/
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check_console(l);
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/*
* Need just enough stack to hold the faked-up "execve()" arguments.
*/
addr = (vaddr_t)STACK_ALLOC(USRSTACK, PAGE_SIZE);
if (uvm_map(&p->p_vmspace->vm_map, &addr, PAGE_SIZE,
NULL, UVM_UNKNOWN_OFFSET, 0,
UVM_MAPFLAG(UVM_PROT_ALL, UVM_PROT_ALL, UVM_INH_COPY,
UVM_ADV_NORMAL,
UVM_FLAG_FIXED|UVM_FLAG_OVERLAY|UVM_FLAG_COPYONW)) != 0)
panic("init: couldn't allocate argument space");
p->p_vmspace->vm_maxsaddr = (void *)STACK_MAX(addr, PAGE_SIZE);
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ipx = 0;
while (1) {
if (boothowto & RB_ASKNAME) {
printf("init path");
if (initpaths[ipx])
printf(" (default %s)", initpaths[ipx]);
printf(": ");
len = cngetsn(ipath, sizeof(ipath)-1);
if (len == 4 && strcmp(ipath, "halt") == 0) {
cpu_reboot(RB_HALT, NULL);
} else if (len == 6 && strcmp(ipath, "reboot") == 0) {
cpu_reboot(0, NULL);
#if defined(DDB)
} else if (len == 3 && strcmp(ipath, "ddb") == 0) {
console_debugger();
continue;
#endif
} else if (len > 0 && ipath[0] == '/') {
ipath[len] = '\0';
path = ipath;
} else if (len == 0 && initpaths[ipx] != NULL) {
path = initpaths[ipx++];
} else {
printf("use absolute path, ");
#if defined(DDB)
printf("\"ddb\", ");
#endif
printf("\"halt\", or \"reboot\"\n");
continue;
}
} else {
if ((path = initpaths[ipx++]) == NULL) {
ipx = 0;
boothowto |= RB_ASKNAME;
continue;
}
}
ucp = (char *)USRSTACK;
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/*
* Construct the boot flag argument.
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*/
flagsp = flags;
*flagsp++ = '-';
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options = 0;
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if (boothowto & RB_SINGLE) {
*flagsp++ = 's';
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options = 1;
}
#ifdef notyet
if (boothowto & RB_FASTBOOT) {
*flagsp++ = 'f';
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options = 1;
}
#endif
/*
* Move out the flags (arg 1), if necessary.
*/
if (options != 0) {
*flagsp++ = '\0';
i = flagsp - flags;
#ifdef DEBUG
aprint_normal("init: copying out flags `%s' %d\n", flags, i);
#endif
arg1 = STACK_ALLOC(ucp, i);
ucp = STACK_MAX(arg1, i);
(void)copyout((void *)flags, arg1, i);
}
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/*
* Move out the file name (also arg 0).
*/
i = strlen(path) + 1;
#ifdef DEBUG
aprint_normal("init: copying out path `%s' %d\n", path, i);
#else
if (boothowto & RB_ASKNAME || path != initpaths[0])
printf("init: trying %s\n", path);
#endif
arg0 = STACK_ALLOC(ucp, i);
ucp = STACK_MAX(arg0, i);
(void)copyout(path, arg0, i);
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/*
* Move out the arg pointers.
*/
ucp = (void *)STACK_ALIGN(ucp, STACK_ALIGNBYTES);
uap = (char **)STACK_ALLOC(ucp, sizeof(char *) * 3);
SCARG(&args, path) = arg0;
SCARG(&args, argp) = uap;
SCARG(&args, envp) = NULL;
slash = strrchr(path, '/');
if (slash)
(void)suword((void *)uap++,
(long)arg0 + (slash + 1 - path));
else
(void)suword((void *)uap++, (long)arg0);
if (options != 0)
(void)suword((void *)uap++, (long)arg1);
(void)suword((void *)uap++, 0); /* terminator */
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/*
* Now try to exec the program. If can't for any reason
* other than it doesn't exist, complain.
*/
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error = sys_execve(l, &args, retval);
if (error == 0 || error == EJUSTRETURN) {
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KERNEL_UNLOCK_LAST(l);
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return;
}
printf("exec %s: error %d\n", path, error);
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}
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printf("init: not found\n");
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panic("no init");
}
/*
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* calculate cache size (in bytes) from physmem and vm_map size.
*/
vaddr_t
calc_cache_size(struct vm_map *map, int pct, int va_pct)
{
paddr_t t;
/* XXX should consider competing cache if any */
/* XXX should consider submaps */
t = (uintmax_t)physmem * pct / 100 * PAGE_SIZE;
if (map != NULL) {
vsize_t vsize;
vsize = vm_map_max(map) - vm_map_min(map);
vsize = (uintmax_t)vsize * va_pct / 100;
if (t > vsize) {
t = vsize;
}
}
return t;
}
/*
* Print the system start up banner.
*
* - Print a limited banner if AB_SILENT.
* - Always send normal banner to the log.
*/
#define MEM_PBUFSIZE sizeof("99999 MB")
void
banner(void)
{
static char notice[] = " Notice: this software is "
"protected by copyright";
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char pbuf[81];
void (*pr)(const char *, ...);
int i;
if ((boothowto & AB_SILENT) != 0) {
snprintf(pbuf, sizeof(pbuf), "%s %s (%s)",
ostype, osrelease, kernel_ident);
printf_nolog("%s", pbuf);
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for (i = 80 - strlen(pbuf) - sizeof(notice); i > 0; i--)
printf(" ");
printf_nolog("%s\n", notice);
pr = aprint_normal;
} else {
pr = printf;
}
memset(pbuf, 0, sizeof(pbuf));
(*pr)("%s%s", copyright, version);
format_bytes(pbuf, MEM_PBUFSIZE, ctob((uint64_t)physmem));
(*pr)("total memory = %s\n", pbuf);
format_bytes(pbuf, MEM_PBUFSIZE, ctob((uint64_t)uvmexp.free));
(*pr)("avail memory = %s\n", pbuf);
}