2012-03-13 22:40:26 +04:00
|
|
|
/* $NetBSD: in6.c,v 1.160 2012/03/13 18:40:59 elad Exp $ */
|
2001-07-18 17:12:27 +04:00
|
|
|
/* $KAME: in6.c,v 1.198 2001/07/18 09:12:38 itojun Exp $ */
|
1999-07-04 01:24:45 +04:00
|
|
|
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project.
|
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|
|
* All rights reserved.
|
2000-02-24 15:43:49 +03:00
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|
*
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
|
|
* are met:
|
|
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
|
|
* 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
|
|
|
|
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
|
|
|
|
* without specific prior written permission.
|
2000-02-24 15:43:49 +03:00
|
|
|
*
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
|
|
|
|
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
|
|
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
|
|
|
|
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
|
|
|
|
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
|
|
|
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
|
|
|
|
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
|
|
|
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
|
|
|
|
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
|
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|
|
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
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|
|
* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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/*
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|
|
|
* Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1991, 1993
|
|
|
|
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
|
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|
*
|
|
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
|
|
* are met:
|
|
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
2003-08-07 20:26:28 +04:00
|
|
|
* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
|
|
|
|
* without specific prior written permission.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
|
|
|
|
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
|
|
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
|
|
|
|
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
|
|
|
|
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
|
|
|
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
|
|
|
|
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
|
|
|
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
|
|
|
|
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
|
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|
|
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
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|
* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* @(#)in.c 8.2 (Berkeley) 11/15/93
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*/
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|
2001-11-13 03:56:55 +03:00
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|
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
|
2012-03-13 22:40:26 +04:00
|
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|
__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: in6.c,v 1.160 2012/03/13 18:40:59 elad Exp $");
|
2001-11-13 03:56:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
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|
#include "opt_inet.h"
|
2004-07-26 17:44:35 +04:00
|
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|
#include "opt_pfil_hooks.h"
|
2009-01-15 21:20:48 +03:00
|
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|
#include "opt_compat_netbsd.h"
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
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|
#include <sys/param.h>
|
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|
|
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/errno.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/malloc.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/socket.h>
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|
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
|
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|
#include <sys/sockio.h>
|
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|
|
#include <sys/systm.h>
|
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|
#include <sys/proc.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/time.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/kernel.h>
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/syslog.h>
|
2006-05-15 01:19:33 +04:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/kauth.h>
|
First step of random number subsystem rework described in
<20111022023242.BA26F14A158@mail.netbsd.org>. This change includes
the following:
An initial cleanup and minor reorganization of the entropy pool
code in sys/dev/rnd.c and sys/dev/rndpool.c. Several bugs are
fixed. Some effort is made to accumulate entropy more quickly at
boot time.
A generic interface, "rndsink", is added, for stream generators to
request that they be re-keyed with good quality entropy from the pool
as soon as it is available.
The arc4random()/arc4randbytes() implementation in libkern is
adjusted to use the rndsink interface for rekeying, which helps
address the problem of low-quality keys at boot time.
An implementation of the FIPS 140-2 statistical tests for random
number generator quality is provided (libkern/rngtest.c). This
is based on Greg Rose's implementation from Qualcomm.
A new random stream generator, nist_ctr_drbg, is provided. It is
based on an implementation of the NIST SP800-90 CTR_DRBG by
Henric Jungheim. This generator users AES in a modified counter
mode to generate a backtracking-resistant random stream.
An abstraction layer, "cprng", is provided for in-kernel consumers
of randomness. The arc4random/arc4randbytes API is deprecated for
in-kernel use. It is replaced by "cprng_strong". The current
cprng_fast implementation wraps the existing arc4random
implementation. The current cprng_strong implementation wraps the
new CTR_DRBG implementation. Both interfaces are rekeyed from
the entropy pool automatically at intervals justifiable from best
current cryptographic practice.
In some quick tests, cprng_fast() is about the same speed as
the old arc4randbytes(), and cprng_strong() is about 20% faster
than rnd_extract_data(). Performance is expected to improve.
The AES code in src/crypto/rijndael is no longer an optional
kernel component, as it is required by cprng_strong, which is
not an optional kernel component.
The entropy pool output is subjected to the rngtest tests at
startup time; if it fails, the system will reboot. There is
approximately a 3/10000 chance of a false positive from these
tests. Entropy pool _input_ from hardware random numbers is
subjected to the rngtest tests at attach time, as well as the
FIPS continuous-output test, to detect bad or stuck hardware
RNGs; if any are detected, they are detached, but the system
continues to run.
A problem with rndctl(8) is fixed -- datastructures with
pointers in arrays are no longer passed to userspace (this
was not a security problem, but rather a major issue for
compat32). A new kernel will require a new rndctl.
The sysctl kern.arandom() and kern.urandom() nodes are hooked
up to the new generators, but the /dev/*random pseudodevices
are not, yet.
Manual pages for the new kernel interfaces are forthcoming.
2011-11-20 02:51:18 +04:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/cprng.h>
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <net/if.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <net/if_types.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <net/route.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <net/if_dl.h>
|
|
|
|
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|
|
|
#include <netinet/in.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <netinet/in_var.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <net/if_ether.h>
|
|
|
|
|
2000-02-06 15:49:37 +03:00
|
|
|
#include <netinet/ip6.h>
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>
|
2001-07-18 17:12:27 +04:00
|
|
|
#include <netinet6/nd6.h>
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
#include <netinet6/mld6_var.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <netinet6/ip6_mroute.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <netinet6/in6_ifattach.h>
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
#include <netinet6/scope6_var.h>
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
#include <net/net_osdep.h>
|
|
|
|
|
2004-07-26 17:44:35 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef PFIL_HOOKS
|
|
|
|
#include <net/pfil.h>
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2009-01-15 21:20:48 +03:00
|
|
|
#ifdef COMPAT_50
|
|
|
|
#include <compat/netinet6/in6_var.h>
|
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|
#endif
|
2004-07-26 17:44:35 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2003-02-01 09:23:35 +03:00
|
|
|
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_IP6OPT, "ip6_options", "IPv6 options");
|
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|
2000-02-25 08:13:05 +03:00
|
|
|
/* enable backward compatibility code for obsoleted ioctls */
|
|
|
|
#define COMPAT_IN6IFIOCTL
|
|
|
|
|
Synchronize access to the ifaddr list by in6_update_ifa() and
in6_control() with splnet()/splx(). I was being a bit paranoid
here. Following a cursory analysis of the code, this still looked
necessary. We don't spend a lot of time in these calls, so it
should not be too harmful to suspend network interrupts.
In in6_unlink_ifa(), call in6_delmulti() just once on each multicast
address (in6_multi). Previously, in6_unlink_ifa() called in6_delmulti()
on each in6_multi until in6_delmulti() removed the in6_multi from
the list and freed its memory. That's not justified: the multicast
list holds *one* reference. All other references belong to other
entities. We must wait to free the memory until the other entities
release their references, to protect against dereferencing a freed
in6_multi.
XXX I need to revisit in6_delmulti(), in6_unlink_ifa(), and friends,
XXX to pry apart the conditions where an in6_multi is removed from
XXX its list and where it is freed. Following my change, above,
XXX we still risk dereferencing a freed in6_multi.
Prevent in6_update_ifa() and in6_addremloop() from creating dangling
pointers to interfaces in the routing table. Previously, my NetBSD
tunnel concentrator, which adds and deletes a lot of P2P interfaces
with the same local address, crashed in 8 hours or less when it
dereferenced a dangling pointer to a deleted ifnet. Now, its uptime
is greater than 3 days.
2006-12-02 23:40:58 +03:00
|
|
|
#ifdef IN6_DEBUG
|
|
|
|
#define IN6_DPRINTF(__fmt, ...) printf(__fmt, __VA_ARGS__)
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
#define IN6_DPRINTF(__fmt, ...) do { } while (/*CONSTCOND*/0)
|
|
|
|
#endif /* IN6_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2003-05-14 16:45:06 +04:00
|
|
|
* Definitions of some constant IP6 addresses.
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
const struct in6_addr in6addr_any = IN6ADDR_ANY_INIT;
|
|
|
|
const struct in6_addr in6addr_loopback = IN6ADDR_LOOPBACK_INIT;
|
|
|
|
const struct in6_addr in6addr_nodelocal_allnodes =
|
|
|
|
IN6ADDR_NODELOCAL_ALLNODES_INIT;
|
|
|
|
const struct in6_addr in6addr_linklocal_allnodes =
|
|
|
|
IN6ADDR_LINKLOCAL_ALLNODES_INIT;
|
|
|
|
const struct in6_addr in6addr_linklocal_allrouters =
|
|
|
|
IN6ADDR_LINKLOCAL_ALLROUTERS_INIT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const struct in6_addr in6mask0 = IN6MASK0;
|
|
|
|
const struct in6_addr in6mask32 = IN6MASK32;
|
|
|
|
const struct in6_addr in6mask64 = IN6MASK64;
|
|
|
|
const struct in6_addr in6mask96 = IN6MASK96;
|
|
|
|
const struct in6_addr in6mask128 = IN6MASK128;
|
|
|
|
|
2001-02-11 09:49:49 +03:00
|
|
|
const struct sockaddr_in6 sa6_any = {sizeof(sa6_any), AF_INET6,
|
|
|
|
0, 0, IN6ADDR_ANY_INIT, 0};
|
|
|
|
|
2007-03-04 08:59:00 +03:00
|
|
|
static int in6_lifaddr_ioctl(struct socket *, u_long, void *,
|
2006-11-18 19:23:15 +03:00
|
|
|
struct ifnet *, struct lwp *);
|
|
|
|
static int in6_ifinit(struct ifnet *, struct in6_ifaddr *,
|
2009-02-06 01:32:24 +03:00
|
|
|
const struct sockaddr_in6 *, int);
|
2006-11-18 19:23:15 +03:00
|
|
|
static void in6_unlink_ifa(struct in6_ifaddr *, struct ifnet *);
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Subroutine for in6_ifaddloop() and in6_ifremloop().
|
|
|
|
* This routine does actual work.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
in6_ifloop_request(int cmd, struct ifaddr *ifa)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in6 lo_sa;
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in6 all1_sa;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
struct rtentry *nrt = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int e;
|
2002-06-09 18:43:10 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2007-11-10 03:05:57 +03:00
|
|
|
sockaddr_in6_init(&all1_sa, &in6mask128, 0, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
sockaddr_in6_init(&lo_sa, &in6addr_loopback, 0, 0, 0);
|
2002-06-09 18:43:10 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2000-07-13 13:56:20 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
* We specify the address itself as the gateway, and set the
|
|
|
|
* RTF_LLINFO flag, so that the corresponding host route would have
|
|
|
|
* the flag, and thus applications that assume traditional behavior
|
|
|
|
* would be happy. Note that we assume the caller of the function
|
|
|
|
* (probably implicitly) set nd6_rtrequest() to ifa->ifa_rtrequest,
|
|
|
|
* which changes the outgoing interface to the loopback interface.
|
2000-07-13 13:56:20 +04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
e = rtrequest(cmd, ifa->ifa_addr, ifa->ifa_addr,
|
|
|
|
(struct sockaddr *)&all1_sa, RTF_UP|RTF_HOST|RTF_LLINFO, &nrt);
|
|
|
|
if (e != 0) {
|
|
|
|
log(LOG_ERR, "in6_ifloop_request: "
|
|
|
|
"%s operation failed for %s (errno=%d)\n",
|
|
|
|
cmd == RTM_ADD ? "ADD" : "DELETE",
|
|
|
|
ip6_sprintf(&((struct in6_ifaddr *)ifa)->ia_addr.sin6_addr),
|
|
|
|
e);
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Make sure rt_ifa be equal to IFA, the second argument of the
|
|
|
|
* function.
|
2001-02-10 07:14:26 +03:00
|
|
|
* We need this because when we refer to rt_ifa->ia6_flags in
|
|
|
|
* ip6_input, we assume that the rt_ifa points to the address instead
|
|
|
|
* of the loopback address.
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-11-13 08:13:38 +03:00
|
|
|
if (cmd == RTM_ADD && nrt && ifa != nrt->rt_ifa)
|
|
|
|
rt_replace_ifa(nrt, ifa);
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Report the addition/removal of the address to the routing socket.
|
|
|
|
* XXX: since we called rtinit for a p2p interface with a destination,
|
|
|
|
* we end up reporting twice in such a case. Should we rather
|
|
|
|
* omit the second report?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (nrt) {
|
|
|
|
rt_newaddrmsg(cmd, ifa, e, nrt);
|
|
|
|
if (cmd == RTM_DELETE) {
|
|
|
|
if (nrt->rt_refcnt <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: we should free the entry ourselves. */
|
|
|
|
nrt->rt_refcnt++;
|
|
|
|
rtfree(nrt);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* the cmd must be RTM_ADD here */
|
|
|
|
nrt->rt_refcnt--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
* Add ownaddr as loopback rtentry. We previously add the route only if
|
|
|
|
* necessary (ex. on a p2p link). However, since we now manage addresses
|
|
|
|
* separately from prefixes, we should always add the route. We can't
|
|
|
|
* rely on the cloning mechanism from the corresponding interface route
|
|
|
|
* any more.
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-05-18 13:05:49 +04:00
|
|
|
void
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
in6_ifaddloop(struct ifaddr *ifa)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
struct rtentry *rt;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If there is no loopback entry, allocate one. */
|
|
|
|
rt = rtalloc1(ifa->ifa_addr, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (rt == NULL || (rt->rt_flags & RTF_HOST) == 0 ||
|
|
|
|
(rt->rt_ifp->if_flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) == 0)
|
|
|
|
in6_ifloop_request(RTM_ADD, ifa);
|
2007-03-16 02:22:30 +03:00
|
|
|
if (rt != NULL)
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
rt->rt_refcnt--;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Remove loopback rtentry of ownaddr generated by in6_ifaddloop(),
|
|
|
|
* if it exists.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-05-18 13:05:49 +04:00
|
|
|
void
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
in6_ifremloop(struct ifaddr *ifa)
|
|
|
|
{
|
Synchronize access to the ifaddr list by in6_update_ifa() and
in6_control() with splnet()/splx(). I was being a bit paranoid
here. Following a cursory analysis of the code, this still looked
necessary. We don't spend a lot of time in these calls, so it
should not be too harmful to suspend network interrupts.
In in6_unlink_ifa(), call in6_delmulti() just once on each multicast
address (in6_multi). Previously, in6_unlink_ifa() called in6_delmulti()
on each in6_multi until in6_delmulti() removed the in6_multi from
the list and freed its memory. That's not justified: the multicast
list holds *one* reference. All other references belong to other
entities. We must wait to free the memory until the other entities
release their references, to protect against dereferencing a freed
in6_multi.
XXX I need to revisit in6_delmulti(), in6_unlink_ifa(), and friends,
XXX to pry apart the conditions where an in6_multi is removed from
XXX its list and where it is freed. Following my change, above,
XXX we still risk dereferencing a freed in6_multi.
Prevent in6_update_ifa() and in6_addremloop() from creating dangling
pointers to interfaces in the routing table. Previously, my NetBSD
tunnel concentrator, which adds and deletes a lot of P2P interfaces
with the same local address, crashed in 8 hours or less when it
dereferenced a dangling pointer to a deleted ifnet. Now, its uptime
is greater than 3 days.
2006-12-02 23:40:58 +03:00
|
|
|
struct in6_ifaddr *alt_ia = NULL, *ia;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
struct rtentry *rt;
|
|
|
|
int ia_count = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Some of BSD variants do not remove cloned routes
|
|
|
|
* from an interface direct route, when removing the direct route
|
|
|
|
* (see comments in net/net_osdep.h). Even for variants that do remove
|
|
|
|
* cloned routes, they could fail to remove the cloned routes when
|
|
|
|
* we handle multple addresses that share a common prefix.
|
|
|
|
* So, we should remove the route corresponding to the deleted address.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
Synchronize access to the ifaddr list by in6_update_ifa() and
in6_control() with splnet()/splx(). I was being a bit paranoid
here. Following a cursory analysis of the code, this still looked
necessary. We don't spend a lot of time in these calls, so it
should not be too harmful to suspend network interrupts.
In in6_unlink_ifa(), call in6_delmulti() just once on each multicast
address (in6_multi). Previously, in6_unlink_ifa() called in6_delmulti()
on each in6_multi until in6_delmulti() removed the in6_multi from
the list and freed its memory. That's not justified: the multicast
list holds *one* reference. All other references belong to other
entities. We must wait to free the memory until the other entities
release their references, to protect against dereferencing a freed
in6_multi.
XXX I need to revisit in6_delmulti(), in6_unlink_ifa(), and friends,
XXX to pry apart the conditions where an in6_multi is removed from
XXX its list and where it is freed. Following my change, above,
XXX we still risk dereferencing a freed in6_multi.
Prevent in6_update_ifa() and in6_addremloop() from creating dangling
pointers to interfaces in the routing table. Previously, my NetBSD
tunnel concentrator, which adds and deletes a lot of P2P interfaces
with the same local address, crashed in 8 hours or less when it
dereferenced a dangling pointer to a deleted ifnet. Now, its uptime
is greater than 3 days.
2006-12-02 23:40:58 +03:00
|
|
|
* Delete the entry only if exactly one ifaddr matches the
|
|
|
|
* address, ifa->ifa_addr.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If more than one ifaddr matches, replace the ifaddr in
|
|
|
|
* the routing table, rt_ifa, with a different ifaddr than
|
|
|
|
* the one we are purging, ifa. It is important to do
|
|
|
|
* this, or else the routing table can accumulate dangling
|
|
|
|
* pointers rt->rt_ifa->ifa_ifp to destroyed interfaces,
|
|
|
|
* which will lead to crashes, later. (More than one ifaddr
|
|
|
|
* can match if we assign the same address to multiple---probably
|
|
|
|
* p2p---interfaces.)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* XXX An old comment at this place said, "we should avoid
|
|
|
|
* XXX such a configuration [i.e., interfaces with the same
|
|
|
|
* XXX addressed assigned --ed.] in IPv6...". I do not
|
|
|
|
* XXX agree, especially now that I have fixed the dangling
|
|
|
|
* XXX ifp-pointers bug.
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
for (ia = in6_ifaddr; ia; ia = ia->ia_next) {
|
Synchronize access to the ifaddr list by in6_update_ifa() and
in6_control() with splnet()/splx(). I was being a bit paranoid
here. Following a cursory analysis of the code, this still looked
necessary. We don't spend a lot of time in these calls, so it
should not be too harmful to suspend network interrupts.
In in6_unlink_ifa(), call in6_delmulti() just once on each multicast
address (in6_multi). Previously, in6_unlink_ifa() called in6_delmulti()
on each in6_multi until in6_delmulti() removed the in6_multi from
the list and freed its memory. That's not justified: the multicast
list holds *one* reference. All other references belong to other
entities. We must wait to free the memory until the other entities
release their references, to protect against dereferencing a freed
in6_multi.
XXX I need to revisit in6_delmulti(), in6_unlink_ifa(), and friends,
XXX to pry apart the conditions where an in6_multi is removed from
XXX its list and where it is freed. Following my change, above,
XXX we still risk dereferencing a freed in6_multi.
Prevent in6_update_ifa() and in6_addremloop() from creating dangling
pointers to interfaces in the routing table. Previously, my NetBSD
tunnel concentrator, which adds and deletes a lot of P2P interfaces
with the same local address, crashed in 8 hours or less when it
dereferenced a dangling pointer to a deleted ifnet. Now, its uptime
is greater than 3 days.
2006-12-02 23:40:58 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(IFA_IN6(ifa), &ia->ia_addr.sin6_addr))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (ia->ia_ifp != ifa->ifa_ifp)
|
|
|
|
alt_ia = ia;
|
|
|
|
if (++ia_count > 1 && alt_ia != NULL)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Synchronize access to the ifaddr list by in6_update_ifa() and
in6_control() with splnet()/splx(). I was being a bit paranoid
here. Following a cursory analysis of the code, this still looked
necessary. We don't spend a lot of time in these calls, so it
should not be too harmful to suspend network interrupts.
In in6_unlink_ifa(), call in6_delmulti() just once on each multicast
address (in6_multi). Previously, in6_unlink_ifa() called in6_delmulti()
on each in6_multi until in6_delmulti() removed the in6_multi from
the list and freed its memory. That's not justified: the multicast
list holds *one* reference. All other references belong to other
entities. We must wait to free the memory until the other entities
release their references, to protect against dereferencing a freed
in6_multi.
XXX I need to revisit in6_delmulti(), in6_unlink_ifa(), and friends,
XXX to pry apart the conditions where an in6_multi is removed from
XXX its list and where it is freed. Following my change, above,
XXX we still risk dereferencing a freed in6_multi.
Prevent in6_update_ifa() and in6_addremloop() from creating dangling
pointers to interfaces in the routing table. Previously, my NetBSD
tunnel concentrator, which adds and deletes a lot of P2P interfaces
with the same local address, crashed in 8 hours or less when it
dereferenced a dangling pointer to a deleted ifnet. Now, its uptime
is greater than 3 days.
2006-12-02 23:40:58 +03:00
|
|
|
if (ia_count == 0)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((rt = rtalloc1(ifa->ifa_addr, 0)) == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
rt->rt_refcnt--;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Before deleting, check if a corresponding loopbacked
|
|
|
|
* host route surely exists. With this check, we can avoid
|
|
|
|
* deleting an interface direct route whose destination is
|
|
|
|
* the same as the address being removed. This can happen
|
|
|
|
* when removing a subnet-router anycast address on an
|
|
|
|
* interface attached to a shared medium.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((rt->rt_flags & RTF_HOST) == 0 ||
|
|
|
|
(rt->rt_ifp->if_flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) == 0)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If we cannot replace the route's ifaddr with the equivalent
|
|
|
|
* ifaddr of another interface, I believe it is safest to
|
|
|
|
* delete the route.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (ia_count == 1 || alt_ia == NULL)
|
|
|
|
in6_ifloop_request(RTM_DELETE, ifa);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
rt_replace_ifa(rt, &alt_ia->ia_ifa);
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
2007-05-23 21:14:59 +04:00
|
|
|
in6_mask2len(struct in6_addr *mask, u_char *lim0)
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
int x = 0, y;
|
|
|
|
u_char *lim = lim0, *p;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* ignore the scope_id part */
|
|
|
|
if (lim0 == NULL || lim0 - (u_char *)mask > sizeof(*mask))
|
|
|
|
lim = (u_char *)mask + sizeof(*mask);
|
|
|
|
for (p = (u_char *)mask; p < lim; x++, p++) {
|
|
|
|
if (*p != 0xff)
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
y = 0;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
if (p < lim) {
|
2006-12-02 21:59:17 +03:00
|
|
|
for (y = 0; y < NBBY; y++) {
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
if ((*p & (0x80 >> y)) == 0)
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* when the limit pointer is given, do a stricter check on the
|
|
|
|
* remaining bits.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (p < lim) {
|
|
|
|
if (y != 0 && (*p & (0x00ff >> y)) != 0)
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
for (p = p + 1; p < lim; p++)
|
|
|
|
if (*p != 0)
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-09 18:43:10 +04:00
|
|
|
|
Synchronize access to the ifaddr list by in6_update_ifa() and
in6_control() with splnet()/splx(). I was being a bit paranoid
here. Following a cursory analysis of the code, this still looked
necessary. We don't spend a lot of time in these calls, so it
should not be too harmful to suspend network interrupts.
In in6_unlink_ifa(), call in6_delmulti() just once on each multicast
address (in6_multi). Previously, in6_unlink_ifa() called in6_delmulti()
on each in6_multi until in6_delmulti() removed the in6_multi from
the list and freed its memory. That's not justified: the multicast
list holds *one* reference. All other references belong to other
entities. We must wait to free the memory until the other entities
release their references, to protect against dereferencing a freed
in6_multi.
XXX I need to revisit in6_delmulti(), in6_unlink_ifa(), and friends,
XXX to pry apart the conditions where an in6_multi is removed from
XXX its list and where it is freed. Following my change, above,
XXX we still risk dereferencing a freed in6_multi.
Prevent in6_update_ifa() and in6_addremloop() from creating dangling
pointers to interfaces in the routing table. Previously, my NetBSD
tunnel concentrator, which adds and deletes a lot of P2P interfaces
with the same local address, crashed in 8 hours or less when it
dereferenced a dangling pointer to a deleted ifnet. Now, its uptime
is greater than 3 days.
2006-12-02 23:40:58 +03:00
|
|
|
return x * NBBY + y;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define ifa2ia6(ifa) ((struct in6_ifaddr *)(ifa))
|
2000-02-24 15:59:12 +03:00
|
|
|
#define ia62ifa(ia6) (&((ia6)->ia_ifa))
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
Synchronize access to the ifaddr list by in6_update_ifa() and
in6_control() with splnet()/splx(). I was being a bit paranoid
here. Following a cursory analysis of the code, this still looked
necessary. We don't spend a lot of time in these calls, so it
should not be too harmful to suspend network interrupts.
In in6_unlink_ifa(), call in6_delmulti() just once on each multicast
address (in6_multi). Previously, in6_unlink_ifa() called in6_delmulti()
on each in6_multi until in6_delmulti() removed the in6_multi from
the list and freed its memory. That's not justified: the multicast
list holds *one* reference. All other references belong to other
entities. We must wait to free the memory until the other entities
release their references, to protect against dereferencing a freed
in6_multi.
XXX I need to revisit in6_delmulti(), in6_unlink_ifa(), and friends,
XXX to pry apart the conditions where an in6_multi is removed from
XXX its list and where it is freed. Following my change, above,
XXX we still risk dereferencing a freed in6_multi.
Prevent in6_update_ifa() and in6_addremloop() from creating dangling
pointers to interfaces in the routing table. Previously, my NetBSD
tunnel concentrator, which adds and deletes a lot of P2P interfaces
with the same local address, crashed in 8 hours or less when it
dereferenced a dangling pointer to a deleted ifnet. Now, its uptime
is greater than 3 days.
2006-12-02 23:40:58 +03:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2007-03-04 08:59:00 +03:00
|
|
|
in6_control1(struct socket *so, u_long cmd, void *data, struct ifnet *ifp,
|
Make ifconfig(8) set and display preference numbers for IPv6
addresses. Make the kernel support SIOC[SG]IFADDRPREF for IPv6
interface addresses.
In in6ifa_ifpforlinklocal(), consult preference numbers before
making an otherwise arbitrary choice of in6_ifaddr. Otherwise,
preference numbers are *not* consulted by the kernel, but that will
be rather easy for somebody with a little bit of free time to fix.
Please note that setting the preference number for a link-local
IPv6 address does not work right, yet, but that ought to be fixed
soon.
In support of the changes above,
1 Add a method to struct domain for "externalizing" a sockaddr, and
provide an implementation for IPv6. Expect more work in this area: it
may be more proper to say that the IPv6 implementation "internalizes"
a sockaddr. Add sockaddr_externalize().
2 Add a subroutine, sofamily(), that returns a struct socket's address
family or AF_UNSPEC.
3 Make a lot of IPv4-specific code generic, and move it from
sys/netinet/ to sys/net/ for re-use by IPv6 parts of the kernel and
ifconfig(8).
2009-09-12 02:06:29 +04:00
|
|
|
lwp_t *l)
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct in6_ifreq *ifr = (struct in6_ifreq *)data;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
struct in6_ifaddr *ia = NULL;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
struct in6_aliasreq *ifra = (struct in6_aliasreq *)data;
|
2002-06-07 08:03:53 +04:00
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
|
Synchronize access to the ifaddr list by in6_update_ifa() and
in6_control() with splnet()/splx(). I was being a bit paranoid
here. Following a cursory analysis of the code, this still looked
necessary. We don't spend a lot of time in these calls, so it
should not be too harmful to suspend network interrupts.
In in6_unlink_ifa(), call in6_delmulti() just once on each multicast
address (in6_multi). Previously, in6_unlink_ifa() called in6_delmulti()
on each in6_multi until in6_delmulti() removed the in6_multi from
the list and freed its memory. That's not justified: the multicast
list holds *one* reference. All other references belong to other
entities. We must wait to free the memory until the other entities
release their references, to protect against dereferencing a freed
in6_multi.
XXX I need to revisit in6_delmulti(), in6_unlink_ifa(), and friends,
XXX to pry apart the conditions where an in6_multi is removed from
XXX its list and where it is freed. Following my change, above,
XXX we still risk dereferencing a freed in6_multi.
Prevent in6_update_ifa() and in6_addremloop() from creating dangling
pointers to interfaces in the routing table. Previously, my NetBSD
tunnel concentrator, which adds and deletes a lot of P2P interfaces
with the same local address, crashed in 8 hours or less when it
dereferenced a dangling pointer to a deleted ifnet. Now, its uptime
is greater than 3 days.
2006-12-02 23:40:58 +03:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
Make ifconfig(8) set and display preference numbers for IPv6
addresses. Make the kernel support SIOC[SG]IFADDRPREF for IPv6
interface addresses.
In in6ifa_ifpforlinklocal(), consult preference numbers before
making an otherwise arbitrary choice of in6_ifaddr. Otherwise,
preference numbers are *not* consulted by the kernel, but that will
be rather easy for somebody with a little bit of free time to fix.
Please note that setting the preference number for a link-local
IPv6 address does not work right, yet, but that ought to be fixed
soon.
In support of the changes above,
1 Add a method to struct domain for "externalizing" a sockaddr, and
provide an implementation for IPv6. Expect more work in this area: it
may be more proper to say that the IPv6 implementation "internalizes"
a sockaddr. Add sockaddr_externalize().
2 Add a subroutine, sofamily(), that returns a struct socket's address
family or AF_UNSPEC.
3 Make a lot of IPv4-specific code generic, and move it from
sys/netinet/ to sys/net/ for re-use by IPv6 parts of the kernel and
ifconfig(8).
2009-09-12 02:06:29 +04:00
|
|
|
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
switch (cmd) {
|
This is ugly, but it is the simplest fix to avoid calling in the default
case:
<driver>_ioctl(ifp, SIOCSIFADDR, struct ifreq *)
where it should be calling:
<driver>_ioctl(ifp, SIOCSIFADDR, struct ifaddr *)
and "Bad Things Happen (TM)"
Returning an error is good enough because none of the drivers handle INET6.
The problem here is that handling SIOCSIFADDR is a kludge. The ioctl gets
passed a struct ifreq * from userland, but then in the control routines
SIOCSIFADDR is handled "specially", and we call:
ifp->if_ioctl(ifp, SIOCSIFADDR, struct ifaddr *)
directly with the ifaddr we computed for that interface. It would be nice
if we called the ioctl routine if the original struct ifreq, and computed
the ifaddr, or passed it directly. This way all the ioctls would be treated
the same way, and we would not have the problem of pointer overloading.
2006-06-03 05:04:29 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2006-06-03 05:32:52 +04:00
|
|
|
* XXX: Fix me, once we fix SIOCSIFADDR, SIOCIFDSTADDR, etc.
|
This is ugly, but it is the simplest fix to avoid calling in the default
case:
<driver>_ioctl(ifp, SIOCSIFADDR, struct ifreq *)
where it should be calling:
<driver>_ioctl(ifp, SIOCSIFADDR, struct ifaddr *)
and "Bad Things Happen (TM)"
Returning an error is good enough because none of the drivers handle INET6.
The problem here is that handling SIOCSIFADDR is a kludge. The ioctl gets
passed a struct ifreq * from userland, but then in the control routines
SIOCSIFADDR is handled "specially", and we call:
ifp->if_ioctl(ifp, SIOCSIFADDR, struct ifaddr *)
directly with the ifaddr we computed for that interface. It would be nice
if we called the ioctl routine if the original struct ifreq, and computed
the ifaddr, or passed it directly. This way all the ioctls would be treated
the same way, and we would not have the problem of pointer overloading.
2006-06-03 05:04:29 +04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
case SIOCSIFADDR:
|
2006-06-03 05:32:52 +04:00
|
|
|
case SIOCSIFDSTADDR:
|
2007-05-27 20:58:17 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef SIOCSIFCONF_X25
|
2006-06-03 05:43:47 +04:00
|
|
|
case SIOCSIFCONF_X25:
|
2006-08-25 22:29:17 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
This is ugly, but it is the simplest fix to avoid calling in the default
case:
<driver>_ioctl(ifp, SIOCSIFADDR, struct ifreq *)
where it should be calling:
<driver>_ioctl(ifp, SIOCSIFADDR, struct ifaddr *)
and "Bad Things Happen (TM)"
Returning an error is good enough because none of the drivers handle INET6.
The problem here is that handling SIOCSIFADDR is a kludge. The ioctl gets
passed a struct ifreq * from userland, but then in the control routines
SIOCSIFADDR is handled "specially", and we call:
ifp->if_ioctl(ifp, SIOCSIFADDR, struct ifaddr *)
directly with the ifaddr we computed for that interface. It would be nice
if we called the ioctl routine if the original struct ifreq, and computed
the ifaddr, or passed it directly. This way all the ioctls would be treated
the same way, and we would not have the problem of pointer overloading.
2006-06-03 05:04:29 +04:00
|
|
|
return EOPNOTSUPP;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
case SIOCGETSGCNT_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCGETMIFCNT_IN6:
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return mrt6_ioctl(cmd, data);
|
Make ifconfig(8) set and display preference numbers for IPv6
addresses. Make the kernel support SIOC[SG]IFADDRPREF for IPv6
interface addresses.
In in6ifa_ifpforlinklocal(), consult preference numbers before
making an otherwise arbitrary choice of in6_ifaddr. Otherwise,
preference numbers are *not* consulted by the kernel, but that will
be rather easy for somebody with a little bit of free time to fix.
Please note that setting the preference number for a link-local
IPv6 address does not work right, yet, but that ought to be fixed
soon.
In support of the changes above,
1 Add a method to struct domain for "externalizing" a sockaddr, and
provide an implementation for IPv6. Expect more work in this area: it
may be more proper to say that the IPv6 implementation "internalizes"
a sockaddr. Add sockaddr_externalize().
2 Add a subroutine, sofamily(), that returns a struct socket's address
family or AF_UNSPEC.
3 Make a lot of IPv4-specific code generic, and move it from
sys/netinet/ to sys/net/ for re-use by IPv6 parts of the kernel and
ifconfig(8).
2009-09-12 02:06:29 +04:00
|
|
|
case SIOCGIFADDRPREF:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCSIFADDRPREF:
|
|
|
|
if (ifp == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
return ifaddrpref_ioctl(so, cmd, data, ifp, l);
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-02-25 08:13:05 +03:00
|
|
|
if (ifp == NULL)
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return EOPNOTSUPP;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (cmd) {
|
|
|
|
case SIOCSNDFLUSH_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCSPFXFLUSH_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCSRTRFLUSH_IN6:
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
case SIOCSDEFIFACE_IN6:
|
2000-04-16 19:27:59 +04:00
|
|
|
case SIOCSIFINFO_FLAGS:
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
case SIOCSIFINFO_IN6:
|
2009-05-13 03:01:26 +04:00
|
|
|
/* Privileged. */
|
2002-06-07 08:18:11 +04:00
|
|
|
/* FALLTHROUGH */
|
2002-05-29 11:53:39 +04:00
|
|
|
case OSIOCGIFINFO_IN6:
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
case SIOCGIFINFO_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCGDRLST_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCGPRLST_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCGNBRINFO_IN6:
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
case SIOCGDEFIFACE_IN6:
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return nd6_ioctl(cmd, data, ifp);
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (cmd) {
|
|
|
|
case SIOCSIFPREFIX_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCDIFPREFIX_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCAIFPREFIX_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCCIFPREFIX_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCSGIFPREFIX_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCGIFPREFIX_IN6:
|
2002-06-07 08:03:53 +04:00
|
|
|
log(LOG_NOTICE,
|
|
|
|
"prefix ioctls are now invalidated. "
|
|
|
|
"please use ifconfig.\n");
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return EOPNOTSUPP;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (cmd) {
|
|
|
|
case SIOCALIFADDR:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCDLIFADDR:
|
2009-05-13 03:01:26 +04:00
|
|
|
/* Privileged. */
|
2002-06-07 08:18:11 +04:00
|
|
|
/* FALLTHROUGH */
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
case SIOCGLIFADDR:
|
2006-07-24 02:06:03 +04:00
|
|
|
return in6_lifaddr_ioctl(so, cmd, data, ifp, l);
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Find address for this interface, if it exists.
|
2002-06-07 08:03:53 +04:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* In netinet code, we have checked ifra_addr in SIOCSIF*ADDR operation
|
|
|
|
* only, and used the first interface address as the target of other
|
|
|
|
* operations (without checking ifra_addr). This was because netinet
|
|
|
|
* code/API assumed at most 1 interface address per interface.
|
|
|
|
* Since IPv6 allows a node to assign multiple addresses
|
|
|
|
* on a single interface, we almost always look and check the
|
|
|
|
* presence of ifra_addr, and reject invalid ones here.
|
|
|
|
* It also decreases duplicated code among SIOC*_IN6 operations.
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-06-07 08:03:53 +04:00
|
|
|
switch (cmd) {
|
|
|
|
case SIOCAIFADDR_IN6:
|
2009-01-15 23:32:59 +03:00
|
|
|
#ifdef OSIOCAIFADDR_IN6
|
|
|
|
case OSIOCAIFADDR_IN6:
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef OSIOCSIFPHYADDR_IN6
|
|
|
|
case OSIOCSIFPHYADDR_IN6:
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2002-06-07 08:03:53 +04:00
|
|
|
case SIOCSIFPHYADDR_IN6:
|
|
|
|
sa6 = &ifra->ifra_addr;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SIOCSIFADDR_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCGIFADDR_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCSIFDSTADDR_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCSIFNETMASK_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCGIFDSTADDR_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCGIFNETMASK_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCDIFADDR_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCGIFPSRCADDR_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCGIFPDSTADDR_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCGIFAFLAG_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCSNDFLUSH_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCSPFXFLUSH_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCSRTRFLUSH_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCGIFALIFETIME_IN6:
|
2009-01-15 21:20:48 +03:00
|
|
|
#ifdef OSIOCGIFALIFETIME_IN6
|
|
|
|
case OSIOCGIFALIFETIME_IN6:
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2002-06-07 08:03:53 +04:00
|
|
|
case SIOCGIFSTAT_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCGIFSTAT_ICMP6:
|
|
|
|
sa6 = &ifr->ifr_addr;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
sa6 = NULL;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sa6 && sa6->sin6_family == AF_INET6) {
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
if (sa6->sin6_scope_id != 0)
|
|
|
|
error = sa6_embedscope(sa6, 0);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
error = in6_setscope(&sa6->sin6_addr, ifp, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return error;
|
2002-06-07 08:03:53 +04:00
|
|
|
ia = in6ifa_ifpwithaddr(ifp, &sa6->sin6_addr);
|
2000-12-04 15:11:49 +03:00
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
ia = NULL;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (cmd) {
|
2002-06-07 08:03:53 +04:00
|
|
|
case SIOCSIFADDR_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCSIFDSTADDR_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCSIFNETMASK_IN6:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Since IPv6 allows a node to assign multiple addresses
|
|
|
|
* on a single interface, SIOCSIFxxx ioctls are deprecated.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SIOCDIFADDR_IN6:
|
2000-02-25 08:13:05 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2001-02-10 07:14:26 +03:00
|
|
|
* for IPv4, we look for existing in_ifaddr here to allow
|
2001-12-21 11:54:52 +03:00
|
|
|
* "ifconfig if0 delete" to remove the first IPv4 address on
|
|
|
|
* the interface. For IPv6, as the spec allows multiple
|
|
|
|
* interface address from the day one, we consider "remove the
|
|
|
|
* first one" semantics to be not preferable.
|
2000-02-25 08:13:05 +03:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (ia == NULL)
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return EADDRNOTAVAIL;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
/* FALLTHROUGH */
|
2009-01-15 23:32:59 +03:00
|
|
|
#ifdef OSIOCAIFADDR_IN6
|
|
|
|
case OSIOCAIFADDR_IN6:
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
case SIOCAIFADDR_IN6:
|
2002-06-08 04:01:30 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We always require users to specify a valid IPv6 address for
|
|
|
|
* the corresponding operation.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (ifra->ifra_addr.sin6_family != AF_INET6 ||
|
|
|
|
ifra->ifra_addr.sin6_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return EAFNOSUPPORT;
|
2009-05-13 03:01:26 +04:00
|
|
|
/* Privileged. */
|
2000-02-02 01:52:04 +03:00
|
|
|
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SIOCGIFADDR_IN6:
|
|
|
|
/* This interface is basically deprecated. use SIOCGIFCONF. */
|
2002-06-07 08:18:11 +04:00
|
|
|
/* FALLTHROUGH */
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
case SIOCGIFAFLAG_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCGIFNETMASK_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCGIFDSTADDR_IN6:
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
case SIOCGIFALIFETIME_IN6:
|
2009-01-15 21:20:48 +03:00
|
|
|
#ifdef OSIOCGIFALIFETIME_IN6
|
|
|
|
case OSIOCGIFALIFETIME_IN6:
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
/* must think again about its semantics */
|
2000-02-25 08:13:05 +03:00
|
|
|
if (ia == NULL)
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return EADDRNOTAVAIL;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (cmd) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SIOCGIFADDR_IN6:
|
|
|
|
ifr->ifr_addr = ia->ia_addr;
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
if ((error = sa6_recoverscope(&ifr->ifr_addr)) != 0)
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return error;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SIOCGIFDSTADDR_IN6:
|
|
|
|
if ((ifp->if_flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT) == 0)
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
2001-02-10 07:14:26 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* XXX: should we check if ifa_dstaddr is NULL and return
|
|
|
|
* an error?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
ifr->ifr_dstaddr = ia->ia_dstaddr;
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
if ((error = sa6_recoverscope(&ifr->ifr_dstaddr)) != 0)
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return error;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SIOCGIFNETMASK_IN6:
|
|
|
|
ifr->ifr_addr = ia->ia_prefixmask;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SIOCGIFAFLAG_IN6:
|
|
|
|
ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_flags6 = ia->ia6_flags;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2000-02-24 15:43:49 +03:00
|
|
|
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
case SIOCGIFSTAT_IN6:
|
|
|
|
if (ifp == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
2009-03-18 19:00:08 +03:00
|
|
|
memset(&ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_stat, 0,
|
2002-05-29 06:58:28 +04:00
|
|
|
sizeof(ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_stat));
|
|
|
|
ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_stat =
|
|
|
|
*((struct in6_ifextra *)ifp->if_afdata[AF_INET6])->in6_ifstat;
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SIOCGIFSTAT_ICMP6:
|
|
|
|
if (ifp == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
2009-03-18 19:00:08 +03:00
|
|
|
memset(&ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_icmp6stat, 0,
|
2002-05-29 06:58:28 +04:00
|
|
|
sizeof(ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_icmp6stat));
|
|
|
|
ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_icmp6stat =
|
|
|
|
*((struct in6_ifextra *)ifp->if_afdata[AF_INET6])->icmp6_ifstat;
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-15 21:20:48 +03:00
|
|
|
#ifdef OSIOCGIFALIFETIME_IN6
|
|
|
|
case OSIOCGIFALIFETIME_IN6:
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
case SIOCGIFALIFETIME_IN6:
|
|
|
|
ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_lifetime = ia->ia6_lifetime;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ia->ia6_lifetime.ia6t_vltime != ND6_INFINITE_LIFETIME) {
|
|
|
|
time_t maxexpire;
|
|
|
|
struct in6_addrlifetime *retlt =
|
|
|
|
&ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_lifetime;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* XXX: adjust expiration time assuming time_t is
|
|
|
|
* signed.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-06-08 02:33:33 +04:00
|
|
|
maxexpire = ((time_t)~0) &
|
2006-12-02 21:59:17 +03:00
|
|
|
~((time_t)1 << ((sizeof(maxexpire) * NBBY) - 1));
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ia->ia6_lifetime.ia6t_vltime <
|
|
|
|
maxexpire - ia->ia6_updatetime) {
|
|
|
|
retlt->ia6t_expire = ia->ia6_updatetime +
|
|
|
|
ia->ia6_lifetime.ia6t_vltime;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
retlt->ia6t_expire = maxexpire;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ia->ia6_lifetime.ia6t_pltime != ND6_INFINITE_LIFETIME) {
|
|
|
|
time_t maxexpire;
|
|
|
|
struct in6_addrlifetime *retlt =
|
|
|
|
&ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_lifetime;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* XXX: adjust expiration time assuming time_t is
|
|
|
|
* signed.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-06-08 02:33:33 +04:00
|
|
|
maxexpire = ((time_t)~0) &
|
2006-12-02 21:59:17 +03:00
|
|
|
~((time_t)1 << ((sizeof(maxexpire) * NBBY) - 1));
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ia->ia6_lifetime.ia6t_pltime <
|
|
|
|
maxexpire - ia->ia6_updatetime) {
|
|
|
|
retlt->ia6t_preferred = ia->ia6_updatetime +
|
|
|
|
ia->ia6_lifetime.ia6t_pltime;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
retlt->ia6t_preferred = maxexpire;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-15 21:20:48 +03:00
|
|
|
#ifdef OSIOCFIFALIFETIME_IN6
|
|
|
|
if (cmd == OSIOCFIFALIFETIME_IN6)
|
|
|
|
in6_addrlifetime_to_in6_addrlifetime50(
|
|
|
|
&ifr->ifru.ifru_lifetime);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-15 23:32:59 +03:00
|
|
|
#ifdef OSIOCAIFADDR_IN6
|
|
|
|
case OSIOCAIFADDR_IN6:
|
|
|
|
in6_aliasreq50_to_in6_aliasreq(ifra);
|
|
|
|
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
case SIOCAIFADDR_IN6:
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
int i;
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
struct nd_prefixctl pr0;
|
|
|
|
struct nd_prefix *pr;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2002-09-23 17:16:52 +04:00
|
|
|
/* reject read-only flags */
|
|
|
|
if ((ifra->ifra_flags & IN6_IFF_DUPLICATED) != 0 ||
|
|
|
|
(ifra->ifra_flags & IN6_IFF_DETACHED) != 0 ||
|
|
|
|
(ifra->ifra_flags & IN6_IFF_NODAD) != 0 ||
|
|
|
|
(ifra->ifra_flags & IN6_IFF_AUTOCONF) != 0) {
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
2002-09-23 17:16:52 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* first, make or update the interface address structure,
|
|
|
|
* and link it to the list.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
if ((error = in6_update_ifa(ifp, ifra, ia, 0)) != 0)
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return error;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
if ((ia = in6ifa_ifpwithaddr(ifp, &ifra->ifra_addr.sin6_addr))
|
|
|
|
== NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* this can happen when the user specify the 0 valid
|
|
|
|
* lifetime.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2000-02-25 08:13:05 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
* then, make the prefix on-link on the interface.
|
|
|
|
* XXX: we'd rather create the prefix before the address, but
|
|
|
|
* we need at least one address to install the corresponding
|
|
|
|
* interface route, so we configure the address first.
|
2000-02-25 08:13:05 +03:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2000-02-25 08:13:05 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
* convert mask to prefix length (prefixmask has already
|
|
|
|
* been validated in in6_update_ifa().
|
2000-02-25 08:13:05 +03:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-03-18 19:00:08 +03:00
|
|
|
memset(&pr0, 0, sizeof(pr0));
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
pr0.ndpr_ifp = ifp;
|
|
|
|
pr0.ndpr_plen = in6_mask2len(&ifra->ifra_prefixmask.sin6_addr,
|
|
|
|
NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (pr0.ndpr_plen == 128) {
|
|
|
|
break; /* we don't need to install a host route. */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pr0.ndpr_prefix = ifra->ifra_addr;
|
|
|
|
/* apply the mask for safety. */
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
|
|
|
|
pr0.ndpr_prefix.sin6_addr.s6_addr32[i] &=
|
|
|
|
ifra->ifra_prefixmask.sin6_addr.s6_addr32[i];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* XXX: since we don't have an API to set prefix (not address)
|
|
|
|
* lifetimes, we just use the same lifetimes as addresses.
|
|
|
|
* The (temporarily) installed lifetimes can be overridden by
|
|
|
|
* later advertised RAs (when accept_rtadv is non 0), which is
|
|
|
|
* an intended behavior.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
pr0.ndpr_raf_onlink = 1; /* should be configurable? */
|
|
|
|
pr0.ndpr_raf_auto =
|
|
|
|
((ifra->ifra_flags & IN6_IFF_AUTOCONF) != 0);
|
|
|
|
pr0.ndpr_vltime = ifra->ifra_lifetime.ia6t_vltime;
|
|
|
|
pr0.ndpr_pltime = ifra->ifra_lifetime.ia6t_pltime;
|
|
|
|
|
2002-10-17 04:07:44 +04:00
|
|
|
/* add the prefix if not yet. */
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
if ((pr = nd6_prefix_lookup(&pr0)) == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* nd6_prelist_add will install the corresponding
|
|
|
|
* interface route.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((error = nd6_prelist_add(&pr0, NULL, &pr)) != 0)
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return error;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
if (pr == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
log(LOG_ERR, "nd6_prelist_add succeeded but "
|
|
|
|
"no prefix\n");
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return EINVAL; /* XXX panic here? */
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-10-17 04:07:44 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* relate the address to the prefix */
|
|
|
|
if (ia->ia6_ndpr == NULL) {
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
ia->ia6_ndpr = pr;
|
|
|
|
pr->ndpr_refcnt++;
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If this is the first autoconf address from the
|
|
|
|
* prefix, create a temporary address as well
|
|
|
|
* (when required).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((ia->ia6_flags & IN6_IFF_AUTOCONF) &&
|
|
|
|
ip6_use_tempaddr && pr->ndpr_refcnt == 1) {
|
|
|
|
int e;
|
|
|
|
if ((e = in6_tmpifadd(ia, 1, 0)) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
log(LOG_NOTICE, "in6_control: failed "
|
|
|
|
"to create a temporary address, "
|
|
|
|
"errno=%d\n", e);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2000-02-25 08:13:05 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* this might affect the status of autoconfigured addresses,
|
|
|
|
* that is, this address might make other addresses detached.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
pfxlist_onlink_check();
|
|
|
|
|
2004-07-26 17:44:35 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef PFIL_HOOKS
|
|
|
|
(void)pfil_run_hooks(&if_pfil, (struct mbuf **)SIOCAIFADDR_IN6,
|
|
|
|
ifp, PFIL_IFADDR);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SIOCDIFADDR_IN6:
|
|
|
|
{
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
struct nd_prefix *pr;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If the address being deleted is the only one that owns
|
|
|
|
* the corresponding prefix, expire the prefix as well.
|
|
|
|
* XXX: theoretically, we don't have to worry about such
|
|
|
|
* relationship, since we separate the address management
|
|
|
|
* and the prefix management. We do this, however, to provide
|
|
|
|
* as much backward compatibility as possible in terms of
|
|
|
|
* the ioctl operation.
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
* Note that in6_purgeaddr() will decrement ndpr_refcnt.
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
pr = ia->ia6_ndpr;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
in6_purgeaddr(&ia->ia_ifa);
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
if (pr && pr->ndpr_refcnt == 0)
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
prelist_remove(pr);
|
2004-07-26 17:44:35 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef PFIL_HOOKS
|
|
|
|
(void)pfil_run_hooks(&if_pfil, (struct mbuf **)SIOCDIFADDR_IN6,
|
|
|
|
ifp, PFIL_IFADDR);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
*** Summary ***
When a link-layer address changes (e.g., ifconfig ex0 link
02:de:ad:be:ef:02 active), send a gratuitous ARP and/or a Neighbor
Advertisement to update the network-/link-layer address bindings
on our LAN peers.
Refuse a change of ethernet address to the address 00:00:00:00:00:00
or to any multicast/broadcast address. (Thanks matt@.)
Reorder ifnet ioctl operations so that driver ioctls may inherit
the functions of their "class"---ether_ioctl(), fddi_ioctl(), et
cetera---and the class ioctls may inherit from the generic ioctl,
ifioctl_common(), but both driver- and class-ioctls may override
the generic behavior. Make network drivers share more code.
Distinguish a "factory" link-layer address from others for the
purposes of both protecting that address from deletion and computing
EUI64.
Return consistent, appropriate error codes from network drivers.
Improve readability. KNF.
*** Details ***
In if_attach(), always initialize the interface ioctl routine,
ifnet->if_ioctl, if the driver has not already initialized it.
Delete if_ioctl == NULL tests everywhere else, because it cannot
happen.
In the ioctl routines of network interfaces, inherit common ioctl
behaviors by calling either ifioctl_common() or whichever ioctl
routine is appropriate for the class of interface---e.g., ether_ioctl()
for ethernets.
Stop (ab)using SIOCSIFADDR and start to use SIOCINITIFADDR. In
the user->kernel interface, SIOCSIFADDR's argument was an ifreq,
but on the protocol->ifnet interface, SIOCSIFADDR's argument was
an ifaddr. That was confusing, and it would work against me as I
make it possible for a network interface to overload most ioctls.
On the protocol->ifnet interface, replace SIOCSIFADDR with
SIOCINITIFADDR. In ifioctl(), return EPERM if userland tries to
invoke SIOCINITIFADDR.
In ifioctl(), give the interface the first shot at handling most
interface ioctls, and give the protocol the second shot, instead
of the other way around. Finally, let compatibility code (COMPAT_OSOCK)
take a shot.
Pull device initialization out of switch statements under
SIOCINITIFADDR. For example, pull ..._init() out of any switch
statement that looks like this:
switch (...->sa_family) {
case ...:
..._init();
...
break;
...
default:
..._init();
...
break;
}
Rewrite many if-else clauses that handle all permutations of IFF_UP
and IFF_RUNNING to use a switch statement,
switch (x & (IFF_UP|IFF_RUNNING)) {
case 0:
...
break;
case IFF_RUNNING:
...
break;
case IFF_UP:
...
break;
case IFF_UP|IFF_RUNNING:
...
break;
}
unifdef lots of code containing #ifdef FreeBSD, #ifdef NetBSD, and
#ifdef SIOCSIFMTU, especially in fwip(4) and in ndis(4).
In ipw(4), remove an if_set_sadl() call that is out of place.
In nfe(4), reuse the jumbo MTU logic in ether_ioctl().
Let ethernets register a callback for setting h/w state such as
promiscuous mode and the multicast filter in accord with a change
in the if_flags: ether_set_ifflags_cb() registers a callback that
returns ENETRESET if the caller should reset the ethernet by calling
if_init(), 0 on success, != 0 on failure. Pull common code from
ex(4), gem(4), nfe(4), sip(4), tlp(4), vge(4) into ether_ioctl(),
and register if_flags callbacks for those drivers.
Return ENOTTY instead of EINVAL for inappropriate ioctls. In
zyd(4), use ENXIO instead of ENOTTY to indicate that the device is
not any longer attached.
Add to if_set_sadl() a boolean 'factory' argument that indicates
whether a link-layer address was assigned by the factory or some
other source. In a comment, recommend using the factory address
for generating an EUI64, and update in6_get_hw_ifid() to prefer a
factory address to any other link-layer address.
Add a routing message, RTM_LLINFO_UPD, that tells protocols to
update the binding of network-layer addresses to link-layer addresses.
Implement this message in IPv4 and IPv6 by sending a gratuitous
ARP or a neighbor advertisement, respectively. Generate RTM_LLINFO_UPD
messages on a change of an interface's link-layer address.
In ether_ioctl(), do not let SIOCALIFADDR set a link-layer address
that is broadcast/multicast or equal to 00:00:00:00:00:00.
Make ether_ioctl() call ifioctl_common() to handle ioctls that it
does not understand.
In gif(4), initialize if_softc and use it, instead of assuming that
the gif_softc and ifp overlap.
Let ifioctl_common() handle SIOCGIFADDR.
Sprinkle rtcache_invariants(), which checks on DIAGNOSTIC kernels
that certain invariants on a struct route are satisfied.
In agr(4), rewrite agr_ioctl_filter() to be a bit more explicit
about the ioctls that we do not allow on an agr(4) member interface.
bzero -> memset. Delete unnecessary casts to void *. Use
sockaddr_in_init() and sockaddr_in6_init(). Compare pointers with
NULL instead of "testing truth". Replace some instances of (type
*)0 with NULL. Change some K&R prototypes to ANSI C, and join
lines.
2008-11-07 03:20:01 +03:00
|
|
|
return ENOTTY;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Synchronize access to the ifaddr list by in6_update_ifa() and
in6_control() with splnet()/splx(). I was being a bit paranoid
here. Following a cursory analysis of the code, this still looked
necessary. We don't spend a lot of time in these calls, so it
should not be too harmful to suspend network interrupts.
In in6_unlink_ifa(), call in6_delmulti() just once on each multicast
address (in6_multi). Previously, in6_unlink_ifa() called in6_delmulti()
on each in6_multi until in6_delmulti() removed the in6_multi from
the list and freed its memory. That's not justified: the multicast
list holds *one* reference. All other references belong to other
entities. We must wait to free the memory until the other entities
release their references, to protect against dereferencing a freed
in6_multi.
XXX I need to revisit in6_delmulti(), in6_unlink_ifa(), and friends,
XXX to pry apart the conditions where an in6_multi is removed from
XXX its list and where it is freed. Following my change, above,
XXX we still risk dereferencing a freed in6_multi.
Prevent in6_update_ifa() and in6_addremloop() from creating dangling
pointers to interfaces in the routing table. Previously, my NetBSD
tunnel concentrator, which adds and deletes a lot of P2P interfaces
with the same local address, crashed in 8 hours or less when it
dereferenced a dangling pointer to a deleted ifnet. Now, its uptime
is greater than 3 days.
2006-12-02 23:40:58 +03:00
|
|
|
int
|
2007-03-04 08:59:00 +03:00
|
|
|
in6_control(struct socket *so, u_long cmd, void *data, struct ifnet *ifp,
|
Synchronize access to the ifaddr list by in6_update_ifa() and
in6_control() with splnet()/splx(). I was being a bit paranoid
here. Following a cursory analysis of the code, this still looked
necessary. We don't spend a lot of time in these calls, so it
should not be too harmful to suspend network interrupts.
In in6_unlink_ifa(), call in6_delmulti() just once on each multicast
address (in6_multi). Previously, in6_unlink_ifa() called in6_delmulti()
on each in6_multi until in6_delmulti() removed the in6_multi from
the list and freed its memory. That's not justified: the multicast
list holds *one* reference. All other references belong to other
entities. We must wait to free the memory until the other entities
release their references, to protect against dereferencing a freed
in6_multi.
XXX I need to revisit in6_delmulti(), in6_unlink_ifa(), and friends,
XXX to pry apart the conditions where an in6_multi is removed from
XXX its list and where it is freed. Following my change, above,
XXX we still risk dereferencing a freed in6_multi.
Prevent in6_update_ifa() and in6_addremloop() from creating dangling
pointers to interfaces in the routing table. Previously, my NetBSD
tunnel concentrator, which adds and deletes a lot of P2P interfaces
with the same local address, crashed in 8 hours or less when it
dereferenced a dangling pointer to a deleted ifnet. Now, its uptime
is greater than 3 days.
2006-12-02 23:40:58 +03:00
|
|
|
struct lwp *l)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2009-05-13 03:01:26 +04:00
|
|
|
int error, s;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (cmd) {
|
|
|
|
case SIOCSNDFLUSH_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCSPFXFLUSH_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCSRTRFLUSH_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCSDEFIFACE_IN6:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCSIFINFO_FLAGS:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCSIFINFO_IN6:
|
Synchronize access to the ifaddr list by in6_update_ifa() and
in6_control() with splnet()/splx(). I was being a bit paranoid
here. Following a cursory analysis of the code, this still looked
necessary. We don't spend a lot of time in these calls, so it
should not be too harmful to suspend network interrupts.
In in6_unlink_ifa(), call in6_delmulti() just once on each multicast
address (in6_multi). Previously, in6_unlink_ifa() called in6_delmulti()
on each in6_multi until in6_delmulti() removed the in6_multi from
the list and freed its memory. That's not justified: the multicast
list holds *one* reference. All other references belong to other
entities. We must wait to free the memory until the other entities
release their references, to protect against dereferencing a freed
in6_multi.
XXX I need to revisit in6_delmulti(), in6_unlink_ifa(), and friends,
XXX to pry apart the conditions where an in6_multi is removed from
XXX its list and where it is freed. Following my change, above,
XXX we still risk dereferencing a freed in6_multi.
Prevent in6_update_ifa() and in6_addremloop() from creating dangling
pointers to interfaces in the routing table. Previously, my NetBSD
tunnel concentrator, which adds and deletes a lot of P2P interfaces
with the same local address, crashed in 8 hours or less when it
dereferenced a dangling pointer to a deleted ifnet. Now, its uptime
is greater than 3 days.
2006-12-02 23:40:58 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2009-05-13 03:01:26 +04:00
|
|
|
case SIOCALIFADDR:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCDLIFADDR:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SIOCDIFADDR_IN6:
|
|
|
|
#ifdef OSIOCAIFADDR_IN6
|
|
|
|
case OSIOCAIFADDR_IN6:
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
case SIOCAIFADDR_IN6:
|
2012-03-13 22:40:26 +04:00
|
|
|
if (kauth_authorize_network(l->l_cred,
|
|
|
|
KAUTH_NETWORK_SOCKET,
|
|
|
|
KAUTH_REQ_NETWORK_SOCKET_SETPRIV,
|
|
|
|
so, NULL, NULL))
|
2009-05-13 03:01:26 +04:00
|
|
|
return EPERM;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
Synchronize access to the ifaddr list by in6_update_ifa() and
in6_control() with splnet()/splx(). I was being a bit paranoid
here. Following a cursory analysis of the code, this still looked
necessary. We don't spend a lot of time in these calls, so it
should not be too harmful to suspend network interrupts.
In in6_unlink_ifa(), call in6_delmulti() just once on each multicast
address (in6_multi). Previously, in6_unlink_ifa() called in6_delmulti()
on each in6_multi until in6_delmulti() removed the in6_multi from
the list and freed its memory. That's not justified: the multicast
list holds *one* reference. All other references belong to other
entities. We must wait to free the memory until the other entities
release their references, to protect against dereferencing a freed
in6_multi.
XXX I need to revisit in6_delmulti(), in6_unlink_ifa(), and friends,
XXX to pry apart the conditions where an in6_multi is removed from
XXX its list and where it is freed. Following my change, above,
XXX we still risk dereferencing a freed in6_multi.
Prevent in6_update_ifa() and in6_addremloop() from creating dangling
pointers to interfaces in the routing table. Previously, my NetBSD
tunnel concentrator, which adds and deletes a lot of P2P interfaces
with the same local address, crashed in 8 hours or less when it
dereferenced a dangling pointer to a deleted ifnet. Now, its uptime
is greater than 3 days.
2006-12-02 23:40:58 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s = splnet();
|
2009-05-13 03:01:26 +04:00
|
|
|
error = in6_control1(so , cmd, data, ifp, l);
|
Synchronize access to the ifaddr list by in6_update_ifa() and
in6_control() with splnet()/splx(). I was being a bit paranoid
here. Following a cursory analysis of the code, this still looked
necessary. We don't spend a lot of time in these calls, so it
should not be too harmful to suspend network interrupts.
In in6_unlink_ifa(), call in6_delmulti() just once on each multicast
address (in6_multi). Previously, in6_unlink_ifa() called in6_delmulti()
on each in6_multi until in6_delmulti() removed the in6_multi from
the list and freed its memory. That's not justified: the multicast
list holds *one* reference. All other references belong to other
entities. We must wait to free the memory until the other entities
release their references, to protect against dereferencing a freed
in6_multi.
XXX I need to revisit in6_delmulti(), in6_unlink_ifa(), and friends,
XXX to pry apart the conditions where an in6_multi is removed from
XXX its list and where it is freed. Following my change, above,
XXX we still risk dereferencing a freed in6_multi.
Prevent in6_update_ifa() and in6_addremloop() from creating dangling
pointers to interfaces in the routing table. Previously, my NetBSD
tunnel concentrator, which adds and deletes a lot of P2P interfaces
with the same local address, crashed in 8 hours or less when it
dereferenced a dangling pointer to a deleted ifnet. Now, its uptime
is greater than 3 days.
2006-12-02 23:40:58 +03:00
|
|
|
splx(s);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Update parameters of an IPv6 interface address.
|
|
|
|
* If necessary, a new entry is created and linked into address chains.
|
|
|
|
* This function is separated from in6_control().
|
|
|
|
* XXX: should this be performed under splnet()?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
Synchronize access to the ifaddr list by in6_update_ifa() and
in6_control() with splnet()/splx(). I was being a bit paranoid
here. Following a cursory analysis of the code, this still looked
necessary. We don't spend a lot of time in these calls, so it
should not be too harmful to suspend network interrupts.
In in6_unlink_ifa(), call in6_delmulti() just once on each multicast
address (in6_multi). Previously, in6_unlink_ifa() called in6_delmulti()
on each in6_multi until in6_delmulti() removed the in6_multi from
the list and freed its memory. That's not justified: the multicast
list holds *one* reference. All other references belong to other
entities. We must wait to free the memory until the other entities
release their references, to protect against dereferencing a freed
in6_multi.
XXX I need to revisit in6_delmulti(), in6_unlink_ifa(), and friends,
XXX to pry apart the conditions where an in6_multi is removed from
XXX its list and where it is freed. Following my change, above,
XXX we still risk dereferencing a freed in6_multi.
Prevent in6_update_ifa() and in6_addremloop() from creating dangling
pointers to interfaces in the routing table. Previously, my NetBSD
tunnel concentrator, which adds and deletes a lot of P2P interfaces
with the same local address, crashed in 8 hours or less when it
dereferenced a dangling pointer to a deleted ifnet. Now, its uptime
is greater than 3 days.
2006-12-02 23:40:58 +03:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
in6_update_ifa1(struct ifnet *ifp, struct in6_aliasreq *ifra,
|
|
|
|
struct in6_ifaddr *ia, int flags)
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int error = 0, hostIsNew = 0, plen = -1;
|
|
|
|
struct in6_ifaddr *oia;
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in6 dst6;
|
|
|
|
struct in6_addrlifetime *lt;
|
|
|
|
struct in6_multi_mship *imm;
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
struct in6_multi *in6m_sol;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
struct rtentry *rt;
|
2006-03-06 23:33:52 +03:00
|
|
|
int dad_delay;
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
in6m_sol = NULL;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Validate parameters */
|
|
|
|
if (ifp == NULL || ifra == NULL) /* this maybe redundant */
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The destination address for a p2p link must have a family
|
|
|
|
* of AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET6.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((ifp->if_flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT) != 0 &&
|
|
|
|
ifra->ifra_dstaddr.sin6_family != AF_INET6 &&
|
|
|
|
ifra->ifra_dstaddr.sin6_family != AF_UNSPEC)
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return EAFNOSUPPORT;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* validate ifra_prefixmask. don't check sin6_family, netmask
|
|
|
|
* does not carry fields other than sin6_len.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (ifra->ifra_prefixmask.sin6_len > sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Because the IPv6 address architecture is classless, we require
|
|
|
|
* users to specify a (non 0) prefix length (mask) for a new address.
|
|
|
|
* We also require the prefix (when specified) mask is valid, and thus
|
|
|
|
* reject a non-consecutive mask.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (ia == NULL && ifra->ifra_prefixmask.sin6_len == 0)
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ifra->ifra_prefixmask.sin6_len != 0) {
|
|
|
|
plen = in6_mask2len(&ifra->ifra_prefixmask.sin6_addr,
|
|
|
|
(u_char *)&ifra->ifra_prefixmask +
|
|
|
|
ifra->ifra_prefixmask.sin6_len);
|
|
|
|
if (plen <= 0)
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* In this case, ia must not be NULL. We just use its prefix
|
|
|
|
* length.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
plen = in6_mask2len(&ia->ia_prefixmask.sin6_addr, NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If the destination address on a p2p interface is specified,
|
|
|
|
* and the address is a scoped one, validate/set the scope
|
|
|
|
* zone identifier.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
dst6 = ifra->ifra_dstaddr;
|
|
|
|
if ((ifp->if_flags & (IFF_POINTOPOINT|IFF_LOOPBACK)) != 0 &&
|
|
|
|
(dst6.sin6_family == AF_INET6)) {
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
struct in6_addr in6_tmp;
|
|
|
|
u_int32_t zoneid;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
in6_tmp = dst6.sin6_addr;
|
|
|
|
if (in6_setscope(&in6_tmp, ifp, &zoneid))
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return EINVAL; /* XXX: should be impossible */
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (dst6.sin6_scope_id != 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (dst6.sin6_scope_id != zoneid)
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
} else /* user omit to specify the ID. */
|
|
|
|
dst6.sin6_scope_id = zoneid;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* convert into the internal form */
|
|
|
|
if (sa6_embedscope(&dst6, 0))
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return EINVAL; /* XXX: should be impossible */
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The destination address can be specified only for a p2p or a
|
|
|
|
* loopback interface. If specified, the corresponding prefix length
|
|
|
|
* must be 128.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (ifra->ifra_dstaddr.sin6_family == AF_INET6) {
|
|
|
|
#ifdef FORCE_P2PPLEN
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
2000-03-18 05:41:58 +03:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
if ((ifp->if_flags & (IFF_POINTOPOINT|IFF_LOOPBACK)) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: noisy message */
|
2002-09-23 17:16:52 +04:00
|
|
|
nd6log((LOG_INFO, "in6_update_ifa: a destination can "
|
|
|
|
"be specified for a p2p or a loopback IF only\n"));
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (plen != 128) {
|
2002-09-23 17:16:52 +04:00
|
|
|
nd6log((LOG_INFO, "in6_update_ifa: prefixlen should "
|
|
|
|
"be 128 when dstaddr is specified\n"));
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef FORCE_P2PPLEN
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
* To be compatible with old configurations,
|
|
|
|
* such as ifconfig gif0 inet6 2001::1 2001::2
|
|
|
|
* prefixlen 126, we override the specified
|
|
|
|
* prefixmask as if the prefix length was 128.
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
ifra->ifra_prefixmask.sin6_len =
|
|
|
|
sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
|
|
|
|
ifra->ifra_prefixmask.sin6_addr.s6_addr32[i] =
|
|
|
|
0xffffffff;
|
|
|
|
plen = 128;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* lifetime consistency check */
|
|
|
|
lt = &ifra->ifra_lifetime;
|
|
|
|
if (lt->ia6t_pltime > lt->ia6t_vltime)
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
if (lt->ia6t_vltime == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* the following log might be noisy, but this is a typical
|
|
|
|
* configuration mistake or a tool's bug.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-06-11 11:28:05 +04:00
|
|
|
nd6log((LOG_INFO,
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
"in6_update_ifa: valid lifetime is 0 for %s\n",
|
2002-06-11 11:28:05 +04:00
|
|
|
ip6_sprintf(&ifra->ifra_addr.sin6_addr)));
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ia == NULL)
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return 0; /* there's nothing to do */
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If this is a new address, allocate a new ifaddr and link it
|
|
|
|
* into chains.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (ia == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
hostIsNew = 1;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* When in6_update_ifa() is called in a process of a received
|
|
|
|
* RA, it is called under an interrupt context. So, we should
|
|
|
|
* call malloc with M_NOWAIT.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ia = (struct in6_ifaddr *) malloc(sizeof(*ia), M_IFADDR,
|
|
|
|
M_NOWAIT);
|
|
|
|
if (ia == NULL)
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return ENOBUFS;
|
2011-02-06 22:12:55 +03:00
|
|
|
memset(ia, 0, sizeof(*ia));
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
LIST_INIT(&ia->ia6_memberships);
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize the address and masks, and put time stamp */
|
|
|
|
ia->ia_ifa.ifa_addr = (struct sockaddr *)&ia->ia_addr;
|
|
|
|
ia->ia_addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
|
|
|
|
ia->ia_addr.sin6_len = sizeof(ia->ia_addr);
|
2006-06-08 02:33:33 +04:00
|
|
|
ia->ia6_createtime = time_second;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
if ((ifp->if_flags & (IFF_POINTOPOINT | IFF_LOOPBACK)) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* XXX: some functions expect that ifa_dstaddr is not
|
|
|
|
* NULL for p2p interfaces.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ia->ia_ifa.ifa_dstaddr =
|
|
|
|
(struct sockaddr *)&ia->ia_dstaddr;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ia->ia_ifa.ifa_dstaddr = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ia->ia_ifa.ifa_netmask =
|
|
|
|
(struct sockaddr *)&ia->ia_prefixmask;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ia->ia_ifp = ifp;
|
|
|
|
if ((oia = in6_ifaddr) != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
for ( ; oia->ia_next; oia = oia->ia_next)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
oia->ia_next = ia;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
} else
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
in6_ifaddr = ia;
|
|
|
|
/* gain a refcnt for the link from in6_ifaddr */
|
|
|
|
IFAREF(&ia->ia_ifa);
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-06 03:28:36 +03:00
|
|
|
ifa_insert(ifp, &ia->ia_ifa);
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
/* update timestamp */
|
2006-06-08 02:33:33 +04:00
|
|
|
ia->ia6_updatetime = time_second;
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
/* set prefix mask */
|
|
|
|
if (ifra->ifra_prefixmask.sin6_len) {
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
* We prohibit changing the prefix length of an existing
|
|
|
|
* address, because
|
|
|
|
* + such an operation should be rare in IPv6, and
|
|
|
|
* + the operation would confuse prefix management.
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ia->ia_prefixmask.sin6_len &&
|
|
|
|
in6_mask2len(&ia->ia_prefixmask.sin6_addr, NULL) != plen) {
|
2002-06-11 11:28:05 +04:00
|
|
|
nd6log((LOG_INFO, "in6_update_ifa: the prefix length of an"
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
" existing (%s) address should not be changed\n",
|
2002-06-11 11:28:05 +04:00
|
|
|
ip6_sprintf(&ia->ia_addr.sin6_addr)));
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
goto unlink;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
ia->ia_prefixmask = ifra->ifra_prefixmask;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If a new destination address is specified, scrub the old one and
|
|
|
|
* install the new destination. Note that the interface must be
|
|
|
|
* p2p or loopback (see the check above.)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (dst6.sin6_family == AF_INET6 &&
|
|
|
|
!IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&dst6.sin6_addr, &ia->ia_dstaddr.sin6_addr)) {
|
|
|
|
if ((ia->ia_flags & IFA_ROUTE) != 0 &&
|
2003-10-30 04:43:08 +03:00
|
|
|
rtinit(&(ia->ia_ifa), (int)RTM_DELETE, RTF_HOST) != 0) {
|
2002-06-11 11:28:05 +04:00
|
|
|
nd6log((LOG_ERR, "in6_update_ifa: failed to remove "
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
"a route to the old destination: %s\n",
|
2002-06-11 11:28:05 +04:00
|
|
|
ip6_sprintf(&ia->ia_addr.sin6_addr)));
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
/* proceed anyway... */
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
ia->ia_flags &= ~IFA_ROUTE;
|
|
|
|
ia->ia_dstaddr = dst6;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Set lifetimes. We do not refer to ia6t_expire and ia6t_preferred
|
|
|
|
* to see if the address is deprecated or invalidated, but initialize
|
|
|
|
* these members for applications.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ia->ia6_lifetime = ifra->ifra_lifetime;
|
|
|
|
if (ia->ia6_lifetime.ia6t_vltime != ND6_INFINITE_LIFETIME) {
|
|
|
|
ia->ia6_lifetime.ia6t_expire =
|
2006-06-08 02:33:33 +04:00
|
|
|
time_second + ia->ia6_lifetime.ia6t_vltime;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
ia->ia6_lifetime.ia6t_expire = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (ia->ia6_lifetime.ia6t_pltime != ND6_INFINITE_LIFETIME) {
|
|
|
|
ia->ia6_lifetime.ia6t_preferred =
|
2006-06-08 02:33:33 +04:00
|
|
|
time_second + ia->ia6_lifetime.ia6t_pltime;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
ia->ia6_lifetime.ia6t_preferred = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* reset the interface and routing table appropriately. */
|
|
|
|
if ((error = in6_ifinit(ifp, ia, &ifra->ifra_addr, hostIsNew)) != 0)
|
|
|
|
goto unlink;
|
|
|
|
|
2002-09-23 17:16:52 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* configure address flags.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ia->ia6_flags = ifra->ifra_flags;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* backward compatibility - if IN6_IFF_DEPRECATED is set from the
|
|
|
|
* userland, make it deprecated.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((ifra->ifra_flags & IN6_IFF_DEPRECATED) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
ia->ia6_lifetime.ia6t_pltime = 0;
|
2006-06-08 02:33:33 +04:00
|
|
|
ia->ia6_lifetime.ia6t_preferred = time_second;
|
2002-09-23 17:16:52 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
* Make the address tentative before joining multicast addresses,
|
|
|
|
* so that corresponding MLD responses would not have a tentative
|
|
|
|
* source address.
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
ia->ia6_flags &= ~IN6_IFF_DUPLICATED; /* safety */
|
|
|
|
if (hostIsNew && in6if_do_dad(ifp))
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
ia->ia6_flags |= IN6_IFF_TENTATIVE;
|
|
|
|
|
2004-06-16 07:17:26 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We are done if we have simply modified an existing address.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!hostIsNew)
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return error;
|
2004-06-16 07:17:26 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Beyond this point, we should call in6_purgeaddr upon an error,
|
|
|
|
* not just go to unlink.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2006-03-03 17:07:06 +03:00
|
|
|
/* join necessary multicast groups */
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
if ((ifp->if_flags & IFF_MULTICAST) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in6 mltaddr, mltmask;
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
struct in6_addr llsol;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2004-06-16 07:17:26 +04:00
|
|
|
/* join solicited multicast addr for new host id */
|
2009-03-18 19:00:08 +03:00
|
|
|
memset(&llsol, 0, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
llsol.s6_addr16[0] = htons(0xff02);
|
|
|
|
llsol.s6_addr32[1] = 0;
|
|
|
|
llsol.s6_addr32[2] = htonl(1);
|
|
|
|
llsol.s6_addr32[3] = ifra->ifra_addr.sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3];
|
|
|
|
llsol.s6_addr8[12] = 0xff;
|
|
|
|
if ((error = in6_setscope(&llsol, ifp, NULL)) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: should not happen */
|
|
|
|
log(LOG_ERR, "in6_update_ifa: "
|
|
|
|
"in6_setscope failed\n");
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-03-06 23:33:52 +03:00
|
|
|
dad_delay = 0;
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
if ((flags & IN6_IFAUPDATE_DADDELAY)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We need a random delay for DAD on the address
|
|
|
|
* being configured. It also means delaying
|
|
|
|
* transmission of the corresponding MLD report to
|
|
|
|
* avoid report collision.
|
|
|
|
* [draft-ietf-ipv6-rfc2462bis-02.txt]
|
|
|
|
*/
|
First step of random number subsystem rework described in
<20111022023242.BA26F14A158@mail.netbsd.org>. This change includes
the following:
An initial cleanup and minor reorganization of the entropy pool
code in sys/dev/rnd.c and sys/dev/rndpool.c. Several bugs are
fixed. Some effort is made to accumulate entropy more quickly at
boot time.
A generic interface, "rndsink", is added, for stream generators to
request that they be re-keyed with good quality entropy from the pool
as soon as it is available.
The arc4random()/arc4randbytes() implementation in libkern is
adjusted to use the rndsink interface for rekeying, which helps
address the problem of low-quality keys at boot time.
An implementation of the FIPS 140-2 statistical tests for random
number generator quality is provided (libkern/rngtest.c). This
is based on Greg Rose's implementation from Qualcomm.
A new random stream generator, nist_ctr_drbg, is provided. It is
based on an implementation of the NIST SP800-90 CTR_DRBG by
Henric Jungheim. This generator users AES in a modified counter
mode to generate a backtracking-resistant random stream.
An abstraction layer, "cprng", is provided for in-kernel consumers
of randomness. The arc4random/arc4randbytes API is deprecated for
in-kernel use. It is replaced by "cprng_strong". The current
cprng_fast implementation wraps the existing arc4random
implementation. The current cprng_strong implementation wraps the
new CTR_DRBG implementation. Both interfaces are rekeyed from
the entropy pool automatically at intervals justifiable from best
current cryptographic practice.
In some quick tests, cprng_fast() is about the same speed as
the old arc4randbytes(), and cprng_strong() is about 20% faster
than rnd_extract_data(). Performance is expected to improve.
The AES code in src/crypto/rijndael is no longer an optional
kernel component, as it is required by cprng_strong, which is
not an optional kernel component.
The entropy pool output is subjected to the rngtest tests at
startup time; if it fails, the system will reboot. There is
approximately a 3/10000 chance of a false positive from these
tests. Entropy pool _input_ from hardware random numbers is
subjected to the rngtest tests at attach time, as well as the
FIPS continuous-output test, to detect bad or stuck hardware
RNGs; if any are detected, they are detached, but the system
continues to run.
A problem with rndctl(8) is fixed -- datastructures with
pointers in arrays are no longer passed to userspace (this
was not a security problem, but rather a major issue for
compat32). A new kernel will require a new rndctl.
The sysctl kern.arandom() and kern.urandom() nodes are hooked
up to the new generators, but the /dev/*random pseudodevices
are not, yet.
Manual pages for the new kernel interfaces are forthcoming.
2011-11-20 02:51:18 +04:00
|
|
|
dad_delay = cprng_fast32() %
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
(MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY * hz);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define MLTMASK_LEN 4 /* mltmask's masklen (=32bit=4octet) */
|
|
|
|
/* join solicited multicast addr for new host id */
|
2006-03-06 23:33:52 +03:00
|
|
|
imm = in6_joingroup(ifp, &llsol, &error, dad_delay);
|
2004-06-16 07:17:26 +04:00
|
|
|
if (!imm) {
|
|
|
|
nd6log((LOG_ERR,
|
|
|
|
"in6_update_ifa: addmulti "
|
|
|
|
"failed for %s on %s (errno=%d)\n",
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
ip6_sprintf(&llsol), if_name(ifp), error));
|
2004-06-16 07:17:26 +04:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-06-16 07:17:26 +04:00
|
|
|
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&ia->ia6_memberships, imm, i6mm_chain);
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
in6m_sol = imm->i6mm_maddr;
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2007-11-10 03:05:57 +03:00
|
|
|
sockaddr_in6_init(&mltmask, &in6mask32, 0, 0, 0);
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* join link-local all-nodes address
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2007-11-10 03:05:57 +03:00
|
|
|
sockaddr_in6_init(&mltaddr, &in6addr_linklocal_allnodes,
|
|
|
|
0, 0, 0);
|
2006-12-02 21:59:17 +03:00
|
|
|
if ((error = in6_setscope(&mltaddr.sin6_addr, ifp, NULL)) != 0)
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup; /* XXX: should not fail */
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* XXX: do we really need this automatic routes?
|
|
|
|
* We should probably reconsider this stuff. Most applications
|
|
|
|
* actually do not need the routes, since they usually specify
|
|
|
|
* the outgoing interface.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
rt = rtalloc1((struct sockaddr *)&mltaddr, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (rt) {
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(&mltaddr.sin6_addr,
|
Take steps to hide the radix_node implementation of the forwarding table
from the forwarding table's users:
Introduce rt_walktree() for walking the routing table and
applying a function to each rtentry. Replace most
rn_walktree() calls with it.
Use rt_getkey()/rt_setkey() to get/set a route's destination.
Keep a pointer to the sockaddr key in the rtentry, so that
rtentry users do not have to grovel in the radix_node for
the key.
Add a RTM_GET method to rtrequest. Use that instead of
radix_node lookups in, e.g., carp(4).
Add sys/net/link_proto.c, which supplies sockaddr routines for
link-layer socket addresses (sockaddr_dl).
Cosmetic:
Constify. KNF. Stop open-coding LIST_FOREACH, TAILQ_FOREACH,
et cetera. Use NULL instead of 0 for null pointers. Use
__arraycount(). Reduce gratuitous parenthesization.
Stop using variadic arguments for rip6_output(), it is
unnecessary.
Remove the unnecessary rtentry member rt_genmask and the
code to maintain it, since nothing actually used it.
Make rt_maskedcopy() easier to read by using meaningful variable
names.
Extract a subroutine intern_netmask() for looking up a netmask in
the masks table.
Start converting backslash-ridden IPv6 macros in
sys/netinet6/in6_var.h into inline subroutines that one
can read without special eyeglasses.
One functional change: when the kernel serves an RTM_GET, RTM_LOCK,
or RTM_CHANGE request, it applies the netmask (if supplied) to a
destination before searching for it in the forwarding table.
I have changed sys/netinet/ip_carp.c, carp_setroute(), to remove
the unlawful radix_node knowledge.
Apart from the changes to carp(4), netiso, ATM, and strip(4), I
have run the changes on three nodes in my wireless routing testbed,
which involves IPv4 + IPv6 dynamic routing acrobatics, and it's
working beautifully so far.
2007-07-20 00:48:52 +04:00
|
|
|
&satocsin6(rt_getkey(rt))->sin6_addr,
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
MLTMASK_LEN)) {
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
RTFREE(rt);
|
|
|
|
rt = NULL;
|
Synchronize access to the ifaddr list by in6_update_ifa() and
in6_control() with splnet()/splx(). I was being a bit paranoid
here. Following a cursory analysis of the code, this still looked
necessary. We don't spend a lot of time in these calls, so it
should not be too harmful to suspend network interrupts.
In in6_unlink_ifa(), call in6_delmulti() just once on each multicast
address (in6_multi). Previously, in6_unlink_ifa() called in6_delmulti()
on each in6_multi until in6_delmulti() removed the in6_multi from
the list and freed its memory. That's not justified: the multicast
list holds *one* reference. All other references belong to other
entities. We must wait to free the memory until the other entities
release their references, to protect against dereferencing a freed
in6_multi.
XXX I need to revisit in6_delmulti(), in6_unlink_ifa(), and friends,
XXX to pry apart the conditions where an in6_multi is removed from
XXX its list and where it is freed. Following my change, above,
XXX we still risk dereferencing a freed in6_multi.
Prevent in6_update_ifa() and in6_addremloop() from creating dangling
pointers to interfaces in the routing table. Previously, my NetBSD
tunnel concentrator, which adds and deletes a lot of P2P interfaces
with the same local address, crashed in 8 hours or less when it
dereferenced a dangling pointer to a deleted ifnet. Now, its uptime
is greater than 3 days.
2006-12-02 23:40:58 +03:00
|
|
|
} else if (rt->rt_ifp != ifp) {
|
|
|
|
IN6_DPRINTF("%s: rt_ifp %p -> %p (%s) "
|
|
|
|
"network %04x:%04x::/32 = %04x:%04x::/32\n",
|
|
|
|
__func__, rt->rt_ifp, ifp, ifp->if_xname,
|
|
|
|
ntohs(mltaddr.sin6_addr.s6_addr16[0]),
|
|
|
|
ntohs(mltaddr.sin6_addr.s6_addr16[1]),
|
Take steps to hide the radix_node implementation of the forwarding table
from the forwarding table's users:
Introduce rt_walktree() for walking the routing table and
applying a function to each rtentry. Replace most
rn_walktree() calls with it.
Use rt_getkey()/rt_setkey() to get/set a route's destination.
Keep a pointer to the sockaddr key in the rtentry, so that
rtentry users do not have to grovel in the radix_node for
the key.
Add a RTM_GET method to rtrequest. Use that instead of
radix_node lookups in, e.g., carp(4).
Add sys/net/link_proto.c, which supplies sockaddr routines for
link-layer socket addresses (sockaddr_dl).
Cosmetic:
Constify. KNF. Stop open-coding LIST_FOREACH, TAILQ_FOREACH,
et cetera. Use NULL instead of 0 for null pointers. Use
__arraycount(). Reduce gratuitous parenthesization.
Stop using variadic arguments for rip6_output(), it is
unnecessary.
Remove the unnecessary rtentry member rt_genmask and the
code to maintain it, since nothing actually used it.
Make rt_maskedcopy() easier to read by using meaningful variable
names.
Extract a subroutine intern_netmask() for looking up a netmask in
the masks table.
Start converting backslash-ridden IPv6 macros in
sys/netinet6/in6_var.h into inline subroutines that one
can read without special eyeglasses.
One functional change: when the kernel serves an RTM_GET, RTM_LOCK,
or RTM_CHANGE request, it applies the netmask (if supplied) to a
destination before searching for it in the forwarding table.
I have changed sys/netinet/ip_carp.c, carp_setroute(), to remove
the unlawful radix_node knowledge.
Apart from the changes to carp(4), netiso, ATM, and strip(4), I
have run the changes on three nodes in my wireless routing testbed,
which involves IPv4 + IPv6 dynamic routing acrobatics, and it's
working beautifully so far.
2007-07-20 00:48:52 +04:00
|
|
|
satocsin6(rt_getkey(rt))->sin6_addr.s6_addr16[0],
|
|
|
|
satocsin6(rt_getkey(rt))->sin6_addr.s6_addr16[1]);
|
Synchronize access to the ifaddr list by in6_update_ifa() and
in6_control() with splnet()/splx(). I was being a bit paranoid
here. Following a cursory analysis of the code, this still looked
necessary. We don't spend a lot of time in these calls, so it
should not be too harmful to suspend network interrupts.
In in6_unlink_ifa(), call in6_delmulti() just once on each multicast
address (in6_multi). Previously, in6_unlink_ifa() called in6_delmulti()
on each in6_multi until in6_delmulti() removed the in6_multi from
the list and freed its memory. That's not justified: the multicast
list holds *one* reference. All other references belong to other
entities. We must wait to free the memory until the other entities
release their references, to protect against dereferencing a freed
in6_multi.
XXX I need to revisit in6_delmulti(), in6_unlink_ifa(), and friends,
XXX to pry apart the conditions where an in6_multi is removed from
XXX its list and where it is freed. Following my change, above,
XXX we still risk dereferencing a freed in6_multi.
Prevent in6_update_ifa() and in6_addremloop() from creating dangling
pointers to interfaces in the routing table. Previously, my NetBSD
tunnel concentrator, which adds and deletes a lot of P2P interfaces
with the same local address, crashed in 8 hours or less when it
dereferenced a dangling pointer to a deleted ifnet. Now, its uptime
is greater than 3 days.
2006-12-02 23:40:58 +03:00
|
|
|
rt_replace_ifa(rt, &ia->ia_ifa);
|
|
|
|
rt->rt_ifp = ifp;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!rt) {
|
|
|
|
struct rt_addrinfo info;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-18 19:00:08 +03:00
|
|
|
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
info.rti_info[RTAX_DST] = (struct sockaddr *)&mltaddr;
|
|
|
|
info.rti_info[RTAX_GATEWAY] =
|
|
|
|
(struct sockaddr *)&ia->ia_addr;
|
|
|
|
info.rti_info[RTAX_NETMASK] =
|
|
|
|
(struct sockaddr *)&mltmask;
|
|
|
|
info.rti_info[RTAX_IFA] =
|
|
|
|
(struct sockaddr *)&ia->ia_addr;
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: we need RTF_CLONING to fake nd6_rtrequest */
|
|
|
|
info.rti_flags = RTF_UP | RTF_CLONING;
|
|
|
|
error = rtrequest1(RTM_ADD, &info, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
RTFREE(rt);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
imm = in6_joingroup(ifp, &mltaddr.sin6_addr, &error, 0);
|
2004-06-16 07:17:26 +04:00
|
|
|
if (!imm) {
|
|
|
|
nd6log((LOG_WARNING,
|
|
|
|
"in6_update_ifa: addmulti failed for "
|
|
|
|
"%s on %s (errno=%d)\n",
|
|
|
|
ip6_sprintf(&mltaddr.sin6_addr),
|
|
|
|
if_name(ifp), error));
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-06-16 07:17:26 +04:00
|
|
|
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&ia->ia6_memberships, imm, i6mm_chain);
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* join node information group address
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-03-06 23:33:52 +03:00
|
|
|
dad_delay = 0;
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
if ((flags & IN6_IFAUPDATE_DADDELAY)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The spec doesn't say anything about delay for this
|
|
|
|
* group, but the same logic should apply.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
First step of random number subsystem rework described in
<20111022023242.BA26F14A158@mail.netbsd.org>. This change includes
the following:
An initial cleanup and minor reorganization of the entropy pool
code in sys/dev/rnd.c and sys/dev/rndpool.c. Several bugs are
fixed. Some effort is made to accumulate entropy more quickly at
boot time.
A generic interface, "rndsink", is added, for stream generators to
request that they be re-keyed with good quality entropy from the pool
as soon as it is available.
The arc4random()/arc4randbytes() implementation in libkern is
adjusted to use the rndsink interface for rekeying, which helps
address the problem of low-quality keys at boot time.
An implementation of the FIPS 140-2 statistical tests for random
number generator quality is provided (libkern/rngtest.c). This
is based on Greg Rose's implementation from Qualcomm.
A new random stream generator, nist_ctr_drbg, is provided. It is
based on an implementation of the NIST SP800-90 CTR_DRBG by
Henric Jungheim. This generator users AES in a modified counter
mode to generate a backtracking-resistant random stream.
An abstraction layer, "cprng", is provided for in-kernel consumers
of randomness. The arc4random/arc4randbytes API is deprecated for
in-kernel use. It is replaced by "cprng_strong". The current
cprng_fast implementation wraps the existing arc4random
implementation. The current cprng_strong implementation wraps the
new CTR_DRBG implementation. Both interfaces are rekeyed from
the entropy pool automatically at intervals justifiable from best
current cryptographic practice.
In some quick tests, cprng_fast() is about the same speed as
the old arc4randbytes(), and cprng_strong() is about 20% faster
than rnd_extract_data(). Performance is expected to improve.
The AES code in src/crypto/rijndael is no longer an optional
kernel component, as it is required by cprng_strong, which is
not an optional kernel component.
The entropy pool output is subjected to the rngtest tests at
startup time; if it fails, the system will reboot. There is
approximately a 3/10000 chance of a false positive from these
tests. Entropy pool _input_ from hardware random numbers is
subjected to the rngtest tests at attach time, as well as the
FIPS continuous-output test, to detect bad or stuck hardware
RNGs; if any are detected, they are detached, but the system
continues to run.
A problem with rndctl(8) is fixed -- datastructures with
pointers in arrays are no longer passed to userspace (this
was not a security problem, but rather a major issue for
compat32). A new kernel will require a new rndctl.
The sysctl kern.arandom() and kern.urandom() nodes are hooked
up to the new generators, but the /dev/*random pseudodevices
are not, yet.
Manual pages for the new kernel interfaces are forthcoming.
2011-11-20 02:51:18 +04:00
|
|
|
dad_delay = cprng_fast32() %
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
(MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY * hz);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-12-02 21:59:17 +03:00
|
|
|
if (in6_nigroup(ifp, hostname, hostnamelen, &mltaddr) != 0)
|
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
else if ((imm = in6_joingroup(ifp, &mltaddr.sin6_addr, &error,
|
|
|
|
dad_delay)) == NULL) { /* XXX jinmei */
|
|
|
|
nd6log((LOG_WARNING, "in6_update_ifa: "
|
|
|
|
"addmulti failed for %s on %s (errno=%d)\n",
|
|
|
|
ip6_sprintf(&mltaddr.sin6_addr),
|
|
|
|
if_name(ifp), error));
|
|
|
|
/* XXX not very fatal, go on... */
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&ia->ia6_memberships, imm, i6mm_chain);
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* join interface-local all-nodes address.
|
|
|
|
* (ff01::1%ifN, and ff01::%ifN/32)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
mltaddr.sin6_addr = in6addr_nodelocal_allnodes;
|
2006-12-02 21:59:17 +03:00
|
|
|
if ((error = in6_setscope(&mltaddr.sin6_addr, ifp, NULL)) != 0)
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup; /* XXX: should not fail */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: again, do we really need the route? */
|
|
|
|
rt = rtalloc1((struct sockaddr *)&mltaddr, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (rt) {
|
|
|
|
/* 32bit came from "mltmask" */
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(&mltaddr.sin6_addr,
|
Take steps to hide the radix_node implementation of the forwarding table
from the forwarding table's users:
Introduce rt_walktree() for walking the routing table and
applying a function to each rtentry. Replace most
rn_walktree() calls with it.
Use rt_getkey()/rt_setkey() to get/set a route's destination.
Keep a pointer to the sockaddr key in the rtentry, so that
rtentry users do not have to grovel in the radix_node for
the key.
Add a RTM_GET method to rtrequest. Use that instead of
radix_node lookups in, e.g., carp(4).
Add sys/net/link_proto.c, which supplies sockaddr routines for
link-layer socket addresses (sockaddr_dl).
Cosmetic:
Constify. KNF. Stop open-coding LIST_FOREACH, TAILQ_FOREACH,
et cetera. Use NULL instead of 0 for null pointers. Use
__arraycount(). Reduce gratuitous parenthesization.
Stop using variadic arguments for rip6_output(), it is
unnecessary.
Remove the unnecessary rtentry member rt_genmask and the
code to maintain it, since nothing actually used it.
Make rt_maskedcopy() easier to read by using meaningful variable
names.
Extract a subroutine intern_netmask() for looking up a netmask in
the masks table.
Start converting backslash-ridden IPv6 macros in
sys/netinet6/in6_var.h into inline subroutines that one
can read without special eyeglasses.
One functional change: when the kernel serves an RTM_GET, RTM_LOCK,
or RTM_CHANGE request, it applies the netmask (if supplied) to a
destination before searching for it in the forwarding table.
I have changed sys/netinet/ip_carp.c, carp_setroute(), to remove
the unlawful radix_node knowledge.
Apart from the changes to carp(4), netiso, ATM, and strip(4), I
have run the changes on three nodes in my wireless routing testbed,
which involves IPv4 + IPv6 dynamic routing acrobatics, and it's
working beautifully so far.
2007-07-20 00:48:52 +04:00
|
|
|
&satocsin6(rt_getkey(rt))->sin6_addr,
|
Synchronize access to the ifaddr list by in6_update_ifa() and
in6_control() with splnet()/splx(). I was being a bit paranoid
here. Following a cursory analysis of the code, this still looked
necessary. We don't spend a lot of time in these calls, so it
should not be too harmful to suspend network interrupts.
In in6_unlink_ifa(), call in6_delmulti() just once on each multicast
address (in6_multi). Previously, in6_unlink_ifa() called in6_delmulti()
on each in6_multi until in6_delmulti() removed the in6_multi from
the list and freed its memory. That's not justified: the multicast
list holds *one* reference. All other references belong to other
entities. We must wait to free the memory until the other entities
release their references, to protect against dereferencing a freed
in6_multi.
XXX I need to revisit in6_delmulti(), in6_unlink_ifa(), and friends,
XXX to pry apart the conditions where an in6_multi is removed from
XXX its list and where it is freed. Following my change, above,
XXX we still risk dereferencing a freed in6_multi.
Prevent in6_update_ifa() and in6_addremloop() from creating dangling
pointers to interfaces in the routing table. Previously, my NetBSD
tunnel concentrator, which adds and deletes a lot of P2P interfaces
with the same local address, crashed in 8 hours or less when it
dereferenced a dangling pointer to a deleted ifnet. Now, its uptime
is greater than 3 days.
2006-12-02 23:40:58 +03:00
|
|
|
32 / NBBY)) {
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
RTFREE(rt);
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
rt = NULL;
|
Synchronize access to the ifaddr list by in6_update_ifa() and
in6_control() with splnet()/splx(). I was being a bit paranoid
here. Following a cursory analysis of the code, this still looked
necessary. We don't spend a lot of time in these calls, so it
should not be too harmful to suspend network interrupts.
In in6_unlink_ifa(), call in6_delmulti() just once on each multicast
address (in6_multi). Previously, in6_unlink_ifa() called in6_delmulti()
on each in6_multi until in6_delmulti() removed the in6_multi from
the list and freed its memory. That's not justified: the multicast
list holds *one* reference. All other references belong to other
entities. We must wait to free the memory until the other entities
release their references, to protect against dereferencing a freed
in6_multi.
XXX I need to revisit in6_delmulti(), in6_unlink_ifa(), and friends,
XXX to pry apart the conditions where an in6_multi is removed from
XXX its list and where it is freed. Following my change, above,
XXX we still risk dereferencing a freed in6_multi.
Prevent in6_update_ifa() and in6_addremloop() from creating dangling
pointers to interfaces in the routing table. Previously, my NetBSD
tunnel concentrator, which adds and deletes a lot of P2P interfaces
with the same local address, crashed in 8 hours or less when it
dereferenced a dangling pointer to a deleted ifnet. Now, its uptime
is greater than 3 days.
2006-12-02 23:40:58 +03:00
|
|
|
} else if (rt->rt_ifp != ifp) {
|
|
|
|
IN6_DPRINTF("%s: rt_ifp %p -> %p (%s) "
|
|
|
|
"network %04x:%04x::/32 = %04x:%04x::/32\n",
|
|
|
|
__func__, rt->rt_ifp, ifp, ifp->if_xname,
|
|
|
|
ntohs(mltaddr.sin6_addr.s6_addr16[0]),
|
|
|
|
ntohs(mltaddr.sin6_addr.s6_addr16[1]),
|
Take steps to hide the radix_node implementation of the forwarding table
from the forwarding table's users:
Introduce rt_walktree() for walking the routing table and
applying a function to each rtentry. Replace most
rn_walktree() calls with it.
Use rt_getkey()/rt_setkey() to get/set a route's destination.
Keep a pointer to the sockaddr key in the rtentry, so that
rtentry users do not have to grovel in the radix_node for
the key.
Add a RTM_GET method to rtrequest. Use that instead of
radix_node lookups in, e.g., carp(4).
Add sys/net/link_proto.c, which supplies sockaddr routines for
link-layer socket addresses (sockaddr_dl).
Cosmetic:
Constify. KNF. Stop open-coding LIST_FOREACH, TAILQ_FOREACH,
et cetera. Use NULL instead of 0 for null pointers. Use
__arraycount(). Reduce gratuitous parenthesization.
Stop using variadic arguments for rip6_output(), it is
unnecessary.
Remove the unnecessary rtentry member rt_genmask and the
code to maintain it, since nothing actually used it.
Make rt_maskedcopy() easier to read by using meaningful variable
names.
Extract a subroutine intern_netmask() for looking up a netmask in
the masks table.
Start converting backslash-ridden IPv6 macros in
sys/netinet6/in6_var.h into inline subroutines that one
can read without special eyeglasses.
One functional change: when the kernel serves an RTM_GET, RTM_LOCK,
or RTM_CHANGE request, it applies the netmask (if supplied) to a
destination before searching for it in the forwarding table.
I have changed sys/netinet/ip_carp.c, carp_setroute(), to remove
the unlawful radix_node knowledge.
Apart from the changes to carp(4), netiso, ATM, and strip(4), I
have run the changes on three nodes in my wireless routing testbed,
which involves IPv4 + IPv6 dynamic routing acrobatics, and it's
working beautifully so far.
2007-07-20 00:48:52 +04:00
|
|
|
satocsin6(rt_getkey(rt))->sin6_addr.s6_addr16[0],
|
|
|
|
satocsin6(rt_getkey(rt))->sin6_addr.s6_addr16[1]);
|
Synchronize access to the ifaddr list by in6_update_ifa() and
in6_control() with splnet()/splx(). I was being a bit paranoid
here. Following a cursory analysis of the code, this still looked
necessary. We don't spend a lot of time in these calls, so it
should not be too harmful to suspend network interrupts.
In in6_unlink_ifa(), call in6_delmulti() just once on each multicast
address (in6_multi). Previously, in6_unlink_ifa() called in6_delmulti()
on each in6_multi until in6_delmulti() removed the in6_multi from
the list and freed its memory. That's not justified: the multicast
list holds *one* reference. All other references belong to other
entities. We must wait to free the memory until the other entities
release their references, to protect against dereferencing a freed
in6_multi.
XXX I need to revisit in6_delmulti(), in6_unlink_ifa(), and friends,
XXX to pry apart the conditions where an in6_multi is removed from
XXX its list and where it is freed. Following my change, above,
XXX we still risk dereferencing a freed in6_multi.
Prevent in6_update_ifa() and in6_addremloop() from creating dangling
pointers to interfaces in the routing table. Previously, my NetBSD
tunnel concentrator, which adds and deletes a lot of P2P interfaces
with the same local address, crashed in 8 hours or less when it
dereferenced a dangling pointer to a deleted ifnet. Now, its uptime
is greater than 3 days.
2006-12-02 23:40:58 +03:00
|
|
|
rt_replace_ifa(rt, &ia->ia_ifa);
|
|
|
|
rt->rt_ifp = ifp;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!rt) {
|
|
|
|
struct rt_addrinfo info;
|
2001-12-21 11:54:52 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-18 19:00:08 +03:00
|
|
|
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
info.rti_info[RTAX_DST] = (struct sockaddr *)&mltaddr;
|
|
|
|
info.rti_info[RTAX_GATEWAY] =
|
|
|
|
(struct sockaddr *)&ia->ia_addr;
|
|
|
|
info.rti_info[RTAX_NETMASK] =
|
|
|
|
(struct sockaddr *)&mltmask;
|
|
|
|
info.rti_info[RTAX_IFA] =
|
|
|
|
(struct sockaddr *)&ia->ia_addr;
|
|
|
|
info.rti_flags = RTF_UP | RTF_CLONING;
|
|
|
|
error = rtrequest1(RTM_ADD, &info, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
#undef MLTMASK_LEN
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
RTFREE(rt);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
imm = in6_joingroup(ifp, &mltaddr.sin6_addr, &error, 0);
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!imm) {
|
|
|
|
nd6log((LOG_WARNING, "in6_update_ifa: "
|
|
|
|
"addmulti failed for %s on %s (errno=%d)\n",
|
|
|
|
ip6_sprintf(&mltaddr.sin6_addr),
|
|
|
|
if_name(ifp), error));
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&ia->ia6_memberships, imm, i6mm_chain);
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Perform DAD, if needed.
|
|
|
|
* XXX It may be of use, if we can administratively
|
|
|
|
* disable DAD.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (hostIsNew && in6if_do_dad(ifp) &&
|
|
|
|
((ifra->ifra_flags & IN6_IFF_NODAD) == 0) &&
|
|
|
|
(ia->ia6_flags & IN6_IFF_TENTATIVE))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int mindelay, maxdelay;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-03-06 23:33:52 +03:00
|
|
|
dad_delay = 0;
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
if ((flags & IN6_IFAUPDATE_DADDELAY)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We need to impose a delay before sending an NS
|
|
|
|
* for DAD. Check if we also needed a delay for the
|
|
|
|
* corresponding MLD message. If we did, the delay
|
|
|
|
* should be larger than the MLD delay (this could be
|
|
|
|
* relaxed a bit, but this simple logic is at least
|
|
|
|
* safe).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
mindelay = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (in6m_sol != NULL &&
|
|
|
|
in6m_sol->in6m_state == MLD_REPORTPENDING) {
|
|
|
|
mindelay = in6m_sol->in6m_timer;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
maxdelay = MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY * hz;
|
|
|
|
if (maxdelay - mindelay == 0)
|
2006-03-06 23:33:52 +03:00
|
|
|
dad_delay = 0;
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
else {
|
2006-03-06 23:33:52 +03:00
|
|
|
dad_delay =
|
First step of random number subsystem rework described in
<20111022023242.BA26F14A158@mail.netbsd.org>. This change includes
the following:
An initial cleanup and minor reorganization of the entropy pool
code in sys/dev/rnd.c and sys/dev/rndpool.c. Several bugs are
fixed. Some effort is made to accumulate entropy more quickly at
boot time.
A generic interface, "rndsink", is added, for stream generators to
request that they be re-keyed with good quality entropy from the pool
as soon as it is available.
The arc4random()/arc4randbytes() implementation in libkern is
adjusted to use the rndsink interface for rekeying, which helps
address the problem of low-quality keys at boot time.
An implementation of the FIPS 140-2 statistical tests for random
number generator quality is provided (libkern/rngtest.c). This
is based on Greg Rose's implementation from Qualcomm.
A new random stream generator, nist_ctr_drbg, is provided. It is
based on an implementation of the NIST SP800-90 CTR_DRBG by
Henric Jungheim. This generator users AES in a modified counter
mode to generate a backtracking-resistant random stream.
An abstraction layer, "cprng", is provided for in-kernel consumers
of randomness. The arc4random/arc4randbytes API is deprecated for
in-kernel use. It is replaced by "cprng_strong". The current
cprng_fast implementation wraps the existing arc4random
implementation. The current cprng_strong implementation wraps the
new CTR_DRBG implementation. Both interfaces are rekeyed from
the entropy pool automatically at intervals justifiable from best
current cryptographic practice.
In some quick tests, cprng_fast() is about the same speed as
the old arc4randbytes(), and cprng_strong() is about 20% faster
than rnd_extract_data(). Performance is expected to improve.
The AES code in src/crypto/rijndael is no longer an optional
kernel component, as it is required by cprng_strong, which is
not an optional kernel component.
The entropy pool output is subjected to the rngtest tests at
startup time; if it fails, the system will reboot. There is
approximately a 3/10000 chance of a false positive from these
tests. Entropy pool _input_ from hardware random numbers is
subjected to the rngtest tests at attach time, as well as the
FIPS continuous-output test, to detect bad or stuck hardware
RNGs; if any are detected, they are detached, but the system
continues to run.
A problem with rndctl(8) is fixed -- datastructures with
pointers in arrays are no longer passed to userspace (this
was not a security problem, but rather a major issue for
compat32). A new kernel will require a new rndctl.
The sysctl kern.arandom() and kern.urandom() nodes are hooked
up to the new generators, but the /dev/*random pseudodevices
are not, yet.
Manual pages for the new kernel interfaces are forthcoming.
2011-11-20 02:51:18 +04:00
|
|
|
(cprng_fast32() % (maxdelay - mindelay)) +
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
mindelay;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-02-06 01:32:24 +03:00
|
|
|
nd6_dad_start(&ia->ia_ifa, dad_delay);
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return error;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
unlink:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* XXX: if a change of an existing address failed, keep the entry
|
|
|
|
* anyway.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (hostIsNew)
|
|
|
|
in6_unlink_ifa(ia, ifp);
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return error;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
|
|
in6_purgeaddr(&ia->ia_ifa);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Synchronize access to the ifaddr list by in6_update_ifa() and
in6_control() with splnet()/splx(). I was being a bit paranoid
here. Following a cursory analysis of the code, this still looked
necessary. We don't spend a lot of time in these calls, so it
should not be too harmful to suspend network interrupts.
In in6_unlink_ifa(), call in6_delmulti() just once on each multicast
address (in6_multi). Previously, in6_unlink_ifa() called in6_delmulti()
on each in6_multi until in6_delmulti() removed the in6_multi from
the list and freed its memory. That's not justified: the multicast
list holds *one* reference. All other references belong to other
entities. We must wait to free the memory until the other entities
release their references, to protect against dereferencing a freed
in6_multi.
XXX I need to revisit in6_delmulti(), in6_unlink_ifa(), and friends,
XXX to pry apart the conditions where an in6_multi is removed from
XXX its list and where it is freed. Following my change, above,
XXX we still risk dereferencing a freed in6_multi.
Prevent in6_update_ifa() and in6_addremloop() from creating dangling
pointers to interfaces in the routing table. Previously, my NetBSD
tunnel concentrator, which adds and deletes a lot of P2P interfaces
with the same local address, crashed in 8 hours or less when it
dereferenced a dangling pointer to a deleted ifnet. Now, its uptime
is greater than 3 days.
2006-12-02 23:40:58 +03:00
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
in6_update_ifa(struct ifnet *ifp, struct in6_aliasreq *ifra,
|
|
|
|
struct in6_ifaddr *ia, int flags)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc, s;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s = splnet();
|
|
|
|
rc = in6_update_ifa1(ifp, ifra, ia, flags);
|
|
|
|
splx(s);
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-02-02 01:52:04 +03:00
|
|
|
void
|
2007-05-23 21:14:59 +04:00
|
|
|
in6_purgeaddr(struct ifaddr *ifa)
|
2000-02-02 01:52:04 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
struct ifnet *ifp = ifa->ifa_ifp;
|
|
|
|
struct in6_ifaddr *ia = (struct in6_ifaddr *) ifa;
|
|
|
|
struct in6_multi_mship *imm;
|
2000-02-02 01:52:04 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2001-02-07 11:59:47 +03:00
|
|
|
/* stop DAD processing */
|
|
|
|
nd6_dad_stop(ifa);
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* delete route to the destination of the address being purged.
|
|
|
|
* The interface must be p2p or loopback in this case.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((ia->ia_flags & IFA_ROUTE) != 0 && ia->ia_dstaddr.sin6_len != 0) {
|
|
|
|
int e;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((e = rtinit(&(ia->ia_ifa), (int)RTM_DELETE, RTF_HOST))
|
|
|
|
!= 0) {
|
|
|
|
log(LOG_ERR, "in6_purgeaddr: failed to remove "
|
|
|
|
"a route to the p2p destination: %s on %s, "
|
|
|
|
"errno=%d\n",
|
|
|
|
ip6_sprintf(&ia->ia_addr.sin6_addr), if_name(ifp),
|
|
|
|
e);
|
|
|
|
/* proceed anyway... */
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
ia->ia_flags &= ~IFA_ROUTE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-02-02 01:52:04 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
/* Remove ownaddr's loopback rtentry, if it exists. */
|
|
|
|
in6_ifremloop(&(ia->ia_ifa));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* leave from multicast groups we have joined for the interface
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-11-18 19:23:15 +03:00
|
|
|
while ((imm = LIST_FIRST(&ia->ia6_memberships)) != NULL) {
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
LIST_REMOVE(imm, i6mm_chain);
|
|
|
|
in6_leavegroup(imm);
|
2000-02-02 01:52:04 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
in6_unlink_ifa(ia, ifp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2007-05-23 21:14:59 +04:00
|
|
|
in6_unlink_ifa(struct in6_ifaddr *ia, struct ifnet *ifp)
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct in6_ifaddr *oia;
|
|
|
|
int s = splnet();
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-06 03:28:36 +03:00
|
|
|
ifa_remove(ifp, &ia->ia_ifa);
|
2000-02-02 01:52:04 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
oia = ia;
|
|
|
|
if (oia == (ia = in6_ifaddr))
|
|
|
|
in6_ifaddr = ia->ia_next;
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
while (ia->ia_next && (ia->ia_next != oia))
|
|
|
|
ia = ia->ia_next;
|
|
|
|
if (ia->ia_next)
|
|
|
|
ia->ia_next = oia->ia_next;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
/* search failed */
|
|
|
|
printf("Couldn't unlink in6_ifaddr from in6_ifaddr\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-02-02 01:52:04 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-09-16 22:01:30 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* XXX thorpej@NetBSD.org -- if the interface is going
|
|
|
|
* XXX away, don't save the multicast entries, delete them!
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (LIST_EMPTY(&oia->ia6_multiaddrs))
|
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
else if (oia->ia_ifa.ifa_ifp->if_output == if_nulloutput) {
|
|
|
|
struct in6_multi *in6m, *next;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (in6m = LIST_FIRST(&oia->ia6_multiaddrs); in6m != NULL;
|
|
|
|
in6m = next) {
|
|
|
|
next = LIST_NEXT(in6m, in6m_entry);
|
|
|
|
in6_delmulti(in6m);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
in6_savemkludge(oia);
|
2000-02-02 01:52:04 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
* Release the reference to the base prefix. There should be a
|
|
|
|
* positive reference.
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
if (oia->ia6_ndpr == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
nd6log((LOG_NOTICE, "in6_unlink_ifa: autoconf'ed address "
|
|
|
|
"%p has no prefix\n", oia));
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
oia->ia6_ndpr->ndpr_refcnt--;
|
|
|
|
oia->ia6_ndpr = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Also, if the address being removed is autoconf'ed, call
|
|
|
|
* pfxlist_onlink_check() since the release might affect the status of
|
|
|
|
* other (detached) addresses.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((oia->ia6_flags & IN6_IFF_AUTOCONF) != 0)
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
pfxlist_onlink_check();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* release another refcnt for the link from in6_ifaddr.
|
|
|
|
* Note that we should decrement the refcnt at least once for all *BSD.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2000-02-02 01:52:04 +03:00
|
|
|
IFAFREE(&oia->ia_ifa);
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
splx(s);
|
2000-02-03 02:28:08 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2000-02-02 16:44:05 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2000-02-03 02:28:08 +03:00
|
|
|
void
|
2007-05-23 21:14:59 +04:00
|
|
|
in6_purgeif(struct ifnet *ifp)
|
2000-02-03 02:28:08 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2007-12-06 02:47:17 +03:00
|
|
|
if_purgeaddrs(ifp, AF_INET6, in6_purgeaddr);
|
2000-02-03 02:28:08 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
in6_ifdetach(ifp);
|
2000-02-02 01:52:04 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* SIOC[GAD]LIFADDR.
|
2001-02-10 07:14:26 +03:00
|
|
|
* SIOCGLIFADDR: get first address. (?)
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
* SIOCGLIFADDR with IFLR_PREFIX:
|
|
|
|
* get first address that matches the specified prefix.
|
|
|
|
* SIOCALIFADDR: add the specified address.
|
|
|
|
* SIOCALIFADDR with IFLR_PREFIX:
|
|
|
|
* add the specified prefix, filling hostid part from
|
|
|
|
* the first link-local address. prefixlen must be <= 64.
|
|
|
|
* SIOCDLIFADDR: delete the specified address.
|
|
|
|
* SIOCDLIFADDR with IFLR_PREFIX:
|
|
|
|
* delete the first address that matches the specified prefix.
|
|
|
|
* return values:
|
|
|
|
* EINVAL on invalid parameters
|
|
|
|
* EADDRNOTAVAIL on prefix match failed/specified address not found
|
|
|
|
* other values may be returned from in6_ioctl()
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* NOTE: SIOCALIFADDR(with IFLR_PREFIX set) allows prefixlen less than 64.
|
2006-11-24 22:46:58 +03:00
|
|
|
* this is to accommodate address naming scheme other than RFC2374,
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
* in the future.
|
|
|
|
* RFC2373 defines interface id to be 64bit, but it allows non-RFC2374
|
|
|
|
* address encoding scheme. (see figure on page 8)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
2007-05-23 21:14:59 +04:00
|
|
|
in6_lifaddr_ioctl(struct socket *so, u_long cmd, void *data,
|
|
|
|
struct ifnet *ifp, struct lwp *l)
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2009-02-06 01:32:24 +03:00
|
|
|
struct in6_ifaddr *ia;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
struct if_laddrreq *iflr = (struct if_laddrreq *)data;
|
|
|
|
struct ifaddr *ifa;
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
struct sockaddr *sa;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* sanity checks */
|
|
|
|
if (!data || !ifp) {
|
|
|
|
panic("invalid argument to in6_lifaddr_ioctl");
|
2001-12-21 11:54:52 +03:00
|
|
|
/* NOTREACHED */
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (cmd) {
|
|
|
|
case SIOCGLIFADDR:
|
|
|
|
/* address must be specified on GET with IFLR_PREFIX */
|
|
|
|
if ((iflr->flags & IFLR_PREFIX) == 0)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2001-12-21 11:54:52 +03:00
|
|
|
/* FALLTHROUGH */
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
case SIOCALIFADDR:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCDLIFADDR:
|
|
|
|
/* address must be specified on ADD and DELETE */
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
sa = (struct sockaddr *)&iflr->addr;
|
|
|
|
if (sa->sa_family != AF_INET6)
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
if (sa->sa_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
/* XXX need improvement */
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
sa = (struct sockaddr *)&iflr->dstaddr;
|
|
|
|
if (sa->sa_family && sa->sa_family != AF_INET6)
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
if (sa->sa_len && sa->sa_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2001-12-21 11:54:52 +03:00
|
|
|
default: /* shouldn't happen */
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
|
|
panic("invalid cmd to in6_lifaddr_ioctl");
|
2001-12-21 11:54:52 +03:00
|
|
|
/* NOTREACHED */
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
return EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-12-02 21:59:17 +03:00
|
|
|
if (sizeof(struct in6_addr) * NBBY < iflr->prefixlen)
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (cmd) {
|
|
|
|
case SIOCALIFADDR:
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct in6_aliasreq ifra;
|
2005-05-30 01:43:51 +04:00
|
|
|
struct in6_addr *xhostid = NULL;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
int prefixlen;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((iflr->flags & IFLR_PREFIX) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2005-05-30 01:43:51 +04:00
|
|
|
* xhostid is to fill in the hostid part of the
|
|
|
|
* address. xhostid points to the first link-local
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
* address attached to the interface.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-02-06 01:32:24 +03:00
|
|
|
ia = in6ifa_ifpforlinklocal(ifp, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (ia == NULL)
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
return EADDRNOTAVAIL;
|
2009-02-06 01:32:24 +03:00
|
|
|
xhostid = IFA_IN6(&ia->ia_ifa);
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* prefixlen must be <= 64. */
|
|
|
|
if (64 < iflr->prefixlen)
|
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
prefixlen = iflr->prefixlen;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* hostid part must be zero. */
|
|
|
|
sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&iflr->addr;
|
|
|
|
if (sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[2] != 0
|
|
|
|
|| sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3] != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
prefixlen = iflr->prefixlen;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* copy args to in6_aliasreq, perform ioctl(SIOCAIFADDR_IN6). */
|
2009-03-18 19:00:08 +03:00
|
|
|
memset(&ifra, 0, sizeof(ifra));
|
2009-04-18 18:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
memcpy(ifra.ifra_name, iflr->iflr_name, sizeof(ifra.ifra_name));
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-04-18 18:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
memcpy(&ifra.ifra_addr, &iflr->addr,
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
((struct sockaddr *)&iflr->addr)->sa_len);
|
2005-05-30 01:43:51 +04:00
|
|
|
if (xhostid) {
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
/* fill in hostid part */
|
|
|
|
ifra.ifra_addr.sin6_addr.s6_addr32[2] =
|
2005-05-30 01:43:51 +04:00
|
|
|
xhostid->s6_addr32[2];
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
ifra.ifra_addr.sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3] =
|
2005-05-30 01:43:51 +04:00
|
|
|
xhostid->s6_addr32[3];
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-12-21 11:54:52 +03:00
|
|
|
if (((struct sockaddr *)&iflr->dstaddr)->sa_family) { /* XXX */
|
2009-04-18 18:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
memcpy(&ifra.ifra_dstaddr, &iflr->dstaddr,
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
((struct sockaddr *)&iflr->dstaddr)->sa_len);
|
2005-05-30 01:43:51 +04:00
|
|
|
if (xhostid) {
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
ifra.ifra_dstaddr.sin6_addr.s6_addr32[2] =
|
2005-05-30 01:43:51 +04:00
|
|
|
xhostid->s6_addr32[2];
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
ifra.ifra_dstaddr.sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3] =
|
2005-05-30 01:43:51 +04:00
|
|
|
xhostid->s6_addr32[3];
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ifra.ifra_prefixmask.sin6_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
|
2002-06-08 04:07:00 +04:00
|
|
|
in6_prefixlen2mask(&ifra.ifra_prefixmask.sin6_addr, prefixlen);
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2006-10-15 11:00:44 +04:00
|
|
|
ifra.ifra_lifetime.ia6t_vltime = ND6_INFINITE_LIFETIME;
|
|
|
|
ifra.ifra_lifetime.ia6t_pltime = ND6_INFINITE_LIFETIME;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
ifra.ifra_flags = iflr->flags & ~IFLR_PREFIX;
|
2011-02-06 22:12:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return in6_control(so, SIOCAIFADDR_IN6, &ifra, ifp, l);
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case SIOCGLIFADDR:
|
|
|
|
case SIOCDLIFADDR:
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct in6_addr mask, candidate, match;
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6;
|
|
|
|
int cmp;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-18 19:00:08 +03:00
|
|
|
memset(&mask, 0, sizeof(mask));
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
if (iflr->flags & IFLR_PREFIX) {
|
|
|
|
/* lookup a prefix rather than address. */
|
2002-06-08 04:07:00 +04:00
|
|
|
in6_prefixlen2mask(&mask, iflr->prefixlen);
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&iflr->addr;
|
2009-04-18 18:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
memcpy(&match, &sin6->sin6_addr, sizeof(match));
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
match.s6_addr32[0] &= mask.s6_addr32[0];
|
|
|
|
match.s6_addr32[1] &= mask.s6_addr32[1];
|
|
|
|
match.s6_addr32[2] &= mask.s6_addr32[2];
|
|
|
|
match.s6_addr32[3] &= mask.s6_addr32[3];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* if you set extra bits, that's wrong */
|
2009-03-18 18:14:29 +03:00
|
|
|
if (memcmp(&match, &sin6->sin6_addr, sizeof(match)))
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cmp = 1;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (cmd == SIOCGLIFADDR) {
|
|
|
|
/* on getting an address, take the 1st match */
|
2001-12-21 11:54:52 +03:00
|
|
|
cmp = 0; /* XXX */
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* on deleting an address, do exact match */
|
2002-06-08 04:07:00 +04:00
|
|
|
in6_prefixlen2mask(&mask, 128);
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&iflr->addr;
|
2009-04-18 18:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
memcpy(&match, &sin6->sin6_addr, sizeof(match));
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cmp = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-04 13:27:33 +03:00
|
|
|
IFADDR_FOREACH(ifa, ifp) {
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family != AF_INET6)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (!cmp)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* XXX: this is adhoc, but is necessary to allow
|
|
|
|
* a user to specify fe80::/64 (not /10) for a
|
|
|
|
* link-local address.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-04-18 18:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
memcpy(&candidate, IFA_IN6(ifa), sizeof(candidate));
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
in6_clearscope(&candidate);
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
candidate.s6_addr32[0] &= mask.s6_addr32[0];
|
|
|
|
candidate.s6_addr32[1] &= mask.s6_addr32[1];
|
|
|
|
candidate.s6_addr32[2] &= mask.s6_addr32[2];
|
|
|
|
candidate.s6_addr32[3] &= mask.s6_addr32[3];
|
|
|
|
if (IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&candidate, &match))
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ifa)
|
|
|
|
return EADDRNOTAVAIL;
|
|
|
|
ia = ifa2ia6(ifa);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (cmd == SIOCGLIFADDR) {
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
/* fill in the if_laddrreq structure */
|
2009-04-18 18:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
memcpy(&iflr->addr, &ia->ia_addr, ia->ia_addr.sin6_len);
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
error = sa6_recoverscope(
|
|
|
|
(struct sockaddr_in6 *)&iflr->addr);
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return error;
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
if ((ifp->if_flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT) != 0) {
|
2009-04-18 18:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
memcpy(&iflr->dstaddr, &ia->ia_dstaddr,
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
ia->ia_dstaddr.sin6_len);
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
error = sa6_recoverscope(
|
|
|
|
(struct sockaddr_in6 *)&iflr->dstaddr);
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return error;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
} else
|
2009-03-18 19:00:08 +03:00
|
|
|
memset(&iflr->dstaddr, 0, sizeof(iflr->dstaddr));
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
iflr->prefixlen =
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
in6_mask2len(&ia->ia_prefixmask.sin6_addr, NULL);
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2001-12-21 11:54:52 +03:00
|
|
|
iflr->flags = ia->ia6_flags; /* XXX */
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
struct in6_aliasreq ifra;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* fill in6_aliasreq and do ioctl(SIOCDIFADDR_IN6) */
|
2009-03-18 19:00:08 +03:00
|
|
|
memset(&ifra, 0, sizeof(ifra));
|
2009-04-18 18:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
memcpy(ifra.ifra_name, iflr->iflr_name,
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
sizeof(ifra.ifra_name));
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-04-18 18:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
memcpy(&ifra.ifra_addr, &ia->ia_addr,
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
ia->ia_addr.sin6_len);
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
if ((ifp->if_flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT) != 0) {
|
2009-04-18 18:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
memcpy(&ifra.ifra_dstaddr, &ia->ia_dstaddr,
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
ia->ia_dstaddr.sin6_len);
|
2000-03-02 10:14:52 +03:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2009-03-18 19:00:08 +03:00
|
|
|
memset(&ifra.ifra_dstaddr, 0,
|
2000-03-02 10:14:52 +03:00
|
|
|
sizeof(ifra.ifra_dstaddr));
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-04-18 18:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
memcpy(&ifra.ifra_dstaddr, &ia->ia_prefixmask,
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
ia->ia_prefixmask.sin6_len);
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ifra.ifra_flags = ia->ia6_flags;
|
2011-02-06 22:12:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return in6_control(so, SIOCDIFADDR_IN6, &ifra, ifp, l);
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-12-21 11:54:52 +03:00
|
|
|
return EOPNOTSUPP; /* just for safety */
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2006-09-26 15:55:41 +04:00
|
|
|
* Initialize an interface's internet6 address
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
* and routing table entry.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2001-12-21 11:54:52 +03:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2007-05-23 21:14:59 +04:00
|
|
|
in6_ifinit(struct ifnet *ifp, struct in6_ifaddr *ia,
|
2009-02-06 01:32:24 +03:00
|
|
|
const struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6, int newhost)
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
int error = 0, plen, ifacount = 0;
|
2001-04-14 03:29:55 +04:00
|
|
|
int s = splnet();
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
struct ifaddr *ifa;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Give the interface a chance to initialize
|
|
|
|
* if this is its first address,
|
|
|
|
* and to validate the address if necessary.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2007-12-04 13:27:33 +03:00
|
|
|
IFADDR_FOREACH(ifa, ifp) {
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ifa->ifa_addr == NULL)
|
|
|
|
continue; /* just for safety */
|
|
|
|
if (ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family != AF_INET6)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
ifacount++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ia->ia_addr = *sin6;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-10-19 05:52:22 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ifacount <= 1 &&
|
|
|
|
(error = if_addr_init(ifp, &ia->ia_ifa, true)) != 0) {
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
splx(s);
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return error;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
splx(s);
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
ia->ia_ifa.ifa_metric = ifp->if_metric;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* we could do in(6)_socktrim here, but just omit it at this moment. */
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
* Special case:
|
|
|
|
* If the destination address is specified for a point-to-point
|
|
|
|
* interface, install a route to the destination as an interface
|
|
|
|
* direct route.
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
plen = in6_mask2len(&ia->ia_prefixmask.sin6_addr, NULL); /* XXX */
|
|
|
|
if (plen == 128 && ia->ia_dstaddr.sin6_family == AF_INET6) {
|
2009-02-06 01:32:24 +03:00
|
|
|
if ((error = rtinit(&ia->ia_ifa, RTM_ADD,
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
RTF_UP | RTF_HOST)) != 0)
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return error;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
ia->ia_flags |= IFA_ROUTE;
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
/* Add ownaddr as loopback rtentry, if necessary (ex. on p2p link). */
|
|
|
|
if (newhost) {
|
|
|
|
/* set the rtrequest function to create llinfo */
|
|
|
|
ia->ia_ifa.ifa_rtrequest = nd6_rtrequest;
|
2009-02-06 01:32:24 +03:00
|
|
|
in6_ifaddloop(&ia->ia_ifa);
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ifp->if_flags & IFF_MULTICAST)
|
|
|
|
in6_restoremkludge(ia, ifp);
|
|
|
|
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return error;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-04-23 00:05:15 +04:00
|
|
|
static struct ifaddr *
|
|
|
|
bestifa(struct ifaddr *best_ifa, struct ifaddr *ifa)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (best_ifa == NULL || best_ifa->ifa_preference < ifa->ifa_preference)
|
|
|
|
return ifa;
|
|
|
|
return best_ifa;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Find an IPv6 interface link-local address specific to an interface.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct in6_ifaddr *
|
KNF: de-__P, bzero -> memset, bcmp -> memcmp. Remove extraneous
parentheses in return statements.
Cosmetic: don't open-code TAILQ_FOREACH().
Cosmetic: change types of variables to avoid oodles of casts: in
in6_src.c, avoid casts by changing several route_in6 pointers
to struct route pointers. Remove unnecessary casts to caddr_t
elsewhere.
Pave the way for eliminating address family-specific route caches:
soon, struct route will not embed a sockaddr, but it will hold
a reference to an external sockaddr, instead. We will set the
destination sockaddr using rtcache_setdst(). (I created a stub
for it, but it isn't used anywhere, yet.) rtcache_free() will
free the sockaddr. I have extracted from rtcache_free() a helper
subroutine, rtcache_clear(). rtcache_clear() will "forget" a
cached route, but it will not forget the destination by releasing
the sockaddr. I use rtcache_clear() instead of rtcache_free()
in rtcache_update(), because rtcache_update() is not supposed
to forget the destination.
Constify:
1 Introduce const accessor for route->ro_dst, rtcache_getdst().
2 Constify the 'dst' argument to ifnet->if_output(). This
led me to constify a lot of code called by output routines.
3 Constify the sockaddr argument to protosw->pr_ctlinput. This
led me to constify a lot of code called by ctlinput routines.
4 Introduce const macros for converting from a generic sockaddr
to family-specific sockaddrs, e.g., sockaddr_in: satocsin6,
satocsin, et cetera.
2007-02-18 01:34:07 +03:00
|
|
|
in6ifa_ifpforlinklocal(const struct ifnet *ifp, const int ignoreflags)
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
Make ifconfig(8) set and display preference numbers for IPv6
addresses. Make the kernel support SIOC[SG]IFADDRPREF for IPv6
interface addresses.
In in6ifa_ifpforlinklocal(), consult preference numbers before
making an otherwise arbitrary choice of in6_ifaddr. Otherwise,
preference numbers are *not* consulted by the kernel, but that will
be rather easy for somebody with a little bit of free time to fix.
Please note that setting the preference number for a link-local
IPv6 address does not work right, yet, but that ought to be fixed
soon.
In support of the changes above,
1 Add a method to struct domain for "externalizing" a sockaddr, and
provide an implementation for IPv6. Expect more work in this area: it
may be more proper to say that the IPv6 implementation "internalizes"
a sockaddr. Add sockaddr_externalize().
2 Add a subroutine, sofamily(), that returns a struct socket's address
family or AF_UNSPEC.
3 Make a lot of IPv4-specific code generic, and move it from
sys/netinet/ to sys/net/ for re-use by IPv6 parts of the kernel and
ifconfig(8).
2009-09-12 02:06:29 +04:00
|
|
|
struct ifaddr *best_ifa = NULL, *ifa;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2007-12-04 13:27:33 +03:00
|
|
|
IFADDR_FOREACH(ifa, ifp) {
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ifa->ifa_addr == NULL)
|
|
|
|
continue; /* just for safety */
|
|
|
|
if (ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family != AF_INET6)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
Make ifconfig(8) set and display preference numbers for IPv6
addresses. Make the kernel support SIOC[SG]IFADDRPREF for IPv6
interface addresses.
In in6ifa_ifpforlinklocal(), consult preference numbers before
making an otherwise arbitrary choice of in6_ifaddr. Otherwise,
preference numbers are *not* consulted by the kernel, but that will
be rather easy for somebody with a little bit of free time to fix.
Please note that setting the preference number for a link-local
IPv6 address does not work right, yet, but that ought to be fixed
soon.
In support of the changes above,
1 Add a method to struct domain for "externalizing" a sockaddr, and
provide an implementation for IPv6. Expect more work in this area: it
may be more proper to say that the IPv6 implementation "internalizes"
a sockaddr. Add sockaddr_externalize().
2 Add a subroutine, sofamily(), that returns a struct socket's address
family or AF_UNSPEC.
3 Make a lot of IPv4-specific code generic, and move it from
sys/netinet/ to sys/net/ for re-use by IPv6 parts of the kernel and
ifconfig(8).
2009-09-12 02:06:29 +04:00
|
|
|
if (!IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(IFA_IN6(ifa)))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if ((((struct in6_ifaddr *)ifa)->ia6_flags & ignoreflags) != 0)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2010-04-23 00:05:15 +04:00
|
|
|
best_ifa = bestifa(best_ifa, ifa);
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Make ifconfig(8) set and display preference numbers for IPv6
addresses. Make the kernel support SIOC[SG]IFADDRPREF for IPv6
interface addresses.
In in6ifa_ifpforlinklocal(), consult preference numbers before
making an otherwise arbitrary choice of in6_ifaddr. Otherwise,
preference numbers are *not* consulted by the kernel, but that will
be rather easy for somebody with a little bit of free time to fix.
Please note that setting the preference number for a link-local
IPv6 address does not work right, yet, but that ought to be fixed
soon.
In support of the changes above,
1 Add a method to struct domain for "externalizing" a sockaddr, and
provide an implementation for IPv6. Expect more work in this area: it
may be more proper to say that the IPv6 implementation "internalizes"
a sockaddr. Add sockaddr_externalize().
2 Add a subroutine, sofamily(), that returns a struct socket's address
family or AF_UNSPEC.
3 Make a lot of IPv4-specific code generic, and move it from
sys/netinet/ to sys/net/ for re-use by IPv6 parts of the kernel and
ifconfig(8).
2009-09-12 02:06:29 +04:00
|
|
|
return (struct in6_ifaddr *)best_ifa;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* find the internet address corresponding to a given interface and address.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct in6_ifaddr *
|
KNF: de-__P, bzero -> memset, bcmp -> memcmp. Remove extraneous
parentheses in return statements.
Cosmetic: don't open-code TAILQ_FOREACH().
Cosmetic: change types of variables to avoid oodles of casts: in
in6_src.c, avoid casts by changing several route_in6 pointers
to struct route pointers. Remove unnecessary casts to caddr_t
elsewhere.
Pave the way for eliminating address family-specific route caches:
soon, struct route will not embed a sockaddr, but it will hold
a reference to an external sockaddr, instead. We will set the
destination sockaddr using rtcache_setdst(). (I created a stub
for it, but it isn't used anywhere, yet.) rtcache_free() will
free the sockaddr. I have extracted from rtcache_free() a helper
subroutine, rtcache_clear(). rtcache_clear() will "forget" a
cached route, but it will not forget the destination by releasing
the sockaddr. I use rtcache_clear() instead of rtcache_free()
in rtcache_update(), because rtcache_update() is not supposed
to forget the destination.
Constify:
1 Introduce const accessor for route->ro_dst, rtcache_getdst().
2 Constify the 'dst' argument to ifnet->if_output(). This
led me to constify a lot of code called by output routines.
3 Constify the sockaddr argument to protosw->pr_ctlinput. This
led me to constify a lot of code called by ctlinput routines.
4 Introduce const macros for converting from a generic sockaddr
to family-specific sockaddrs, e.g., sockaddr_in: satocsin6,
satocsin, et cetera.
2007-02-18 01:34:07 +03:00
|
|
|
in6ifa_ifpwithaddr(const struct ifnet *ifp, const struct in6_addr *addr)
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2010-04-23 00:05:15 +04:00
|
|
|
struct ifaddr *best_ifa = NULL, *ifa;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2007-12-04 13:27:33 +03:00
|
|
|
IFADDR_FOREACH(ifa, ifp) {
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ifa->ifa_addr == NULL)
|
|
|
|
continue; /* just for safety */
|
|
|
|
if (ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family != AF_INET6)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2010-04-23 00:05:15 +04:00
|
|
|
if (!IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(addr, IFA_IN6(ifa)))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
best_ifa = bestifa(best_ifa, ifa);
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-04-23 00:05:15 +04:00
|
|
|
return (struct in6_ifaddr *)best_ifa;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct in6_ifaddr *
|
|
|
|
bestia(struct in6_ifaddr *best_ia, struct in6_ifaddr *ia)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (best_ia == NULL ||
|
|
|
|
best_ia->ia_ifa.ifa_preference < ia->ia_ifa.ifa_preference)
|
|
|
|
return ia;
|
|
|
|
return best_ia;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-07-31 22:24:07 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* find the internet address on a given interface corresponding to a neighbor's
|
|
|
|
* address.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct in6_ifaddr *
|
|
|
|
in6ifa_ifplocaladdr(const struct ifnet *ifp, const struct in6_addr *addr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ifaddr *ifa;
|
2010-04-23 00:05:15 +04:00
|
|
|
struct in6_ifaddr *best_ia = NULL, *ia;
|
2008-07-31 22:24:07 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IFADDR_FOREACH(ifa, ifp) {
|
|
|
|
if (ifa->ifa_addr == NULL)
|
|
|
|
continue; /* just for safety */
|
|
|
|
if (ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family != AF_INET6)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
ia = (struct in6_ifaddr *)ifa;
|
2010-04-23 00:05:15 +04:00
|
|
|
if (!IN6_ARE_MASKED_ADDR_EQUAL(addr,
|
2008-07-31 22:24:07 +04:00
|
|
|
&ia->ia_addr.sin6_addr,
|
|
|
|
&ia->ia_prefixmask.sin6_addr))
|
2010-04-23 00:05:15 +04:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
best_ia = bestia(best_ia, ia);
|
2008-07-31 22:24:07 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-04-23 00:05:15 +04:00
|
|
|
return best_ia;
|
2008-07-31 22:24:07 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Convert IP6 address to printable (loggable) representation.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int ip6round = 0;
|
|
|
|
char *
|
2007-05-23 21:14:59 +04:00
|
|
|
ip6_sprintf(const struct in6_addr *addr)
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
static char ip6buf[8][48];
|
2001-02-10 07:14:26 +03:00
|
|
|
int i;
|
2010-04-08 02:59:15 +04:00
|
|
|
char *bp;
|
2001-02-10 07:14:26 +03:00
|
|
|
char *cp;
|
2003-09-06 03:20:48 +04:00
|
|
|
const u_int16_t *a = (const u_int16_t *)addr;
|
|
|
|
const u_int8_t *d;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
int dcolon = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ip6round = (ip6round + 1) & 7;
|
|
|
|
cp = ip6buf[ip6round];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
|
|
|
|
if (dcolon == 1) {
|
|
|
|
if (*a == 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (i == 7)
|
|
|
|
*cp++ = ':';
|
|
|
|
a++;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
dcolon = 2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (*a == 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (dcolon == 0 && *(a + 1) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (i == 0)
|
|
|
|
*cp++ = ':';
|
|
|
|
*cp++ = ':';
|
|
|
|
dcolon = 1;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
*cp++ = '0';
|
|
|
|
*cp++ = ':';
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
a++;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2001-12-21 11:54:52 +03:00
|
|
|
d = (const u_char *)a;
|
2010-04-08 02:59:15 +04:00
|
|
|
bp = cp;
|
|
|
|
*cp = hexdigits[*d >> 4];
|
|
|
|
if (*cp != '0')
|
|
|
|
cp++;
|
|
|
|
*cp = hexdigits[*d++ & 0xf];
|
|
|
|
if (cp != bp || *cp != '0')
|
|
|
|
cp++;
|
|
|
|
*cp = hexdigits[*d >> 4];
|
|
|
|
if (cp != bp || *cp != '0')
|
|
|
|
cp++;
|
2005-05-17 08:14:57 +04:00
|
|
|
*cp++ = hexdigits[*d & 0xf];
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
*cp++ = ':';
|
|
|
|
a++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*--cp = 0;
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return ip6buf[ip6round];
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2003-02-28 01:06:38 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Determine if an address is on a local network.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
2007-10-24 10:37:20 +04:00
|
|
|
in6_localaddr(const struct in6_addr *in6)
|
2003-02-28 01:06:38 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct in6_ifaddr *ia;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(in6) || IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(in6))
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2003-02-28 01:06:38 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (ia = in6_ifaddr; ia; ia = ia->ia_next)
|
|
|
|
if (IN6_ARE_MASKED_ADDR_EQUAL(in6, &ia->ia_addr.sin6_addr,
|
|
|
|
&ia->ia_prefixmask.sin6_addr))
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2003-02-28 01:06:38 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2003-02-28 01:06:38 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
int
|
2007-05-23 21:14:59 +04:00
|
|
|
in6_is_addr_deprecated(struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6)
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct in6_ifaddr *ia;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (ia = in6_ifaddr; ia; ia = ia->ia_next) {
|
|
|
|
if (IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&ia->ia_addr.sin6_addr,
|
|
|
|
&sa6->sin6_addr) &&
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SCOPEDROUTING
|
|
|
|
ia->ia_addr.sin6_scope_id == sa6->sin6_scope_id &&
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
(ia->ia6_flags & IN6_IFF_DEPRECATED) != 0)
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return 1; /* true */
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: do we still have to go thru the rest of the list? */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return 0; /* false */
|
2002-06-09 01:22:29 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* return length of part which dst and src are equal
|
|
|
|
* hard coding...
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
2007-05-23 21:14:59 +04:00
|
|
|
in6_matchlen(struct in6_addr *src, struct in6_addr *dst)
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int match = 0;
|
|
|
|
u_char *s = (u_char *)src, *d = (u_char *)dst;
|
|
|
|
u_char *lim = s + 16, r;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (s < lim)
|
|
|
|
if ((r = (*d++ ^ *s++)) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
while (r < 128) {
|
|
|
|
match++;
|
|
|
|
r <<= 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
2006-12-02 21:59:17 +03:00
|
|
|
match += NBBY;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
return match;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-12-21 11:54:52 +03:00
|
|
|
/* XXX: to be scope conscious */
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
int
|
2007-05-23 21:14:59 +04:00
|
|
|
in6_are_prefix_equal(struct in6_addr *p1, struct in6_addr *p2, int len)
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int bytelen, bitlen;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* sanity check */
|
2006-03-18 02:26:06 +03:00
|
|
|
if (len < 0 || len > 128) {
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
log(LOG_ERR, "in6_are_prefix_equal: invalid prefix length(%d)\n",
|
|
|
|
len);
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-12-02 21:59:17 +03:00
|
|
|
bytelen = len / NBBY;
|
|
|
|
bitlen = len % NBBY;
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-18 18:14:29 +03:00
|
|
|
if (memcmp(&p1->s6_addr, &p2->s6_addr, bytelen))
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2004-02-23 08:01:04 +03:00
|
|
|
if (bitlen != 0 &&
|
2006-12-02 21:59:17 +03:00
|
|
|
p1->s6_addr[bytelen] >> (NBBY - bitlen) !=
|
|
|
|
p2->s6_addr[bytelen] >> (NBBY - bitlen))
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void
|
2007-05-23 21:14:59 +04:00
|
|
|
in6_prefixlen2mask(struct in6_addr *maskp, int len)
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2006-12-02 21:59:17 +03:00
|
|
|
static const u_char maskarray[NBBY] = {0x80, 0xc0, 0xe0, 0xf0, 0xf8, 0xfc, 0xfe, 0xff};
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
int bytelen, bitlen, i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* sanity check */
|
2006-03-18 02:29:20 +03:00
|
|
|
if (len < 0 || len > 128) {
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
log(LOG_ERR, "in6_prefixlen2mask: invalid prefix length(%d)\n",
|
|
|
|
len);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-18 19:00:08 +03:00
|
|
|
memset(maskp, 0, sizeof(*maskp));
|
2006-12-02 21:59:17 +03:00
|
|
|
bytelen = len / NBBY;
|
|
|
|
bitlen = len % NBBY;
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < bytelen; i++)
|
|
|
|
maskp->s6_addr[i] = 0xff;
|
|
|
|
if (bitlen)
|
|
|
|
maskp->s6_addr[bytelen] = maskarray[bitlen - 1];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* return the best address out of the same scope. if no address was
|
|
|
|
* found, return the first valid address from designated IF.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct in6_ifaddr *
|
2007-05-23 21:14:59 +04:00
|
|
|
in6_ifawithifp(struct ifnet *ifp, struct in6_addr *dst)
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int dst_scope = in6_addrscope(dst), blen = -1, tlen;
|
|
|
|
struct ifaddr *ifa;
|
2010-04-23 00:05:15 +04:00
|
|
|
struct in6_ifaddr *best_ia = NULL, *ia;
|
2001-12-21 11:54:52 +03:00
|
|
|
struct in6_ifaddr *dep[2]; /* last-resort: deprecated */
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dep[0] = dep[1] = NULL;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2000-02-24 15:43:49 +03:00
|
|
|
* We first look for addresses in the same scope.
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
* If there is one, return it.
|
|
|
|
* If two or more, return one which matches the dst longest.
|
|
|
|
* If none, return one of global addresses assigned other ifs.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2007-12-04 13:27:33 +03:00
|
|
|
IFADDR_FOREACH(ifa, ifp) {
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family != AF_INET6)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2010-04-23 00:05:15 +04:00
|
|
|
ia = (struct in6_ifaddr *)ifa;
|
|
|
|
if (ia->ia6_flags & IN6_IFF_ANYCAST)
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
continue; /* XXX: is there any case to allow anycast? */
|
2010-04-23 00:05:15 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ia->ia6_flags & IN6_IFF_NOTREADY)
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
continue; /* don't use this interface */
|
2010-04-23 00:05:15 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ia->ia6_flags & IN6_IFF_DETACHED)
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
2010-04-23 00:05:15 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ia->ia6_flags & IN6_IFF_DEPRECATED) {
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
if (ip6_use_deprecated)
|
2010-04-23 00:05:15 +04:00
|
|
|
dep[0] = ia;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2010-04-23 00:05:15 +04:00
|
|
|
if (dst_scope != in6_addrscope(IFA_IN6(ifa)))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* call in6_matchlen() as few as possible
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (best_ia == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
best_ia = ia;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-04-23 00:05:15 +04:00
|
|
|
if (blen == -1)
|
|
|
|
blen = in6_matchlen(&best_ia->ia_addr.sin6_addr, dst);
|
|
|
|
tlen = in6_matchlen(IFA_IN6(ifa), dst);
|
|
|
|
if (tlen > blen) {
|
|
|
|
blen = tlen;
|
|
|
|
best_ia = ia;
|
|
|
|
} else if (tlen == blen)
|
|
|
|
best_ia = bestia(best_ia, ia);
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-04-23 00:05:15 +04:00
|
|
|
if (best_ia != NULL)
|
|
|
|
return best_ia;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2007-12-04 13:27:33 +03:00
|
|
|
IFADDR_FOREACH(ifa, ifp) {
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family != AF_INET6)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2010-04-23 00:05:15 +04:00
|
|
|
ia = (struct in6_ifaddr *)ifa;
|
|
|
|
if (ia->ia6_flags & IN6_IFF_ANYCAST)
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
continue; /* XXX: is there any case to allow anycast? */
|
2010-04-23 00:05:15 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ia->ia6_flags & IN6_IFF_NOTREADY)
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
continue; /* don't use this interface */
|
2010-04-23 00:05:15 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ia->ia6_flags & IN6_IFF_DETACHED)
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
2010-04-23 00:05:15 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ia->ia6_flags & IN6_IFF_DEPRECATED) {
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
if (ip6_use_deprecated)
|
|
|
|
dep[1] = (struct in6_ifaddr *)ifa;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2010-04-23 00:05:15 +04:00
|
|
|
best_ia = bestia(best_ia, ia);
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-04-23 00:05:15 +04:00
|
|
|
if (best_ia != NULL)
|
|
|
|
return best_ia;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
1999-12-13 18:17:17 +03:00
|
|
|
/* use the last-resort values, that are, deprecated addresses */
|
|
|
|
if (dep[0])
|
|
|
|
return dep[0];
|
|
|
|
if (dep[1])
|
|
|
|
return dep[1];
|
|
|
|
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* perform DAD when interface becomes IFF_UP.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
2007-03-16 02:22:30 +03:00
|
|
|
in6_if_up(struct ifnet *ifp)
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ifaddr *ifa;
|
|
|
|
struct in6_ifaddr *ia;
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-04 13:27:33 +03:00
|
|
|
IFADDR_FOREACH(ifa, ifp) {
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family != AF_INET6)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
ia = (struct in6_ifaddr *)ifa;
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
if (ia->ia6_flags & IN6_IFF_TENTATIVE) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The TENTATIVE flag was likely set by hand
|
|
|
|
* beforehand, implicitly indicating the need for DAD.
|
|
|
|
* We may be able to skip the random delay in this
|
|
|
|
* case, but we impose delays just in case.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
nd6_dad_start(ifa,
|
First step of random number subsystem rework described in
<20111022023242.BA26F14A158@mail.netbsd.org>. This change includes
the following:
An initial cleanup and minor reorganization of the entropy pool
code in sys/dev/rnd.c and sys/dev/rndpool.c. Several bugs are
fixed. Some effort is made to accumulate entropy more quickly at
boot time.
A generic interface, "rndsink", is added, for stream generators to
request that they be re-keyed with good quality entropy from the pool
as soon as it is available.
The arc4random()/arc4randbytes() implementation in libkern is
adjusted to use the rndsink interface for rekeying, which helps
address the problem of low-quality keys at boot time.
An implementation of the FIPS 140-2 statistical tests for random
number generator quality is provided (libkern/rngtest.c). This
is based on Greg Rose's implementation from Qualcomm.
A new random stream generator, nist_ctr_drbg, is provided. It is
based on an implementation of the NIST SP800-90 CTR_DRBG by
Henric Jungheim. This generator users AES in a modified counter
mode to generate a backtracking-resistant random stream.
An abstraction layer, "cprng", is provided for in-kernel consumers
of randomness. The arc4random/arc4randbytes API is deprecated for
in-kernel use. It is replaced by "cprng_strong". The current
cprng_fast implementation wraps the existing arc4random
implementation. The current cprng_strong implementation wraps the
new CTR_DRBG implementation. Both interfaces are rekeyed from
the entropy pool automatically at intervals justifiable from best
current cryptographic practice.
In some quick tests, cprng_fast() is about the same speed as
the old arc4randbytes(), and cprng_strong() is about 20% faster
than rnd_extract_data(). Performance is expected to improve.
The AES code in src/crypto/rijndael is no longer an optional
kernel component, as it is required by cprng_strong, which is
not an optional kernel component.
The entropy pool output is subjected to the rngtest tests at
startup time; if it fails, the system will reboot. There is
approximately a 3/10000 chance of a false positive from these
tests. Entropy pool _input_ from hardware random numbers is
subjected to the rngtest tests at attach time, as well as the
FIPS continuous-output test, to detect bad or stuck hardware
RNGs; if any are detected, they are detached, but the system
continues to run.
A problem with rndctl(8) is fixed -- datastructures with
pointers in arrays are no longer passed to userspace (this
was not a security problem, but rather a major issue for
compat32). A new kernel will require a new rndctl.
The sysctl kern.arandom() and kern.urandom() nodes are hooked
up to the new generators, but the /dev/*random pseudodevices
are not, yet.
Manual pages for the new kernel interfaces are forthcoming.
2011-11-20 02:51:18 +04:00
|
|
|
cprng_fast32() %
|
|
|
|
(MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY * hz));
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* special cases, like 6to4, are handled in in6_ifattach
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
in6_ifattach(ifp, NULL);
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2002-05-23 10:35:18 +04:00
|
|
|
int
|
2007-05-23 21:14:59 +04:00
|
|
|
in6if_do_dad(struct ifnet *ifp)
|
2002-05-23 10:35:18 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ((ifp->if_flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) != 0)
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2002-05-23 10:35:18 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (ifp->if_type) {
|
|
|
|
case IFT_FAITH:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* These interfaces do not have the IFF_LOOPBACK flag,
|
|
|
|
* but loop packets back. We do not have to do DAD on such
|
|
|
|
* interfaces. We should even omit it, because loop-backed
|
|
|
|
* NS would confuse the DAD procedure.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2002-05-23 10:35:18 +04:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Our DAD routine requires the interface up and running.
|
|
|
|
* However, some interfaces can be up before the RUNNING
|
|
|
|
* status. Additionaly, users may try to assign addresses
|
|
|
|
* before the interface becomes up (or running).
|
|
|
|
* We simply skip DAD in such a case as a work around.
|
|
|
|
* XXX: we should rather mark "tentative" on such addresses,
|
|
|
|
* and do DAD after the interface becomes ready.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((ifp->if_flags & (IFF_UP|IFF_RUNNING)) !=
|
|
|
|
(IFF_UP|IFF_RUNNING))
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2002-05-23 10:35:18 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2006-11-18 19:17:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2002-05-23 10:35:18 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Calculate max IPv6 MTU through all the interfaces and store it
|
|
|
|
* to in6_maxmtu.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
2008-02-27 22:40:56 +03:00
|
|
|
in6_setmaxmtu(void)
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned long maxmtu = 0;
|
|
|
|
struct ifnet *ifp;
|
|
|
|
|
2007-02-22 11:43:43 +03:00
|
|
|
TAILQ_FOREACH(ifp, &ifnet, if_list) {
|
2002-05-29 11:53:39 +04:00
|
|
|
/* this function can be called during ifnet initialization */
|
|
|
|
if (!ifp->if_afdata[AF_INET6])
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
if ((ifp->if_flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) == 0 &&
|
2002-05-29 11:53:39 +04:00
|
|
|
IN6_LINKMTU(ifp) > maxmtu)
|
|
|
|
maxmtu = IN6_LINKMTU(ifp);
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2002-05-29 11:53:39 +04:00
|
|
|
if (maxmtu) /* update only when maxmtu is positive */
|
1999-06-28 10:36:47 +04:00
|
|
|
in6_maxmtu = maxmtu;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-05-29 06:58:28 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Provide the length of interface identifiers to be used for the link attached
|
|
|
|
* to the given interface. The length should be defined in "IPv6 over
|
|
|
|
* xxx-link" document. Note that address architecture might also define
|
|
|
|
* the length for a particular set of address prefixes, regardless of the
|
|
|
|
* link type. As clarified in rfc2462bis, those two definitions should be
|
|
|
|
* consistent, and those really are as of August 2004.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
2007-05-23 21:14:59 +04:00
|
|
|
in6_if2idlen(struct ifnet *ifp)
|
2006-03-06 02:47:08 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (ifp->if_type) {
|
|
|
|
case IFT_ETHER: /* RFC2464 */
|
|
|
|
case IFT_PROPVIRTUAL: /* XXX: no RFC. treat it as ether */
|
|
|
|
case IFT_L2VLAN: /* ditto */
|
|
|
|
case IFT_IEEE80211: /* ditto */
|
|
|
|
case IFT_FDDI: /* RFC2467 */
|
|
|
|
case IFT_ISO88025: /* RFC2470 (IPv6 over Token Ring) */
|
|
|
|
case IFT_PPP: /* RFC2472 */
|
|
|
|
case IFT_ARCNET: /* RFC2497 */
|
|
|
|
case IFT_FRELAY: /* RFC2590 */
|
|
|
|
case IFT_IEEE1394: /* RFC3146 */
|
|
|
|
case IFT_GIF: /* draft-ietf-v6ops-mech-v2-07 */
|
|
|
|
case IFT_LOOP: /* XXX: is this really correct? */
|
|
|
|
return 64;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Unknown link type:
|
|
|
|
* It might be controversial to use the today's common constant
|
|
|
|
* of 64 for these cases unconditionally. For full compliance,
|
|
|
|
* we should return an error in this case. On the other hand,
|
|
|
|
* if we simply miss the standard for the link type or a new
|
|
|
|
* standard is defined for a new link type, the IFID length
|
|
|
|
* is very likely to be the common constant. As a compromise,
|
|
|
|
* we always use the constant, but make an explicit notice
|
|
|
|
* indicating the "unknown" case.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
printf("in6_if2idlen: unknown link type (%d)\n", ifp->if_type);
|
|
|
|
return 64;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2002-05-29 06:58:28 +04:00
|
|
|
void *
|
2007-05-23 21:14:59 +04:00
|
|
|
in6_domifattach(struct ifnet *ifp)
|
2002-05-29 06:58:28 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct in6_ifextra *ext;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-12-19 21:49:37 +03:00
|
|
|
ext = malloc(sizeof(*ext), M_IFADDR, M_WAITOK|M_ZERO);
|
2002-05-29 06:58:28 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2008-12-19 21:49:37 +03:00
|
|
|
ext->in6_ifstat = malloc(sizeof(struct in6_ifstat),
|
|
|
|
M_IFADDR, M_WAITOK|M_ZERO);
|
2002-05-29 06:58:28 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2008-12-19 21:49:37 +03:00
|
|
|
ext->icmp6_ifstat = malloc(sizeof(struct icmp6_ifstat),
|
|
|
|
M_IFADDR, M_WAITOK|M_ZERO);
|
2002-05-29 06:58:28 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ext->nd_ifinfo = nd6_ifattach(ifp);
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
ext->scope6_id = scope6_ifattach(ifp);
|
2002-05-29 06:58:28 +04:00
|
|
|
return ext;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void
|
2006-11-16 04:32:37 +03:00
|
|
|
in6_domifdetach(struct ifnet *ifp, void *aux)
|
2002-05-29 06:58:28 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct in6_ifextra *ext = (struct in6_ifextra *)aux;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
nd6_ifdetach(ext->nd_ifinfo);
|
|
|
|
free(ext->in6_ifstat, M_IFADDR);
|
|
|
|
free(ext->icmp6_ifstat, M_IFADDR);
|
Better support of IPv6 scoped addresses.
- most of the kernel code will not care about the actual encoding of
scope zone IDs and won't touch "s6_addr16[1]" directly.
- similarly, most of the kernel code will not care about link-local
scoped addresses as a special case.
- scope boundary check will be stricter. For example, the current
*BSD code allows a packet with src=::1 and dst=(some global IPv6
address) to be sent outside of the node, if the application do:
s = socket(AF_INET6);
bind(s, "::1");
sendto(s, some_global_IPv6_addr);
This is clearly wrong, since ::1 is only meaningful within a single
node, but the current implementation of the *BSD kernel cannot
reject this attempt.
- and, while there, don't try to remove the ff02::/32 interface route
entry in in6_ifdetach() as it's already gone.
This also includes some level of support for the standard source
address selection algorithm defined in RFC3484, which will be
completed on in the future.
From the KAME project via JINMEI Tatuya.
Approved by core@.
2006-01-21 03:15:35 +03:00
|
|
|
scope6_ifdetach(ext->scope6_id);
|
2002-05-29 06:58:28 +04:00
|
|
|
free(ext, M_IFADDR);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-06-29 01:03:47 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Convert sockaddr_in6 to sockaddr_in. Original sockaddr_in6 must be
|
|
|
|
* v4 mapped addr or v4 compat addr
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
in6_sin6_2_sin(struct sockaddr_in *sin, struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2009-03-18 19:00:08 +03:00
|
|
|
memset(sin, 0, sizeof(*sin));
|
2007-06-29 01:03:47 +04:00
|
|
|
sin->sin_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
|
|
|
|
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
|
|
|
|
sin->sin_port = sin6->sin6_port;
|
|
|
|
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Convert sockaddr_in to sockaddr_in6 in v4 mapped addr format. */
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
in6_sin_2_v4mapsin6(struct sockaddr_in *sin, struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2009-03-18 19:00:08 +03:00
|
|
|
memset(sin6, 0, sizeof(*sin6));
|
2007-06-29 01:03:47 +04:00
|
|
|
sin6->sin6_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
|
|
|
|
sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
|
|
|
|
sin6->sin6_port = sin->sin_port;
|
|
|
|
sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[0] = 0;
|
|
|
|
sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[1] = 0;
|
|
|
|
sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[2] = IPV6_ADDR_INT32_SMP;
|
|
|
|
sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3] = sin->sin_addr.s_addr;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Convert sockaddr_in6 into sockaddr_in. */
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
in6_sin6_2_sin_in_sock(struct sockaddr *nam)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in *sin_p;
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in6 sin6;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Save original sockaddr_in6 addr and convert it
|
|
|
|
* to sockaddr_in.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
sin6 = *(struct sockaddr_in6 *)nam;
|
|
|
|
sin_p = (struct sockaddr_in *)nam;
|
|
|
|
in6_sin6_2_sin(sin_p, &sin6);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Convert sockaddr_in into sockaddr_in6 in v4 mapped addr format. */
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
in6_sin_2_v4mapsin6_in_sock(struct sockaddr **nam)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in *sin_p;
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6_p;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sin6_p = malloc(sizeof(*sin6_p), M_SONAME, M_WAITOK);
|
|
|
|
sin_p = (struct sockaddr_in *)*nam;
|
|
|
|
in6_sin_2_v4mapsin6(sin_p, sin6_p);
|
|
|
|
free(*nam, M_SONAME);
|
|
|
|
*nam = (struct sockaddr *)sin6_p;
|
|
|
|
}
|